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Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere
It is self-evident that where a state chooses
 a ‘legal aid’ system to provide for access to court, 
such a system can only operate effectively,
 given the limited resources available, 
by establishing machinery to select which cases
 should be legally aided.
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VSvensk sammanfattning (Summary in Swedish)
Fastän rättshjälpen är en viktig del av rättsstatligheten, finns det relativt få studier 
om rättshjälp ur ett juridiskt perspektiv. Denna avhandling är ämnad att utöka 
kunskapen inom området genom att undersöka den offentligrättsliga grunden 
på vilken rättshjälp är byggd. Målet är att dokumentera beslutsfattandet om 
hur de begränsade medlen för rättshjälp styrs till vissa individer och vissa fall, 
vem som fattar besluten och hur besluten påverkas av relevant nationell lag. 
Forskningsmetoden är jämförande, och nio rättsordningar har undersökts: 
de fem Nordiska länderna (Danmark, Finland, Island, Norge och Sverige); 
Storbritannien (Skottland, Nordirland och England & Wales) och Irland.
Avhandlingen börjar med en diskussion om varför rättshjälp är nödvändig 
och vad internationella mänskliga rättigheter kräver inom detta område. 
Efter en översikt av de olika nationella juridiska systemen och juristyrkena 
i länderna, behandlas fem forskningsfrågor: (i) Vilka är de nationella 
förvaltningsformerna och förfaranden för beslutsfattande inom rättshjälp och 
för övervakning av dessa beslut? (ii) Vilka nationella juridiska bestämmelser 
begränsar beslutsfattandet inom rättshjälp? (iii) Vilket är sambandet 
mellan nationell rättshjälp, internationell människorättslagstiftning och 
rättsstatsprincipen och i vilken grad uppfyller länderna de krav som ställs på 
dem? (iv) Hur varierar de processuella och materiella aspekterna hos rättshjälp 
mellan de undersökta rättsordningarna och vilka orsaker kan förklara dessa 
variationer? (v) Kan olika rättsordningar lära sig eller ‘låna’ av varandra inom 
rättshjälpen och i så fall hur?
Forskningen visar att rättshjälpen varierar betydligt mellan de nio 
rättsordningarna och att det inte finns tydliga, eller förväntade, korrelationer 
mellan de olika systemen. Till exempel Finland och Sverige företer avsevärda 
skillnader, medan Finlands och Irlands rättshjälpssystem har mycket 
gemensamt. 
En viktig slutsats är att det inte finns en korrelation mellan storleken av 
den statliga budgeten som används för rättshjälp och hur omfattande systemet 
är. Ingen av de nio rättsordningarna uppfyller fullt ut kraven som folkrätten 
ställer. Finland och Sverige kommer dock närmast till att möta kraven. 
Att inom rättshjälpen lära sig och låna av andra rättsordningar är möjligt 
och önskvärt, men måste göras mycket försiktigt. Alla rättshjälpssystem 
ar mycket komplicerade. Före man ‘lånar’ från ett annat system måste man, 
genom att göra en detaljerad studie av alla aspekter hos ‘långivarsystemet’, 
kunna påvisa orsak och verkan. Sedan måste man bedöma huruvida ‘lånet’ 
passar in i ‘låntagarsystemets’ helhet.
Avhandlingen avslutas med ett förslag om hur befintlig och framtida 
forskning om rättshjälp kunde koordineras med hjälp av ett nytt ramverk. Det 
ramverk som utvecklats i avhandlingen kunde möjliggöra relevant jämförelse 
mellan rättshjälpssystem och analys av individuella system samt underlätta 
konstruktionen av rationella och sammanhängande nationella system som 
uppfyller den internationella människorättslagstiftningens krav.
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11. Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Legal aid
Consider a situation in which a person, living in one of the wealthy, 
developed nations of North-West Europe, has limited personal financial 
resources. In among the many daily dealings with other individuals and 
with the authorities, a serious problem arises which cannot be ignored. 
Maybe a relationship breaks down and it is impossible to amicably agree 
arrangements for the home and children. Possibly a sole trader faces the risk 
of bankruptcy because of difficulties with customers not paying bills, or a 
pregnant woman is dismissed by an unsympathetic employer. An asylum-
seeker might need to appeal to court against a refusal of refugee status, or a 
mental health patient may object to compulsory treatment. Serious disrepair 
of a rented home may mean a family has to live with damp and mould, 
causing health problems for them all, or there may be problems arranging 
the appropriate education for a child with a learning disability. Maybe there 
has even been an allegation of the commission of a crime.
All these potential issues are acknowledged by the State, and mechanisms 
for the fair resolution of the ensuing conflicts are in place. Sometimes the 
mechanism involves the formal legal process, sometimes not, but there is 
always ultimately a structure available either for the negotiation of a solution 
or for a decision to be imposed by a third party.
The processes alone, though, are not enough. The person experiencing 
the difficulty may not know about the existence of the relevant mechanism, 
and even if she or he does, may need help in using it. The circumstances 
giving rise to the problem will cause stress and anxiety and make it even 
more difficult to navigate an unfamiliar system, particularly if the mode 
of resolution is formal and legal, peopled by experts who can easily seem 
intimidating. What the individual really needs is help from one of those 
experts, a lawyer, but lawyers are expensive and there is no possibility of 
affording one without assistance. The person concerned has no savings, 
no-one else who will pay and no relevant insurance. Legal aid addresses 
this problem by providing legal advice and representation, paid for by 
the State, to a person who needs help in engaging with the legal system. 
2It can be argued that efforts should be made to reduce the frequency of this situation 
arising, because judicial dispute resolution routes are expensive and potentially 
unsuitable. Even defining a problem as ‘legal’ implies a judgment, usually by lawyers 
(with their vested interests in play), that the law is the best way to deal with the 
problem, and some commentators argue that this categorisation must be resisted in 
order for more appropriate and effective dispute resolution methods to be developed.1 
Whatever the truth of this assertion, the present reality is that there are circumstances 
which force people into the judicial resolution of disputes, either because another 
party has chosen that route or because no other options are available. As legal 
proceedings are sometimes inevitable, legal aid must be available for the protection of 
indigent parties.
This thesis seeks to add to the understanding of how legal aid works, how well it 
works and how it could be improved. As will be seen in the literature review below, 
legal aid scholarship has until now generally focused on the need for and political 
commitment to legal aid, or the contribution made by legal aid to access to justice. 
This study extends the range of legal aid research by applying a public law perspective 
in considering the legal basis for legal aid schemes and the internal mechanisms 
according to which they operate. It aims to discover who makes the decisions 
allocating limited legal aid resources to certain individuals and certain cases, and 
the parameters within which these decisions are made. The geographical scope of 
the investigation will be a group of jurisdictions in North-West Europe: the UK, the 
Republic of Ireland and the Nordic countries. 
The research takes as its definition of legal aid the provision by the state of legal 
help and representation by lawyers, either through the provision of state employed 
lawyers or by paying for private lawyers. This is a relatively narrow definition of legal 
aid; other studies have included the assistance provided through insurance and by 
volunteer advice services,2 whereas here attention is focused on instances where three 
criteria are met: assistance is provided by lawyers; those lawyers are paid for their 
work; and payment is by the state (albeit potentially with client contributions). Legal 
aid relating to civil, administrative and criminal law will be considered, thus whilst 
in the Nordic countries publicly funded legal assistance for criminal defendants 
is not called ‘legal aid’, their public defence schemes are within the remit of this 
research. The intention is to examine the procedural choices which have been made 
by a selection of jurisdictions in creating legal aid schemes, through a public and 
administrative law lens, and thereby answer a number of questions.
1  Cousins 1994.
2  E.g. Hammerslev and Rønning (eds.) 2018.
31.2 Research questions
1.2.1 Organisational forms for legal aid decision-making and oversight of     
 decision
Statutory provisions and regulations set up complex administrative and bureaucratic 
structures for the provision and control of legal aid in each of the jurisdictions to 
be considered. In some cases, there are a number of specific posts and organisations 
created solely to deal with legal aid; in others, legal aid is largely administered through 
existing structures. The structures provided must be able to deal with applications for 
legal aid and with appeals against refusals and must have mechanisms to ensure that 
the end result of a successful application is the provision of help to the individual by a 
lawyer, either state-employed or in private practice.
The need of a person to receive legal aid, and/or an application by such a person, triggers 
an administrative process within the relevant competent body. This leads to an 
initial acceptance or refusal of the right to legal aid, concretised in an administrative 
decision which is obliged to fulfil certain criteria. The initial decisions are generally 
subject to appeal and appeal decisions, likewise, must be taken according to an 
administrative process set out in law. This study aims to catalogue these organisational 
structures and processes in the jurisdictions under consideration. 
The first research question is: in the relevant jurisdictions, what are the 
organisational forms and procedures for legal aid decision-making and for the 
oversight of such decisions?
1.2.2 Limits on decision-making discretion 
The legal aid decision-makers identified in answering the first research question are 
subject to law when making their determinations. The legal requirements include 
those of both general and specific nature; they are set out in general administrative 
law and also in specific legislation governing legal aid. Some requirements are 
provided in primary or secondary legal aid legislation, whilst others take the form 
of binding guidance. Even if there are no legal limits to the discretion on a particular 
point, there may be non-binding guidance designed to ensure consistency of 
decision-making across the jurisdiction.
Discretion can be curtailed to a greater or lesser extent depending on the jurisdiction 
and the nature of the decision being made. The point at which decisions are made 
is a crucial one for governments because the number of legal aid grants has a direct 
budgetary consequence. Thus, the control of grant decisions is a central factor in the 
establishment of a legal aid scheme. Choices made as to how cases should be selected 
for eligibility indicate the priorities which governments set in spending limited 
resources. As such, a consideration of the limits on decision-making discretion is 
crucial in understanding a legal aid system and a full exploration of these rules will 
be undertaken.
The second research question is therefore: what are the material rules limiting 
decision-making discretion in legal aid? 
41.2.3 Compliance with international human rights law
International human rights law has relevance to legal aid, as an element of 
the fair trial guarantees provided in numerous instruments. Treaties and the 
related jurisprudence set parameters for how restrictive governments can be 
when providing legal aid; as the procedural and material requirements for legal 
aid limit the discretion of decision-makers, so international obligations limit 
the discretion of governments when setting legal aid policy. The international 
requirements can also act as a neutral measure outside the legal aid schemes 
which can be used to compare them impartially. 
The clearest guidance can be obtained from cases decided by the treaty 
bodies, but where there are none relevant, it is also possible to judge legal aid 
rules against the spirit of the treaties, and even against overriding principles 
such as the rule of law. 
Research question three is: what is the nature and extent of the connections 
between legal aid, international human rights law, and the rule of law, and to 
what extent do the jurisdictions comply with the relevant obligations?
1.2.4 Comparison of the jurisdictions in the above matters
This dissertation employs a functional comparative methodology and as such 
the comparison of the jurisdictions is the core work. The subject matter of the 
comparison is complex, and the jurisdictions numerous, and a disciplined 
approach will therefore be needed for the comparison. Not only differences 
between individual jurisdictions, but also patterns of difference within the 
group of jurisdictions, will be sought.
In addition to identifying differences and similarities in the administrative 
law components of legal aid, possible explanations for the differences can be 
considered. These might include policy differences, contextual dissimilarities or 
other factors yet to be explored.
The fourth research question asks: how do the procedural and material 
aspects of legal aid vary between jurisdictions and what reasons might there be 
for this variation?
1.2.5 The possibility of transfer or learning between jurisdictions 
The value of a comparative law approach is partly in bringing to light the 
peculiarities of each system and opening the eyes of its practitioners to the 
idiosyncrasies which may previously have seemed mundane. There may also, 
though, be more to gain through the transfer or borrowing of ideas to solve 
problems being experienced in the home jurisdiction. Transplant theorists 
within comparative law disagree on the extent to which transfer is possible. 
However, within the field of legal aid, transplants have been considered by 
policy-makers and small-scale transfers have successfully been implemented 
within the jurisdictions under consideration.3
3  These are described in section 9.5.2.1. below.
5The detailed comparison of the procedural and material requirements for legal 
aid undertaken in the earlier parts of the study should make it possible to 
consider a fifth and final research question: can transfer or learning between 
jurisdictions take place within the sphere of legal aid and, if so, how?
1.3 Methods and materials
1.3.1 Choice of methodology
The provision of legal aid is a necessary function which is common to, inter 
alia, all states in the Council of Europe, as will be seen below in Chapter 2. 
According to their international human rights obligations they must provide 
legal aid in some cases, both criminal and civil. However, to pay for free legal 
assistance for anybody appearing before any court or tribunal would involve 
considerable and unpredictable expense, which is not acceptable. Thus, as the 
European Commission on Human Rights noted:
It is self-evident that where a state chooses a “legal aid” system to provide 
for access to court, such a system can only operate effectively, given the 
limited resources available, by establishing machinery to select which cases 
should be legally aided.4
The construction of this machinery is a national governmental task and is not 
dependent on the approach of other states. However, considering the position 
in other jurisdictions through the use of comparative law has the potential 
to “help compare the ability of different solutions to solve similar problems, 
and spur similar degrees of progress”.5 We can “look at other jurisdictions as a 
source of inspiration”.6
As in many areas of public policy, governments tend to adjust legal aid provision 
from time to time, sometimes in response to a crisis of affordability.7Information 
on how this is achieved in similar countries might provide a useful input for 
better policy-making. At a minimum, comparative research can show that there 
are potential alternatives to elements of the home system which currently seem 
self-evident and may be overlooked in policy and lobbying. It also enables the 
possible alternatives to be evaluated, in the light of their particular national 
context, so that policy-makers can assess whether they would be suitable for 
use at home.
It appears that a functional comparative law approach might be appropriate, 
given that the research questions include how different jurisdictions approach a 
particular issue. For this method to be a good fit, though, it must be ascertained 
what social ‘need’ is being met by legal aid systems. This can be challenging 
4  X v UK, 1980, para. 16.
5  Michaels 2006, p. 351.
6  Smits 2011, p. 555.
7  Such as the overhaul of legal aid in England & Wales enacted by the Legal Aid,   
  Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.
6because societal needs “cannot be directly observed”.8 However, the conditions 
in which even the relatively sceptical Husa accepts that functional comparatism 
may be appropriate are met: “if by ‘law’ we mean a certain body of rules, legal 
principles or institutions and if the study is directed at micro-level to these 
things, then functional assumptions may make sense”.9 Furthermore, in this 
study the needs can be thought of as “second-tier”; they are derived from other 
needs (to implement international duties and to provide a fair system of justice) 
and therefore potentially more readily identified. The benefit for the research of 
the ‘needs’ being at least partially imposed from above by international human 
rights law will be further addressed below. 
It has been argued that functional comparatists are “often insufficiently 
aware of the non-legal elements of success or failure of societies, including 
cultural differences.”10 If we can extend this to encompass legal culture11 
we are at the core of a major issue in a functional comparison of legal aid 
systems. Let us take as the starting assumption that it is possible to measure 
the success of a legal aid scheme by a combination of economic sustainability 
(which is of course also tied up with political will) and delivery of access to 
justice. How well the system performs against these measures will not only 
depend on the functioning of the scheme itself but also by what is demanded 
of it by the justice system and by the public. The function performed by the 
legal aid scheme will vary between jurisdictions according to how courts and 
judges operate, the availability and popularity of informal dispute resolution, 
crime rates and levels of civil litigation embarked upon. Other factors such as 
complexity of laws and even level of education amongst the public may also be 
highly relevant. Nonetheless, it is hoped that as long as an awareness of these 
complexities is maintained, the comparison can still be useful as a tool for 
gaining insight into each system. A comparative exploration of some of these 
contextual factors will be needed to illuminate the procedural and material 
comparison.
When considering the appropriateness of a comparative approach, it 
should also to be borne in mind that comparisons between legal aid systems, 
including several of those currently under study, already take place. Policy-
makers are interested in other legal aid systems and are particularly keen 
to try and discover why their own system may be more expensive than a 
neighbouring one. There is, for instance, a hope that elements of other systems 
could be adopted to reduce costs at home.12 Whether such inter-jurisdictional 
learning is truly possible is a moot point amongst theorists, and some of the 
academic arguments surrounding transfer theory will be discussed in Chapter 
9. Whatever the theoretical position, one possible outcome of the current 
8  Husa 2011, p. 549.
9  Ibidem, p. 552.
10  Michaels 2006, p. 351.
11  De Cruz 2008, p. 5, referencing Lawrence Friedman.
12  See e.g. Johnsen 2009a.
7research could be a conclusion that such comparisons are not appropriate, if the 
complexity referred to above so indicates. This would of itself be an interesting 
result. 
The ambition of this study will therefore be to determine and record the 
laws establishing the decision-making structures and material rules of legal 
aid systems in various jurisdictions and to analyse the connection between the 
structures and their specific national contexts in order to suggest whether there 
could or should be transposition between states where one system is felt to be 
failing and another succeeding. 
The definition of legal aid which will be used in the study was set out 
above: provision by the state of legal help and representation by lawyers, either 
through state employees or by paying for private lawyers. This definition places 
the research in the public law sphere as all relevant legal relationships are 
between the state and another party, be it a lawyer providing services or the 
ultimate beneficiary, the client. Furthermore, in so far as it is regulated through 
government departments or agencies, legal aid law is also administrative law, 
and much of what will be discussed in the thesis falls within this category. 
There can also be found, within the field of legal aid in the jurisdictions 
under consideration, examples of indirect public administration. These arise 
when the administration of the public functions of legal aid is delegated to 
non-governmental entities, either individuals or independent legal persons. 
Consideration of such situations will be included as they arise in the text. 
It will additionally be seen throughout the thesis that much of the relevant 
law is of a procedural nature. However, this procedural law can itself be viewed 
as falling within public law, if the latter term is broadly understood, and a 
public law approach allows consideration of the procedural legal elements 
without conflict. The research questions will thus be addressed from a public 
and administrative law perspective. 
Other approaches are also relevant to legal aid research, although not the 
focus of this study. Social law has a dual relationship with legal aid: legal aid 
is often a crucial tool in the enforcement of social law, as seen above, yet legal 
aid itself can also be considered a social benefit and thus a direct subject of 
social law research. This positioning of legal aid may be particularly relevant in 
the Nordic welfare states, but is also found in some of the other jurisdictions. 
A discussion of the policy identification of legal aid as a social benefit will 
be conducted in the conclusions in Chapter 9, but throughout the study 
arguments will be made which are of a social law nature, despite the public 
and administrative law focus. As will be seen from the literature review later 
in this chapter, a social law approach characterises much legal aid writing to 
date. The current research aims to complement that body of work with its 
alternative emphasis on the structural and procedural aspects of the topic. 
Thus, whilst social law must properly be referred to, this study will where 
possible pay greater attention to the procedural law aspects which arise. It will 
8be the machinery of legal aid, which falls within the overlapping spheres of 
public, administrative and procedural law, which will be the focus; social law 
will provide some of the arguments used to critique legal aid schemes. 
Public administration is also an area which has much to offer an interdisciplinary 
understanding of legal aid, but is outside the expertise of the author. 
1.3.2 The application of functional comparatism to legal aid
In order for a functional comparatist approach to be applied in pure form, 
it should be possible to express a single function which is being performed 
within the various jurisdictions. Bell points out that “it is not possible … to 
assume that there is a single, universal function [of administrative law]”13 
However, in carrying out a micro-comparison, it may be that a common purpose 
can be ascertained, although in the present instance this is not necessarily 
straightforward. 
As “institutions in public law perform tasks in the light of local political 
agendas”,14 purpose is a complex concept. It is not always clear whether a 
government’s purpose in providing a legal aid system is to ensure access 
to justice, or to satisfy the duty imposed internationally. The former is an 
expression of a state’s interest in desiring a justice system which functions 
according to certain standards. If, however, a government has not internalised 
legal aid as a necessary part of the operation of the courts and justice system 
then it may be fulfilling a different purpose; to avoid international censure. 
These differences in possible purpose may lead to reduced comparability of 
legal aid systems as solutions. However, whilst the jurisdictions under scrutiny 
fall at various points along the scale from an “access to justice” purpose to an 
“international compliance” purpose, at least some element of each purpose 
can be found in each jurisdiction and it is thus submitted that the comparison 
of solutions can be meaningful. Given the “functional similarity” of the 
jurisdictions,15 it can be assumed that the understanding of both the need to 
comply with international rules and the understanding of access to justice are 
sufficiently similar to allow valid comparison. This is so despite the ‘formal’ 
difference, and indeed the presence in the study of civil law and common law 
jurisdictions may allow tentative conclusions to be drawn about the impact of 
legal family on the functioning of legal aid systems.
A functional comparative perspective will enable the comparison of the 
legal institutions which, in different jurisdictions, perform a similar problem-
solving function, in this case the provision of a legal aid scheme to contribute 
to the achievement of access to justice and to satisfy international human rights 
requirements.
13  Bell 2006, p. 1260.
14  Ibidem, p. 1268.
15  Siems 2014, p. 38.
91.3.3 Choice of jurisdictions
It is usual when conducting functional comparative research to concentrate on 
two jurisdictions: the ‘home’ system and another. There is understood to be a 
risk that “choosing a large number of countries may just lead to parallel country 
studies”.16 However, the length of a doctoral dissertation does, it is submitted, 
give time and space for in-depth consideration of several jurisdictions, as long 
as a sufficiently narrow field of study is chosen. 
The advantage of choosing a narrow focus with a larger range of 
jurisdictions within the subject of legal aid is precisely because legal aid 
is connected to the legal system in which it operates in a very intimate and 
particular way; not only must the laws and rules establishing the system comply 
with the requirements of the legal system of the state in question, but its area 
of operation is that same legal system. It is therefore helpful to look at several 
systems which provide different contexts for their legal aid systems, making 
critical comparisons possible and meaningful. The choice for this doctorate 
of two groups of jurisdictions is intended to enable patterns to be seen across 
jurisdictions which share some, but not all, contextual characteristics.
The two groups selected are those of the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Iceland), those of the United Kingdom (England & 
Wales,17 Scotland and Northern Ireland), and the Republic of Ireland. It will 
be noted that there are seven states but nine jurisdictions in this list, as the 
appropriate frame of reference is the area covered by a distinct legal aid system. 
These jurisdictions, as well as being geographically grouped together in North-
West Europe, are all parties to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
allocate (together with the Netherlands) the highest proportions in Europe of 
their judicial systems budget to legal aid.18 They thus form a suitable cohort for 
comparison: high-spending on legal aid, geographically close and with legal, 
cultural and historical ties.
As will be seen below, the international requirements upon all nine 
jurisdictions are similar. They are also at a “similar stage in their legal (and 
often their political, economic and social) evolution”.19 However, the Nordic 
group all have civil law systems, whilst the Irish and UK systems (with the 
exception of Scotland, which is a mixed system) are common law systems. 
It is expected that within each sub-group similarities will be found, due to 
historical, political and social parallels. Any clear differences between the two 
sub-groups might be analysed and explained accordingly. However, within each 
sub-group there are differences in legal systems which may also illuminate the 
overall research task. 
16  Ibidem, p. 15.
17  Throughout this thesis, the phrase ‘England & Wales’ in the singular, with the conjoining 
     ampersand, will be used to describe the single jurisdiction which covers both countries.
18  See section 8.2.1.3, below.
19  De Cruz 2008, p. 227.
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The author of this study additionally has good access to the two groups of 
systems: she is a qualified English lawyer with many years’ practice there, but 
is also a Swedish-speaking dual national of Finland, where she now lives. As a 
result, whilst the English & Welsh legal system must be considered the ‘home’ 
jurisdiction, there is an element of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ perspective already in 
both that jurisdiction and in Finland.20
Within the states under consideration there are several self-governing 
territories: the Åland Islands, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Channel 
Islands. Legal aid remains within the national competence of Finland (with 
respect to the Åland Islands) and Denmark (Faroe Islands and Greenland) at 
the time of writing. The Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey have their 
own legal aid systems separate from the other UK schemes, which will not be 
considered in this thesis for reasons of space.
1.3.4 Areas of concern
Care will be taken to minimise the effect of some potential problems of the 
comparative law method.21 Firstly, linguistic issues must be considered. The 
laws to be examined in this study are in several languages: English, Swedish 
(for both Finland and Sweden), Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic. The first 
three of these can be read by the author. Much Danish and Icelandic material 
is available in English but care will need to be taken to ensure that broadly the 
same range of material is accessed in all jurisdictions, by means of translation 
if necessary. It is proposed when writing to translate legal terms into English, 
for pragmatic purposes, whilst taking care to ensure that translation does not 
obscure potential different meaning in the different jurisdictions.22
Additionally, there will be a need to be alert to differences in legal culture. 
These are anticipated in this study and will form part of the analysis of the 
variance found in the systems. It is also expected that the relevant context 
of each system will include “’extra-legal’ factors, which may be informal 
customs and practices, which operate outside strict law, or various non-legal 
phenomena, which ultimately influence the state of the law”,23 such as public 
attitudes to law. These will be examined briefly in Chapter 8. Whilst it can 
be argued that functional comparatism demands the inclusion of non-legal 
answers to societal needs,24 it must be borne in mind that this study has as its 
subject the state’s response to a problem of the state. Thus, non-state solutions 
are only relevant to the extent that the state can rely on them to reduce its own 
responsibilities.
20  For a discussion of these perspectives, see Michaels 2006, p. 379.
21  De Cruz 2008, p. 219.
22  Siems 2014, pp. 17-18.
23  De Cruz 2008, p. 230.
24  Michaels 2006, p. 364.
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1.3.5 The possibility of a de lege ferenda solution
There is a difference of opinion as to whether a de lege ferenda solution can or 
should be sought as the outcome of a functional comparative law exercise. De 
Cruz suggests that the question of “how the law ought to be” must be asked to 
avoid a sociological study consisting of simple observation of how the legal 
institutions in practice operate.25 However, Michaels disagrees:
Because we cannot say easily whether a foreign law is better than our own, 
recognizing different solutions abroad does not show us deficiencies at 
home. Functionalist comparison can open our eyes to alternative solutions, 
but it cannot tell us whether those alternative solutions are better or not.26
Furthermore, “the yardstick [for comparison] must … lie outside the specific 
function under scrutiny [and] can be found either in the costs of an institution, 
or in its functionality of dysfunctionality regarding other problems. This, 
however, makes a comprehensive evaluation almost impossibly complex”.27 The 
current study benefits from an external yardstick in the form of international 
human rights obligations, and therefore it should be possible to make findings 
as to which systems better comply with the text and spirit of the relevant 
treaties. 
The current research is a “micro-comparison”28 in that it does not attempt to 
compare the whole of the legal systems of the jurisdictions involved, but there 
is a risk that the attempt to evaluate may turn “micro-comparison regarding 
individual functions … into macro-comparison between whole legal systems”. 29 
This risk will be minimised by using international human rights law standards 
to judge each individual aspect studied, leaving overall comparison of systems 
until the final conclusions and ensuring that these do not stray beyond legal aid 
as defined.
It is also worth noting that comparative law has already been used by policy-
makers as a practical tool for law reform in the field of legal aid. Examples 
include an examination of the law in England & Wales by the Northern Irish 
government30 and a comparison between Norway and Finland when proposing 
new Norwegian legislation.31 In these situations conclusions as to which legal 
aid system was preferable had to be made to inform policy-making, albeit at a 
micro level with only particular elements of legal systems judged against each 
other. These exercises will be elaborated upon in Chapter 9.
It has been shown that a functional comparative method is an appropriate 
and potentially rewarding choice for a study of legal aid from a public and 
25  De Cruz 2008, p. 10.
26  Michaels 2006, p. 379.
27  Ibidem, p. 375.
28  De Cruz 2008, p. 233.
29  Michaels 2006, p. 375.
30  Access to Justice Review Northern Ireland, 2011.
31  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008–2009), para. 1.1.
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administrative law perspective. There are a number of possible hazards which 
could reduce the validity of the research findings and these must be kept in mind 
so that they are avoided where possible and, where not, taken into account 
when drawing conclusions. The choice of a large number of jurisdictions is 
challenging but may bear useful fruit as the scope of the comparison will be 
narrow. An attempt will be made to present normative recommendations and 
to comment on the potential for transposition of aspects of legal aid systems.
1.3.6 Practical method
The different ‘machinery’ of legal aid will be examined in detail using the 
sources described below. The practical method used was a desk survey of the 
available primary sources followed by interviews with relevant actors. The 
interviews were not conducted as an empirical part of the data collection but 
were intended to ensure that all important sources used in practice had been 
identified. This is not easy to ascertain from an external viewpoint as such 
detailed technical information is often only shared with a small group of people 
carrying out the task in question. Its very existence may not be apparent to an 
outsider and access to the document itself is often not possible without the 
agency of an insider. 
In each jurisdiction, contact was made with the relevant body deciding 
legal aid applications, with the national Bar Association or equivalent, with the 
judiciary and with individual legal practitioners and, in most places, interviews 
took place with professionals in all these categories. In some jurisdictions, 
meetings also took place with charitable and voluntary organisations providing 
legal advice and assistance. The interviews took place at the office of the 
interviewee, between 2015 and early 2018. 74 people were interviewed in 
person. There was a significant difference in the approach to Iceland, where the 
legal aid machinery is much smaller. There, questions were answered through 
email exchange rather than by in person interview.
Interviews were followed by perusal of any new primary sources and 
relevant secondary sources before identification of similarities and differences 
between the systems. Additional information was also sought as needed 
through written questions and answers from appropriate actors in the national 
legal aid systems. 
1.3.7 Materials 
The materials used can usefully be considered using the primary/secondary 
sources distinction familiar in some jurisdictions including those of the UK, 
although this is not the customary categorisation in the Nordic countries. 
Primary sources are those which authoritatively state the content of the law; 
secondary sources comment upon it and can assist in interpretation of the law.
For this study, the most fundamental materials are the legal norms 
establishing the procedural and material aspects of the legal aid and public 
13
defence schemes in the nine jurisdictions. In all cases the highest domestic 
legal aid norms are legislative, the most relevant in each jurisdiction being as 
follows.
The governing legislation for civil and criminal legal aid in England & 
Wales is the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), Part 1 of which concerns legal aid. A significant proportion of the 
provisions of LASPO are enabling powers for secondary legislation, and there 
are a considerable number of Regulations relevant to legal aid which are also 
primary source materials for this research. 
In Scotland, the basic legal aid system is set out in the Legal Aid (Scotland) 
Act 1986, again with a body of secondary legislation, notably the Civil 
Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 2002, the Legal Aid (Scotland) (Children) 
Regulations 1997 and the Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 1996, all 
of which have been amended several times. 
The legislative basis for Northern Irish legal aid is complex and has built 
up in a piecemeal fashion. The main current starting point is the Access to 
Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 which sets out the overall shape of 
the civil legal service32 and criminal defence service.33 However, significant 
amendments were made by the Legal Aid and Coroners’ Courts Act (Northern 
Ireland) 2014, and furthermore some elements of earlier regulations continue 
to apply. The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 
2015 and the Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 
(as amended) set out the practical arrangements for the civil and criminal 
service respectively, with specific elements still governed by the early Legal 
Aid (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1965. It should also be noted 
that most of the civil legal aid provisions of the 2003 Order did not come into 
force immediately; indeed, many of the most important provisions were only 
effective from April 2015.34
In the Republic of Ireland, criminal legal aid is governed by the Criminal 
Justice (Legal Aid) Act 1962,35 and its accompanying Criminal Justice (Legal 
Aid) Regulations 1965, whilst civil legal aid is governed by the Civil Legal Aid 
Act 1995. The Civil Legal Aid Regulations 1996 flesh out the basis of the civil 
scheme, and further sets of regulations have amended the position on both the 
criminal and the civil side.
There is no dedicated legal aid legislation in Denmark; the relevant 
provisions are included in the Administration of Justice Act 2017.36 Civil 
legal aid is described in Chapter 31 and the criminal public defender scheme 
32  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, ss.10 -20.
33  Ibidem, ss. 21-31.
34  The Access to Justice (2003 Order) (Commencement No. 7, Transitional Provisions  
     and Savings) Order (Northern Ireland) 2015.
35  On the 1 April, under the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962 (Commencement)  
    Order, 1965. 
36  Retsplejeloven, 2017.
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is at Chapter 66. Under the regulatory powers within the Act,37 the Minister 
of Justice has issued more detailed regulations on the procedures for civil 
legal aid provided by lawyers.38 Subject-specific legislation also provides rules 
concerning legal aid for particular types of case. Similarly, Icelandic civil legal 
aid is governed by the Civil Procedure Act 1991,39 Chapter 5, and by secondary 
legislation.40 The 2008 Law on Criminal Procedure41 sets out the criminal public 
defender scheme. 
The Legal Aid Act 198042 sets out the Norwegian civil legal aid scheme and 
is supplemented by secondary legislation, notably the Legal Aid Regulations 
200543 and various regulations providing the structure and amounts for fee 
payments to lawyers.44 In criminal cases, Norway operates a public defence 
counsel system governed by Chapter 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1981.45
In Sweden the civil legal aid scheme is legislatively based on the 1996 Legal 
Aid Act46 which came into force on the 1 December 1997. In criminal cases, the 
basic provisions for the provision of public defence counsel are contained in 
Chapter 21 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.47
For both civil and criminal legal aid in Finland, the relevant legislation 
is in two parts: the Legal Aid Act of 200248 and the State Legal Aid and 
Public Guardianship Districts Act49 of 2016. There are a few relevant sets of 
regulations, notably the 2002 Regulations on Legal Aid50 and 2016 Regulations 
on State Legal Aid and Public Guardianship Districts.51 In addition, in 
criminal matters the Criminal Procedure Act52 provides the potential for the 
appointment of a public defender.
The jurisdictions have different practice when referring to statutory 
materials. In order to achieve a level of consistency, the footnotes to this thesis 
state the name and year of primary legislation; the Sources section contains 
the full reference. Regulations are referred to by number where this is usual 
practice in the jurisdiction in question, but otherwise by name and year. In 
the preceding description, and in the body of the main text which follows, 
translations of legislative titles have been used, in order to allow a broad 
understanding of the nature of the legislation to English language readers. 
37  Ibidem, § 323(7).
38  Bekendtgørelse om offentlig retshjælp ved advokater, 2017.
39  Lög um meðferð einkamála, 1991.
40  Regulation 45/2008.
41  Lög um meðferð sakamála, 2008.
42  Rettshjelploven, 1980, as amended.
43  FOR-2005-12-12-1443.
44  E.g. FOR-1997-12-03-1441 and FOR-2005-12-12-1442.
45  Straffeprosessloven, 1981.
46  Rättshjälpslagen, 1996.
47  Rättegångsbalk, 1942, as amended.
48  Rättshjälpslagen, 2002.
49  Lag om statens rättshjälps- och intressebevakningsdistrikt, 2016.
50  Statsrådets förordning om rättshjälp, 2002.
51  Justitieministeriets förordning om statens rättshjälps- och intressebevakningsdistrikt, 2016.
52  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2.
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However, only some statutes in non-English speaking countries are given 
official English language titles, and informal translations vary. Thus, for 
accuracy and ease of reference for readers wishing to locate the material, the 
original language version will be used in footnotes and in the Sources section 
of the thesis. In respect of Finnish legislation, references are in Swedish, which 
is one of the two official languages in which legislation is published.
In addition to these legislative primary sources, in most of the jurisdictions 
there is further direction issued on the proper interpretation of the legal 
norms. This can be in the form of binding guidance issued by government as 
an instruction to decision-makers or, in many cases, documents issued by the 
public bodies administering legal aid indicating to lawyers and their clients how 
they will apply the norms. Binding guidance is issued in England & Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and these documents are primary sources for this research. 
Whilst strictly speaking secondary sources, the non-binding handbooks and 
circulars issued in Denmark, Scotland, Sweden, the Republic of Ireland and 
Norway are nonetheless highly relevant as they indicate how the administrators 
of legal aid schemes apply the legislative provisions. In an examination of the 
procedural status quo this information is important because it is likely, prima 
facie, that this is the interpretation which is applied in practice. 
The Swedish handbooks produced by the National Courts Administration 
were previously publicly available online, but in April 2018 they were 
withdrawn from public access. In explaining this decision, the National Courts 
Administration reiterated that the handbooks are intended as an internal 
resource for the assistance of the courts and that they should not be regarded as 
legally binding,53 thus confirming that they do not amount to primary sources. 
There has been no indication that the content of the handbooks has undergone 
substantial change, and therefore the content which was previously viewable 
is for present purposes assumed to be relevant. References to the handbooks 
within this thesis are to the version most recently publicly available, in April 
2018. 
The legal aid handbook produced in Finland is a guide written by and 
for the individual decision-makers to encourage consistency; in this it is 
equivalent to the internal guide on criminal legal aid produced in the Republic 
of Ireland by the Judicial Researchers’ Office, setting out useful decided cases 
and legislation for use by judges in their daily work. For this research, these 
two latter handbooks are less persuasive but nonetheless relevant secondary 
sources.
Decided cases have differing weights in the different jurisdictions. In the 
UK and Republic of Ireland they may amount to primary sources, depending 
on the level of court taking the decision, whereas in the Nordic countries 
they are indicative but not binding. Again, as this research is considering the 
practical administration of legal aid, relevant jurisprudence in all jurisdictions 
53  Swedish Courts website, http://www.domstol.se/Ladda-ner--bestall/Verksamhetsstyrning/Handbocker/.
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is useful source material, as even where it is not binding, administrators take 
the decisions of courts into account when interpreting the normative rules.
Legislative preparatory documents useful to the interpretation of the law are 
among the relevant secondary sources and form part of the materials for this 
study. In Finland and Sweden such documents are of high importance, almost 
equivalent to decided Supreme Court cases, and thus particularly attention 
will be paid to legislative preparatory documents in these jurisdictions. Where 
useful, academic journal articles are referred to as an aid to analysis, as are 
studies and reports by NGOs and professional bodies.
International norms will be sourced from treaties, with supporting 
interpretative information from the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies. As 
part of the context for the legal aid systems discussed, internationally-collated 
statistical information will be used, largely that published by the European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ).
The use of sources from many different jurisdictions has necessitated 
deviations from the usual source-handling conventions. In general, legislative 
provisions as primary sources have not been referenced in the body of the 
text, but in footnotes, to avoid overburdening the text. This is necessary as a 
paragraph comparing provisions in several jurisdictions would otherwise 
become unwieldy and difficult to read. All efforts have been made to include 
changes to the law up to and including the end of June 2018. Unless otherwise 
stated, translations of sources are the author’s own.
1.3.8 Limitations
In accordance with the definition of legal aid set out above, schemes contributing 
to access to justice which are not funded through the central legal aid provisions 
of the state will not be examined. All of the jurisdictions to be considered benefit 
from various advice services provided on a voluntary basis or funded through 
charity. Furthermore, legal expenses insurance and assistance from trades unions 
and employer organisations are available. However, it is not within the scope of 
this project to consider these services, despite their valuable contribution, other 
than as part of the context of each statutory legal aid scheme.
The project will be limited to legal aid for domestic proceedings. Legal 
aid for international proceedings is available but this will not form part of 
the study. Similarly, there are a number of specific treaties dealing with the 
requirements for legal aid for cross-border cases, particularly within the 
European Union. These agreements only affect the small number of cases where 
the parties are resident in different jurisdictions or the cause of action arises in 
a state other than that of the residence of the parties, and these provisions will 
not be examined here. Legal assistance to victims of crime, whilst important 
and provided in some form in many jurisdictions, is not within the scope of 
this study.
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There are procedural and material aspects to legal aid schemes. The procedural 
element includes the structure and organisation of the legal aid system itself: 
what is the legal foundation for the system; who makes decisions (both general 
rules on e.g. financial eligibility and in individual cases) and how appeals 
can be made. This is within the scope of the study. The material element of 
a legal aid scheme concerns the content of the legal aid rules made using the 
procedure in question, and the content of decisions made in individual cases. 
The content of the rules and decisions (the material element of the legal 
aid scheme) can also be divided into procedural and material aspects. The 
former would include which types of proceedings are covered by the scheme 
(civil, criminal, administrative etc.) and before which courts or tribunals, and 
how a case can qualify for legal aid. The latter covers issues such as financial 
qualification, level of fees paid and any quality requirements of the service 
provided. In this dissertation material aspects of the content of the rules, 
including financial assessment, will be considered in Chapter 7, concerning the 
coverage of legal aid, even though assessment of these elements may form part 
of the decision-making process in an individual case, potentially conducted by 
the decision-maker who also performs the procedural assessment. The study 
as a whole concentrates on the procedural administrative requirements of the 
legal aid schemes and the procedural aspects of the material content of the 
rules.
Whilst Iceland is included in this study, the quantity and accessibility of 
available materials is considerably lower than in the other jurisdictions. As 
a consequence, the comparison is less comprehensive as regards Iceland. 
Nonetheless, as far as possible Iceland has been included in the analysis.
1.4 Structure
This introductory chapter will conclude with a survey of the existing literature. 
An overview of the body of legal aid research will be given, followed by a closer 
examination of the more relevant material. Legal aid is a relatively under-
explored research area, which brings the advantage that it will be possible to 
outline the body of material as a whole, but the disadvantage that even the 
more pertinent previous work is not, on the whole, closely connected to the 
current study. Nonetheless, the literature survey will enable the work to be 
placed in an academic context.
Chapter 2 provides background of two kinds. Firstly, a brief discussion of 
the reasons which compel states to establish legal aid systems, including the 
rule of law, international treaties covering fair trial and domestic constitutional 
obligations, will set out the motivations for the provision of legal aid. Secondly, 
the operational context of the legal aid schemes in the various jurisdictions will 
be provided; information on their judicial systems and legal professions. An 
explanation will also be given of the distribution of legal aid work within the 
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legal profession, as not all lawyers are entitled to carry out legal aid work in all 
of the jurisdictions. This information will enable the detailed examination of 
the legal aid schemes, in the next chapters, to be more readily and accurately 
understood.
Four chapters will then follow, comparing in detail the legal aid schemes 
in the nine jurisdictions. Each of these chapters will also consider the 
international human rights obligations relevant to the topic and assess the 
compliance of the national schemes against this measure.
Chapter 3 will concentrate on the area of criminal law and set out the 
criminal legal aid schemes and public defence attorney systems in place. 
These two different models will be examined and compared, in terms of the 
procedural requirements in each jurisdiction; initial decision-making and 
appeals against refusals will be included in this comparison. The difference 
between the two models, from the point of view of the assisted person, will 
be assessed, and the particular case of Finland, where both types of provision 
are available, will be used to help illuminate the comparison. Attention will 
then turn to the material requirements for legal aid or a public defender. In 
particular, the interests of justice test which features in all jurisdictions will be 
examined and its different application noted.
Civil legal aid schemes are more complex and more varied than criminal 
legal aid and public defender schemes, and therefore examination of these 
will be spread over three chapters. Chapter 4 will describe and compare the 
decision-making processes for civil legal aid in the nine jurisdictions, at 
both the initial and appeal stages. In addition to considering the two stages 
independently, consideration will also be given to the interrelationship between 
the two, and whether certain combinations of initial and appeal decision-
making power might be preferable to others, particularly with a view to the 
need to avoid arbitrariness.
The scope of civil legal aid will be the subject of Chapter 5. All of the civil 
legal aid schemes under consideration have some limitation on the types of 
case for which assistance can be given. However, the extent of the restrictions 
varies very considerably; some schemes exclude a small number of case types, 
some only include a restricted range of matters. Many of the scope rules are 
direct and specify according to type of case, but some jurisdictions in addition 
identify legal venues in which representation is or is not covered by legal aid, 
such as an exclusion of cases before administrative tribunals. As in other 
chapters, the compliance of scope restrictions with international human rights 
obligations will be considered and, in this case, found wanting.
Chapter 6 has as its subject the merits tests which must be fulfilled before 
civil legal is granted. These tests can be complex, and vary dramatically between 
the jurisdictions. Reasonableness and prospects of success are the two most 
commonly-used criteria and will be explored in detail, together with a number 
of other less-used tests. Consideration of the merits tests applied can shed light 
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on the policy considerations behind a legal aid scheme, and these links will be 
explored in the chapter.
Each of Chapters 3 to 6 will conclude with a comparative case study. These 
will consider a practical situation from the point of view of a potential legal aid 
recipient, and contrast the different responses of three of the jurisdictions. Each 
jurisdiction will feature at least once in the case studies, and the examples are 
chosen to illustrate the most interesting contrast in approach for each chapter.
Moving away from the normative consideration of legal aid, Chapters 7 
and 8 turn to the context of legal aid in order to inform the final analysis of 
the comparative information gathered. Chapter 7 looks at the micro context: 
the possibility and consequences of a grant of legal aid or a public attorney 
to a particular individual. Financial eligibility levels, the availability of lawyers 
taking legal aid cases and how much work they are able to provide to a publicly-
funded client will all be examined. 
Chapter 8 then considers the macro context of legal aid within the 
justice system, both economically and structurally. Three main areas will be 
considered: the spend on each legal aid scheme, both alone and as part of 
the justice budget; socio-economic factors which might impact demand for 
legal aid; and the systemic context. Budgeting decisions quantify how much 
money is available for legal aid and thus how generous a system can be, but 
the amounts allocated to other parts of the judicial system are also relevant as 
concentrating more resources elsewhere may ease the burden on the legal aid 
scheme itself. The level of demand for legal aid may also be connected to the 
economic circumstances in a jurisdiction and poverty levels will be considered, 
in addition to other factors potentially affecting demand, such as level of 
recourse to law. Finally in this chapter, the systemic context of legal aid will 
be considered; mechanisms for resolving disputes outside the formal justice 
system clearly reduce the need for legal aid, but approaches within the formal 
justice system which aim to make it possible for litigants to navigate without 
assistance also have a role to play, and both aspects will be discussed. 
Chapter 9 forms the final part of the dissertation. It includes an analysis and 
some conclusions about the current state of legal aid in the Nordic countries, 
the Republic of Ireland and the jurisdictions of the UK. The schemes will be 
measured against international requirements and criticisms will be presented 
of elements of some schemes. The jurisdictions will tentatively be compared 
with each other, against this benchmark, and the main failings highlighted. In 
addition to the level of compliance with human rights law, the methods used 
to achieve compliance will be compared and patterns sought. An analysis of 
the patterns and of the linkages between the different aspects of a legal aid 
system will inform a discussion of whether learning and borrowing between 
jurisdictions is possible and appropriate in the legal aid sphere. 
A new framework for analysing legal aid schemes will then be proposed, 
which can be applied to one system or used to systematically compare schemes. 
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It will be argued that a methodical approach to comparison is needed, due to 
the complexity of legal aid schemes. The suggested framework will identify 
three different levels at which choices are made in legal aid schemes: the 
establishment of guiding principles; policy choices ideally consistent with these 
principles; and practical delivery methods. These three levels interact with each 
other and with the social, economic and legal context in the jurisdiction. The 
proposal will be made that more, and more coordinated, studies are needed to 
populate the framework with research data and further improve the structural 
understanding of legal aid.
1.5 Literature review
1.5.1 Overview
Hitherto, legal aid research from a public law perspective has been largely 
absent. Legal aid has most often been written about by journalists or 
practitioners in the form of practical handbooks54 or pleas for improved 
services or against cutbacks.55 Academic writing on the subject is often heavily 
slanted towards the sociology of law; in particular issues of unmet legal need,56 
the cost to the state of providing legal aid57 and the impact of legal aid.58 
When policy-makers have commissioned comparative studies of legal aid, 
or journalists or practitioners have made pleas for improved services or against 
cutbacks,59 the main focus has usually been, naturally enough, on the aspects 
which can be changed quickly to meet political objectives. Such variables as 
financial eligibility levels, areas of law covered and rates of pay to lawyers 
can be adjusted relatively simply without altering the underlying structure of 
the system. The highly practical purpose of much legal aid research to date 
has, however, meant that little attention60 has been paid to some of the more 
structural aspects of legal aid provision and scant consideration given to the 
law which constitutes the legal aid systems themselves:
Legal aid scholarship generally focuses on a relatively narrow range of 
issues. Much of the literature either describes national schemes, or examines 
recent reforms, or discusses empirical research into the effectiveness of legal 
services. There are many detailed accounts of eligibility provisions, and 
various criticisms and defences of government policy, but there are far fewer 
discussions of how and why governments introduce legal aid schemes and 
what they intend such schemes to achieve.61
54  e.g. those issued by the Legal Action Group in England & Wales or, in Denmark, Mavrogenis 2012.
55  e.g. Hynes and Robins 2009.
56  See in particular the work of Warwick University School of Law.
57  e.g. the regular reports of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice.
58  e.g. Cousins 1994; Cape et. al. 2010.
59  e.g. Hynes and Robins 2009.
60  One exception is the study of legal aid in nine European countries, Barendrecht et. al. 2014.
61  Regan and Goriely 2006.
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There has also been little consideration of legal aid from a public and 
administrative law perspective. The multidisciplinary body of knowledge on 
legal aid will be enhanced by this study, which goes deeper into legal aid and 
gives attention to the skeleton beneath the surface: how the legal framework 
is constructed in terms of legislation and other law, and what the decision-
making and appeals structures are.
Aside from the relatively narrow body of research specifically on legal aid, 
access to justice writing is also often relevant. Some studies address the access 
to justice implications of legal aid without considering in detail the role of 
lawyers and legal aid in achieving access to justice; an overall critique of access 
to justice, including legal aid, is instead made. A slightly different category of 
research does specifically address the role of legal aid within the overall access 
to justice framework, and debates the extent to which payments to lawyers 
should feature in a state’s access to justice policy. 
Awareness-raising and lobbying about current or future proposed aspects 
of a legal aid scheme, or its costs, is a particular feature of jurisdictions such 
as England & Wales where significant changes have taken place. A number 
of comparative studies have also been undertaken often, but not always, 
connected to a process of development of one of the schemes compared. The 
extent to which international human rights conventions obligate the provision 
of legal aid is another topic which generates research, either from a theoretical 
angle or as part of arguments against current or proposed government policy, 
from a variety of sources.
Some key examples of the research to date on legal aid follow, with an 
emphasis on more recent research and on that with greater relevance to 
this dissertation, although as little has been written on the topic, many 
of the publications discussed are of indirect, contextual value rather than 
direct relevance. Writing by academics will be presented alongside studies 
commissioned by governments, international organisations, professional bodies 
and NGOs. These different types of document can overlap, as where academics 
are commissioned to prepare reports for policy-makers. This summary will 
not include research on unmet legal aid, although this exists in several of the 
jurisdictions under consideration; such research is too far removed from the 
current focus to be of use here.
The reader may note a preponderance of English language writings in the 
review. This is in part due to a greater number of academics in the field working 
in English, but it is also the case that language barriers have made texts in other 
languages, particularly Finnish and Icelandic, less accessible to the author. To 
some extent it is also the case that there has been less research in some of the 
Nordic countries; in Sweden, for example, academic publications on legal aid 
are few;62 in Finland there has been more focus on other aspects of socio-legal 
studies rather than access to justice;63 in Denmark there have been relatively 
62  Schoultz 2018, p. 48.
63  Rissanen 2018, p. 79.
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few studies on legal aid, and most of these have concentrated on unmet need 
for legal aid64 and “to say that literature on access to legal aid in Iceland is 
scarce is an understatement”.65
1.5.2 Legal aid and access to justice
Much has been written about legal aid as an aspect of access to justice, 
including some very recent contributions to the literature precipitated by the 
negative impact of legal aid restrictions under ‘austerity’ policies. 
The collection of essays Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics 
of Austerity66 addresses, in the main, the situation in England & Wales post-
LASPO, although there are comparative chapters on the French and Scottish 
approaches. The book is in three parts: the theoretical, legal and policy 
background to access to justice; pressure points on the justice system; and 
alternative approaches to funding legal services. Caplen, from the perspective 
of the Law Society of England & Wales, considers that security and justice are 
the most important imperatives of government,67 and thus that the provision of 
adequate and affordable access to the justice system takes, in principle, priority 
over most other calls on public funds. He is highly critical of the current 
political environment in the UK which has enabled significant and, he feels, 
dangerous reductions in legal aid. Access to justice must be defended; it is “a 
fundamental corollary of ‘the rule of law’ because without access to justice the 
rule of law can be nothing more than just a concept, an ideal”. 68Furthermore, 
the reduction in funding for lawyers to carry out work in certain areas of law 
which are mainly funded by legal aid results in diminishing legal expertise in 
these subjects.69
 Cornford addresses the meaning of the oft-used phrase ‘access to justice’ 
and concludes that:
properly understood, access to justice entails a right of equal access to 
legal assistance for every citizen. We do not have access to justice properly 
understood, however, but something weaker. We have a state of affairs in 
which courts, public authorities and other citizens are obliged in principle 
to respect our rights regardless of our social status or wealth but in which 
the degree to which they do respect them is likely to vary in accordance with 
our wealth. As citizens, the most we can hope for is the chance of protecting 
our rights rather than the certainty that our rights will be accorded equal 
weight with those of richer or more powerful persons.70 
64  Lemann Kristiansen 2018, p. 102.
65  Antonsdóttir 2018, p. 126.
66  Palmer, Cornford, Guinchard and Yseult (eds) 2016.
67  Caplen 2016, p. 13.
68  Ibidem, p. 24.
69  Ibidem, p. 21.
70  Ibidem, p. 39.
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The particular challenges in achieving access to justice in specific areas of law 
are addressed in Part II of Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics 
of Austerity. These essays are detailed considerations of the state of the law, 
practice and access to justice in England & Wales for administrative law, 
immigration, housing, employment and family law. The specific difficulties 
faced by young people in accessing justice are also addressed, and a case 
study of an advice project in London is offered. These chapters are interesting 
but highly specialised and of limited value to the broad comparison being 
undertaken in this thesis; they will therefore not be summarised here. 
In Part III of the same collection of essays, alternative solutions to problems 
of access to justice are considered, in particular a possible role for Alternative 
Business Structures71 and the potential of technology to improve advice 
delivery.72 A brief overview is given of access to justice in France, where “legal 
aid and the justice system […] are seriously underfunded”, yet “governments, 
lawyers, the judiciary and public civil servants both at national and local levels 
remain committed to the provision of legal aid services to those in need”.73 
Suggestions for ways to improve access to justice, including the extension of 
legal expenses insurance and opening up a competitive market for legal services 
are made. The Scottish response to austerity is offered as a positive model for 
progressive planning for the future of legal aid and access to justice; legal aid 
strategy is embedded in the Scottish Government’s overall development plan, 
within the Making Justice Work Programme. A focus on prevention and early 
advice leads to government funding of advice programmes with various focal 
issues such as debt. The Scottish Legal Aid Board has a statutory duty to report 
on availability and accessibility of publicly funded legal services, including 
drawing attention to areas of the country or subject areas where there may be 
difficulties accessing assistance. An additional strand of policy is to ensure that, 
within the group of people eligible for legal aid, contributions are collected 
from those who can afford to pay towards their legal help. Finally, programmes 
to improve the efficiency of the justice system overall are underway. There is 
optimism that:
the investment which is being made now by the Scottish government, 
[Scottish Legal Aid Board] and other partners in working towards 
preventative and innovative approaches, targeted assistance, and strategic 
coordination and delivery, together with the eventual impacts of wider 
reforms within the justice system, could reap rewards in terms of both the 
legal aid budget and access to justice for the people of Scotland.74
71  Stephen 2016.
72  Yates 2016.
73  Guinchard and Wesley 2016, p. 284.
74  O’Neill 2016, p. 301.
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The book overall is a useful introduction to the role which legal aid may play in 
access to justice, but it does not attempt a detailed public or administrative law 
analysis of legal aid, nor a substantive comparison between jurisdictions, and 
thus does not overlap with the current study. 
The compound difficulties of accessing justice in the Republic of Ireland 
during a time of government austerity measures was addressed in a 2016 
NGO report.75 Concern was addressed in particular on two fronts: that at a 
time of economic downturn, potential applicants for legal aid were less able to 
afford the minimum contribution; and that funding for the Legal Aid Board 
fell, resulting in extreme pressure on services. Concerns that inadequate 
legal aid can result in democratic deficit have also been expressed in the 2012 
Democratic Audit of the UK:
We note that problems with the effectiveness of the legal aid system in 
England and Wales are an ongoing issue of democratic concern. They can 
mean that some of the most excluded members of society can be denied 
access to an important part of the democratic system. Uneven coverage is 
problematic from the point of view of effectively securing the rule of law 
for all.76 
It has even been argued in the context of UK immigration law that reduction 
of legal aid might be part of an ideological government agenda moving towards 
reduced access to justice for marginalised groups within the immigration 
system.77 These studies all form useful background to the present research but 
do not contribute to the main elements under consideration.
1.5.3 Balancing legal aid and other tactics for achieving access to justice
Moore and Newbury have set out a well-reasoned argument for ensuring 
that lawyers, funded by legal aid, must continue to play a considerable role in 
access to justice in the UK. They suggest that attempts to use legal aid policy to 
decrease the use of courts and increase informal dispute resolution have failed. 
The decline in publicly-funded legal advice has removed a source of support 
and advice which previously assisted potential litigants to resolve their cases 
before court proceedings commenced, and has led to an increase rather than 
a decrease in, for example, contested family cases reaching the courts post-
LASPO.78 In order to make appropriate legal aid provision, it is argued, the 
debate must be re-framed. Legal dispute is a product of social arrangements 
and as a greater proportion of our dealings have become legalised, legal 
disputes and the need for assistance in solving them have inevitably grown, not 
75  FLAC 2016.
76  Wilks-Heeg, Blick and Crone 2012, section 1.2.4.
77  Thomas 2016, p. 134.
78  Moore and Newbury 2017, p. 43.
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through reckless use of the legal aid scheme but because people have become 
unavoidably embroiled in more legal disputes.79
Arguing against a focus on lawyer-facilitated dispute resolution, however, 
Goriely states that “the English approach to access to justice has been 
dominated by legal aid”,80 and she argues that the concentration of legal aid 
in the hands of the private profession has led to supply being tightly managed 
by professionals. This has resulted in a situation where it is extremely difficult 
for policy-makers to regain control, she argues, to the detriment of provision. 
Goriely finds advice centres staffed by non-lawyers to be more successful and 
suggests that these, together with simplification of legal procedure where 
possible, represent a better option going forwards. 
In agreement with this approach stands the work of Barendrecht; in 
comparing three access to justice strategies he found that legal aid is a relatively 
ineffective use of the public access to justice budget. The difficulty with legal 
aid, he posits, is that it only serves one person at a time, whereas investing in 
accessible dispute resolution procedures or legal information is considerably 
more cost effective. The current concentration of funds on individual legal 
aid should be reversed, and money allocated instead on legal information and 
improving court procedures.81 An interesting and useful summary of some 
arguments on this issue of whether need is driving lawyer-led legal aid or vice 
versa is provided by Papendorf.82
Given the difficulty governments have funding legal aid, it is not surprising 
that there is interest also in this quarter for finding alternative methods for 
achieving access to justice. A clear example of this is the 2015 consultation in 
Northern Ireland on alternative methods for the funding of money damages 
claims. The cost-saving intention was explicit: “the overspend on the legal aid 
budget means that doing nothing is not an option”.83 The consultation built on 
the recommendations of the second Access to Justice Review in suggesting 
that legal aid for money cases could largely be replaced by a combination of 
conditional fees and changes to the inter-partes costs rules. It should be noted, 
though, that these suggestions are geared towards a different way of funding 
the same justice process, and do not extend to the development of cheaper and 
more accessible alternative methods of resolving the disputes.
Funding court proceedings other than by legal aid can additionally be 
achieved through legal expenses insurance and this has also been the subject 
of research. Some literature has considered the role of legal expenses insurance 
and how this should relate to the availability of legal aid. A study in Finland 
concluded that, in that jurisdiction, “public legal aid and [legal expenses 
insurance] can work as interdependent and concurrent systems, and serve 
79  Ibidem, p. 70.
80  Goriely 2002, p. 1.
81  Barendrecht 2011.
82  Papendorf 2018.
83  Department of Justice Northern Ireland 2015, para. 1.6.
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the legal needs of the public better than trusting the provision on [sic.] legal 
services solely on [sic.] private sector”.84
More broad-ranging changes are also sometimes considered in the attempt 
to reduce the costs of access to justice. In tandem with the legal aid changes 
in England & Wales, a wider overhaul of the civil justice system is underway, 
including proposals to reduce the burden on courts through simplification of 
the rules of procedure and the introduction of online, virtual hearings. These 
mechanisms are designed to enable more efficient throughput of cases but it 
is also hoped that members of the public will be able to navigate a redesigned 
judicial system with less or no legal assistance.85
Even in areas where traditionally it has been assumed that access to justice 
can be achieved without the need for legal assistance, and therefore without 
legal aid, the presumption is however open to challenge. In the context of 
administrative law in the UK, Mullen concludes that “it is not reasonable 
to make policy on the assumption that citizens can operate the redress 
mechanisms that take the form of adjudication entirely unaided”.86
The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, established by the 
United Nations and reporting in 2008, had a global remit, and focused on the 
use of strategies to strengthen the rule of law as part of sustainable development 
strategies. However, the findings are relevant to the rich countries of Western 
Europe as well as to the developing nations which were the focus of the report. 
The Commission was very clear that legal empowerment is only possible when 
the rule of law is functioning effectively, which necessitates proper access to 
justice for all. Access to legal services is necessary for the poor to find out 
about the laws which might protect them and for them to make use of such 
laws. Whilst access to justice requires access to legal services, these need not 
be provided by lawyers, and there is an important role for paralegals and other 
non-lawyer service providers who are willing to offer legal services to the poor. 
The development of effective alternative dispute resolution methods and the 
simplification and standardisation of the law are also part of the solution when 
resources are limited.87 These issues were taken up by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations and efforts to improve accessibility of justice systems, 
both through innovative non-formal dispute resolution mechanisms and the 
provision of legal assistance, including by paralegals, were encouraged. 88 
It is interesting to note that in this report legal empowerment, including 
legal aid, is seen as part of the endeavour to eradicate poverty.
This approach also forms part of the strategy of the World Bank; within 
development projects judicial reform is often an element and this has at times 
84  Lasola and Rissanen 2013.
85  Evidence of the Rt Hon Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and 
    Wales, to the House of Commons Justice Committee, 23 February 2016, HC 814.
86  Mullen 2016, p. 100.
87  UNDP 2008.
88  A/64/50, 2009.
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included legal services, provided through funding for NGOs.89 The effect on a 
broader class of beneficiaries, not just the litigants themselves, is also of interest 
to the World Bank. A study found that litigating social and economic rights was 
redistributive of wealth towards the underprivileged in the societies studied, 
thus reducing poverty despite a generally-held presumption that litigation 
would generally benefit the elite.90 
The argument between those who believe lawyers must continue to play a 
central role in ensuring access to justice and those who seek non-lawyer led 
solutions is ongoing. However, it does not damage the premise of this study 
due to the formulation of the research questions and definitions adopted. 
It is currently the case that all the jurisdictions being considered have legal 
aid schemes and these can be usefully compared whether the intention 
of government is to reduce reliance on legal aid or not. Indeed, a detailed 
comparative study may assist such policy decisions by providing reliable 
information on the structure and content of legal aid in similar jurisdictions.
1.5.4 Legal aid and international human rights law
The relevance of legal aid to the realisation of human rights can be seen from 
the involvement of generalist human rights NGOs with the issue. The Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, for example, in its annual report on the status of 
human rights in Denmark, includes a chapter on fair trial rights which deals 
with legal aid. The 2016-2017 report included a call for the government to 
“conduct an overall analysis of the field of legal aid in order to clarify the extent 
to which the legal aid scheme should be modified so as to ensure all citizens 
have proper access to the legal system”.91
Peers summarises the civil subject coverage provided by European Union and 
European Convention on Human Rights provisions on legal aid. His conclusion 
(which will be contradicted later in this thesis) is that the Convention only 
requires legal aid in “sensitive family proceedings” or particularly complex 
cases, whereas in EU law moves can be seen towards widening coverage to 
certain issues affecting asylum seekers. EU provisions, he points out, also 
cover civil cases with a cross-border element such as cross-border family 
maintenance cases.92
The existence or otherwise of a distinct human right to legal aid has been 
considered by Rice in several essays. In 2017 he concluded that “it is difficult 
to conceive of legal aid as a substantive human right on its own terms, and 
it seems unnecessary to promote it along that ‘painful and time-consuming’ 
path”. It is sufficient that, as is the case, legal aid is becoming increasingly 
recognised as an integral part of the realisation of other human rights; 
recognition of a free-standing right to legal aid would be extremely difficult 
89  Maru 2010.
90  Brinks and Gauri 2012.
91  DIHR 2017, p. 62.
92  Peers 2016, p. 65.
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and largely unnecessary.93 An analysis of international human rights law 
obligations regarding legal aid forms an important part of the current thesis, 
as international standards will form the benchmark against which domestic 
schemes are measured. As well as the treaty texts and relevant jurisprudence, 
academic analyses of the subject will therefore be further referred to in the 
substantive chapters of this thesis.
1.5.5 Lobbying and awareness-raising literature
It is not uncommon for documents of various lengths to be prepared by NGOs, 
Bar Associations and political parties outside government describing the 
status quo for access to justice and legal aid in their jurisdiction, and arguing 
for a change in policy. These are sometimes prompted by an anniversary, 
such as the fortieth anniversary of civil legal aid in the Republic of Ireland,94 
or an anniversary of the pressure group.95 Such studies are also sometimes 
written to address specific governmental proposals, for example the proposals 
for LASPO.96 The purpose of a 2012 report by the Law Society of Ireland is 
representative: 
This report aims to highlight the effects of the increased pressure on 
resources in today’s economy and the reduced capacity of the civil legal aid 
system. It seeks to enhance understanding amongst the profession and the 
public of the current problems in the civil legal aid system in Ireland and to 
provide recommendations for future improvement.97
Such texts typically include a historical summary of the situation in a particular 
jurisdiction, followed by an analysis of the difficulties faced and proposals 
for improvements. The studies provide a very useful insight into the practical 
experience of legal aid practitioners at a given moment in time and can round 
out the overall picture in ways which official documents and statistical studies 
do not. A good example of this is the NGO study in the Republic of Ireland,98 
which commented on the organisation’s experience of judicial practice and 
remarked that not all judges were prepared to postpone proceedings until a 
legal aid application had been processed, a problem linked to long waiting 
times for legal aid decisions in this jurisdiction. 
Academic articles have also contributed to the body of awareness-raising 
literature by detailing the consequences of insufficiency in a legal aid system. 
This has been done in specific subjects such as housing law99 or family law.100 
93  Rice 2017.
94  FLAC 2009.
95  E.g. Hynes 2012, published to mark the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Legal  Action Group.
96  Ibidem.
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One strain of such articles addresses the problems of unrepresented litigants, 
both for the individuals concerned and for the courts.101
The cost of legal aid is often central to political discussions of the subject, 
and research is sometimes undertaken to try and quantify the value for money 
represented by legal aid expenditure. Two examples can be seen in the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Republic of Ireland undertook, in 2011, a 
Value for Money and Policy Review of the Legal Aid Board. The effectiveness 
of the Board was measured mainly in terms of the timeliness of the service 
provided, and it was noted that an increasing number of the Board’s Law Centres 
were becoming less effective against this measure. The imminent introduction of 
a new IT system was expected to enable more detailed effectiveness assessment 
in future. An efficiency analysis was also conducted, which considered the 
number of cases cleared compared to the financial and staff resources of the 
Law Centre. The researchers found that there was considerable variation in 
the time taken to clear cases and that efficiency improvements in some offices 
should be possible. A number of recommendations were made, largely for 
managerial steps to improve efficiency.102
The Northern Ireland Audit Office considered the position in that jurisdiction 
in 2016. It noted that despite recent reforms of criminal legal aid, the cost-saving 
aims had not been achieved. Furthermore, non-criminal legal aid had not been 
reformed, and implementation of planned changes was progressing slowly. In 
particular, the report recommended that: there should be regular value for 
money reviews of all legal aid schemes; standard fees should be introduced 
urgently; steps should be taken to ensure budget and expenditure are more 
closely aligned; and that recovering money from fraudulent claimants and 
convicted defendants should be improved.103
The Law Society of Scotland has commissioned a Social Return on 
Investment analysis on the legal aid, and found that government spending on 
legal aid reaps financial benefits overall for clients and for public services.104 
The study considered housing, family and criminal cases and found that, for 
every £1 spend on legal aid, the total returns were, respectively, £11, £5 and £5. 
In addition there were other benefits which were impossible to quantify. The 
study will be used as a tool in Law Society discussions with the Scottish Legal 
Aid Board and government. 
Internationally, in 2010 the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
issued Recommendations on Legal Aid calling on the EU to develop a European-
led legal aid scheme and to support national legal aid schemes within the 
member states. The Council called for a greater involvement of the EU beyond 
the Directives concerning criminal prosecutions and cross-border cases 
101  Genn 2013 and Trinder 2015.
102  Value for Money and Policy Review of the Legal Aid Board, 2011.
103  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016.
104  Law Society of Scotland 2017.
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 including financial assistance to states which cannot afford to provide the 
minimum necessary levels of legal aid.105
At various points throughout this study, useful assistance will be gained 
from these types of publication, particularly when they provide insights into 
the current functioning of legal aid schemes which may not be apparent from 
formal sources.
1.5.6 Comparative studies of legal aid
Some comparative research into legal aid has taken place, both historical 
comparisons and international comparisons. The former have in particular 
been a feature of the response to the significant changes to legal aid in England 
& Wales over the past decades. Two notable examples were both published by 
the Legal Action Group, an independent charity which campaigns for equal 
access to justice. In 2009, Hynes and Robins contributed a detailed description 
of the development of legal aid from its inception to the (then) current state of 
affairs. Finding a situation lacking vision and values, the authors suggest that 
it is essential for policy-makers to commit to a set of principles which could 
then form the theoretical foundation for legal aid. In addition, they set out a 
series of further recommendations, some general across all types of legal aid 
and some subject-specific. Other than the general principles, which will be 
discussed further in the conclusions of this thesis, the suggestions are specific 
to the time and place that the book was written.106
The pace of change in England & Wales has been such that one of the 
authors of the above book wrote another, in 2012, to address the challenges 
arising from the significant funding cuts already implemented and the threats 
posed by the imminent introduction of LASPO. As with the previous work, a 
historical comparison is a major element of the book, tracing the development 
of legal aid and also of the not-for-profit advice sector which briefly flourished 
pre-LASPO. Coming at a time of continued and dramatic change, the book 
tentatively suggests some likely outcomes and gives five suggested priorities for 
policy-makers.107
Over recent decades there have also been a number of comparisons and 
parallel country studies touching on the jurisdictions of North-West Europe. A 
comparison of a number of European legal aid systems was undertaken in 1994 
by Cousins, and some interesting conclusions were reached. At that point in 
time, Cousins found that the vast majority of legal aid schemes were “confined 
to a very traditional approach to legal services and concentrate uniquely (or 
predominantly) on legal advice and representation”.108 Furthermore, of the 
selection of Western European jurisdictions studied only the Netherlands 
and the UK had moved beyond family law in the provision of civil legal aid. 
105  CCBE 2010.
106  Hynes and Robins 2009.
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The study is interesting in that it attempts to find links between legal aid (in 
particular legal aid spend) and wider social factors. For example, it is noted 
that more is spent on legal aid in Protestant than in Catholic countries but that 
there does not appear to be a correlation between numbers of lawyers and legal 
aid spend. Ultimately, Cousins concludes that the cost of legal aid can only be 
explained by supplier-led demand: 
concepts such as ‘access to legal services’ and ‘unmet legal need’ have been 
shown to involve value judgments rather than empirical assessments. 
The people making the value judgments have been lawyers rather than 
individuals seeking access to the law. […] in practice legal aid has much 
more to do with the economic needs of the legal profession than it has to do 
with the ‘legal needs’ of individuals.109
From a UK perspective, Flood and Whyte in 2006 sought possible answers 
from other jurisdictions to the difficulties of legal aid. The jurisdictions used for 
comparison vary within the article according to the element of legal aid which 
is being considered. Thus, the costs of legal aid are compared in the UK, New 
Zealand, Ontario and Queensland, Australia; legal aid strategies are compared 
in Italy, Greece, the UK and Victoria, Australia. Some interesting suggestions 
are made, such as that a legal aid system can afford to be generous with legal 
aid for representation if the state has control over access to court processes. The 
passage of time now makes the comparative data of both these studies obsolete 
for the current dissertation.
The state of criminal defence services in nine European jurisdictions were 
measured against the European Convention of Human Rights in 2010.110 The 
jurisdictions were England & Wales, Finland, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland and Turkey. Each jurisdiction is considered and 
recommendations made for improvements to effective implementation of 
criminal defence rights. This work is a parallel study of the nine jurisdictions 
rather than a true comparison.
A greater degree of comparative analysis, and the use of an external 
yardstick, can be found in a large-scale study in 2014 comparing legal aid in 
nine European jurisdictions: England & Wales, Scotland, Finland, Ireland, 
France, Germany, Belgium, Poland and the Netherlands.111 The legal aid 
systems were assessed against the requirements of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as will also be attempted in this dissertation, 
and there are clearly some similarities with the present work. However, the 
jurisdictions selected are different, and the 2014 work contains more statistical 
information on the breakdown of costs of legal aid and types of cases helped. 
In addition, that work includes information on the quality of services provided 
under legal aid financing, which is not included in this thesis. Conversely, 
109  Ibidem, p. 128. 
110  Cape, Namoradze, Smith and Spronken 2010.
111  Barendrecht, Kistemaker, Scholten, Schrader and Wrzesinska 2014.
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there is less detail on the decision-making processes than will be found in the 
following chapters and, it is submitted, less analysis of the differences found.
A 2017 collection of essays invites the reader to draw parallels between the 
recent experience in Australia and in England & Wales. Both jurisdictions have 
suffered spending cuts resulting in significant reductions in legal aid in recent 
years, including significant changes in the last half decade.112 Some of the essays 
in the volume are historical, such as a consideration of the developments in 
criminal legal aid over time, first positive and now negative, as assessed by 
Smith and Cape. Their current view of the situation in England & Wales is 
bleak: “It is not too strong to conclude that criminal legal aid and the criminal 
defence profession are in crisis. It is difficult to see, at this juncture, how (if at 
all) that crisis will be resolved.”113 A historical overview of the development of 
legal aid in Australia is also included. 
The majority of the essays, however, deal with current problems arising 
from insufficient availability of funding for legal services to the indigent: 
the difficulties of self-represented defendants as observed by an Australian 
magistrate;114 severe impacts on advice agencies in Liverpool, England,115 and 
on English Citizens’ Advice Bureaux in general;116 problems arising from the 
need to resort to mediation rather than representation in private family law 
disputes in England & Wales;117 difficulties for victims of domestic violence in 
Victoria, Australia118 and the particular problems faced by indigenous groups 
in achieving access to justice.119 There is analysis of the impact on lawyers’ 
understanding of their function in society when funding cuts mean their role 
in realising access to justice is threatened120 and some possible partial solutions 
to the current difficulties are considered. These include the use of video-link 
technology in prisons and courtrooms in Australia as a means of improving 
efficiency of advice delivery121 and the advantages and disadvantages of the rise 
of ‘DIY law’.122 The development of Community Legal Centres in Australia and 
recent restrictions on their systemic work are assessed.123 
Whilst all of these essays are positioned within a ‘comparative’ collection, 
they do not utilise a comparative approach internally; each chapter is a free-
standing description of a particular topic without information on similar 
issues in the other jurisdiction. Whilst of course some of the issues brought 
to light are familiar across jurisdictions, such as the similar challenges arising 
112  Flynn and Hodgson 2017.
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from restrictions to criminal legal aid in both jurisdictions, and these parallels 
are briefly mentioned, no detailed comparisons are attempted. One chapter, 
consideration by Rice of whether there is a human right to legal aid, is cross-
jurisdictional and of wider application; this is considered elsewhere in this 
review of literature. 
The issue of cross-jurisdictional comparative spend on legal aid is 
addressed in a 2017 publication by Moore and Newbury. Arguing that direct 
comparisons of spend on legal aid are too simplistic, they urge consideration 
of the amounts spent on other aspects of the justice system, the nature of the 
legal system concerned and the wider impact on other areas of social welfare 
law. Similar arguments will be returned to in Chapter 8 on legal aid in context. 
Furthermore, they point out that comparisons of spend are open to contrasting 
interpretation: higher spend may be evidence of excessive provision or may 
show excellence of provision.124 Whilst the book does not attempt detailed 
comparisons between jurisdictions it does argue strongly for caution if using 
a comparative approach to inform change, in the context of England & Wales.
In terms of detailed comparative studies of legal aid systems, in the 
countries within the remit of this dissertation, the most notable publications 
are those of Johnsen. In particular in connection with work which the 
Norwegian government was undertaking in 2008 he has compared in depth 
the legal aid systems in Norway and Finland,125 and studied the English scheme 
with a view to lessons which might be applicable to Norway.126 Changes have 
occurred in the legal aid schemes of both Finland and England & Wales 
since these studies, and so some of the comparisons are now outdated. The 
first comparison is broadly favourable towards the Finnish approach, with 
particular approval of the system of delivery through Legal Aid Offices. 
Furthermore, it is recommended that the Norwegian government should follow 
the Finnish example by reducing the amount of non-means tested legal aid and 
reforming the means test and contributions scheme. Johnsen also suggests 
extending the scope of Norwegian legal aid to cover a greater range of case 
types. In his consideration of the English scheme, Johnsen particularly picks 
up on the attempts underway at the time of his study (2009) to put legal aid 
on a principled footing, ensuring policy decisions are made by government 
rather than being left to the market. The aim at that time was also to regain 
control of expenditure through a variety of mechanisms such as contracting 
and increasing oversight of high cost cases. The study was pre-LASPO and the 
current situation in England & Wales bears little resemblance to that observed 
by Johnsen in 2009. One area in which this is stark is that he comments 
positively on the extension of legal aid to social welfare law providers in the 
NGO sector; this funding stream has almost completely dried up post-LASPO. 
Both reports were considered by the Norwegian government when it drew up 
124  Moore and Newbury 2017, p. 74.
125  Johnsen 2008.
126  Johnsen 2009b.
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its recommendations on legal aid127 but in Johnsen’s view the resulting policy 
suggestions were not far-reaching enough. In particular, the failure to bring 
civil legal aid and criminal defence closer together in a coordinated system, 
continued concentration on the private profession for delivery of legal aid, 
and lack of comprehensive policy standpoint drew criticism.128 In the event, 
a change of government led to the proposals being shelved and legal aid in 
Norway has continued to be organised as per the status quo described by 
Johnsen.
In 2018 a cross-Nordic study was published, ‘Outsourcing legal aid in the 
Nordic welfare states’.129 The aim was to examine the extent to which legal aid 
schemes in the Nordic countries match welfare state ideology, and whether 
changes in the welfare state are mirrored by changes in legal aid. This study 
clearly demonstrates a strong social law focus. Descriptions of legal aid in all 
five Nordic countries are presented with analyses of their compatibility with 
welfare state ideology. These chapters are in effect parallel country studies 
and are followed by chapters on four particular access to justice schemes: the 
JussBuss student clinics in Norway; Gadejuristen legal service for socially 
marginalised clients in Denmark; an analysis of legal needs and provision 
relating to ex-prisoners in the same jurisdiction and a consideration of clinical 
legal education in the USA and Europe. There is a chapter presenting theoretical 
arguments about the role of lawyer-led legal aid, and two chapters which might 
truly be considered comparative. Johnsen, again largely in the context of 
Norway and Finland, compares Nordic provision as measured against human 
rights norms. He concludes that both the Finnish and Norwegian constitutions 
contain the main access to justice human rights provisions but that entitlement 
to legal aid in neither country fully meets the demands of the caselaw of the 
European Court of Human Rights. This comparison is very relevant to the 
current research and will be referred to later. However, it does not apply the 
measure to all the Nordic jurisdictions, and naturally not the UK or Republic 
of Ireland, and it is suggested that the current research dissertation contributes 
differently in taking a narrower focus (on the public and administrative law 
of legal aid schemes narrowly defined) and comparing more jurisdictions. The 
final chapter of the collection explores the relationship between legal aid and 
the Nordic welfare model, and will be useful in the conclusions to this research. 
127 St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009).
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2. Chapter 2: Background
2.1 Introduction
Before looking in detail at the mechanics of legal aid in the nine jurisdictions 
under comparison, it is useful to consider why states implement legal aid 
systems and to gain a broad appreciation of the environment in which such 
schemes operate. The motivations for legal aid can be international or national 
in nature, and range from an ideological commitment to democratic principles 
to compliance with concrete constitutional provisions. Three categories of 
drivers will be considered below: the political philosophical concept of the rule 
of law; international treaty obligations and domestic constitutions. Together, 
these elements place a compulsion on states to establish and maintain some 
level of legal aid provision.
The legal aid schemes which arise as a result do not operate in a vacuum. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, there is a particularly close relationship 
between legal aid and the legal system in which it operates. The legal aid scheme 
is established by law and forms part of the public administrative arrangements 
of the state; as such it is subject to the requirements of national administrative 
law. However, as well as being obliged to comply with the requirements of the 
legal system of the state in question, legal aid is engaged with the operation of 
that same legal system. In this respect it is akin to the rules of court procedure. 
In addition, legal aid operates upon the legal profession of the state and must 
integrate appropriately with any professional rules of conduct. To enable a 
proper contextualisation of the detailed descriptions of legal aid machinery in 
the following chapters, the judicial systems and legal professions of the nine 
jurisdictions under comparison will therefore be outlined below. 
2.2 Motivations for legal aid
2.2.1 Legal and the rule of law
The provision of a properly functioning justice system is one of the key tasks 
of the state, indeed it can be argued that “a government’s prime responsibility 
is surely to provide for the proper administration of justice within its 
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boundaries”.130 The fundamental nature of a justice system can be seen in the 
emphasis given to the rule of law in international institutions and treaties. 
Taking the United Nations as an example, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in its preamble declares that “it is essential, if man is not to be compelled 
to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, 
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law”. The Preamble to the 
European Convention on Human Rights declares that European countries have 
a “common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law”, 
and it is clear that the concept applies, inter alia, to all the jurisdictions in this 
study. 
Highlighting its importance, the United Nations has ‘strengthening the rule 
of law’ as one of its thematic areas and the Secretary-General has described the 
ideal as:
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and 
which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. 
It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness 
in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency.131
The rule of law thus requires both access to the courts and other processes of 
justice and a fair hearing or trial in any case which is heard before a court or 
tribunal. Such access should be available regardless of who the individual is, 
their position in society or their resources. In modern democracies, law is the 
mechanism by which the duties and rights of individuals are fixed. In order for 
the rule of law to be maintained, it is important that everyone subject to the 
laws of the jurisdiction has access to the justice system in order to be able to 
enforce their rights and have their responsibilities fairly determined. Without 
such access, equal application of law to all members of society is difficult, if 
not impossible to guarantee. The term “access to justice” is in common use 
in English-speaking jurisdictions, but has application also in the Nordic 
countries. It will be used throughout the thesis to express this concept that the 
justice system, as guarantor of the rule of law, should be available to the entire 
population of a state. According to this understanding, access to justice is an 
essential element of the rule of law; the latter provides the theory of universal 
applicability of law and the former makes possible the enforcement of the 
ensuing rights and responsibilities. 
The rule of law requires a wide range of factors to be present. Some elements 
are broad and overarching, such as democracy, the separation of powers 
130 Caplan 2016, p. 13.
131 S/2004/616.
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and legal certainty. Others relate to the enforcement and upholding of laws 
through the judicial system, including the practicalities of physically providing 
a court structure but also the necessary qualities of the system, including 
the independence of the judiciary. The requirement for access to justice 
overlaps with the necessity for a properly functioning judicial system, but 
includes elements which are not part of the judicial system. Legal education 
and the provision of non-judicial dispute resolution methods are examples 
of contributions to access to justice which cannot be located within the 
judicial system. Within the overlap between access to justice and the judicial 
system, legal aid can be located. It plays a role in both the structures of law 
(the judicial system) and proper access for all. Legal aid is part of the judicial 
system inasmuch as it is the counterbalance to state prosecution services in 
criminal cases, and an essential element in any judicial system which relies on 
the parties having legal representation, whenever some citizens will be unable 
to pay for such representation themselves. In addition, legal aid is a necessary 
component of access to the judicial system for those who would otherwise 
lack the necessary assistance and therefore be unable to participate in court 
proceedings. Figure 1 below illustrates this proposition.
 
Fig. 1. The position of legal aid within the rule of law.
This analysis indicates where legal aid may play a role in the rule of law, but 
does not specify that it is a necessary component. It is clear that, whilst legal 
aid is one of the elements of access to justice, it is far from the only one, and 
is not always popular. Money is a significant factor in states’ choices on how to 
provide access to justice; particularly when it is felt necessary to rein in public 
spending, legal aid can be seen as an expensive option. As a result, many states 
actively seek a variety of methods to ensure that citizens have meaningful 
access to justice in ways other than by paying for them to be assisted in dealing 
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with the formal justice system. This is so particularly in civil law, as in criminal 
matters it is less common for alternatives to court to be developed, although 
the expansion of penalties which can be imposed by the police has made some 
inroads in this area. 
However, as long as a judicial system is in place and dealing with matters in 
which one or both parties may be of limited means, it is submitted that legal 
aid is required if the rule of law is to be upheld. The law can be used to ensure 
that a more powerful person or body does not ignore the legal rights of a less 
powerful person. However, because the more powerful very often have more 
money, there is a risk that legal proceedings will not provide neutral justice 
if the potentially oppressive party has unequal access to information about 
what is possible through law and assistance in obtaining the desired outcome. 
Legal aid, in putting the weaker party in a more equal position within legal 
proceedings, can help to avoid the consolidation of advantage which wealth 
and power bring. This is an essential element of the rule of law. The law must 
apply equally to all and in some circumstances this requires the state to assist a 
disadvantaged party in legal proceedings, to level the playing field. 
Situations where the parties are of equal power are more likely to be 
amenable to a fair negotiation or mediation process, thus avoiding judicial 
process; nonetheless, other circumstances particular to the individuals 
concerned or to the jurisdiction may mean that legal proceedings are necessary. 
If the parties are equally inexperienced and neither is represented, there may 
not be a problem of inequality before the court, but wherever the norm is for 
parties to be represented in a given court, the proper administration of justice 
will be much assisted if this is the case. Substantive justice may also require 
legal arguments to be put or legal skills to be exercised on behalf of the parties.
Thus, for the rule of law and access to justice to be achieved completely 
without legal aid in a jurisdiction, a very particular and unusual set of 
circumstances would need to apply. Either the judicial system and laws would 
need to be genuinely so simple that any individual could understand and use 
them without help, or all disputes which might ever involve a person with 
limited financial means would have to be capable of binding resolution through 
a non-judicial process which provided a fair hearing without representation 
of the parties. In the latter situation, it would need to be impossible for one of 
the parties to choose instead to resolve proceedings through a judicial route 
unless the other party agreed. Furthermore, it would need to be impossible for 
one party in judicial proceedings to be represented if the other was not. These 
conditions do not apply in any of the jurisdictions being considered in this 
study and it is difficult to imagine that they would be satisfied anywhere. Legal 
aid is thus a necessary part of implementing the rule of law. 
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2.2.2 International obligations requiring a legal aid scheme
In addition to the theoretical argument that legal aid is directly mandated 
through the rule of law, specific international human rights obligations also 
establish a need for legal aid, either explicitly in the treaties or as developed 
through their interpretation by treaty bodies.
The global and European human rights systems are relevant to a study of 
legal aid as a result of the fair trial provisions they contain. The Human Rights 
Committee has emphasised that “the right to equality before the courts and 
tribunals and to a fair trial is a key element of human rights protection and 
serves as a procedural means to safeguard the rule of law”.132 There is clearly a 
connection between the availability of legal advice and representation to the 
parties and the fairness or otherwise of a trial.133 
All the jurisdictions within this study are, naturally, bound by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They are all 
also within the Council of Europe, and therefore all subject to the regional 
human rights requirements within the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). All except Norway and Iceland are also EU member states or parts of 
such states and thus under the influence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. However, the provisions of the EU Charter have limited 
applicability compared to the ICCPR and ECHR; they apply only to situations 
where there is national application of EU law,134 which within the area of legal 
aid largely restricts applicability to cross-border cases. The Charter does not 
have a bearing on the general duty to provide access to justice within a state. As 
such, it is of limited relevance to this thesis and will only briefly be examined.
The majority of decided cases concerning international human rights 
obligations to provide legal aid are judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (“the Court”) or the former European Commission on Human 
Rights. However, there are some relevant cases decided by the Human Rights 
Committee of the UN and these will also be alluded to where pertinent. In this 
section an overview will be provided but reference will be made throughout the 
thesis to specific international provisions and jurisprudence as relevant. 
The treaty provisions differ significantly in their treatment of criminal and 
of civil proceedings: 
132  CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 2.
133  Ibidem, para. 10.
134  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 51.
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International 
Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 
Article 14:
(1) All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In 
the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his 
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law [...]
[...]
(3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, 
in full equality: 
[...]
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in 
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; 
to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of 
this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, 
in any case where the interests of justice so require, and 
without payment by him in any such case if he does not 
have sufficient means to pay for it;
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights 
Article 6 (3):
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law [...]
[...]
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights:
[...]
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient 
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free 
when the interests of justice so require;
Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
of the European 
Union, Article 47:
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility 
of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be 
made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as 
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.
Whilst the ICCPR and ECHR requirements apply prima facie to all the jurisdictions under 
consideration here, there is in force in respect to the Republic of Ireland a reservation 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, which reads:
The Government of Ireland do hereby confirm and ratify the aforesaid Convention 
and undertake faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein 
contained, subject to the reservation that they do not interpret Article 6.3.c of the 
Convention as requiring the provision of free legal assistance to any wider extent 
than is now provided in Ireland.135
135  In force since 03/09/1953; Council of Europe website.
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This reservation was lodged in 1953, since which time legal aid in Ireland has 
developed significantly. The result of the reservation at present is that it would 
be difficult for an individual to bring a case against the Republic of Ireland 
at the European Court of Human Rights to argue that the Convention requires 
additional criminal legal aid to be provided. However, as civil legal aid falls under 
Article 6.1, challenges may and have been brought concerning such provision.
In addition to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, set out above, the EU also has a number of legal aid-specific directives. 
For the moment, however, the obligations largely relate to cross-border issues, 
such as children’s issues where the parents live in different states or proceedings 
involving European Arrest Warrants.136 The Legal Aid Directive137 provides 
instruction on how the costs of legal aid, translation, travel and other expenses 
of cross-border litigation are to be shared between the states involved. Overall, 
as the Directive only regulates legal aid in cross-border disputes, it has had 
“little or no impact on the minimum rules for the provision of legal services of 
Member States”.138 
It can be seen from the provisions reproduced above that the requirement 
to provide criminal legal aid is explicit; all three treaties state that, where 
the interests of justice so require, a criminal defendant must have legal 
representation paid for by the state if he does not have sufficient means to pay 
for his own defence. The financial eligibility criteria applied in the jurisdictions 
under consideration are explored in Chapter 7, and the interpretation and 
application of the ‘interests of justice’ criterion will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
below. The latter will also set out some additional EU requirements for legal 
aid in criminal cases, with limited applicability to the jurisdictions under 
consideration.139
The international position regarding civil cases and legal aid is more 
complex; only the EU Charter contains an explicit requirement for civil legal 
aid but the treaty bodies, particularly the European Court of Human Rights, 
have developed such a requirement through caselaw. This jurisprudence will 
be discussed in detail as it becomes applicable to the discussions in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6. As an initial observation, however, it is notable that the European 
Court of Human Rights, in its jurisprudence concerning civil legal aid under 
Article 6, has focused on an implied aspect; that of access to court. This right 
has been found capable of limitation, despite the absence of any limitation 
clause in the Article itself. Fair hearing itself has received much less attention 
despite its obvious relevance to the question of legal aid. The consequences of 
this interpretative approach by the Court will be examined in Chapter 6 and 
debated further in the conclusions in Chapter 9.
136  A useful summary of the provisions can be found in Kiraly and Squires 2011.
137  EU Council Directive 2003/8/EC.
138  Kiraly and Squires 2011, p. 45.
139  Directive 2013/48 and Directive 2016/1919.
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In addition to the work of the European Court of Human Rights in this area, 
the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe issued, in 1993, a set of 
(non-binding) recommendations on Effective Access to the Law and to Justice 
for the Very Poor. Inter alia , these encourage governments to defray the cost 
of legal advice for the very poor through legal aid and extend legal aid to all 
judicial instances and all proceedings.140 In addition, the Council of Ministers 
in 1978 issued a Resolution on legal aid and advice, which recommends the 
provision of legal aid to ensure that no one is prevented by financial obstacles 
from pursuing or defending his rights in any court matter.141
International treaty bodies dealing with social, cultural and economic rights 
have also pointed out the importance of legal aid as an element of the effective 
exercise of such rights. The European Committee of Social Rights, which 
monitors implementation of the European Social Charter, has for example 
interpreted the Charter as requiring legal aid in, inter alia, housing, social 
assistance, health and employment cases.142 Such findings emphasise the notion 
that “the right to legal aid is a critical precursor to the effective enjoyment of 
socio-economic rights”,143 without arguing for a right to legal aid as a free-
standing socio-economic right.
2.2.3 Domestic constitutional drivers for legal aid
Several of the jurisdictions of North-West Europe have constitutional provisions 
relevant to legal aid, usually in the form of fair trial rights. These provide 
an additional impetus for the establishment and maintenance of a properly 
functioning legal aid scheme.
In Finland, for example, the right to a fair trial is enshrined in the Constitution, 
alongside provisions which reflect the rule of law:
Section 21 – Protection under the law   
Everyone has the right to have his or her case dealt with appropriately 
and without undue delay by a legally competent court of law or other 
authority, as well as to have a decision pertaining to his or her rights or 
obligations reviewed by a court of law or other independent organ for the 
administration of justice. 
Provisions concerning the publicity of proceedings, the right to be heard, 
the right to receive a reasoned decision and the right of appeal, as well as 
the other guarantees of a fair trial and good governance shall be laid down 
by an Act.
140  Council of Europe Council of Ministers Recommendation No. R(93)1, 8.1.1993.
141  Council of Europe Council of Ministers Resolution (78)8 on Legal Aid and Advice.
142  European Committee of Social Rights, 2008.
143  Durbach 2008, p. 71.
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The Constitutional Committee of Parliament addresses constitutional ramifications 
of legislative proposals and has drawn inter alia the Finance Committee’s 
attention to the need to protect the “fundamental rights to a fair trial … [and] 
to have a case heard appropriately in court … within a reasonable time and at 
reasonable cost”,144 even when spending cuts are needed. Similarly, the Swedish 
constitution provides that legal proceedings must be processed fairly145 and that 
courts must pay regard to the equality of all before the law.146 The equivalent 
provision of the Icelandic Constitution covers criminal and other cases and 
mandates fair trial before an independent and impartial court of law.147 
Chapter E of the Norwegian Constitution sets out various human rights 
which are protected, including at Article 95 that:
Everyone has the right to have their case tried by an independent and 
impartial court within reasonable time. Legal proceedings shall be fair and 
public. [...] The authorities of the state shall ensure the independence and 
impartiality of the courts and the members of the judiciary. 
The Danish constitution, despite containing a chapter on individual rights,148 
does not include fair trial rights within its provisions. However, the European 
Convention of Human Rights has been incorporated in Danish law since 1992 
and thus Article 6 is directly applicable. 
The UK, including England & Wales, has no single constitutional document 
and there are no written constitutional provisions concerning fair trial rights. 
However, the Magna Carta of 1225 famously provided that “to no one will we 
sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice”, a provision which applied to all 
“free men” and which over the centuries was seen as giving, for example, a 
right to trial by jury.149 In modern times, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to which the UK has been a party since 1951, has been the applicable 
source of human rights protection. The Human Rights Act 1998 gave domestic 
effect to the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights 
and thus Article 6 fair trial rights are directly applicable, although there is a 
commitment by the current government to revoke the 1998 Act.150 In addition, 
in Scotland the Scotland Act 1998 provides that “a member of the Scottish 
Government has no power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do 
any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with any of the 
Convention rights or with EU law”.151
Despite having, nominally, a constitution, Northern Ireland has no single 
constitutional document; the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 deals 
144  GrUU 29/2014 rd — RP 131/2014 rd.
145  Regeringsform, 1974, Chapter 2, Article 11(2).
146  Ibidem, Chapter 1, Article 9.
147  Constitution of the Republic of Iceland, Article 70.
148  Grundlov, 1953, Part VIII.
149  Breay and Harrison 2014.
150  Conservative Party Manifesto 2015.
151  Scotland Act 1998, s. 57(2).
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only with aspects of devolution and with discrimination on religious and 
political grounds. There are no constitutional provisions which give fair trial 
rights. However, as in the rest of the UK the Human Rights Act 1998 applies 
and gives domestic effect to, inter alia, Article 6 fair trial rights. It is accepted 
that “legal aid plays a vital role in ensuring that there is fair and equal access to 
justice in Northern Ireland”.152 
The Republic of Ireland is interesting in having two main sets of constitutional 
provisions which have led to significant caselaw on legal aid. Firstly, in respect to 
criminal proceedings, Article 38 provides that “no person shall be tried on any 
criminal charge save in due course of law.” In addition, Article 40 sets out rights 
which are relevant to the conduct of court proceedings:
1. The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its 
laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. 
2. The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust 
attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good 
name, and property rights of every citizen.153 
These provisions have together been held by the Supreme Court to amount in 
some circumstances to a constitutional right to legal aid in criminal proceedings. 
The reasoning bears repeating at some length:
Article 38 deals specifically with a criminal trial and provides that no person 
should be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law. This Article 
must be considered in conjunction with Article 34; with Article 40, s. 3, 
sub-s. 1, under which “the State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as 
far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of 
the citizen” and with sub-s. 2 of the same section under which “the State 
shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack 
and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, 
and property rights of every citizen.” Being so considered, it is clear that 
the words “due course of law” in Article 38 make it mandatory that every 
criminal trial shall be conducted in accordance with the concept of justice, 
that the procedures applied shall be fair, and that the person accused will 
be afforded every opportunity to defend himself. If this were not so, the 
dignity of the individual would be ignored and the State would have failed 
to vindicate his personal rights.154
152  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016, p. 2.
153  Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
154  The State (Healy) v. Donoghue, 1976, judgment of O’Higgins C.J, p. 349.
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The requirements of fairness and of justice must be considered in relation 
to the seriousness of the charge brought against the person and the 
consequences involved for him. Where a man’s liberty is at stake, or where 
he faces a very severe penalty which may affect his welfare or his livelihood, 
justice may require more than the application of normal and fair procedures 
in relation to his trial. Facing, as he does, the power of the State which is 
his accuser, the person charged may be unable to defend himself adequately 
because of ignorance, lack of education, youth or other incapacity. In such 
circumstances his plight may require, if justice is to be done, that he should 
have legal assistance. In such circumstances, if he cannot provide such 
assistance by reason of lack of means, does justice under the Constitution 
also require that he be aided in his defence? In my view it does.155
On the civil side, the High Court has considered the extent to which there exists 
a constitutional duty to provide legal aid. Expanding upon the previously-
established constitutional right of access to court,156 the High Court concluded 
that:
the unfortunate circumstances of the plaintiff in the present case are such 
that access to the courts and fair procedures under the Constitution would 
require that she be provided with legal aid.157
Thus, the Irish constitution has proven an effective tool for the provision of 
access to justice through legal aid.
Within the geographical scope of this thesis (the Nordic countries, the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland), then, it is clear that legal aid 
schemes covering criminal and other matters are required. At least the adherence 
to the rule of law and compliance with international treaty obligations, and 
potentially also constitutional requirements, mandate such assistance in some 
circumstances. The details of how these jurisdictions select cases for funding, 
and the administrative nature of their legal aid and public defender schemes, 
are the subject of this thesis.
2.3 Area of operation of legal aid
2.3.1 Judicial systems and legal professions as the operational sphere of  
 legal aid
The definition of legal aid set out in the introduction to this thesis establishes 
that, for current purposes, legal aid pays for lawyers to help individuals in their 
interactions with the legal system. Therefore, both the nature and operation 
of the legal profession and the structure of the courts are highly relevant in 
understanding legal aid in any given jurisdiction. Significant difference in 
these elements may require different approaches in the provision of legal aid 
155  Ibidem, p. 350.
156  Macauley v. The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, 1966.
157  O’Donoghue -v- Legal Aid Board & ors, 2004, as per Mr Justice Kelly.
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and may also affect the cost of providing assistance particularly, for example, 
if a bifurcated legal profession means that two lawyers are needed. In addition 
to the general arrangement of the legal profession, jurisdictions may have 
rules limiting legal aid work to certain sectors of the profession. Details of the 
arrangements for use of lawyers in criminal legal aid and as public defenders 
will be given in Chapter 3, but an overview across both civil and criminal work 
will be given here. The nine jurisdictions under consideration show significant 
variety in their judicial systems, legal professions and distribution of legal aid 
although clear patterns emerge. 
2.3.2 Judicial systems
A brief examination of the court systems of the Nordic countries, the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland reveals three main groupings. 
The Finnish court system is organised separately for administrative matters 
and for all other matters. The General Courts deal with civil and criminal 
matters and appeals can be made to the Court of Appeal and ultimately the 
Supreme Court. There is an absolute right for either party to appeal to the 
Court of Appeal in more serious matters but in other Court of Appeal cases, 
and for all appeals to the Supreme Court, leave is required. However, all matters 
concerning decisions by or responsibilities of local or central government 
authorities, public bodies, parliamentary agencies or the President’s office fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Courts.158 Administrative Court 
decisions are appealed directly to the Supreme Administrative Court159 and 
leave to appeal is required for some types of case. In addition to these two main 
judicial venues, there are also a number of specialist courts, in particular the 
Commercial Court, Labour Court and Insurance Court. The Ministry of Justice 
also administers several dispute resolution boards such as consumer dispute 
boards and insurance boards. It is possible for parties to appear before any level 
of court without representation, with the minor exception that representation is 
necessary in Supreme Court cases concerning procedural errors.160 
Sweden also has a court system which is divided into general and 
administrative courts. Each kind of court has 3 tiers: first-instance courts, 
in the case of general courts called District Courts and otherwise simply 
Administrative Courts; Appeal Courts and Administrative Appeal Courts; and 
the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court. Individuals are entitled 
to appear before any of these courts without representation. Finland and 
Sweden thus form the first group: jurisdictions divided into administrative and 
general courts, with three separate tiers in each (apart from in administrative 
cases in Finland, with only two tiers).
158  Förvaltningslag, 2003, 2 §, para. 2.
159  Except where there is no right of appeal such as in parking fine cases.
160  Lag om ändring av 15 och 31 kap. i rättegångsbalken, 2011, 1 §.
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Norway has a single court system which deals with criminal, civil and 
administrative matters, and in addition some specialist courts dealing with 
particular types of matter, such as the Land Consolidation courts and the 
Industrial Tribunal.161 There are three levels in the court hierarchy, beginning 
with the 66 District Courts which hear all cases162 as the court of first instance. 
Six Courts of Appeal hear appeals from District Courts in both civil and criminal 
matters. Appeals will only be heard in full if a screening committee of three 
judges believes there is merit in the appeal.163 The highest court in Norway is 
the Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction in all types of case but will not revisit 
the question of guilt or innocence in criminal cases; only sentencing and 
procedural issues are appealable. The stated aim of the Supreme Court is “to 
ensure uniformity, clarity and development of the law”164 and thus the Appeals 
Selection Committee in general gives leave to appeal in cases which raise points 
of legal principle. There is no requirement for representation before courts 
other than the Supreme Court, in which a party can be required to obtain 
representation if they are unable to properly present the case unaided.165
Since the beginning of 2018, Iceland has had a three-tier court system: 
district courts, a new Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. All proceedings 
(criminal, civil and administrative) commence in one of the eight District 
Courts. If certain conditions are met, an unsatisfied party can appeal the 
judgment of the District Court to the Court of Appeal and further, with 
permission of the higher court, to the Supreme Court. It is intended that very 
few cases will proceed to the Supreme Court, and that these cases will be those 
where it is useful for a precedent to be set. Representation is not required 
before any court.
Denmark also has a unified court system: civil, criminal and administrative 
cases are all heard by the same courts. The first tier court is the County Court, 
which hears civil, criminal, enforcement, probate and bankruptcy cases. 
Since 2008, civil claims involving sums of up to DKK 50,000 (approx. 6,700 
€) are dealt with through an accelerated small claims procedure, unless the 
judge decides they are complex and require handling through the usual court 
process.166 There are 24 County Courts in Denmark. 
Appeals against decisions of the County Court are made to the two High 
Courts, which can also hear civil matters at first instance upon referral from 
the County Court. The specialist Maritime and Commercial Court, which 
deals inter alia with bankruptcy, compulsory debt settlement and some 
debt rescheduling matters, replaces both the County and High Court within 
its areas of jurisdiction. The highest court in Denmark is the Supreme Court 
161  The Courts of Norway website.
162  Except those within the competence of the specialist courts.
163  Although criminal cases involving a possible prison sentence of 6 years or more cannot be 
       refused an appeal hearing.
164  The Courts of Norway website.
165  Tvistemålsloven, 1915, § 3(2).
166  Retsplejeloven, 2017, Chapter 39.
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which hears appeals from the High Courts and the Maritime and Commercial 
Court. Leave is needed to appeal to the Supreme Court and in criminal matters 
appeal to the Supreme Court is only possible on a point of law; the factual 
conclusions of the trial jury will not be revisited.167 In civil cases leave to appeal 
will only be granted if the matter raises a point of legal principle or is of general 
importance.168 
As a general rule, courts hold oral hearings to fulfil the basic principle that 
the justice system should operate in public, and representation is not mandated. 
In small claims cases the judge has a duty to assist the parties169 although 
assistance is not given with completing the application forms and formulating 
the claim.
The Republic of Ireland has a legal system in which most court levels are 
unitary, i.e. the court deals with all types of matters. The court of first instance 
for most cases170 is the District Court; more serious cases are heard by the 
Circuit Court. The Circuit Court hears criminal cases by jury trial and civil 
cases up to a certain financial limit.171 The next level up is the only part of the 
courts system which is divided: the High Court acts as an appeal court from 
the Circuit Court in civil matters and has power to review the decisions of 
certain tribunals, whilst the Central Criminal Court hears trials for murder, 
rape, aggravated sexual assault, treason, piracy and related offences. The Court 
of Appeal was established in October 2014 as an additional appeal level for 
both civil and criminal cases, above which the Supreme Court hears appeals 
in matters of general public importance, or where the interests of justice 
require an appeal to that Court.172 The court system is adversarial and as such 
representation is common although there is no requirement to be represented 
before the courts at any level.
Norway, Iceland, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland form the second 
group, with a unitary court system dealing in principle with all types of case, 
with first-instance courts and two appeal tiers (or in some cases in the Republic 
of Ireland, three). Specialist courts may also exist parallel to the general courts.
Northern Ireland has been a separate jurisdiction within the UK since 1921 
and the current division of legislative responsibility between the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and the UK Parliament is set out in the Northern Ireland Act 
1998. Much Northern Irish legislation echoes that in the rest of the UK and 
the justice systems are still closely related; UK Appeal Court cases are highly 
persuasive (although not binding) in Northern Ireland and the UK Supreme 
167  Ibidem, Chapter 83.
168  Ibidem, § 253.
169  Ibidem, § 406.
170  Apart from terrorism and organised crime cases.
171  Unless all parties to an action consent, in which event the jurisdiction is unlimited.  
      The limit of the court’s jurisdiction relates mainly to actions where the claim does not 
        exceed €75,000 and the rateable valuation of land does not exceed €253.95. 
172  Appeals to the Supreme Court are usually from the Court of Appeal but can also be  
      from the High Court with leave.
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Court is the highest court also for Northern Ireland. Legal aid is governed 
independently from the rest of the UK; the court service and some policing 
and justice powers (including legal aid) were devolved by an amendment to the 
1998 Act with effect from April 2010.173 
Civil and criminal courts in Northern Ireland are largely separate at 
the lower levels and all criminal cases are heard at first instance in either the 
Magistrates’ or Crown Court. Criminal offences are of three categories of 
seriousness: summary offences punishable by a fine of up to £5,000 or a prison 
sentence of up to six months; ‘either-way’ offences which have a potential 
penalty of between 6 and 12 months’ imprisonment; and indictable offences 
which may result in a prison term of over 12 months. Broadly speaking, the 
Magistrates’ Courts hear summary offences and either-way offences where the 
defendant has opted out of trial by jury.174 The Crown Court tries indictable 
offences and either-way offences where the defendant has chosen trial by 
jury. However, there are certain offences which can be heard at either court as 
selected by the prosecution175 and others where the magistrate can decide to 
try an offence which would otherwise be indictable, if certain conditions are 
fulfilled.176
Civil cases within the family sphere are also heard by the magistrates’ courts 
(known in such cases as the Family Proceedings Court), but other civil cases 
are heard by the County Courts or, if particularly grave or complex, the High 
Court. Within the County Court, cases with a value of under £3,000177 are 
heard through a special “small claims track” which uses a simplified procedure. 
The High Court hears most civil matters with a value of above £30,000 and 
has various sub-divisions which hear appeals from lower courts in both civil 
and criminal cases as well as first instance hearings of some civil matters. The 
higher appeal courts for both civil and criminal cases are the Court of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court. There is no obligation for a party to be represented in 
proceedings before any court, but, as in the Republic of Ireland, representation 
is usual before all courts except the small claims track of the County Court.
Scotland has been part of the United Kingdom since the Act of Union 1707 
merged the Kingdom of Scotland and the Kingdom of England to form the new 
Kingdom of Great Britain. However, the Act explicitly left the Scottish Court 
of Session and Court of Justiciary with “the same Authority and Privileges, 
as before the Union”.178 Recent devolution has cemented the position; the 
Scotland Act 1998 and Scotland Act 2012, which prescribe the role of the 
Scottish Parliament, permit the passing of legislation on any matter which is 
173  The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Amendment of Schedule 3) Order 2010.
174  Magistrates’ Court Order (NI) 1981, Article 29.
175  As defined in the specific legislation establishing the offence.
176  Magistrates’ Court Order (NI) 1981, Article 45.
177  Not including personal injury claims which are always heard using the full County  
      Court procedure.
178  Act of Union 1707, Article 19.
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not reserved179 and justice and the courts are not on the list of reserved matters. 
As a result, the courts of Scotland form a separate jurisdiction within the UK 
applying legislation passed by the UK Parliament (where these have force in 
Scotland) as well as that passed by the Scottish Parliament.
The courts in Scotland are divided into those with criminal and those with 
civil jurisdiction. Less serious criminal offences are heard by local Justice of 
the Peace Courts. These courts apply a summary (non-jury) procedure and can 
impose a penalty of up to 60 days’ imprisonment or a fine of up to £2,500. 
However, most criminal matters are heard by the Sheriff Courts which, in 
addition to their civil jurisdiction (see below) can conduct criminal trials using 
both summary procedure and and solemn (jury) procedure. The most serious 
crimes such as murder and rape can be heard directly by the High Court of 
Justiciary, which also handles appeals from the Sheriff Court. There is no 
further appeal available in criminal cases in Scotland except that if there is an 
alleged breach of the European Convention on Human Rights or European law 
a referral to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is possible. 
Sheriff Courts are also the first instance venue for most civil cases although 
particularly complex or high value cases are heard at first instance by the Outer 
House of the Court of Session. The Inner House of the Court of Session hears 
appeals on a point of law from the Outer House and from the Sheriff Court; on 
a point of law a further appeal is possible to the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom with permission of either the Inner House or the Supreme Court. 
In addition to the regular Scottish courts there are also a number of specialist 
courts and tribunals including the Scottish Land Court and the Lands Tribunal 
for Scotland, and the Court of the Lord Lyon which deals with heraldry 
matters. There is no requirement for representation in any Scottish court.
England & Wales is the largest jurisdiction in the United Kingdom, with 
89% of the total UK population resident here (compared with 8% in Scotland 
and 3% in Northern Ireland).180 Although the Welsh Assembly has many areas 
of legislative competence,181 responsibility for the court service and legal aid are 
not yet devolved. The Silk Commission on Devolution in Wales recommended 
in 2014 that there should be a review of the case for devolution of legal aid 
within 10 years.182 No devolution of the justice function has yet come to 
fruition,183 but a Commission on Justice in Wales is currently undertaking 
a review of the operation of justice in Wales and considering how the Silk 
Commission recommendations might be implemented. 
The court structure in England & Wales is complex as it has developed 
organically over a period of a thousand years without any clear overarching 
plan. The roles of the various courts overlap to an extent but civil and criminal 
179  Scotland Act 1998, s.29.
180  Office for National Statistics 2015.
181  Schedule 7 to the Government of Wales Act 2006.
182  Commission on Devolution in Wales 2014, Recommendation 28.
183  Sherlock 2015.
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cases are to a large degree dealt with separately.184 Almost all criminal cases 
commence in the magistrates court and over 90% are concluded at that level,185 
but the more serious criminal matters are committed (i.e. forwarded) to the 
Crown Court. Cases at Magistrates’ Courts may be heard either by magistrates, 
who are trained, unpaid lay persons, or by District Judges. Magistrates’ Courts 
deal with certain more minor offences (‘summary offences’) and ‘either-way 
offences’ for which in general either the court or the defendant can insist on the 
case being referred up to the Crown Court. The penalties which the Magistrates’ 
Court can impose are up to 6 months in prison (or up to 12 months in total 
for more than one offence), a fine of up to £5,000 or a community sentence.186 
In addition to either-way offences, the Crown Court hears serious ‘indictable’ 
offences such as murder, rape and robbery, almost always by jury trial. The jury 
decides guilt or innocence, and the presiding judge passes sentence. 
Appeals can be made against the conviction as a whole or against the 
sentence. From the Magistrates’ Courts, appeals are in general to the Crown 
Court;187 appeals from convictions at the Crown Court are generally heard by 
the Court of Appeal Criminal Division,188 with leave of the court. An appeal 
from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court is only possible if the Court 
of Appeal has certified that there is a point of law of general public importance 
involved in the case.
The family courts are a specialist division of the magistrates’ court, with 
specially trained magistrates. These courts hear most family cases at first 
instance and appeals go to the Family Division of the High Court, and then 
on to the Court of Appeal Civil Division on a point of law, and potentially the 
Supreme Court in a case of general public importance.
Although a small group of civil cases begin in the Magistrates’ Court, most 
are heard at the County Court, by professional judges only very rarely assisted 
by a jury. However, some types of case such as judicial review and libel claims 
are reserved to the High Court, which also hears personal injury claims for 
over £50,000 and other money claims of over £100,000.189 The County Court 
has various ‘tracks’ with differing procedures depending on the type and value 
of the case. The small claims track is the track for claims where the financial 
184  The chart at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/courts-  
         structure-0715.pdf is useful to understand the structure.
185  The Courts and tribunals judiciary website, 2016.
186  Government website.
187  However, if sentence was handed down by the Crown Court, an appeal against that sentence 
     will be to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division even if the conviction itself took 
         place at the Magistrates’ Court. Some appeals from the Magistrates’ Court are to the Administrative 
       Court (a division of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court).
188  Criminal appeals on points of law may also be heard in the Queen’s Bench Division  
      of the High Court.
189  Sime 2016.
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value of the claim is not more than £10,000;190 the fast-track covers most claims 
where the financial value is not more than £15,000 and the court considers that 
the trial is not going to be relatively simple in evidence terms and not last for 
more than one day; the multi-track covers all remaining cases.
Appeals from the County Court may, depending on the circumstances, be 
to the High Court or the Court of Appeal; appeals from the High Court are 
to the Court of Appeal. Permission is required to appeal most decisions of 
County Court and High Court judges.191 Further appeals in civil cases will be 
to the Supreme Court, but only in cases of public importance. In most cases 
only one appeal will be possible. Litigants at all levels are entitled to represent 
themselves.
The jurisdictions of the UK thus form a third group, with judicial systems 
which separate criminal cases out at least to a large extent, at trial stage. Civil 
and administrative cases are heard together in the non-criminal courts. There 
is some overlap, for example in the Magistrates’ Courts in England & Wales and 
the Sheriff Courts in Scotland, and at the appeal level this overlap increases. 
The highest court, the Supreme Court, hears any type of case. There is not, in 
these jurisdictions, a clear three-tier structure for appeals; a complex appeals 
structure depends on the case type and judicial venue at first instance. 
To the extent that any judicial system is so complex that it is difficult to 
navigate without advice, there may be an impact on legal aid. Within the 
jurisdictions described above, the three court systems of the UK are particularly 
complicated and it is very likely that a lay person would find it difficult to 
identify the court in which their case should be issued. However, even the 
division between administrative and general courts in Sweden and Finland may 
cause confusion for individuals. The Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic judicial 
structures are straightforward to navigate as all cases commence at the same 
court. In the Republic of Ireland, the situation is more complex as although 
there is no division into general/administrative or civil/criminal, there are a 
number of overlapping competences of courts.
2.3.3 Legal professions
The nature of the legal profession impacts upon legal aid in several ways. The 
extent to which the legal profession has a monopoly on representation in court 
is relevant, as if there is no such monopoly assistance may be obtained, usually 
more cheaply, from other sources. This in turn may either relieve the state of 
any cost, if the individual pays, or if the non-lawyer advisor is permitted to 
act under the terms of the legal aid scheme, reduce the cost to the state by 
lowering the legal aid fee. Additionally, an individual may be able to obtain free 
support and help in court from, for example, family and friends. Conversely, 
190  As well as any claim by a tenant of residential premises against his landlord for repairs, where 
      the estimated cost of the repairs is not more than £1000.
191  Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 52.3.
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a professional monopoly can be beneficial as it brings the advantage of 
professional disciplinary control in enforcing quality and ethical standards, 
which can provide a level of assurance that legal aid money is being well spent. 
The way in which the profession operates can impact on the cost of legal aid, 
particularly if lawyer specialisations mean that more than one lawyer is needed 
for a case, or if within the profession specialists can increase their charges 
because of demand for expert services. Furthermore, the political strength of 
the profession determines the level of influence it has over legal aid fees and 
structures. Several of these themes will be returned to in Chapter 7, but it is 
useful to have an overview of the relevant legal professional structures in mind 
before exploring the detail of legal aid in the following chapters.
Legal services in Finland are relatively unregulated. Since 2014 only a 
member of the Bar Association or a registered lawyer may act as an advocate 
in court but office-based legal services can still be provided by anyone, with no 
restriction on use of the title ‘jurist’. The qualified legal profession in Finland 
can be considered in three sections, all of which are overseen to at least some 
extent by the Finnish Bar Association. The most highly qualified lawyers are 
attorneys (‘advokat’) who are members of the Finnish Bar Association. To 
join the Bar Association, a lawyer must be over 25, have a Masters’ degree 
in law, at least 4 years’ experience in the legal field of which 2 years must be 
in a law office, and pass the Bar exam. The next most regulated group are 
Public Legal Aid Attorneys; attorneys or other lawyers employed by Public 
Legal Aid Offices. Public Legal Aid Attorneys are state officials, appointed by 
the Minister of Justice. Eligibility for the office of Public Legal Aid Attorney 
requires a Master’s degree in law and adequate experience of advocacy or 
adjudication, and more than half of the Public Legal Aid Attorneys in Finland 
are also members of the Bar Association. All Public Legal Aid Attorneys are 
independent of any other actors in the performance of their commissions, but 
are supervised by the Bar Association (whether or not they are members of it) 
when engaged in advocacy before courts of law. In conducting this work Public 
Legal Aid Attorneys are under an obligation to observe the rules of proper 
professional conduct for attorneys enforced by the Finnish Bar Association. 
The third group of lawyers is licensed legal counsel, who are certified by an 
authorisation Board. To be licenced, a lawyer must have a Masters in law and 
either have relevant experience or pass the Bar exam.192 The work of licensed 
legal counsel is supervised by the Bar Association only to the extent of court 
representation; work outside court is supervised by the authorisation Board. 
Whilst the Bar Association can recommend penalty fines or that a licence be 
revoked, penalties can only be actually imposed by the Board.193 Some, but not 
all, licensed legal counsel go on to become attorneys. 
192  Lag om rättegångsbiträden med tillstånd, 2011, 2 §.
193  Ibidem, 12 §.
54
Lawyers in Sweden can be classified as either advocates (‘advokat’) or jurists 
(‘jurister’). The Swedish legal profession is even less regulated than that in 
Finland, as anyone can appear before any level of court, not only representing 
herself but also representing another person. No qualification is required 
before a person can offer legal services to the public and use the title ‘jurist’. 
The title ‘advokat’ is protected by law and refers to members of the Swedish 
Bar Association, entry to which is restricted to those with a law degree and at 
least 3 years’ experience of practising law, and dependent upon passing the Bar 
exam. Advocates are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Bar Association 
and, generally, only advocates are appointed to carry out public defence work. 
There have been no public law offices in Sweden since reforms in 1997; all 
lawyers providing services to members of the public are in private practice.
The rules on who can practice as a lawyer in Norway are contained in 
Chapter 11 of the Courts of Justice Act 1915.194 Anyone who has completed a 
law degree can give legal advice and assistance to members of the public195 but 
to carry on a legal practice a person must hold a licence issued by the Supervisory 
Council for Legal Practice. To qualify for such a licence, the applicant must 
have a law degree and 2 years’ relevant experience,196 usually including a 
certain amount of litigation experience.197 Under the relevant regulations,198 an 
applicant must have attended an obligatory course. Gaining rights of audience 
before the Supreme Court requires 3 years’ practice experience and the taking 
of a test before the Supreme Court.199 Membership of the Bar Association is 
voluntary, but more than 90% of practising lawyers are members,200 which 
enables them to use the title “advokat”. Membership is seen as a mark of quality, 
as advocates are subject to the Bar Association code of conduct.201 
In Iceland, there are three classifications within the legal profession: lawyers, 
district court attorneys and Supreme Court attorneys. All lawyers must be 
members of the Bar Association and are subject to its disciplinary rules. To 
carry out non-court legal work as a ‘lawyer’, a person must be a law graduate 
from the University of Iceland or equivalent. To achieve the position of district 
court attorney and have the right to represent clients before the courts, a lawyer 
must in addition pass the Bar Exam and assist a practising advocate in at least 
one case before the District Court. There are some additional requirements 
concerning personal qualities, inter alia not having been a bankrupt, being of 
unblemished record and of good mental health. After a period of practice of 5 
years it is possible to qualify to act in the Supreme Court, once certain numbers 
of District Court cases have been conducted and if the Supreme Court judges 
194  Lov om domstolene, 1915.
195  Ibidem, § 218, (2)(1).
196  Ibidem, § 220.
197  FOR-1996-12-20-1161, Chapter11, § 8-1.
198  Ibidem, § 8-2.
199  Lov om domstolene, 1915, § 221.
200  Bar Association of Norway website.
201  Ibidem.
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the advocate fit to work before them on the basis of four argued cases.202 
The Danish legal profession is strictly controlled and membership of the Bar 
and Law Society (Advokatsamfundet) is compulsory for any person carrying 
out the work of a lawyer.203 There are around 6000 advocates (‘advokat’) 
registered with the Society. Qualification as a lawyer requires the holding of 
both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in law, three years’ practical training 
experience and the passing of a final postgraduate oral examination. Any 
advocate is entitled to represent clients before the city courts but further 
qualification is needed in order to appear before the High Court or Supreme 
Court. This permission can be granted by the courts to those who have 
adequately conducted at least two cases before the High Court and (for the 
Supreme Court) have practised for a further five years after qualification. There 
is no legal requirement for representation at any level although in a particular 
case a court may order representation, if need be by a public attorney, if it 
is problematic that a party is unrepresented. If a person does choose to be 
represented in a civil case, in general the representation can only be conducted 
by a lawyer or a member of the person’s household. However, in small claims 
cases or enforcement actions with a value of under 100,000 DEK anyone can 
act as a representative. 
As in the UK (see below), the legal profession in the Republic of Ireland 
is divided into solicitors and barristers. Solicitors are the first point of 
contact with the profession for members of the public and provide advice, 
case preparation and representation for clients. Barristers “provide specialist 
advocacy and advisory services in a wide variety of areas and in many different 
types of forum, including the courtroom”204 and are employed by solicitors to 
work on clients’ cases. Since 1970, solicitors in the Republic of Ireland have had 
rights of audience before all courts including the Supreme Court, but the usual 
practice is that barristers are retained to carry out advocacy from the Circuit 
Court level upwards.
The qualification routes for the two arms of the profession differ. To 
become a solicitor an applicant must either be a graduate or pass a preliminary 
examination. All applicants must then pass the ‘Final Examination First Part’ 
in eight legal subjects, following which they should seek a training contract 
with a firm of solicitors. Once a training contract is secured, the individual 
can commence the Professional Practice Course and over the next 32 months 
will complete the Professional Practice Courses I and II at the Law School and 
undergo practical training in the firm, in alternating blocks of time. Once this 
period has come to an end and the exams have been successfully taken, the 
applicant is qualified as a solicitor and can commence work, although the Law 
Society encourages solicitors to be employed for at least a year in someone else’s 
202  Lög um lögmenn, 1998.
203  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 143.
204  Bar of Ireland website.
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firm before setting up in private practice on their own.205 
Becoming a barrister involves three stages: academic, vocational and 
practical. An applicant must obtain a Law Degree or, if they have a bachelor’s 
degree in another subject,206 take a two year Diploma in Legal Studies. The next 
step is to pass an entrance examination in five legal subjects to gain admission 
to the King’s Inns and then take a one year207 course leading to the degree of 
Barrister-at-Law. Once this course is passed, an applicant will be ‘called to 
the Bar’ and must then undertake a 12-month training period of ‘pupilage’ 
(commonly called ‘devilling’) with a suitably qualified barrister before being 
entitled to practise on his or her own.208
The legal profession in Northern Ireland is also split into solicitors and 
barristers operating the same division of labour as in the Republic of Ireland. 
To qualify as a solicitor it is necessary first to take a qualifying undergraduate 
law degree. After graduation there is a further two year training period spent 
partly undertaking academic studies at the Institute of Professional Legal 
Studies and partly working with a “master”, who must be a solicitor. After 
qualification, solicitors cannot work alone for the first 3 years. There are about 
2700 solicitors in practice, mostly in small private practices.209 Solicitors’ rights 
of audience are more restricted than in the Republic of Ireland, Scotland and 
England & Wales; whilst the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 made it 
possible for solicitors to be given powers to appear in higher courts regulations 
effecting the change have not yet been made. To become a barrister, a similar 
route is followed but the master must be a barrister and, in addition to the 
certificate at the Institute, additional advocacy training is arranged by the Bar 
(the barristers’ professional body). There are currently about 700 barristers in 
Northern Ireland.
With a background of historical misgivings about the independence of 
official bodies, the legal profession in Northern Ireland has a particularly 
important role and is determined to retain its independence both in reality 
and in public perception. The Law Society commented, in its response to a 
consultation on the regulatory structures for the profession: 
the independence of the legal profession has a particular significance and 
resonance in Northern Ireland. Despite the ending of the “Troubles” and the 
welcome process of normalisation, there are circumstances of legal practice 
in Northern Ireland which are unique. These, combined with a continued 
context in which manifest sensitivities exist about the accountability 
and independence of state bodies and Government influence over the 
administration of justice […] are all factors which should be taken into 
account.210 
205  Law Society website.
206  Non-graduates over the age of 25 can also qualify by taking the Diploma course.
207  Alternatively the course can be taken part-time over two years.
208  Bar of Ireland website.
209  50% of firms have only one partner and 90% have 3 or fewer.
210  Law Society of Northern Ireland 2005.
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As in the rest of the UK, the legal profession in Scotland is divided into solicitors 
and advocates (the equivalent of barristers in the other UK jurisdictions). A 
member of the public seeking legal help must first approach a solicitor, who 
will advise and carry out most of the preparatory work for court. A solicitor can 
represent a client in Justice of the Peace Courts and Sheriff Courts without 
further qualification. It is also possible for a solicitor with at least 5 years’ 
relevant post-qualification experience to complete additional training and sit 
an exam to qualify as a solicitor advocate. This qualification enables a solicitor 
to appear before any level of court in Scotland, and the UK Supreme Court. The 
advocates’ side of the profession specialises in court representation at all levels 
and is often also instructed to provide a discrete piece of specialist legal advice 
in a case.
Qualification as either a solicitor or advocate generally involves completion 
of an undergraduate degree in Scots law followed by the Diploma in Legal 
Practice. All prospective lawyers must then find a training contract at a 
solicitors’ office; in the case of those intending to qualify as a solicitor this 
training will be for 2 years and completes the training process. For advocates, 
the period of time in a solicitors’ office will be 21 months211 and is followed by a 
further period of training with a qualified advocate. This is known as ‘devilling’ 
and lasts for 9 months, after which the individual can apply to be admitted as 
an advocate.
The legal profession in England & Wales consists, likewise, of solicitors 
and barristers. A client first consults a solicitor, who will advise and carry 
out paperwork, fact-finding and negotiations on their behalf. If the matter 
progresses to court, the question of who will conduct the advocacy arises. All 
solicitors have rights of audience inter alia in Tribunals, Magistrates Courts, 
County Courts and the Family Court. A solicitor may make an application to 
the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA) for civil higher rights of audience 
and if they pass the competency assessment may be authorised to appear in civil 
proceedings in the Crown Court, High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court.212 Solicitors undertaking criminal advocacy must also comply with the 
SRA Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (Crime) Regulations 2013.213 If 
the case is to be heard in a court in which the conducting solicitor does not 
have rights of audience, or if the solicitor or client prefers, the solicitor may 
appoint a barrister to represent the client at court. Barristers are also frequently 
asked to provide advice on specific points and to draft documentation. Only in 
rare situations may a member of the public employ a barrister directly. Judges 
are generally appointed from the ranks of barristers; a number of solicitors 
211  If the individual obtained a first or second class degree this period is reduced to 12  
      months. Faculty of Advocates Regulations as to Intrants. 
212  Solicitors Regulatory Authority Higher Rights of Audience Regulations 2011, Solicitors’ Handbook.
213  Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (Crime) Regulations 2013, Solicitors’ Handbook.
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are also employed in the role but this proportion is small and seems not to be 
growing.214
Students wishing to practice law may either take an undergraduate law 
degree or another bachelors’ degree followed by a one-year Graduate Diploma 
in Law. At this point the two arms of the profession divide. Aspiring solicitors 
undertake a one-year Legal Practice Course followed by a two-year training 
contract with a firm of solicitors. Upon qualification at the end of this training, 
a newly qualified solicitor cannot set up in practice on their own until they have 
worked under supervision for at least 3 years.215 Future barristers undertake the 
Bar Professional Training Course for one year and then spend one year as a 
pupil in barristers’ chambers receiving practical training.
As with the comparison of court systems, there are three different groups of 
legal professional organisation in the jurisdictions under consideration. In the 
UK and Republic of Ireland, the legal profession is divided into solicitors and 
barrister (‘advocates’ in Scotland); each branch has specific responsibilities and 
specialities, but neither can be said to be senior to the other. 
Norway, Denmark and Iceland have unified legal professions which 
are controlled and limited to those who have obtained a certain level of 
qualification and experience. In Norway and Iceland a law degree enables a 
person to provide advice and assistance outside court but further experience 
and a licence is required to represent clients at court. In Denmark post-
graduate legal experience is required to qualify for any legal work, including 
County Court advocacy, although in small claims cases any person can act as 
a representative. In Norway, Bar Association membership is voluntary and 
does not confer any additional areas of permitted work, but is a disciplinary 
and quality indicator. Conversely, in Iceland and Denmark, Bar Association 
membership is compulsory for all practising lawyers. Despite their differences, 
these three jurisdictions can be grouped together as they all require a certain 
level of qualification before legal services can be provided to the public and 
operate a system of increasing qualification permitting increased levels of work. 
In Sweden and Finland, legal practitioners can be from the unregulated 
branch of ‘jurists’ or the professional, regulated ‘advokats’. There is variation 
within this group as in Sweden either type of practitioner can represent clients 
before any court; in Finland, only an advokat, licensed legal counsel or Public 
Legal Aid Attorney can represent clients in court. There is a clear relationship 
of seniority, with the title of advokat superior to that of jurist.
2.3.4 Distribution of legal aid work
The limits on which lawyer can be engaged by a client seeking legally aided 
assistance vary across the jurisdictions. Under international law, there is no 
214  Fouzder 2016.
215  Solicitors Regulatory Authority Practice Framework Rules 2011, Rule 12, Solicitors’ Handbook.
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right to choose one’s own legal aid counsel, but the wishes of the individual 
must be taken into account.216
In Sweden, it is in theory possible for the person representing a client under 
civil legal aid to be legally unqualified; the legislation states that a legal aid 
representative must be “a senior lawyer [advokat], lawyer in a firm [biträdande 
jurist på advokatbyrå] or another suitable person”.217 If the client proposes a 
suitable person, they must be appointed unless there are special reasons for 
not doing so.218 This is in keeping with the unregulated nature of the practice 
of law in Sweden. Under legal aid, the client can only change lawyer for special 
reason, and only once unless there are exceptional reasons.219 Public Attorneys, 
as will be seen in Chapter 3, are provided for defendants in many criminal 
proceedings, but they are also allocated in other cases where the state is taking 
proceedings against an individual such as child care proceedings, compulsory 
treatment of addicts and incarceration under mental health legislation.220 
Norwegian legal aid is provided almost entirely through privately practising 
lawyers, although there are a few state legal aid offices.221 A client has free 
choice of lawyer in civil cases, although dependent of course on the willingness 
of the lawyer to take the case. In criminal cases, defence counsel are appointed 
by the court using a register system which will be described in Chapter 3. In 
Iceland, any qualified advocate can act under legal aid funding or as a public 
defence attorney. 
Any practising solicitor or barrister is entitled to represent a client under 
legal aid in Northern Ireland.222 The criminal and civil legal aid schemes 
both work through payments to private lawyers who, having been instructed 
by a client, apply for the legal fees to be covered by the state. There are no 
government-employed lawyer schemes representing individuals, which may be 
a result of the fierce independence of the legal profession which has historical 
roots in the Troubles.223 Once a client has obtained legal aid to be represented 
by their chosen lawyer, however, they cannot change solicitor and take their 
legal aid with them without the prior authority of the Director of the Legal 
Services Agency.224 Whilst there is legislation allowing civil legal aid to be 
limited to providers who have a contract with the Legal Services Agency,225 
216  ECHR Article 6; ICCPR Article 14. Caselaw includes Croissant v. Germany, 1992, para. 29; 
      Chaplin v. Jamaica, 1995, para. 8.3; Klaus Werenbeck v. Australia, 1997, para. 9.4.
217  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 26 §.
218  Ibidem.
219  Ibidem.
220  A list of some of the governing legislation could be found at Kanslihandbok allmän 
       förvaltningsdomstol, para. 4.4.1., part of the Domstolsverkets handböker, now no longer 
        publicly available.
221  A pilot project took place between 2010 and 2012 in which lawyers were employed by the state to 
       provide one hour of non-means-tested legal advice on any subject within community centres in 
       40 counties. Although this project was positively evaluated, it has not been rolled out further.
222  Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, para. 15.
223  Law Society of Northern Ireland 2005.
224  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 9.
225  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 s.14.
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such a system has not been introduced and there are no current plans to do 
so.226 The Department of Justice has concluded that contracting would not 
provide better value for money although the National Audit Office does not 
accept that this conclusion is properly supported by evidence.227 
Sweden, Norway (in civil cases) and Northern Ireland thus have very few 
provisions limiting the use of legal aid by any lawyer, and Iceland joins this 
group, having no restrictions on the distribution of legal aid cases to lawyers. 
However, several jurisdictions do have systems requiring that lawyers must 
be on some form of register (sometimes involving an element of qualifying or 
contracting) before they are able to carry out work under legal aid. In Denmark 
such a system exists; the Minister of Justice appoints “a suitable number of 
lawyers” to each court to undertake legal aid work.228 The list is prepared and 
updated by the court,229 and the lawyers on the list are obliged to provide legal 
aid advice in order to be permitted to carry out legal aid litigation.230 Lawyers 
who are not on the list for legal aid litigation may also undertake legally aided 
advice work, but only upon application to the Minister. 
In England & Wales, almost all the services provided with legal aid funding 
are organised by the Legal Aid Agency contracting with providers, who are 
most often private firms of solicitors, although contracts for civil work are 
also made with NGOs. A client does not have a free choice of lawyer but is 
obliged to find a contracted supplier with capacity to take the case. However, 
contracts are subject-specific and some subject areas are under-supplied to the 
extent that ‘advice deserts’, i.e. geographical areas without a contracted supplier 
in a subject, are a real problem, particularly in relation to housing law.231 A 
civil legal aid contract provides that the supplier may give advice to a certain 
number of clients per year in a particular subject and indicates whether the 
supplier can also undertake legally aided representation in that subject. The 
definitions determining which matters will fall within a contract are complex 
and frequently change. 
The situation is Scotland is looser, requiring only registration rather than full 
contracting. If a private solicitors’ firm wishes to carry out criminal work, the 
firm and the individual solicitor must be registered232 and comply with a Code of 
Practice.233      
 
226  Stutt 2015, para. 5.39.
227  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016, para. 3.23.
228  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 333.
229  Bekendtgørelse om offentlig retshjælp ved advokater, 2017, § 1.
230  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 333(5).
231  http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/Policy-campaigns/Campaigns/Access-to-justice/end- 
      legal-aid-deserts/.
232  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook, Part II para. 1.1.
233  Scottish Legal Aid Board Code of Practice in relation to Criminal Legal Assistance.
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To carry out civil234 or family235 legal aid work, only the firm needs to register 
with the Scottish Legal Aid Board. This process is administered by the Board 
in cooperation with the Law Society of Scotland, which has issued Ten 
Administrative Requirements for Civil Registration236 which must be met and is 
also tasked with issuing a ‘compliance certificate’ of quality assurance which is a 
prerequisite for registration. The statutory framework is in place for regulations 
to introduce contracting for any criminal legal aid237 or children’s legal aid238 
services at any level, but this has not yet been done, with the exception of the 
police station duty scheme and court and children’s cases duty schemes.
Most legal assistance under legal aid is provided through solicitors in 
private practice, but grant funding is also provided by the Scottish Legal Aid 
Board to law centres for the conduct of civil cases.239 In addition, a small 
proportion of cases are taken on by solicitors directly employed by the Board 
in the Public Defence Solicitors’ Office (PDSO) for criminal cases and in the 
Civil Legal Assistance Offices (CLAO) for civil cases.240 The PDSO and CLAO 
make applications for legal aid for their clients in the same way as private 
practitioners, and the applications are all treated alike. These employed solicitor 
organisations also have the same reporting requirements (for example, the duty 
to report every 6 months on progress of an ongoing legally-aided case), but 
do not submit a bill for payment at the end of the case; the funding is paid 
as a lump sum to the organisation instead. The CLAOs in particular improve 
access to legal advice and support in areas of law and geographical locations 
which are poorly served by private legal aid practitioners, thus reducing the 
problem of ‘advice deserts’ experienced in England & Wales. There is a proposal 
that Scottish third-sector organisations whose clients have complex legal issues 
should also be permitted to provide legal aid services.241
The use of state-employed lawyers in state legal aid offices forms, conversely, 
a mainstay of provision in the Republic of Ireland and in Finland, as will be 
seen in Chapter 4. The provision of legal assistance under legal aid in Finland 
is through private practitioners or state-run Legal Aid Offices; in 2013, 64% of 
legal aid matters were conducted by Legal Aid Offices.242 23 Legal Aid Offices 
around the country are organised within six regions, each led by a Director of 
234  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part I para. 2.1. 
235  Scottish Legal Aid Board Handbook: Children’s Proceedings under the Children’s   
         Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, Part I, para. 1.1.
236  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part I, Chapter 2, and  
         SLAB Practitoner Guide.
237  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s.33A.
238  Ibidem, s.33B.
239  In the year ending 31 March 2016, £6,255,000 grants were made out of a total civil legal aid 
      budget of £41,230,000. Scottish Legal Aid Board Annual Report and Accounts 2016-17.
240  Ibidem. In crime, £2,594,000 out of a total spend of £80,597,000 and in civil   
       £1,769,000 out of £41,230,000 in 2016-17. 
241  Evans 2018, p. 64.
242  Statistics Finland.
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Legal Aid and Public Guardianship District.243 The Offices employ altogether 
about 220 public legal aid attorneys who carry out all types of legal aid work: 
advice and representation in civil and criminal matters. Whilst the starting 
point is that legal aid work is reserved to the Legal Aid Offices,244 private 
practitioners can act in cases which will go before a court245 or where the 
Legal Aid Office cannot act because of lack of capacity, conflict of interests, 
breakdown of trust or inability to provide the service in the appropriate 
national language.246 In a non-court case where a Legal Aid Office cannot act, 
if another Legal Aid Office within a reasonable distance can take the case it 
must be referred there; otherwise a private lawyer can be appointed.247 If an 
applicant requests a private attorney in a non-court case the Legal Aid Office 
dealing with the application must carefully consider whether the grounds for 
appointing a private attorney are present.248 The individual may choose the 
person to be appointed as their lawyer under legal aid, if the requirements for 
using a private lawyer are met, and is entitled to have that choice respected 
unless there are special reasons.249
As divorce and ancillary relief are not dealt with by the courts, these aspects 
of family law can only be dealt with by Legal Aid Offices despite the fact that 
many clients would have money to pay privately with the winnings, and to pay 
the client contribution. The fact that these and other cases not going to court 
must be considered first by a Legal Aid Office and will only be referred out if 
the Legal Aid Office does not have capacity is seen by the Bar Association as 
unfair competition. The generous financial eligibility rules and possibility of 
legal aid with a 100% contribution add to these concerns as it is felt that many 
clients who could appropriately be dealt with by private practitioners, and in 
fact who pay for their assistance albeit at legal aid rates, are reserved to the 
Legal Aid Offices.
Criminal cases in the Republic of Ireland are dealt with by private 
practitioners, but they must be on a panel administered by the Department 
of Justice and Equality, described in Chapter 3. The defendant may request a 
particular solicitor, in which case that person will be appointed as long as they 
are on the panel, unless there is good and sufficient reason to refuse to assign 
that solicitor.250 In respect of civil cases, the Civil Legal Aid Act251 authorises 
the Board to “make legal aid and advice available through […] law centres 
[…] or through solicitors or barristers”.252 In deciding on the locations in 
243  Department of Justice website.
244  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 8 §, para. 1.
245  Ibidem.
246  Lag om statens rättshjälps- och intressebevakningsdistrikt, 2016, 12 §.
247  Ibidem.
248  HFD:2016:27.
249  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 8 §, para. 3.
250  State (Freeman) v Connellan, 1986.
251  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995.
252  Ibidem, s. 30.
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which to establish law centres, the Board must have regard, inter alia, to the 
need for reasonable access nationwide, ready access in areas where the need 
is greatest and the maximisation of resources.253 The majority of provision is 
made through the 33 full-time Law Centres around the country254 from which 
solicitors provide legal advice and representation to the public. 
However, the Legal Aid Board may also, according to statute, contract with 
outside suppliers for services255 and specifically make legal aid and advice 
available through solicitors who have registered on a panel.256 This option is 
exercised by the Board to provide additional services through private solicitors 
where needed. As over 80% of civil legal aid applications are in the area of 
family law,257 it is maybe inevitable that input from private practitioners is 
mainly within this subject. Panels are set up and discontinued as needed; as of 
2018 there is a District Court family law Panel, Circuit Court Panels for separation 
and divorce and for child protection work and a Panel for international 
protection (asylum-seeking, subsidiary protection and leave to remain). A 
new panel in place since 2016 also provides legally aided help in mortgage 
arrears cases through private solicitors. In 2011 it was reported that “in Dublin, 
in general, all District Court family law matters are referred to the Private 
Practitioners Scheme”.258
The availability of a relevant private solicitor panel does not alter the entry 
route into civil legal aid, however. In all cases a potential applicant must 
contact a Law Centre and have an appointment with a Law Centre solicitor to 
discuss their case and receive advice. If a certificate is granted, the case can be 
conducted by a Law Centre solicitor or the certificate can be given to the client 
together with the list of solicitors on the appropriate panel. In the latter case the 
client themselves approaches private firms for assistance, which is then paid for 
by the Legal Aid Board. Whilst enabling high levels of control over expenditure 
on civil legal aid, the delivery of assistance very largely through the law 
centres has disadvantages. In addition to the considerable problems of delay 
in accessing services referred to in Chapter 7 below, the system also engenders 
problems of conflicts of interest, particularly outside Dublin. If a client attends 
a law centre for assistance but it transpires that the other party to the dispute 
has already attended that law centre, the professional rule preventing solicitors 
from acting for parties with conflicting interests will mean that the second 
person will have to seek advice from a different law centre, which may be a 
considerable distance away. The Civil Legal Aid Act states that a law centre may 
provide assistance to more than one party to a dispute259 but the professional 
rule remains in place and renders the statutory permission futile. It should be 
253  Civil Legal Aid Regulations 1996, Regulation 22.
254  The Board also has 20 mediation centres as at April 2018.
255  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, ss. 11(7) and (8).
256  Ibidem, s. 30.
257  In 2017. Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services, 2017, Part 7, p. 7-1.
258  Value for Money and Policy Review of the Legal Aid Board, 2011, para. 2.10.
259  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 30(6).
64
noted that the provision of civil legal aid in the Republic of Ireland does not 
provide any real choice of lawyer to the client.
The distribution of legal aid work amongst lawyers differs radically in 
the jurisdictions being compared. In Finland and the Republic of Ireland, a 
considerable amount of legal aid work is reserved to state-employed lawyers 
in specialist legal aid agencies. In England & Wales, the lawyers who carry 
out legal aid work are private practitioners but must have a contract with the 
Legal Aid Agency; in Scotland and Denmark only registration is required. A 
registration scheme is also in place for public defence work in Norway but in 
civil cases Norway joins Iceland and Northern Ireland in having no restriction 
on the choice of lawyer for a case. In Sweden in theory even an unqualified 
person could receive legal aid to advise, assist or represent a client. 
2.4 Conclusions
It has been seen that all the jurisdictions which are under examination in 
this thesis are under international obligations to provide legal aid in criminal 
cases, and in at least some civil cases. The details of these obligations will be 
further explored in the following chapters. Several of the jurisdictions also have 
constitutional provisions relevant to legal aid, in the form of fair trial rights, 
although none expressly mandate such provision. The generic duty to provide 
legal aid must be realised in the varied settings of the different judicial systems 
and legal professions.
In this regard, the summaries show considerable similarities between the 
three jurisdictions of the UK. They share very similar legal professions and 
their court systems possess similar characteristics, in particular the separation 
of criminal and civil cases at first instance. However, the restrictions on 
distribution of legal aid work to lawyers are not equivalent, as England & Wales 
has a strict contracting system for controlling lawyer eligibility for such work.
The Republic of Ireland shares the structure of its legal profession with 
the UK jurisdictions but its court system has more in common with Norway, 
Denmark and Iceland as there is no division of courts by category of case. The 
Republic of Ireland’s court system is however more complex than the other 
three jurisdictions. The Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic judicial structures 
are unitary and they all have unified, regulated legal professions. In respect of 
selection of lawyers for legal aid work, the Republic of Ireland in civil cases is 
very similar to Finland in having state-employed legal aid lawyers carrying out 
most of the work. This is in contrast to Norway and Iceland which allow free 
choice of any lawyer and Denmark which uses a registration system for private 
lawyers willing to take on legal aid work.
Sweden and Finland are very similar to each other, in comparison with the 
other jurisdictions, with a judicial structure strictly divided between general 
and administrative courts at all levels. These two jurisdictions both have legal 
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professions consisting of regulated advocates and unregulated ‘jurists’ who 
can provide any (in Sweden) or many (in Finland) legal services to the public. 
However, the distribution of legal aid work to lawyers is not at all similar in 
the two jurisdictions; Sweden has almost unrestricted access to legal aid work, 
potentially including non-lawyers, whilst Finland, like the Republic of Ireland, 
retains most such work at public Legal Aid Offices.
The subsequent chapters will compare the legal aid schemes in these nine 
jurisdictions of North-West Europe in detail; the background explored in this 
chapter gives useful context to the following examination. The relationship 
between this background and the findings on legal aid will be considered in the 
conclusions in Chapter 9.
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3. Chapter 3: State-funded assistance for criminal  
 suspects and defendants
3.1 Introduction
In some respects, availability of assistance in criminal cases is the core of access 
to justice. Criminal conviction always has at least some negative effect, by 
intent, and the consequences can be extremely serious. Imprisonment is, in the 
absence of the death penalty in North West Europe, the ultimate exercise of 
state authority over the life of a person, and lesser penalties than imprisonment 
also have a serious impact: fines are intended to cause financial discomfort and 
may cause serious monetary difficulties; community penalties remove freedom 
of movement for certain periods of time; some convictions can render a person 
unable to carry out particular jobs and thus may cause loss of livelihood, and 
any conviction can cause social stigma. The right to a fair criminal trial can 
rightly be described as a “key element of human rights protection and […] a 
procedural means to safeguard the rule of law”.260 
It is well-established, furthermore, that international human rights bodies 
consider legal aid to be “an essential element of a fair, humane and efficient 
criminal justice system that is based on the rule of law.”261 Indeed, in 
international treaties touching on legal aid, the primary focus is on fair trial 
in criminal prosecutions in an attempt to avert the worst abuses of state power 
over individuals. The international obligations touching on fair trial which 
are applicable to the jurisdictions with which we are concerned arise from 
three main sources: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (although this latter does not, of course, apply 
to Norway or Iceland). These will all be considered below, together with the 
interpretation of the provisions by the treaty bodies. 
Fair trial in criminal proceedings can be difficult to achieve without legal 
representation which itself is dependent on being able to afford to pay a lawyer, 
or on the state paying for assistance. Ashworth finds four points of connection 
260  HRC, General Comment No. 32, para. 2.
261  UNODC 2012, A1.
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between the right not to be wrongly convicted262 and legal aid: the complexity, 
technicality and jargon of criminal proceedings; the immense resources of law 
enforcement agencies; the consequences of conviction for an individual and the 
principle of equality before the law.263
The method of providing legal assistance to criminal defendants varies 
between the jurisdictions being compared in this study. In four of the 
Nordic jurisdictions (Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and Norway), advice and 
representation in criminal cases is provided through public defence attorney 
schemes administered by the courts.264 In the UK jurisdictions and the Republic 
of Ireland, criminal matters fall within the legal aid scheme and in Scotland 
and England & Wales are administered alongside civil legal aid. In Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland criminal legal aid is administered by the 
courts whilst civil legal aid is respectively within the remit of the Legal Services 
Agency and Legal Aid Board. Finland operates a dual system whereby legal 
assistance in criminal matters can be obtained either through legal aid or via 
the appointment of a public defence attorney.
Despite these differences, the coverage of state-funded assistance in criminal 
cases is similar in all of the jurisdictions under consideration. In contrast to 
the position in civil cases where most of the jurisdictions under consideration 
implement some form of ‘prospects of success’ test, no tests are applied asking 
whether the accused person is thought likely to be convicted (although 
Scotland does consider whether a defence is frivolous, in the determination of 
whether criminal legal aid should be granted). In criminal matters, rather than 
cases being excluded because they are not sufficiently likely to succeed, they 
may be excluded because the offence is too minor, either judged on the basis 
of the possible sentence upon conviction or on a more general test of whether 
the ‘interests of justice’ require that the accused have representation. The latter 
test encompasses severity of offence but allows a broader range of factors to 
be taken into account, including in some jurisdictions whether the interests of 
someone other than the accused mean that the accused must be represented, 
in the interests of justice. As will be seen in later chapters, several jurisdictions 
significantly restrict the availability of civil legal aid by limiting the types of 
case for which assistance is available. Scope restrictions are by comparison rare 
in state financing of criminal defence, but there are often exclusions for minor 
offences, and in particular road traffic offences.
This chapter will commence with a brief examination of the international 
requirements concerning state-funded legal assistance in criminal cases, before 
considering the organisation of such provision in the UK, the Republic of 
Ireland and the Nordic countries, with particular attention being given to the 
unusual position in Finland. The non-financial restrictions on eligibility and 
262  Ashworth 1996, pp. 55-56.
263  Ibidem, pp. 56-57.
264  Rättegångsbalken, 1942, Chapter 21 (Sweden); Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 102   
         (Norway); Retsplejeloven, 2017, Chapter 66 (Denmark).
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the coverage for appeals against conviction or sentence will then be discussed, 
before conclusions are drawn.
3.2 International obligations
3.2.1 Assistance in criminal proceedings
The main international human rights treaties applying to the jurisdictions 
which are the subject of this study include the right to a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings, with a specific reference to the provision of free legal assistance. 
The main relevant provisions are as follows:
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights, (ICCPR) Article 
14 (3):
In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone shall be entitled to the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
[...]
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself 
in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance 
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of 
justice so require, and without payment by him in any 
such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay 
for it;
European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) 
Article 6 (3):
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights:
[...]
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given 
it free when the interests of justice so require;
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European 
Union, Article 47:
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack 
sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to 
ensure effective access to justice.265
The majority of decided cases are judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights or the former European Commission on Human Rights. However, 
there are some relevant cases decided by the Human Rights Committee of the 
UN and these will be referenced where relevant. There are two relevant EU 
Directives: Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal 
proceedings and Directive 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused 
persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest 
warrant proceedings. Neither of these Directives apply to the UK, the Republic 
of Ireland or Denmark266 and thus, within this study only apply to Finland and 
Sweden and are consequently of limited value here. Nonetheless, where relevant 
265 This provision does not specify that only criminal cases are covered and it is thus also applicable 
        in civil cases, as will be seen in Chapter 4.
266  Directive 2013/48/EU para. 58 and 59; Directive 2016/1919, para. 32 and 33.
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they will be mentioned.
3.2.2 The definition of a criminal charge
The above provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and European Convention on Human Rights apply only to those subject 
to a “criminal charge”267 or “charged with a criminal offence”.268 Whilst in most 
cases it is clear that a criminal charge is being brought, because national law 
classifies the proceedings as criminal, there have been situations in which this 
delineation required deliberation by the European Court of Human Rights. 
For example, in Campbell & Fell v. UK269 the Court considered the situation 
of a hearing before the Board of Visitors of a prison, which domestic law 
did not characterise as criminal proceedings. The Board of Visitors dealt 
with disciplinary offences by prisoners and had power to forfeit remission 
of a sentence, with the effect that a prisoner could be deprived of his liberty 
for longer than would otherwise be the case. The Court found that “both 
the ‘especially grave’ character of the offences with which Mr. Campbell was 
charged [...] and the nature and severity of the penalty that he risked incurring 
and did in fact incur”270 meant that the adjudication was the determination of a 
criminal charge regardless of its status under national law.
The three indicators of a criminal charge were clarified in Benham v. UK 
as “the classification of the proceedings under national law, the nature of the 
proceedings and the nature and degree of severity of the penalty”.271 In that 
case, although the proceedings were again clearly civil under national law, the 
fact that “the proceedings in question were brought by a public authority under 
statutory powers of enforcement [... and] had some punitive elements”, together 
with the fact that “the applicant faced a relatively severe maximum penalty 
of three months’ imprisonment, and was in fact ordered to be detained for 
thirty days”,272 led the Court to find that the applicant had been charged with a 
criminal offence. However, in Aerts v. Belgium,273 incarceration of the applicant 
in a mental hospital did not involve ‘determination of a criminal charge’ despite 
the fact that deprivation of liberty was at stake. It seems that the non-punitive 
nature of the proceedings was decisive.
The EU Directive also addresses the situation where sanctions are applied 
through non-criminal proceedings, but limits its consideration to minor 
matters:
267  ICCPR Art. 14(3).
268  ECHR Art. 6(3).
269  Campbell & Fell v. UK, 1984.
270  Ibidem, para. 73.
271  Benham v. UK, 1996, para. 56.
272  Ibidem, para. 36.
273  Aerts v. Belgium, 1998.
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In some Member States an authority other than a court having jurisdiction 
in criminal matters has competence for imposing sanctions other than 
deprivation of liberty in relation to relatively minor offences. That may be 
the case, for example, in relation to traffic offences which are committed 
on a large scale and which might be established following a traffic control. 
In such situations, it would be unreasonable to require that the competent 
authorities ensure all the rights under this Directive.274
It is clear on the face of both the ECHR and the ICCPR that the state must, 
where the interests of justice so require, pay for legal assistance for an indigent 
defendant in criminal proceedings. This applies even if the defendant himself is 
not present at the trial.275 
3.2.3 Sufficient means to pay
The treaties provide that legal assistance must be given free of charge if the 
defendant does not have ‘sufficient means to pay’. The meaning of this phrase 
has been the subject of very few decisions by the treaty bodies. A case before 
the European Court of Human Rights has however dealt with some procedural 
details. According to the decision in Croissant v. Germany,276 assessment of 
means after the trial is compatible with Article 6 as long as it does not adversely 
affect the fairness of the proceedings.277 Furthermore, it is also acceptable for 
the burden of proving inability to pay to rest with the applicant.278 However, 
in very many cases the state does not contest the issue of ‘sufficient means to 
pay’,279 thus removing the need for a decision by the Court. As McBride notes, 
“there is still uncertainty as to the point at which a person’s financial resources 
make the provision of legal aid necessary”.280 
It is likely that, if faced with the need to decide on a specific situation 
where ability to pay for legal assistance was disputed, the Court would allow a 
wide margin of appreciation to states to set their own financial rules for legal 
aid.281 This would be in keeping with the very varied economic situations in 
the countries of the Council of Europe, and the Court’s traditional reluctance 
to become involved in directly economic matters.282 Chapter 7 below sets out 
information on financial eligibility for legal aid in the jurisdictions under 
consideration, and it will be seen later in the current chapter that the public 
defender schemes are not means-tested.
274  Directive 2013/48/EU, para. 16.
275  Petrina v. Croatia, 2014, para. 47.
276  Croissant v. Germany, 1988.
277 Ibidem, paras. 35 and 36.
278  Ibidem, para. 37.
279  See e.g. Artico v. Italy, 1980; Granger v. UK, 1990; Quaranta v. Switzerland, 1991;  
     Maxwell v. UK, 1994.
280  McBride 1998, p. 259.
281  Ashworth 1996, p. 62.
282  See e.g. Béláné Nagy v. Hungary, 2016.
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3.2.4 The interests of justice
On occasion, when a state has been accused of violating Article 6 through 
lack of provision of a legal aid lawyer to assist a criminal defendant, the state 
has argued that in the circumstances the interests of justice did not require 
representation for the accused, relying on the final phrase of Article 6(3). In 
such cases, the Court has been at pains to examine the arguments in some 
detail and to analyse the content of the proceedings for themselves in order 
to decide whether the interests of justice did require legal assistance for the 
accused. 283 Importantly, proof of actual prejudice to the applicant is not 
required.284
In Granger v. UK,285 the Court emphasised that “whether the interests of 
justice required a grant of legal aid must be determined in the light of the 
case as a whole”,286 and in that determination took into account “not only the 
situation obtaining at the time the decision on the application for legal aid 
was handed down but also that obtaining at the time the appeal was heard”.287 
Thus, the emergence during the appeal hearing of a complex ground of appeal 
required the possibility that the refusal of legal aid could be reconsidered as it 
“would have been in the interests of justice for free legal assistance to be given 
to the applicant at least at that stage for the ensuing proceedings”.288 
Where criminal matters are minor states frequently do not extend either 
the right to be assisted by Counsel, or the right to legal aid, to all cases. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court has: 
accepted that there could be exceptional circumstances dispensing the 
obligation to hold an oral hearing in cases not belonging to the traditional 
categories of criminal law such as proceedings concerning traffic offences 
where the issues at stake were of a rather technical nature, or even relating 
to a factual matter, and where the accused had been given an adequate 
opportunity to put forward his case in writing and to challenge the evidence 
against him. These considerations are not limited to the issue of the lack 
of an oral hearing but may be extended to other procedural requirements 
covered by Article 6.289
Such exclusions established by governments have not always been approved 
by the European Court of Human Rights, however. In a case before the 
lowest criminal courts in the UK, the possibility of a custodial sentence, in 
combination with the application of laws which were “not straightforward” led 
to a requirement of free legal representation in a case concerning non-payment 
of local tax.290
283  See e.g. Artico v. Italy, 1980, para. 34.
284  Ibidem, para. 35.
285  Granger v. UK, 1990.
286  Ibidem, para. 46.
287  Ibidem.
288  Ibidem, para. 47.
289  Marčan v. Croatia, 2014, para. 35.
290  Benham v. UK, 1996, paras. 61-64.
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Before the Human Rights Committee, the fact that in a particular case “charges 
were trivial and ordinary and could in practice only lead to a small fine” led 
to a decision that the claimant had “failed to show that in his particular case 
the ‘interests of justice’ would have required the assignment of a lawyer at the 
expense of the State party”.291
This is in keeping with the EU Directive which observes that:
In some Member States certain minor offences, in particular minor traffic 
offences, minor offences in relation to general municipal regulations and 
minor public order offences, are considered to be criminal offences. In 
such situations, it would be unreasonable to require that the competent 
authorities ensure all the rights under this Directive.292 
Ashworth points out that “it could be argued that no criminal proceedings are 
so trivial that they matter little to defendants” and also suggests an interesting 
possible tactic: “the state should be obliged to provide legal aid for the indigent 
in all proceedings serious enough to involve the criminal law, which might in 
turn persuade states to ensure that their criminal process was reserved for non-
minor wrongs”.293
For the present, though, the European Court of Human Rights continues to 
treat the right to a lawyer paid for by the state under Art 6(3) as “[an aspect] 
of the notion of a fair trial in criminal proceedings”294 and to decide cases by 
looking at the provision in this context, with seriousness of the offence only 
one of many factors to be considered. The Court must “determine […] whether 
the proceedings considered as a whole, including the way in which prosecution 
and defence evidence was taken, were fair.”295 The Court will consider Article 
6(3)(c) together with the general right to a fair trial under Article 6(1).296 If 
proceedings will not be fair without representation of the accused, and the 
accused does not have the means to pay for private legal assistance, such 
assistance must be provided by the state.
291  O. F. v. Norway, paras. 3.4 and 5.6.
292  Directive 2013/48/EU, para. 17.
293  Ashworth 1996, p. 65.
294  Artico v. Italy, 1980, para. 32.
295  Barberà, Messegué & Jabardo v. Spain, 1988, para. 67.
296  Granger v. UK, 1990, para. 43. See also Dvorski v. Croatia, 2013, para. 86 and   
         Omelchenko v. Ukraine, 2014, para. 45.
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3.2.5 Pre-trial assistance
The international human rights treaties reveal an important difference in wording 
as regards early access to legal assistance. The ICCPR provides:
Article 14(3): In the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, 
in full equality:
[...]
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
[emphasis added]
The ECHR, on the other hand, simply provides that:
Article 6(3): Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
[...]
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence;
On the face of the treaties there is arguably the right under the ICCPR but not 
under the ECHR to legal assistance prior to trial. Even under the ICCPR this 
right is not extended so as to provide a right to free legal advice at this stage 
if unable to afford to pay for a lawyer. However, both the UN Human Rights 
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have used the interests 
of justice requirement to extend the reach of this right beyond that which is 
explicit in the treaties.
The Human Rights Committee has been concerned, particularly in capital 
cases, that “legal assistance must be made available to an accused faced with 
a capital crime not only to the trial and relevant appeals, but also to any 
preliminary hearing relating to the case”.297 Furthermore, “it is axiomatic that 
sufficient time must be granted to the accused and his counsel to prepare the 
defence for the trial; this requirement applies to all the stages of the judicial 
proceedings”.298 These statements, made in cases where a lawyer had been 
assigned and paid for by the state, suggest that a legal aid scheme must, at 
least in serious criminal cases, allow for early provision of legal assistance and 
sufficient time for the preparation of the case. This includes time for the lawyer 
to review the statements of prosecution witnesses with his client, and sufficient 
time for the lawyer to ensure the adequate preparation of the defence.299 What 
counts as ‘adequate time’ depends on the circumstances of the case.300 The issue 
of the amount of lawyer time included in legal aid provision is considered 
further in Chapter 7 below.
297  Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 1998, para. 6.2.
298  Little v. Jamaica, 1991, para. 8.3.
299  Ibidem, para. 8.4.
300  HRC General Comment No. 32, para. 32.
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The European Court of Human Rights has shown a different emphasis: less 
time is taken up with capital offences due to their relative rarity in the countries 
of the Council of Europe. Instead, in criminal cases in general the emphasis has 
been on early access to legal help as a necessary prerequisite to a fair trial. The 
Grand Chamber has stated that:
National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused 
at the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the 
prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In such 
circumstances, Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to 
benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police 
interrogation.301
Extending this even further, it has been held that:
an accused person is entitled, as soon as he or she is taken into custody, 
to be assisted by a lawyer, and not only while being questioned. Indeed, 
the fairness of proceedings requires that an accused be able to obtain the 
whole range of services specifically associated with legal assistance. In this 
regard, counsel has to be able to secure without restriction the fundamental 
aspects of that person’s defence: discussion of the case, organisation of 
the defence, collection of evidence favourable to the accused, preparation 
for questioning, support of an accused in distress and checking of the 
conditions of detention.302
Early access to a lawyer is seen as a “procedural guarantee of the privilege 
against self-incrimination and a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment, 
noting the particular vulnerability of an accused at the early stages of the 
proceedings, when he is confronted with both the stress of the situation and 
the increasingly complex criminal legislation involved”.303 This is particularly 
important when the accused is a child.304 A ‘holistic’ approach has been 
suggested by Judge Power-Forde in his dissenting judgment in Dzhulay v. 
Ukraine.305 He remarks that “[from] the moment of arrest until the handing 
down of sentence, criminal proceedings form an organic and interconnected 
whole and an event that occurs at one stage may influence and, at times, 
determine what transpires at another”. He thus urges a presumption that a 
trial is unfair unless access to a lawyer has been given from the initial police 
interrogation. Particularly where disputed confession statements have been 
taken in the absence of lawyers, the Court has found that lack of access to legal 
advice in the early stages prejudices the whole proceedings even where there is 
301  Salduz v. Turkey, 2008, para. 52. See also Blokhin v. Russia, 2013, para. 158; Blaj v.  
      Romania, 2014, para. 88.
302  Dayanan v. Turkey, 2009, para. 32.
303  Yuriy Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, para. 62.
304  Blokhin v. Russia, 2013, para. 160.
305  Dzhulay v. Ukraine, 2014.
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the opportunity to later challenge the statements in court.306
EU Directive 2013/48 imposes a requirement on Finland and Sweden that a 
suspect must have access to a lawyer from the earliest of the following events: 
police questioning; evidence collection by the authorities; deprivation of liberty 
or summons to appear before the court.307 This is built upon in EU Directive 
2016/1919 which states that legal aid should be available where a suspect is 
deprived of liberty, required to be assisted by a lawyer in accordance with EU or 
national law, or is required or permitted to attend an aspect of the investigation 
of the criminal offence.308 Furthermore, legal aid should be available in criminal 
proceedings either when a suspect is in detention or is brought before a judge 
to decide on detention without a means test.309
3.2.6 A lawyer of one’s choice
In criminal cases, both the ICCPR and the ECHR provide the right of a 
defendant to be represented by a lawyer “of his own choosing”. This clearly 
causes difficulties when legal counsel is to be paid for by the state, as funds are 
limited and many jurisdictions have legal aid schemes which provide relatively 
low rates of pay, thus impeding access to lawyers unprepared to work for those 
low fees. The problem was explored in Croissant v. Germany:
It is true that Article 6 para. 3 (c) entitles ‘everyone charged with a criminal 
offence’ to be defended by counsel of his own choosing. Nevertheless, and 
notwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between 
lawyer and client, this right cannot be considered to be absolute. It is 
necessarily subject to certain limitations where free legal aid is concerned 
and also where, as in the present case, it is for the courts to decide whether 
the interests of justice require that the accused be defended by counsel 
appointed by them. When appointing defence counsel the national courts 
must certainly have regard to the defendant’s wishes [...]. However, they can 
override those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for 
holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice.310
The Human Rights Committee is clear that “article 14, paragraph 3(d), does 
not entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him free of charge”,311 
although it has not explained how this finding is supported by the wording of 
the Article. 
The jurisdictions of this study provide some element of choice of counsel 
within their publicly funded criminal assistance schemes, but this choice is 
limited. A common restriction is that counsel must be selected from a register 
306  See e.g. Pakshayev v. Russia, 2014, para. 31; Aleksandr Vladimirovich Smirnov v. Ukraine, 2014, 
      para. 73; Zinchenko v. Ukraine, 2014, para. 88; and Çarkçi v. Turkey (No.2), 2014, para. 45.
307  Directive 2013/48/EU, Article 3(2).
308  Directive 2016/1919, Article 2.
309  Ibidem, Article 4.
310  Croissant v. Germany, 1992, para. 29. Applied inter alia in Zinchenko v. Ukraine, 2014, para. 93.
311  Chaplin v. Jamaica, 1995, para. 8.3; Klaus Werenbeck v. Australia, 1997, para. 9.4.
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kept by the authorities. In Norway, for example, the courts must advertise 
vacancies for public defence attorneys in the newspapers and notify the local 
Bar Association.312 After the published application deadline has passed, the 
chief justice of the court makes recommendations to the court administration 
and the recommended lawyers are appointed as permanent public defence 
attorneys for that court. When a public defence attorney is needed, the 
selection will be made from the list and, assuming that there is more than one 
such person appointed at that court, they will normally act in turn.313 There 
is however some concern that, particularly in Oslo, the permanent defender 
scheme is anti-competitive and may not be performing its role of ensuring 
quality because the work is often delegated to other lawyers in the permanent 
defender’s firm.314
If the permanent attorneys are so busy that it would cause delay to appoint 
one of them, another lawyer satisfying the eligibility criteria for a public 
defence counsel may be chosen by the court.315 The government has pointed out 
in its recent proposal for a new Criminal Procedure Act that the right to a free 
choice of public defender is an important procedural safeguard for the accused. 
Nonetheless, efficiency of the criminal courts is an important consideration and 
difficulties can arise when a particular lawyer is popular and thus very busy; a 
compromise has to be reached between choice and delay.316
Finland has a generous approach to the choice of lawyer; any public legal 
aid attorney or advocate317 can be appointed as a public defender unless they 
are personally disqualified. Furthermore, if no such person is available or there 
are other special reasons, a licensed legal counsel (see Chapter 2) can also be 
appointed.318 Legal aid in criminal cases can be provided by a public legal aid 
attorney at a Legal Aid Office, or by any private lawyer applying for legal aid in 
the same way as for civil/administrative cases (see Chapter 4 below).
The Swedish arrangement for public defenders is similar; the general rule 
is that an advocate should be appointed, but in special circumstances a less 
legally-qualified person can be allocated the defence role. Usually, a person 
who is experienced in appearing before the court should be appointed.319 The 
National Courts Administration’s online Handbook on criminal proceedings 
clarifies that different courts have different practices concerning the selection 
and appointment of public defence attorneys. These include sharing the work 
between the lawyers working in the geographical area of the court by means of 
lists of lawyers willing to take on the work.320 Such courts are thus operating 
312  FOR-2011-03-04-251.
313  Straffeprosessloven 1981, § 103.
314  NOU 2016: 24, para. 9.4.3.8.
315  Ibidem.
316  Ibidem, para. 9.4.
317  See Chapter 2 for an explanation of this qualification.
318  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2, 2 §.
319  Rättegångsbalken, 1942, Chapter 21, 5 §.
320  Domstolsverkets handböcker, brottmål, chapter 3.3.
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under a very similar scheme to that in Norway. It is not necessary for the 
Swedish defendant to be asked for their opinion on the choice of lawyer before 
allocation, but they are given the opportunity to comment after the allocation, 
and a change can be permitted by the court in certain circumstances.321
In Iceland, the accused person must be given the opportunity to select the 
lawyer who is to be appointed and this choice must be respected unless there is 
reason to believe that there would be a risk to the investigation if that person 
was appointed.322 Any suitably qualified lawyer can be appointed as public 
defender, and all Icelandic attorneys are obliged to take on criminal work even 
if they specialise in civil or administrative cases, to ensure sufficient availability. 
The accused can also request a change of public defender and this must be 
permitted unless it would cause delay.323 Denmark adds a further category of 
persons who can be appointed as official defenders: in addition to advocates 
with rights of audience and others approved by the Minister of Justice, 
advocates from other Nordic countries can be given the role if appropriate in 
the circumstances of the case.324 
The legal aid panel in the Republic of Ireland is maintained for the whole 
jurisdiction by the Courts Policy Division of the Department of Justice and 
Equality. Solicitors wishing to carry out legally aided criminal work must 
apply to be put on the list of panel members and show evidence of the relevant 
tax certification. Barristers have an additional hurdle of approval by the Bar 
Council before they can apply to the panel. However, it is not necessary to show 
expertise in criminal law and in effect the panel acts as a useful list of those 
willing to take on criminal legal aid cases.
Solicitors wishing to carry out criminal defence work in England & Wales 
under legal aid must have a contract with the Legal Aid Agency, which will 
specify the types of work which the provider is authorised to carry out, such as 
police station advice or Magistrates’ Court representation. Bidding rounds for 
contracts take place periodically, and although the process is not competitive, 
there are a significant number of criteria which must be met before a contract 
will be awarded. These criteria cover issues such as quality of legal work, 
administrative processes and compliance with detailed rules on how work is to 
be carried out. Contracts generally last for three years.325 
If a private solicitors’ firm in Scotland wishes to carry out criminal 
work, the firm and the individual solicitor must be registered326 and comply 
with a Code of Practice.327 Unlike in England & Wales, there is no explicit 
contracting system in place but some practitioners feel that the compliance 
rules have become so detailed that they amount to ‘contracting by the back 
321  Ibidem.
322  Lög um meðferð sakamála, 2008, § 33(3).
323  Ibidem, § 34.
324  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 730(2).
325  Ling and Pugh 2017, Chapter 18.
326  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook, Part II para. 1.1.
327  Scottish Legal Aid Board Code of Practice in relation to Criminal Legal Assistance.
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door’. Inspections of private firms take place annually to check compliance with 
quality standards and the Code.
Northern Ireland has considered the introduction of panels of lawyers 
able to take on criminal legal aid work but the current intention is to keep the 
existing position of open competition between all suitably qualified solicitors 
and barristers,328 thus retaining a system similar to that in Finland, Denmark 
and Sweden. All the restrictions imposed in the other jurisdictions are likely to 
be within the latitude allowed by the international treaty bodies.
3.3 Models of provision
3.3.1 Public defender schemes: decision-making and appeals
Public defender schemes are in place in all the Nordic countries, but the details 
of the selection, appointment and timing of defenders vary. 
The relevant provisions in Denmark are included in the Administration 
of Justice Act,329 which contains the criminal public defender scheme at 
Chapter 66. Under § 729a, an accused is entitled to choose his legal counsel330 
who must usually be a qualified advocate or on the list of public defenders 
appointed by the Minister of Justice.331 The court may refuse to appoint the 
chosen representative332 or dismiss the representative333 if the appointment will 
cause a significant delay or there is a demonstrable risk that the advocate might 
interfere with the resolution of the case. If the defendant has not organised his 
or her own legal representative, or if that representative has been rejected by the 
court, the court must appoint a public defender if certain conditions are met.334 
These include that conviction might result in a penalty higher than a fine, 
in which case (and for victims entitled to a public attorney) an appointment 
can only be made upon request of the person to be assisted;335 in other cases 
the court can act of its own motion. Other factors leading to mandatory 
appointment of a public defender include: pre-trial detention; trial by jurors 
or lay assessors; appeal against conviction which is not immediately dismissed; 
questioning of the defendant behind closed doors or cross-examination of 
family members. If the conditions for the obligatory appointment of public 
counsel are not met, the court can be asked to use its discretionary powers 
to appoint a defender if the nature of the case, the accused or the general 
circumstances make it desirable and the accused has not arranged his own 
representation.336
328  Stutt 2015, Chapter 14. 
329  Retsplejeloven, 2017.
330  Ibidem, § 729a, 730.
331  Ibidem, § 730 (2). The selection criteria are set out at § 733-735.
332  Ibidem, § 733(2).
333  Ibidem, § 736(2).
334  Ibidem, § 731.
335  Ibidem, § 731(2).
336  Ibidem, § 732.
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Decisions on mandatory appointments are not appealable, but those concerning 
discretionary appointments can be appealed to the higher court in the usual 
way. Decisions ancillary to the appointment of defence counsel in Denmark, 
such as refusal to accede to the defendant’s choice of counsel, are appealable to 
the Special Court of Indictment and Revision (‘Den Særlige Klageret’), rather 
than the regular appeal courts.337 No further appeal is possible from these 
decisions.338 
The public defender in Denmark will normally be appointed at the point 
when a suspect is charged (which takes place before interview), upon request of 
the police to the court.339 
In Sweden, also, it is the role of the court dealing with the criminal 
prosecution to decide whether a defence lawyer will be provided by the state. 
The court “shall consider the appointment of a public defence counsel upon 
request, or when the court otherwise considers reason therefore”.340 In practice, 
the court should be notified by the prosecutor, who themselves should be 
notified by the police, that an accused person has been arrested. At this point, 
or at the first later point when the court becomes aware of the prosecution, 
consideration will be given to the appointment of a Public Defence Attorney. 
For the avoidance of doubt, the National Courts Administration’s online 
Handbook on criminal proceedings341 confirms that a defendant can request 
such an attorney at any time, verbally or in writing.342 However, if a suspect is 
already being represented by an attorney she or he has engaged privately, no 
public defence attorney will be appointed.343 If the court refuses to appoint a 
public defence attorney or appoints a person other than the attorney requested 
by the accused, the decision can be appealed in the same manner as any other 
decision of the court, to the appeal court.344
Icelandic public defence attorneys are appointed under the Act on 
Criminal Procedure.345 If a suspect is arrested, the police must appoint a public 
defender346 and if they refuse to do so the accused may ask the court to appoint 
a defender.347 In a situation where the accused has not been arrested, the police 
may, at the request of the individual, appoint a public defence attorney if this 
is needed in light of the nature of the case or the overall circumstances.348 An 
appointment by the police lapses when the suspect is released or brought before 
a judge; at that point the judge must appoint a public defender if there is to be 
337  Ibidem, § 737(1).
338  Ibidem, § 737(2).
339  Ibidem.
340  Rättegångsbalken, 1942, Chapter 21, 4 §.
341  Domstolsverkets handböcker, brottmål, Chapter 3.3.
342  Ibidem.
343  Rättegångsbalken, 1942, Chapter 21, 3a §.
344  Ibidem, Chapter 52, 1 §; Domstolsverkets handböcker, brottmål, chapter 3.3.
345  Lög um meðferð sakamála, 2008, Chapter 4.
346  Ibidem, § 30.
347  Ibdem, § 31(4).
348  Ibidem, § 29(2).
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continued custody on remand or investigations, or if the suspect is charged 
with an offence.349 A public defender must be appointed for the main trial, 
unless the defendant has employed a private attorney to represent him.350 If the 
accused refuses a public defender, none will be appointed as long as the police 
or judge believe that the individual is competent to defend himself.351 
The public defence counsel system in Norway is governed by Chapter 9 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1981.352 If a person is entitled to defence counsel, 
they are specifically excluded from the legal aid scheme as part of the principle 
that legal aid is to be subsidiary.353 The Act establishes a two-stage process for 
the appointment of ‘official defence counsel’, i.e. defence counsel paid for by the 
state. Section 94 sets out that “the person charged is entitled to the assistance 
of defence counsel of his own choice at every stage of the case” and shall be 
so informed.354 This provision establishes the right to instruct counsel once 
charged and receive assistance throughout the case but it does not mandate 
such assistance. However, subsequent sections go on to specify the situations 
in which defence counsel is obligatory. In particular, defence counsel shall 
be available during pre-trial detention of over 24 hours,355 the main hearing 
of the case356 and the judicial recording of evidence.357 The entitlement to 
defence counsel is generally irrespective of the seriousness of the charge; 
the basic rule is that a defendant will be entitled to defence counsel,358 but 
there are exceptions for some minor matters in the District Court. 359 If the 
defendant expressly renounces his right to defence counsel then such assistance 
may be dispensed with, but only if the court finds this unobjectionable.360 In 
some specified circumstances, such as if the defendant suffers from a mental 
disability, it is obligatory for defence counsel to be appointed.361
However, all these provisions relate to the general right to be represented 
in the proceedings and do not in themselves establish a right to have such 
representation paid for by the state. Official defence counsel are appointed by 
the court under § 100, which provides that the court ‘shall’ appoint an official 
defence counsel where the preceding sections 96 to 99 provide that defence 
counsel is mandatory. There is thus a comprehensive right to have a defence 
lawyer paid for by the state during the main hearing of most cases, the judicial 
recording of evidence, whilst arrested or in pre-trial detention of more than 24 
349  Ibidem., § 31.
350  Ibidem, § 31(2).
351  Ibidem, § 29.
352  Straffeprosessloven, 1981.
353  Lov om fri rettshjelp, 1980, § 5.
354  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 94.
355  Ibidem, § 98.
356  Ibidem, § 96.
357  Ibidem, § 97.
358  Ibidem, § 94.
359  Ibidem, § 96.
360  Ibidem, § 96.
361  Ibidem.
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hours or during hearing or sentencing of a summary judgment on a confession. 
In addition, however, an official defence counsel may be appointed where there 
are ‘special reasons’ for doing so. This has proved important in the conduct 
of interviews whilst a suspect is in police custody. There is only an absolute 
right to defence counsel pre-charge if police detention lasts over 24 hours but 
in practice suspects are generally permitted to be accompanied by their own 
lawyer at interview, if they refuse to give a statement unless accompanied.362 
If the period in custody subsequently ends before 24 hours have elapsed, the 
defendant will retrospectively be found not to have had a statutory right to 
defence counsel and therefore payment by the state will be dependent upon the 
court accepting that there were special reasons. There is a proposal to slightly 
relax the rule on representation whilst in police custody by changing the 
provision to entitle a suspect to an attorney if ‘there is reason to believe’ that a 
suspect will be in custody for more than 24 hours (rather than the current rule 
that it must be clear that he will not be released within 24 hours).363
Defence counsel are appointed by the court,364 although as regards the 
period between arrest and first court appearance, defence counsel may also be 
appointed by the prosecuting authority.365 Such an appointment is only possible 
if the need arises outside court opening hours or if for some other reason a 
court cannot deal with the matter sufficiently quickly,366 and the prosecution’s 
failure to appoint counsel, or choice of counsel, can be referred to the court by 
the defendant.367 If the defendant requests a particular lawyer, that person must 
be appointed as defence counsel unless significant delay would result or other 
circumstances make the appointment of that person inappropriate.368 However, 
in the situation that no particular lawyer is requested, the court will appoint 
defence counsel from the register held by the court.369 The court can make 
an appointment to cover the whole case or a particular court appearance.370 
Appeals against decisions of the courts can be made to a higher court.371
It is important to note that the right to a public defence attorney in Norway 
applies to those under arrest or in pre-trial detention, and during the main 
trial and the judicial recording of evidence. Unlike the other schemes being 
considered here, there is no general availability of state-funded advice during 
the investigations phase, unless the suspect is in custody. This is a gap which 
has been recognised as problematic by the Norwegian government and a 
362  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 230 provides that no suspect or witness can be compelled to make a statement.
363  NOU 2016: 24, para. 9.4.3.4.
364  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 102.
365  Ibidem.
366  FOR-1985-06-28-1679, § 9A-2.
367  Ibidem, § 9A-7.
368  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 102.
369  According to the procedure laid down in FOR-2011-03-04-251.
370  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 102.
371  See e.g. Supreme Court cases HR-2015-01406-A and HR-2015-01405-A.
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proposal has been made to extend the right to assistance to this stage other 
than in minor cases.372 
In Finland, civil and criminal legal aid are dealt with largely through the 
same system, under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, as the provisions 
of the Legal Aid Act apply equally to criminal, civil and administrative cases. 
However, in criminal matters the Criminal Procedure Act373 also provides for 
the appointment of a public defender if no legal aid lawyer has been instructed. 
A public defender can be requested by the suspect or, in some cases, appointed 
by the court without such a request (see below). If the suspect in a criminal 
investigation is under arrest, they have the right to a public attorney.374 Public 
defenders are appointed by the court dealing with the criminal proceedings and 
appeals against such decisions are possible to the Court of Appeal as with all 
court decisions.
All the Nordic jurisdictions thus offer public defence attorney schemes, 
administered by the court, to provide state-paid assistance to defendants in 
cases considered sufficiently serious. There is no means-testing for the services 
of such an attorney, but, as will be seen below, defendants who are subsequently 
convicted may be required to repay a proportion of the costs incurred. 
Provision is made for legal assistance at the police station through the public 
defence attorney schemes, which as seen above is required for compliance with 
the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The public defender services in the Nordic jurisdictions are provided 
almost entirely by private practitioners rather than a cohort of state-employed 
public defence lawyers. The only exception is in Finland, where a public 
legal aid attorney may be appointed as the public defender; however, private 
practitioners can also be so appointed, and the choice of lawyer is for the 
defendant. Elsewhere in the world, for example Philadelphia and New South 
Wales, public defender schemes are operated by salaried lawyers and this 
characteristic of employing full-time lawyers is sometimes taken as part of 
the definition of a public defender system.375 However, the Nordic countries 
all describe their systems as public defender schemes and administer them 
separately from legal aid, and the schemes share characteristics which are 
absent from criminal legal aid schemes, as will be seen below. Therefore the 
suggestion that an essential part of a public defender scheme is the state 
employment of the lawyers delivering the service is rejected.
3.3.2 Criminal legal aid schemes: decision-making and appeals
The alternative model for state funding of criminal defence is that of legal aid. 
Unique among the jurisdictions under consideration is Finland, where despite 
the existence of a public defence attorney scheme, a person charged with a 
372  NOU 2016: 24, para. 9.4.3.2.
373  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2. 
374  Ibidem, Chapter 2 § 1.
375  See e.g. Republic of Ireland Criminal Legal Aid Review Committee First Report 1999, p. 9.
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criminal offence may instead choose to apply for legal aid for representation. 
Under Finnish legal aid legislation, simple criminal matters are excluded376 
on the basis that such matters do not require the help of an attorney. However, 
even in cases excluded from scope, advice and assistance with preparation 
of documents can be provided by a public legal aid attorney under the usual 
financial eligibility rules.377 The system places initial legal aid decision-
making in the hands of the lawyers in the State Legal Aid Offices in both civil 
and criminal cases. These lawyers, despite being state employees, are given 
independence in exercising this power, and no official guidance is given on the 
interpretation of the law. The discretion must, naturally, be exercised within 
the legislative framework and the lawyer is individually liable for the decisions. 
To encourage consistency of decisions across the Legal Aid Offices, a working 
group of senior Legal Aid Office staff has produced a handbook of agreed 
interpretation of the legislation, which is published by the Ministry.378 Refusals 
of legal aid can be submitted to court for ‘reconsideration’379 in a specific 
process outside the normal appeal process for administrative decisions.380 Legal 
aid reconsideration decisions made by courts can be appealed in line with the 
usual routes for appeals of decisions.381 
In the remaining jurisdictions, i.e. those of the UK and the Republic of 
Ireland, there is no public defence attorney scheme and criminal legal aid is the 
only option for those seeking publicly-funded legal assistance when arrested or 
charged with a criminal offence. In England & Wales and in Scotland, criminal 
legal aid is administered by the relevant legal aid authority which also oversees 
civil legal aid. However, in Northern Ireland the courts administer criminal 
legal aid with the Legal Services Agency only responsible for administering 
civil legal aid. Likewise, in the Republic of Ireland, whilst the courts are 
largely unified, the legal aid schemes for civil and criminal matters are very 
different. A review of criminal legal aid in the Republic of Ireland is currently 
underway with an expectation that responsibility for criminal legal aid will 
eventually be moved from the courts to the Legal Aid Board, which currently 
only administers civil legal aid. The Legal Aid Board already administers 
and pays for the Garda (Police) Station Legal Advice Scheme which provides 
telephone and in-person advice to those who have a legal right to be advised at 
a police station but whose means are insufficient to enable private payment for 
a solicitor.382 
376  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 6 §, para. 2(2).
377  Ibidem, 6 §, para. 3.
378  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013.
379  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 11 §, para. 1 and 24 §.
380  See commentary on this process in Chapter 4.
381  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 26 §.
382  For details of the scheme, see the online Garda Station Legal Advice Revised Scheme  Provisions 
      and Guidance Document 2014.
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Criminal legal aid in the Republic of Ireland was set on a statutory footing in 
1962 with the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, which came into force in 1965383 
and remains the governing legislation for criminal legal aid, accompanied by 
Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Regulations 1965. Under the scheme set up by this 
legislation, criminal legal aid is administered by the Department of Justice and 
Equality, which deals with policy and payments under the scheme. However, 
“the Department […] has no involvement in the day to day running of the 
scheme, the granting of free legal aid or assignment of lawyers. These matters 
are handled entirely by the courts”.384 The judge conducting the first hearing of 
the case in question makes the decision on granting a legal aid certificate and 
will allocate a solicitor from the panel administered by the Department. The 
defendant may request a particular solicitor, in which case that person will be 
appointed as long as they are on the panel, unless there is good and sufficient 
reason to refuse to assign that solicitor.385 There is, though, no right to choose 
a lawyer who is not on the panel. Whilst the wording of the legislation suggests 
that legal aid will be granted ‘on application’,386 decided cases have established 
that the court must inform defendants of the right to legal aid, if they are 
unable to afford representation.387 Failure to do so amounts to a denial of justice 
and will render any subsequent conviction void.388
The appeal possibilities against refusal of criminal legal aid in the Republic 
of Ireland are very limited. Legislation expressly states that no appeal lies 
against a decision on an application for a legal aid certificate in the District 
Court389 and no provisions at all concerning appeal are present in relation to 
legal aid certificates for trial on indictment. However, for appeal certificates, 
case stated certificates and Supreme Court certificates, an applicant may renew 
his application to a higher court if the District Court refuses the certificate. 
Not only is there no general right of appeal for applicants, there is also no 
possibility for the Department of Justice and Equality to challenge legal aid 
decisions of the court, which reduces government control over criminal legal 
aid expenditure. 
In Scotland, the Scottish Legal Aid Board deals with all applications for 
legal aid: criminal, civil and children’s legal aid. All three types of legal aid are 
sub-divided into Advice and Assistance, Assistance by Way of Representation 
(ABWOR) and a final category which covers representation at court but 
is, confusingly, simply referred to as ‘civil legal aid’, ‘children’s legal aid’ or 
‘criminal legal aid’. Advice and Assistance is rarely used in criminal cases 
other than in connection with advice at a police station.390 The criminal legal 
383  On the 1 April, under the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962 (Commencement) Order.
384  Department of Justice and Equality website, accessed on 12 March 2018.
385  State (Freeman) v. Connellan, 1986.
386  Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act 1962, ss.2, 3(2)(a), 4(2)(a), 5(2)(a) and 6(2)(a).
387  See e.g. Carmody v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform and the Attorney General, 2010.
388  McSorley v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison, 1996, p. 331.
389  Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962 s. 2(2).
390  Law Society of Scotland 2014, p. 6.
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aid scheme is established in the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 and specific 
procedures and criteria for applications are set out in regulations, particularly 
the Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 1996, which have been amended 
several times. Guidance is also provided in the online handbook published by 
the Scottish Legal Aid Board, which indicates the approach which will be taken 
in interpreting the statutory provisions. 
Criminal legal aid is automatically available to an accused person in certain 
situations non-means tested and without application.391 Automatic criminal 
legal aid covers, inter alia, representation at an identification parade, some 
sexual offences, trials in absentia and cases where on appeal the High Court 
has granted authority for a new prosecution for the same or a similar offence. 
Where a defendant is being dealt with under solemn procedure (more serious 
offences), they are given the benefit of automatic criminal legal aid while they 
are in custody, but must apply for full legal aid once they are bailed or fully 
committed; in prosecutions brought under summary procedure (less serious 
offences), automatic criminal legal aid is only available when the accused is in 
custody or has been released on an undertaking to appear, and it ends when 
a plea of not guilty is tendered. Automatic criminal legal aid thus provides 
non-means tested assistance whilst a person is in custody at a police station, 
whatever the gravity of the offence. Police station assistance is provided by a 
rota of qualified participating criminal solicitors, if the arrested person does 
not request a particular solicitor. The processing of a guilty plea in summary 
cases can also be covered by automatic legal aid if the other circumstances for 
such legal aid apply,392 or by ABWOR.393 Full legal aid can be applied for in 
summary proceedings if the accused has pleaded not guilty, but will only be 
granted if the Legal Aid Board considers that it is in the interests of justice that 
the defendant be granted legal aid (see below).394 
The statutory provisions concerning appeals against refusals of criminal 
legal aid in Scotland are almost identical to those in civil and children’s matters; 
the Board has a statutory duty to establish a procedure allowing someone 
refused legal aid to apply for a review of his application.395 The procedure so 
established provides that a review application must be lodged within 10 days 
of notification of the refusal, unless the Board accepts that there are special 
reasons for a late submission.396 The review is considered internally by the 
Board.
The complexity of the funding arrangements leads to some potentially 
inappropriate results within Scottish criminal legal aid. For example, the 
financial eligibility test for ABWOR, which is used for representation where the 
391  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 22.
392  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook Part III para. 8.8. 
393  Ibidem, para. 11.1. 
394  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 24(1)(b).
395  Ibidem, s. 24(5) (summary proceedings) and 23A(4) (solemn proceedings).
396  Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 1996, Regulation 7A(3)(b).
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defendant is pleading guilty, is stricter than that for criminal legal aid used 
for representation on a not guilty plea. Furthermore, a recipient of ABWOR 
may have to pay financial contributions towards the cost of legal assistance, 
which is not the case for criminal legal aid. This leads to a possible incentive 
for some defendants to plead not guilty in order to obtain free representation 
through the legal aid scheme. When combined with a fees structure that means 
lawyers are better paid for guilty pleas, there is a risk that the legal aid scheme 
is encouraging decisions on plea to be made for reasons related to legal aid 
rather than reasons related to the client and the case, albeit that these pressures 
operate in opposing directions. This issue was pinpointed as problematic by 
the 2018 Independent Strategic Review, which recommended a comprehensive 
criminal fees review.397
Although the majority of criminal legal aid work in Scotland is carried out 
by private practitioners, there is also a government-employed service which 
contributes to provision. The Public Defence Solicitors’ Office was established 
as a pilot in 1998; following positive evaluation398 the office was maintained and 
expanded. The intention is that the PDSO should meet unmet need in some 
geographical areas but also to try to keep costs down in some areas where there 
is sufficient supply. There is some resentment among private solicitors that the 
PDSOs are given a larger share of the police station duty roster to ensure they 
are sufficiently busy. This of course makes sense in terms of value for public 
money but impacts on the access of private practitioners to new clients. PDSOs 
also enable the government to have a window into how legal aid and the justice 
system are working. 
Similarly to the situation in Scotland, representation in criminal cases in 
England & Wales is not in general provided through a public defender scheme 
but through criminal legal aid which, like civil legal aid, pays the fees of private 
solicitors and barristers who undertake the work. There is a small employed 
Public Defender Service with four local offices, but this was set up to provide 
comparative information on the costs and performance of such a service and 
was not intended to be extended to cover any significant proportion of criminal 
defence work.399 Criminal contracts for private firms (unlike civil contracts) do 
not specify a maximum number of cases, but do provide a considerable amount 
of detail on how a case must be conducted in order to claim payment from the 
Legal Aid Agency, the government agency responsible for the scheme. There are 
in addition duty solicitor schemes whereby solicitors are contracted to attend 
courts to provide immediate advice and representation assistance to members 
of the public who attend criminal courts unrepresented.
Standard criminal contracts divide work into several classes: investigations 
(pre-charge work); proceedings (most post-charge work); appeals and reviews 
(work done in relation to appeals or reviews of conviction or sentence); prison 
397  Evans 2018, p. 82.
398  Goriely, McCrone et. al. 2001.
399  Ling and Pugh 2017, para. 18.41.
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law; and civil work associated with criminal proceedings (e.g. habeas corpus 
cases). Different financial eligibility criteria and other criteria apply to the 
various classes of work. 
The investigations class of work includes police station advice and other 
pre-charge advice and assistance. In the police station, allocation of cases is 
coordinated by a government telephone service, which may divert less serious 
cases to a telephone advice helpline, Criminal Defence Direct.400 Advice at 
the police station, whether by a lawyer in person or over the telephone, is not 
means-tested and can be provided without a formal application by the client; 
the solicitor provides the necessary assistance and claims payment after the 
work is completed. Criminal Advice and Assistance outside the police station 
is, however, subject to a means test which is administered by the solicitor. The 
lawyer must also assess merits and decide whether there is “sufficient benefit 
to the client, having regard to the circumstances of the matter, including the 
personal circumstances of the client, to justify work or further work being 
carried out”.401 Advice and Assistance can be awarded by the solicitor without 
application to the Legal Aid Agency; the application forms must be kept on file 
but need not be submitted to the Agency unless required to do so as part of an 
audit. 
Once a person is charged with a criminal offence, the ‘proceedings’ class 
of funding becomes relevant. This class includes assistance provided by court 
duty solicitors, and representation orders. Representation orders are the main 
method of funding criminal proceedings in the Magistrates’ and Crown Courts. 
Applications for Representation Orders must be made to the Legal Aid Agency, 
which applies a financial eligibility test and an ‘interests of justice’ merits 
test. Applications must be submitted online and guidance on applications is 
available in a manual for criminal practitioners issued by the Agency.402 
If funding is refused on application of the interests of justice test, a 
reconsideration by the Agency may be requested, with reasons, in writing.403 
If the result of this administrative review is still negative, the applicant can 
ask for an appeal to the court and a judge will consider whether the test is 
met.404 The English & Welsh legal aid structure includes Independent Funding 
Adjudicators who conduct reviews in civil cases (see below Chapter 4). In 
criminal cases, however, the adjudicators’ role is limited to appeals concerning 
advice and assistance preceding the charge of an offence.405 There is no right 
to review or appeal of a refusal of criminal legal aid on grounds of financial 
ineligibility.
400  Standard Crime Contract 2017 Specification para. 9.9.
401  Ibidem, para. 3.10.
402  Legal Aid Agency Criminal Legal Aid Manual: Applying for legal aid in criminal   
     cases in the magistrates’ and Crown Court July 2016.
403  The Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013, Regulation 27.
404  Ibidem, Regulation 29 and 30.
405  Ibidem, Regulation 17.
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The legislative basis for Northern Irish legal aid is, as set out above in Chapter 
1, complex. The civil legal service and criminal defence service each have 
sub-categories, the most significant of which in organisational terms is the 
distinction between advice and assistance on the one hand and representation 
on the other. Criminal advice and assistance covers advice for individuals 
who are under investigation, or who have been the subject of criminal 
proceedings,406 and a separate scheme covers assistance at the police station,407 
which is not means-tested and provides assistance before and during police 
interviews. Both types of advice and assistance are granted by the solicitor, 
who in non-police station cases also applies the means test and collects any 
contribution. 
The granting of legal aid by solicitors at the advice level in Northern Ireland, 
England & Wales and Scotland is an example in the criminal sphere of indirect 
public administration, which is more common in civil legal aid and will be 
discussed further in section 4.5.1, below.
Once charges are brought in a criminal case in Northern Ireland, advice 
and assistance will no longer cover the work required and a legal aid certificate 
must be applied for. Criminal legal aid certificates can be granted subject to 
limitations as to time or proceedings408 but this is rarely done, except for bail 
hearings. There is statutory authority for regulations to be made allowing the 
Legal Services Agency to award and withdraw legal aid in criminal cases but no 
such regulations have been made.409 Thus, decisions on grants of criminal legal 
aid are made by the courts, who assess both financial eligibility and merits. 
Appeals against refusals of legal aid for criminal representation are to be made 
“to such court or other person or body as may be prescribed”.410 However, no 
such prescription has been made and there is therefore no formal route for 
appeal against decisions. 
The UN Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal 
Justice Systems address the issue of appeals and state that there should always 
be the possibility of a court overturning a refusal of criminal legal aid when 
the interests of justice so require.411 The criminal legal aid schemes described 
above do not meet this benchmark, other than in Finland and to a limited 
extent England & Wales. The Guidelines also make it clear that there should 
always be the possibility of appeal against refusal on the grounds of means,412 
an impossibility in the English & Welsh system as well as in Northern Ireland.
As has been seen, the legal aid schemes of Finland, the UK and the Republic 
of Ireland provide means-tested criminal legal aid to pay for legal advice 
and representation to suspects and defendants. Other than in Finland, legal 
406  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, s.23(1)(b). 
407  Ibidem, s.23(1)(a).
408  Ibidem, s.26(5).
409  Ibidem, s.27.
410  Ibidem, s. 28.
411  UNODC 2012, Guideline 1(e).
412  Ibidem, Guideline 1(d).
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aid also covers assistance in the police station which may be means-tested 
(in the Republic of Ireland) or not (the UK jurisdictions). As will be seen 
below, financial contributions towards the cost of legal aid may be repaid to 
defendants who are not convicted in some jurisdictions and circumstances, and 
those who paid for their defence privately due to financial ineligibility for legal 
aid may also sometimes be reimbursed. 
3.3.3 Financial implications for defendants of the different models
It has been seen that there are two structurally very different models of 
provision of legal assistance for those under investigation for or accused of 
criminal offences in the jurisdictions of North-West Europe. In the Nordic 
countries, the usual model is a public defender system whilst in the UK and 
Republic of Ireland, criminal legal aid is in place. Finland operates a dual 
system with both options available, at the choice of the accused.
Public defender systems are not means-tested and thus accessible to any 
person accused of a sufficiently serious crime. Those of sufficient means can 
choose to instruct a lawyer privately, but are entitled to use the public defender 
service if they prefer, although in Norway the court retains a power to appoint 
public counsel in addition to a private lawyer already instructed, if necessary or 
desirable.413 However, in each of the relevant jurisdictions a person convicted 
of an offence may have to repay the costs of their unsuccessful defence in whole 
or in part.
In Denmark, for example, the legislation provides that if the defendant is 
found guilty he is obliged to reimburse the public purse.414 The amounts can 
be substantial and it is feared that the possibility of an attachment of earnings 
order for recovery of the debt may act as a deterrent to obtaining regular 
employment after conviction and even be an incitement to further criminal 
activity.415 Approximately a third of the costs ordered to be paid are actually 
recovered.416 The requirement to repay defence costs in Norway is less absolute; 
upon conviction the defendant should ‘normally’ be ordered to pay the costs 
incurred in the prosecution,417 however, “costs shall only be imposed if it is 
deemed possible to obtain payment thereof, and they shall be proportionate to 
the financial capacity of the person charged”418 with the result that in practice 
recovery of prosecution costs is often symbolic in cases other than white-collar 
crime. 
The consideration of the means of the convicted person is in Sweden linked to 
the rules on financial eligibility for civil legal aid,419 resulting in a percentage 
413  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 100.
414  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 1008(1).
415  Danmarks Nationale Menneskerettighedsinstitution 2016, Chapter 5.4.
416  Ibidem. In 2014, 450 million Danish Krone were ordered to be paid and 150 million  
      Krone were recovered. 
417  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 436.
418  Ibidem, § 437.
419  Rättegångsbalk, 1942, Chapter 31, 1 §.
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contribution to be applied to the costs of the Public Defence Attorney and any 
fee for counsel for the victim.420 However, if the defendant has been sentenced 
to a long prison term it is usual for the fee to be waived.421 Similarly, under the 
Finnish scheme, a person found guilty will be ordered to reimburse the state for 
the amount paid to the public defence attorney from state funds, up to the level 
which would have been payable under legal aid according to the defendant’s 
financial situation (as in Sweden, a percentage contribution).422 
An equivalent issue arises if a legally aided criminal defendant is convicted 
and, again, a range of approaches is taken. In England & Wales, prior to the 
introduction of means-testing for legal aid for criminal representation before 
the Crown Court (i.e. more serious offences), legal aid defence costs could 
be recovered from wealthy, convicted defendants by means of a Recovery of 
Defence Costs Order.423 Since the introduction of means-testing for all criminal 
legal aid such orders no longer apply in the Crown Court, presumably on the 
assumption that those now receiving legal aid will not have the means to repay 
their legal aid defence costs upon conviction. There is a partial exception to 
this rule; if the convicted defendant has more than £30,000 assets, including 
the value of their home, they may be required to repay the costs of their legal 
aid defence from this capital.424 The general result in England & Wales, though, 
is similar to that in Sweden and Finland, where those within the financial 
eligibility rules for legal aid will not be required to repay defence costs upon 
conviction, but may have paid contributions towards the cost of the case, which 
will not be refunded to them (contributions in Sweden and Finland will be paid 
at the end of the case). 
In Northern Ireland, there has since 2012 been the option to recover Crown 
Court criminal legal aid costs upon conviction,425 though there is currently no 
mechanism in place to identify suitable cases for such an order. In the first four 
years of the existence of these powers only one recovery order was issued and 
no recoveries were actually executed.426 A government review recommended 
that the question of a convicted defendant’s liability to repay legal aid costs 
should be “revisited after implementation of the [proposed] stricter means 
test”.427 Potential recovery of costs orders are subject to a test of reasonableness 
and a judge making such an order must consider whether it would cause undue 
financial hardship to the assisted person, their dependants or immediate 
family.428 The closest Nordic comparator is Norway with the rule of ‘deemed 
420  Lag om målsägandebiträde, 1988, 8 §.
421  Rättegångsbalk, 1942, Chapter 31, 1 §, para. 4.
422  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2, 11 §.
423  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Schedule 7 and the  
      Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Regulations 2013.
424  The Criminal Legal Aid (Contribution Orders) Regulations 2013, Part 2.
425  Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2012.
426  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016, para. 3.10.
427  Stutt 2015, para. 13.23.
428  Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2012, s. 5(3).
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possibility’ of obtaining payment, and requirement of proportionality to the 
financial capacity of the person charged.
A further distinction can be seen in the outcomes for better-off defendants, 
which vary significantly between the two models. Whilst there is a strong 
correlation between low socio-economic status and experience of criminal 
justice interventions, and therefore high levels of financial eligibility for legal 
aid amongst those prosecuted for crime, means-tested schemes will result in 
some defendants paying for their own defence during investigation and trial. 
Schemes are in place in some jurisdictions for the recovery of defence costs 
from the state by defendants found not guilty, but these do not provide full 
recompense. In England & Wales, for example, the rules on recovery of defence 
costs by acquitted defendants do not equate to the provision of public defence 
counsel, as defence costs can only be refunded at legal aid rates, and not at all 
after Crown Court acquittals unless the defendant applied for legal aid and was 
refused on the basis of his means.429 Whilst the restriction to legal aid rates can 
be justified by the need to limit public expenditure, it is highly unlikely that 
a defence lawyer would charge the same, very low, rates to a private client as 
those received under the legal aid scheme. This leaves a large proportion of the 
fees to be paid by the client, despite the acquittal. Contributions paid towards 
criminal legal aid will, though, be fully refunded with interest if the defendant 
is acquitted.430 
However, the rules are more generous in Northern Ireland. If an accused 
person is acquitted, their private defence costs can be reimbursed by the 
prosecution if the court so orders431 at an amount “reasonably sufficient to 
compensate the accused for the expenses properly incurred by him in carrying 
on the defence”. Contributions are not required under the criminal legal aid 
scheme in Northern Ireland and therefore an acquitted defendant will only 
be out of pocket if the court awards an amount which, although ‘reasonably 
sufficient’, do not in fact cover all the costs.
Scotland has no scheme for the recovery of defence costs by acquitted 
defendants whether publicly or privately funded; thus private lawyers’ fees and 
contributions paid under legal aid are not recoverable. The Justice Committee 
of the Scottish Parliament asked the Scottish Government to consider the issue 
when legislation on legal aid contributions was being prepared in 2012 but the 
Government declined to introduce such a rule, noting that “recovery of costs 
in defending criminal proceedings has never been a feature of the Scottish 
criminal system, whatever is the case in other jurisdictions”.432 Concern was 
expressed that refunds in all acquittals would be prohibitively expensive, yet 
to refund in only some cases might result in a perception that some acquittals 
429  Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s. 16A(5A).
430  The Criminal Legal Aid (Contribution Orders) Regulations 2013, Regulation 37.
431  Costs in Criminal Cases Act (Northern Ireland) 1968, s.3.
432  Scottish Civil Justice Council and Criminal Legal Assistance Bill; Response from the 
      Scottish Government to the Justice Committee Stage 1 Report, 2012, p. 9.
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were less conclusive than others. Furthermore, “prosecution is undertaken in 
the public interest, on the basis of the test outlined in the prosecution code, 
that there is sufficient admissible evidence and that it is in the public interest 
to take action. An acquittal does not equate to a finding that it was not in the 
public interest to take proceedings.”433
In the Republic of Ireland the District Court, in summary criminal 
proceedings, may make an order for costs against a party except the Director of 
Public Prosecutions or a prosecuting police officer.434 The Circuit Court435 and 
Central Criminal Court436 (the courts having jurisdiction to try on indictment) 
have a discretion to award costs in the case of an acquittal (which award is 
appealable to the Court of Criminal Appeal) and the Court of Criminal Appeal 
itself has discretion to make costs orders in the interests of justice.437 However, 
the award of costs in criminal cases is extremely rare in practice and it is usual 
for a privately-funded acquitted defendant to pay for their own defence in full.
3.3.4 The case of Finland
It may be possible to gain further insights into the comparative merits of 
public defender and criminal legal aid schemes by examining the case of 
Finland, which has both systems running concurrently. The public defender 
scheme is newer than the legal aid scheme, having only been in place since 
1998.438 A consideration of the preparatory papers for the legislation 
introducing the public defender scheme makes it clear that the principle 
behind the new scheme is qualitatively different from that embodied by the 
legal aid scheme. The relevant parliamentary proposal is based upon the idea 
that “a person suspected of a crime shall always, irrespective of his economic 
situation, have the right to a defence counsel at the state’s expense during 
investigation and trial when he cannot sufficiently protect his rights without 
expert representation”.439 Explicitly, “the right which this law gives a suspect, 
irrespective of his economic circumstances, to a defence counsel implies a 
system which is primary in relation to the system of representatives within the 
Legal Aid Act”.440 This primacy of public defenders over legal aid representation 
is illustrated by the provision that legal aid cannot be granted to an accused 
who has already been allocated a public defender, but that if a defendant with a 
legal aid attorney requests a public defender that lawyer will become the public 
defender.441 It is accepted that “there should not in practice be a need to assign 
both a legal aid lawyer and a public defender, but the provision underlines 
433  Ibidem, p. 10.
434  District Court Rules, Order 36, Rule 1. 
435  Circuit Court Rules, Rule 66.
436  Rules of the Superior Courts, Order 99.
437  The Courts of Justice Act, 1924, s. 34.
438  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2, as amended by statutory instrument  6.2.1998/107.
439  Regeringens proposition 132/1997, p. 32.
440  Ibidem.
441  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2, 2 §.
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that the public defender system is primary”.442 The two routes for obtaining 
assistance in defending a charge apply the same rates of lawyers’ pay, through 
the mechanism of fixing public defenders’ pay at legal aid rates.443 
From the point of view of a client who is financially eligible for legal aid 
there is very little difference between the schemes; the work covered by each 
scheme is identical and the financial outcome for the assisted person is also 
the same, albeit by a different route. As a matter of principle, as seen above, 
public defenders are non-means tested. However, if the defendant is found 
guilty, he or she will be ordered to reimburse the state for the amount paid to 
the public defence attorney from state funds, up to the level which would have 
been payable under legal aid according to the defendant’s financial situation. 444 
Conversely, if the defendant is acquitted, the state will be liable to reimburse 
him or her for the costs of the defence, 445 which will only apply in practice 
if the defence lawyer was paid privately or under legal aid, as no ongoing 
contributions are paid in respect of public defence attorneys. Thus whatever the 
source of the defence representation, the defendant will pay the defence (as well 
as prosecution446) costs at legal aid contribution levels if they are convicted, and 
will not pay for the defence if acquitted. 
Separate statistics are not collected but it is understood to be the case that 
far more criminal defence takes place through legal aid than through the public 
defender scheme. It is not clear why this might be so; it is unlikely to have 
much to do with the question of principle which differentiates the two schemes 
in the political sphere. One possible explanation is that legal aid was already 
working well in criminal as well as civil cases when the public defender scheme 
was introduced and, given the similarity of the schemes for both lawyers 
and clients, there was no incentive for lawyers to change their practice and 
embrace the public defence scheme. Defendants who are financially ineligible 
for legal aid can of course only use the public defender scheme, although as 
approximately 75% of the Finnish population is financially eligible,447 the 
numbers of such defendants are likely to be low, given the correlation between 
low income and involvement in the criminal justice system. Those who are 
eligible for legal aid but with a financial contribution may prefer the public 
defender scheme as this is completely free at point of use, although as seen 
above the ultimate financial outcome is the same.
Affecting both schemes is the possibility of tactical decision-making by 
private lawyers; if the lawyer feels the client is very likely to be acquitted it 
may be preferable not to apply for either legal aid or public defender status, as 
the hourly rate will then not be tied into the legal aid scheme and the lawyer’s 
remuneration will be higher when the state repays the legal costs on acquittal.
442  Regeringens proposition 132/1997, Chapter 1.3.
443  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2, 10 §.
444  Ibidem, Chapter 2, 11 §.
445  Ibidem, Chapter 9, 1a §.
446  Ibidem, Chapter 9, 1 §.
447  See Chapter 7 on legal aid in context, below.
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The usage levels of criminal legal aid and the public defender scheme in 
Finland might be thought to indicate that legal aid is a more attractive scheme 
for clients and lawyers, but caution is needed. The specificities of the Finnish 
system, not least the high level of financial eligibility for legal aid, make the 
schemes difficult to differentiate in practice. Ultimately, it may be that the main 
practical difference between the two models overall in all the jurisdictions 
under consideration is in the timing and level of payments by defendants 
who were convicted and the financial burden on those who are acquitted. 
In public defence schemes a person who is acquitted will not have had any 
financial outlay during the investigation and trial, whatever their financial 
circumstances, and has no need to go through the process of recovering costs 
from the state. In criminal legal aid schemes this protection is only afforded to 
those financially eligible for assistance without a contribution, and recovery 
of private fees or legal aid contributions is very limited (except in Finland). 
Convicted parties in public defence attorney jurisdictions will only have to 
pay any contribution after that conviction has been handed down. In legal 
aid scheme jurisdictions, contributions or private fees will be paid at the time 
defence work is carried out, pre-judgment, and additional amounts may also be 
demanded post-conviction.
3.4 Interests of justice tests
All the jurisdictions under consideration apply some restriction on the range 
of criminal cases for which publicly funded assistance is available. It was seen 
at the beginning of this chapter that some limitation to state assistance in 
criminal cases is permissible under the applicable international treaties and 
states in general aim to avoid paying for the defence of minor matters which 
should be capable of fair resolution without the benefit of representation for the 
defendant. The disqualification measures used in the jurisdictions of North-
West Europe, as appropriate in the international context, relate explicitly or 
implicitly to the question of whether the interests of justice require that the 
defendant is represented.
Broadly speaking, the tests either adhere to an overall assessment of the 
interests of justice, with guidance as to factors which should be considered 
relevant; or dictate the factors which, if present, mean that the interests of justice 
will require assistance to be provided. The first approach leaves the discretion 
with the decision-maker in the individual case whilst the second pre-judges 
cases according to certain characteristics. 
The three UK jurisdictions all base their merits test for criminal legal aid 
on an explicit interests of justice test, as described in a set of factors known 
as the ‘Widgery criteria’. These criteria set out certain factors which must be 
taken into account in deciding whether the interests of justice require the 
defendant to be granted free representation: risk of imprisonment; risk of loss of 
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employment; potential for serious damage to reputation; need for interviewing 
of witnesses and need for expert cross-examination. The Widgery criteria were 
first established as principles in case-law, and spread to all parts of the UK due 
to the close relationship of the justice systems.448 Subsequently the English 
& Welsh Departmental Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings,449 
chaired by Lord Widgery, recommended that the rules be codified into statute. 
This has been done in all three UK jurisdictions, as will be seen below, and all 
the jurisdictions continue to use the criteria in the determination of whether 
legal aid shall be granted for a particular case.
The statutory organisation of criminal legal aid eligibility in England & 
Wales is such that only two tests apply: a financial means test and the interests 
of justice test,450 although it is assumed to always be in the interests of justice 
that a defendant is represented in the Crown Court.451 In Magistrates’ Court 
matters, it is mandatory for certain factors to be taken into account in deciding 
whether legal aid is necessary in the interests of justice, and these closely 
mirror the Widgery criteria. Consideration must be given to the potential for 
loss of liberty or livelihood or for serious damage to reputation; the presence 
of a substantial question of law; the ability of the individual to understand the 
proceedings or to state his or her own case; evidential and witness complexities; 
and whether it is in the interests of another person that the individual be 
represented.452 The list of factors is not exhaustive and other factors may be 
relevant. The guidance published online provides a useful indication of how the 
test is applied by the Legal Aid Agency. It clarifies that:
other reasons may be taken into account as part of the interests of justice 
test beyond the criteria listed above. Additional factors may be sufficient 
in themselves to justify grant, but will usually be matters to be considered 
alongside other criteria in the application. Examples in this category could 
include the need for expert examination of defence witnesses or expert 
cross-examination of a co-defendant or co-defendant’s witness. […] Each 
case turns upon its own individual circumstances and combination of 
factors and it is very difficult to establish general rules about the weight that 
each factor should be given.453
448  The Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) is the highest court for England  
      & Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as for civil Scottish cases. Whilst the Scottish 
       criminal justice system has no formal overlap with that of England & Wales,   
         decisions of the higher courts have been highly persuasive in both directions.
449  CMND 2934, 1966.
450  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s. 17.
451  The Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013, Regulation 21. 
452  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 s. 17(2).
453  Legal Aid Agency Guidance on the Consideration of Defence Representation Order  
     Applications, 2013, p. 14.
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Very similar statutory provisions apply in Northern Ireland, where the criminal 
courts determine applications for legal aid in all cases “according to the interests 
of justice”.454 Certain factors, to all intents the same as those applicable in 
England & Wales, must be taken into account in deciding whether the interests 
of justice require the defendant to be granted free representation. These 
are: whether there is a likelihood of loss of liberty or livelihood or serious 
damage to reputation if convicted; whether there is a substantial question 
of law involved; whether the individual may be unable to understand the 
proceedings or to state his own case; whether the proceedings may involve 
the tracing, interviewing or expert cross-examination of witnesses on behalf 
of the individual, and whether it is in the interests of another person that the 
individual be represented. No additional guidance is given to judges on the 
application of the criterion. A recent governmental review formed the view 
that the test is satisfactory and should remain the sole merits criteria for 
criminal legal aid. Suggestions that other factors could be added to the list for 
consideration were rejected as this “might lead to an unjustified expansion of 
the range of cases currently satisfying the test”.455 The Widgery test had stood 
the test of time and should not be altered. However, it was suggested that the 
test could be computerised and applied by the Legal Services Agency in the 
future and that, pending such reform, judges should be required to give their 
reasons for granting or refusing legal aid by reference to the criteria. 456 This 
change has not been implemented, possibly as a result of fears that such a 
requirement could cause significant delay in the courts, where many legal aid 
decisions are made daily, under pressure of time.457 
The statutory formulation of the interests of justice test for summary cases 
(less serious offences) in Scotland is slightly different to those in England 
& Wales and Northern Ireland. Regulations provide for a number of types 
of proceedings for which criminal legal aid will not be available;458 a list of 
minor matters such as removal of a driving disqualification and variation of 
a non-harassment order. In other matters, as in the other two jurisdictions, 
criminal legal aid shall be granted if “in all the circumstances of the case it is 
in the interests of justice that legal aid should be made available”,459 although 
similarly to the English & Welsh position there is no interests of justice test 
in solemn cases (due to the seriousness of the charges covered), and only a 
financial assessment is made.460 Compared to the other UK jurisdictions, the 
factors which must be taken into consideration when assessing the interests 
of justice are slightly extended and elaborated upon. The elements to be taken 
into account must include: the likelihood of a loss of livelihood or liberty; the 
454  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 s.29.
455  Stutt 2015, para. 12.4. 
456  Ibidem, para. 28.
457  Ibidem, para. 12.7. 
458  Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) (Prescribed Proceedings) Regulations 1997.
459  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 24.
460  Ibidem, s. 23A.
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existence of any substantial question of law or evidence of a complex or difficult 
nature; difficulties for the defendant in understanding the proceedings or to 
state their own case due to age, language skills, mental illness, other mental or 
physical disability or otherwise; whether it is in the interests of someone other 
than the accused that the accused be legally represented; that the defence to be 
advanced by the accused does not appear to be frivolous; and that the accused 
has been remanded in custody pending trial.461 It has been made clear by the 
courts that the criteria are only to be considered when applying the interests of 
justice test and do not replace it. As in England & Wales, the list of factors is 
not exhaustive and the Court of Session has confirmed that the decision as to 
the interests of justice is for the Scottish Legal Aid Board in each case:
According to the system which is set out in sec. 24 of the Act the granting 
of legal aid does not depend upon whether the applicant has accumulated 
a sufficient number of points in his favour but whether he has satisfied the 
[Board] that it is in the interests of justice that he should be granted legal 
aid for the purpose of obtaining representation in the criminal proceedings 
to which the application relates. It is to that end that the [Board is] enjoined 
to take into account, so far as applicable, the factors set out in the various 
heads contained in the subsection. Whether a particular head is satisfied 
and, if so, what weight should be attached to that factor is a matter for the 
[Board] in the particular circumstances of the case.462
The presence of a factor relating to the quality of the defence is noteworthy 
and potentially problematic. Almost certainly an outright ban on legal aid 
for defendants with a ‘frivolous’ defence would be a breach of Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. However, the fact that the criteria is 
only one to be considered as part of a whole should prevent a refusal on this 
ground alone unless there were no other factors indicating that representation 
was needed. The Scottish Legal Aid Board in their guidance to practitioners 
confirm that they will “take a balanced view in deciding whether it is in the 
interests of justice to grant criminal legal aid in any particular case”,463 thus 
rooting the test firmly in the internationally accepted standard. 
A slightly different formulation of the criminal legal aid merits test is found 
in the Republic of Ireland. The statutory test itself refers to matters in addition 
to the bare interests of justice test. For trial on indictment (more serious 
crimes), the merits test is that “having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case (including the nature of such defence (if any) as may have been set up), 
it is essential in the interests of justice that the person should have legal aid”. 
The interests of justice test is not imposed for prosecutions for murder.464 A 
grant of legal aid for summary (more minor) matters465 and for appeals against 
461  Ibidem, s. 24(3).
462  K v. The Scottish Legal Aid Board No. 3, 1989 S.C. 21 Lord Cullen.
463  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook Part III para. 11.16.
464  Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962, ss. 3(c)(i) and 4(c)(i).
465  Ibidem, s.3.
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conviction or sentence466 should be approved if “by reason of the gravity of the 
charge or of exceptional circumstances it is essential in the interests of justice 
that [the person charged] should have legal aid”.467 Thus both the severity of the 
offence and exceptional circumstances form part of the test itself, rather than 
just featuring on a list of factors to be considered, as in the UK. Decided cases 
have shown that exceptional circumstances can include personal characteristics 
of the defendant such as age, immaturity, lack of illness or disability.468 They can 
also relate to the consequences of a conviction on an accused’s employment469 
or potential damage to the reputation of the accused.470
No guidance is issued to judges in the Republic of Ireland by the Ministry 
of Justice and Equality on the application of the criminal merits test. It 
is considered important that the clear line between the executive and the 
judiciary should be maintained and that it is for judges to decide what is in the 
interests of justice. The wording of the 1962 Act reflects prior Supreme Court 
judgments which had established the circumstance in which legal assistance 
should be given under the non-statutory scheme and it was felt that the judicial 
formulation should be respected as sufficient for this decision to be made. The 
Judicial Researchers’ Office has, however, produced an internal guide which 
gives easy access to the most pertinent decided cases and legislation, for use 
by judges in their daily work. Decided cases confirm that the question of the 
gravity of the charge is for the judge,471 who may not ‘fetter discretion’ by 
making her own restrictive policy such as that she will never award legal aid in 
motoring offences.472
Furthermore, the ‘gravity of the offence’ is not to be understood as synonymous 
with the risk of a custodial sentence. Whilst this is a tempting shortcut, the 
Supreme Court stated in a 2011 judgment that the determining factor should 
in fact be unfairness; if the trial would be unfair without legal aid, it must 
be concluded that the charge is of sufficient gravity or the circumstances are 
sufficiently exceptional as to required legal aid.473 The reasoning behind this 
decision refers back to the constitutional right to legal aid, and finds that the 
Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act 1962 is the practical implementation of the 
constitutional guarantee. As the constitutional right is to a fair trial, the Act 
must be interpreted in accordance with this principle.
The Nordic states do not explicitly refer to the interests of justice in the 
legislative foundation of their public defence attorney schemes474 although, 
interestingly, the Finnish legal aid scheme does. These jurisdictions tend to set 
466  Ibidem, s.4.
467  Ibidem, s. 2.
468  State (Healy) v. Donoghue, 1976, at p. 357.
469  O’Neill v. Butler, 1979.
470  Carmody v. Minister for Justice, 2010, at p. 658.
471  Neeson v. Brady and the Director of Public Prosecutions, 2008.
472  Whelan v. Fitzpatrick, 2008.
473  Joyce v. Brady, 2011, O’Donnell J. 
474  Or in the legal aid scheme as it applies to criminal cases, in Finland.
100
a benchmark based on eligibility if the potential sentence is above a certain 
severity and also provide for assistance to be provided in lesser offences if other 
factors indicate that the trial may be complex or that the defendant will require 
professional input. 
The Danish system operates on the basis of a list of circumstances in which 
a public defender will be appointed, which is very similar to the lists used to 
identify the interests of justice in the UK and Republic of Ireland. This provides 
that there is a right to a public defender if the charge can lead to imprisonment 
or if there are other particularly serious consequences or complexities to the 
proceedings.475 Inter alia, a public defender will be appointed where: a decision 
is to be made as to pre-trial detention; the trial will take place before a jury or 
lay judge; in appeals which are not immediately dismissed; cross-examination 
of close family members will take place or questioning of the defendant will 
take place in closed court. In direct contrast to the approach in Scotland and 
in England & Wales, the list is fixed and a public defender should be appointed 
if any one of the criteria is met. Thus, for instance, if a more serious penalty 
than a fine is indicated, defence counsel must be appointed whatever the other 
circumstances; it is not open to the court to find that the defendant will be able 
to fairly represent himself because, for example, the case is straightforward. 
Furthermore, a public defender may also be appointed if the court considers 
it desirable in light of the nature or circumstances of the cases or the 
characteristics of the accused.476 
With regard to the seriousness of penalty which will trigger the appointment 
of a public attorney, two points are important. Firstly, where the court assesses 
that a higher penalty than a fine is indicated, the appointment of an attorney 
relies on a request for public counsel being made by the defendant.477 However, 
this provision is very rarely used because jurors are appointed in all cases where 
there are indications that a higher penalty than a fine will be imposed478 and 
thus a public attorney will be appointed without the need for a request from the 
defendant, under the criteria that this must happen in jury cases. 
An attorney will always be appointed in Sweden if the suspect is detained or 
if the offence is punishable by imprisonment of six months or more, but also 
possibly in less serious cases if there are special reasons, as set out in the Code 
of Judicial Procedure:
If a suspect under arrest or detained so requests, a public defence counsel 
shall be appointed for him. A public defence counsel shall also be appointed 
upon request for a person who is suspected of an offence in respect of which 
a less severe sentence than six months imprisonment is not prescribed. A 
public defence counsel shall also be appointed (1) if a defence counsel is 
needed by the suspect in connection with the inquiry into the offence, (2) 
475  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 731.
476  Ibidem, § 732.
477  Ibidem, § 731, para. 2.
478  Ibidem, § 686, para. 2.
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if a defence counsel is needed in view of doubt concerning which sanction 
shall be chosen and there is reason to impose a sentence for a sanction other 
than a fine or conditional sentence or such sanctions linked together, or (3) 
if there are otherwise special reasons relating to the personal circumstances 
of the suspect or the subject of the case.479
Accordingly, any charge relating to an offence with a minimum sentence 
of six months’ imprisonment will be covered, as will a lesser charge if in the 
particular case there are grounds for imposing an unconditional custodial 
sentence. The online handbook does not provide any further elaboration of 
these tests, but some guidance can be found in decided cases. In a prosecution 
for violent resistance, relating to injuries allegedly inflicted by the defendant on 
security guards attempting to evict him from a nightclub, the Supreme Court 
was asked to overturn the lower courts’ decision that no public defence counsel 
was needed. The court held that although the offence was relatively minor, with 
a maximum penalty of a fine or imprisonment for of six months, the course 
of events was not quite clear and several witnesses were to be heard giving 
different perspectives on the events. The defendant was therefore in need of 
a public defence counsel “in connection with the inquiry into the offence”.480 
Defendants under the age of 18 will always be allocated a public defence 
counsel unless it is clear that this is not necessary.481 
A public defence counsel will thus be appointed if any one of four criteria 
are met: the offence has a minimum sentence of six months; a custodial 
sentence might be imposed in the particular case; assistance is needed during 
the criminal investigation or there are special reasons. Whilst no reference 
is made to the interests of justice, it might be assumed that in applying the 
‘special reasons’ test judges will pay heed to the Article 6 requirement.
Finnish public defenders are only available on request by the defendant for 
more serious offences, i.e. those punishable by imprisonment of four months or 
more, or if the suspect is under arrest or being held on remand before trial. In 
some cases a public defender can be appointed by the court of its own motion 
even if the potential penalty is less severe: when the suspect is incapable of 
defending himself or herself; is under 18 years of age (unless it is clear that 
there is no need of a public defender); the lawyer retained by the suspect 
does not meet the qualifications required of a public defender or is incapable 
of defending the suspect in an appropriate manner; or where there are other 
special reasons.482 
In the same jurisdiction, the level of potential penalty which will lead to 
legal aid is set lower than that for a public defender. Legal aid excludes simple 
criminal matters, defined as those where the expected penalty is no greater 
than a fine or where the likely penalty in conjunction with the outcome of the 
479  Rättegångsbalken, 1942, Chapter 21, 3a §.
480  Ö5079-13, 2014.
481  Lag med särskilda bestämmelser om unga lagöverträdare, 1964, 24 §.
482  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2, 1 §.
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criminal investigation lead to a conclusion that the defendant will have access 
to justice even without an attorney.483 This is interpreted such that legal aid is 
generally granted in all cases where imprisonment is likely and in situations 
where this is not the case but other factors indicate that legal assistance is 
needed. These could be personal to the defendant, such as age or difficulty 
in understanding the proceedings or relate to the potential effects of the 
sentence such as a risk to livelihood if a driving ban is imposed. However, the 
interpretation handbook also suggests that a criminal matter may be ‘simple’ 
and thus not eligible for legal aid even if there might be a punishment greater 
than a fine, in some situations. This would be the case for example if the facts 
are clear and the penalty will be determined according to a schedule, as in some 
drink driving, theft and criminal damage cases. Legal aid will not usually be 
granted for an application to reduce the level of a fine imposed or to defend 
an application by the prosecution to transmute a community service order 
into imprisonment, unless there are special circumstances. If witnesses will be 
heard, a case will generally not be considered simple.484 
In Norway, as has been seen above, a defendant will in general be entitled 
to official defence counsel during the main hearing,485 although in the District 
Court, defence counsel is not required for some road traffic offences, cases 
concerning only confiscation and optional penalty writs.486 An exception is 
also provided such that during a main hearing in the District Court, where the 
defendant has made a full confession which is supported by other evidence, no 
defence counsel will be needed if the proposed sentence is under six months’ 
imprisonment, unless the court finds that due to the nature of the case and 
other circumstances a defence counsel is in fact necessary.487 The rule also 
applies to summary judgments on confession.488 The general presumption is, 
though, that counsel will be provided during time in police custody or pre-
trial detention and at the main hearing, regardless of the severity of the offence 
or the characteristics of the defendant. It is proposed to extend the right to a 
defence attorney to all defendants where there is a likelihood of imprisonment, 
youth detention or community service, regardless of other circumstances such 
as the existence of a confession.489
In the relatively rare situations where there is no statutory entitlement 
to defence counsel, for example because the matter is minor, a court may 
nonetheless appoint defence counsel where there are ‘special reasons’ for doing 
so. Under statute, ‘special reasons’ include reduced capability or a physical or 
psychological impairment which indicates that there is a particular need for a 
483  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 6 §, para. 2(2). 
484  Oikeusavun käsikirja, 2013, para. 2.2.1.
485  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 94.
486  Ibidem, § 96.
487  Ibidem,§ 96 and 99.
488  Ibidem, § 99.
489  NOU 2016: 24, para. 9.4.3.5.
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defence lawyer.490 The Supreme Court has held that § 100 must be interpreted 
in accordance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.491 
Whilst the Court did not find that this led to a right to paid defence counsel in 
all cases at the investigation stage, it did hold that the interests of justice should 
also be considered when considering whether ‘special reasons’ are present for 
the purposes of § 100 of the Criminal Procedure Act.492 Amongst other factors, 
this will require the consideration of the severity of the potential penalty.493 
Furthermore, the means of the accused are relevant and a wealthy person 
would not be entitled to official defence counsel under the ‘special reasons’ 
provision to the same extent as a poorer person.494 
In Iceland, a public defender will be appointed for any arrested suspect 
and for any person charged with an offence, during investigations if needed 
and in any event for the main trial.495 This is the most generous system under 
consideration, as there is no financial eligibility, scope or merits limitation 
applied.
The complex combinations of factors constituting the merits test for 
criminal legal aid result in different emphases in the various jurisdictions. In 
particular, there are differences in how the severity of the potential penalty 
can trigger a right to publicly-funded legal assistance without the need for 
additional exacerbating factors. The likelihood of a custodial sentence, of any 
length, is a factor to be considered in England & Wales. However, this does 
not mean that legal aid will be granted for any prosecution of an offence 
which carries a potential term of imprisonment; court sentencing guidelines 
and the likelihood of imprisonment being ordered in that particular case are 
the relevant factors.496 Legal aid should not be automatically granted where 
imprisonment is only a theoretical possibility, but regard must be had to the 
specific facts alleged in the case. This approach of considering the likelihood 
of a custodial sentence in that particular case is echoed in Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, in all four jurisdictions it is the 
likelihood of a custodial sentence of any length which is in issue. 
The Swedish approach of providing a public defence attorney in any case 
where the penalty for the offence is six months’ imprisonment or more puts 
an emphasis on the provision of assistance in all serious cases whatever 
the surrounding circumstances, although it must be noted that there is a 
saving provision that assistance must also be given if it is unclear whether 
imprisonment (of any length) will be ordered. In Finland, a potential 
punishment of four months’ imprisonment is the trigger for automatic public 
490  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 100 (2).
491  HR-2015-01405-A, para. 22.
492  Ibidem, para. 48.
493  Ibidem, para. 49.
494  Ibidem, para. 54.
495  Lög um meðferð sakamála, 2008, § 30-31.
496  Legal Aid Agency, Guidance on the Consideration of Defence Representation Order  
      Applications, p. 5. 
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defender eligibility but any length of potential imprisonment may lead to a 
grant of legal aid, or to a public defender if other circumstances so require. In 
Denmark a public defender will be appointed if imprisonment of any length is 
envisaged.
Thus it can be seen that there is a distinction between legal aid schemes 
and public defender schemes which, on the evidence of Finland, is connected 
to the type of scheme rather than the location of the jurisdiction. All the 
legal aid schemes count the likelihood of imprisonment, of any length, as one 
factor to be considered but leave open the possibility that other factors might 
make legal aid unnecessary in the interests of justice even if imprisonment 
is likely. The public defender schemes in Sweden and Finland fix a level of 
potential imprisonment for the offence in question (rather than for that 
defendant in particular) which will automatically lead to entitlement to public 
defence counsel whatever the surrounding circumstances. Denmark’s public 
defender system shares the characteristic with the legal aid schemes that it 
is the likely penalty in the particular case which is relevant, but unlike those 
schemes, if imprisonment of any length is likely a public defender must be 
appointed however able the defendant might be to achieve a fair trial without 
representation. 
Iceland and Norway are unusual in paying very little (and in the case of 
Iceland, no) attention to the likely penalty when deciding whether to appoint 
a public defence attorney. In Norway, six months’ imprisonment is in some 
situations a benchmark, but only if there has been a full confession and, 
again, other factors may lead to a need for official defence counsel even if the 
potential penalty is lower. Attorneys are not generally provided for a charge of 
driving under the influence, even though this offence commonly results in a 
short prison term of up to 30 days. Aside from these situations and some other 
minor exceptions from the general right to public defence counsel, counsel will 
be appointed regardless of the likely or possible sentence; even cases where no 
imprisonment is possible will in most cases lead to the appointment of defence 
counsel, thus making the situation in practice close to the Icelandic situation. 
However, under current Norwegian proposals to extend coverage to include 
the period post-police detention but pre-trial, it is being suggested that public 
defence attorneys should only be granted at this stage for cases in which there 
is a real possibility of imprisonment, youth detention or community service.497 
None of the jurisdictions fully comply with the UN Principle that “anyone 
who is detained, arrested, suspected of, or charged with a criminal offence 
punishable by a term of imprisonment […] is entitled to legal aid at all stages 
of the criminal justice process”,498 as they all have circumstances where, despite 
a possible sentence of imprisonment for the offence, legal aid or a public 
attorney may be refused. However, all the schemes, of both types, provide 
that other circumstances may trigger the availability of assistance even if 
497  NOU 2016: 24, para. 9.4.3.2.
498  ONODC 2012, Principle 3.20.
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imprisonment is not in contemplation. This is clearly necessary for compliance 
with international obligations. In their various ways, the schemes provide good 
cover following the principle that:
Legal aid should also be provided, regardless of the person’s means, if the 
interests of justice so require, for example, given the urgency or complexity 
of the case or the severity of the potential penalty.499
3.5 Legal aid for appeals
Across Europe, many jurisdictions, having provided legal aid at a criminal 
trial at first instance, limit the availability of legal aid upon appeal. The 
European Court of Human Rights has ruled upon the necessity for legal aid in 
criminal appeal cases in terms which focus on broadly the same issues as the 
requirement under the ‘interests of justice’ test at first instance. 
Helpfully, in Quaranta v. Switzerland,500 the Court set out criteria to be 
considered when deciding whether legal assistance is necessary at appeal: the 
seriousness of the offence, the severity of the potential sentence, the complexity 
of the case and the personal situation of the accused.501 These factors need not 
all be present in order for legal aid to be required, as illustrated in a subsequent 
case where a custodial sentence of 5 years was found sufficient to require 
legal representation in the interests of justice even though the appeal did not 
disclose particularly complex legal issues.502 It was decisive in that case that the 
applicant was “unable competently to address the court on [the] legal issues and 
thus to defend himself effectively”. Echoing many of the relevant considerations 
in civil cases, the Court has recently confirmed that the issues pertinent to the 
question of whether the interests of justice require the provision of legal aid in 
an appellate court are:
the nature of the proceedings, the wide powers of the appellate court, 
the complexity of the legal issues involved, the limited ability of the 
unrepresented applicant to present a legal argument and, above all, the 
importance of the issues at stake in view of the severity of the sentence 
and the statutory requirement for mandatory legal representation in such 
cases.503 
It is thus incumbent on states to provide legal aid for appeals against criminal 
conviction if the interests of justice so require. This is achieved in a very 
comprehensive manner in Finland, where a legal aid certificate covers work on 
the case at all levels of the court hierarchy and appeals are thus covered by the 
499 Ibidem, Principle 3.21.
500  Quaranta v. Switzerland, 1991.
501  Ibidem, paras. 33-35.
502  Maxwell v. UK, 1994. For a very similar decision concerning a custodial sentence of 8 
       years, issued on the same date, see Boner v. UK.
503  Shekhov v. Russia, 2014, para. 46.
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same certificate.504 Similarly, if a defendant is represented by a public defence 
attorney, the attorney will also represent him in any appeal to a higher court, 
as needed.505
Denmark has a scheme for representation in criminal appeals which is 
nearly as comprehensive, consisting of the compulsory appointment of a public 
defender in any appeal which is not immediately dismissed by the court.506 
Thus, the convicted defendant will always be represented in any appeal which 
proceeds to consideration. The President of the court can appoint the original 
defence attorney to be the representative also at the appeal, as long as that 
attorney is entitled to appear before the appeal court.507 
In Norway and Northern Ireland, legislation provides that the official 
defence counsel or legal aid lawyer in the original trial must advise on the 
possibility of appeal508 and in Norway the drafting of the notice of appeal is 
also included.509 The role of Norwegian defence counsel for the initial hearing 
ends at this point, but if the appeal is referred for a hearing (rather than being 
dismissed or allowed on the papers), defence counsel must be appointed 
immediately510 as in Denmark. As is the case for all other appointments of 
official defence counsel, the defendant has the right to indicate which lawyer 
they wish to be appointed and the court must comply with this request unless 
there are relevant reasons against the appointment.511 
In Northern Ireland, any representation which is required after the advice 
on an appeal must be the subject of a separate application for legal aid, which is 
subject to the interests of justice test in the same way as legal aid for the initial 
prosecution and trial. In the Republic of Ireland, a similar situation exists, but 
appeals against convictions for murder are exempt from the interests of justice 
test; other cases must satisfy the court that by virtue of the seriousness of the 
offence or exceptional circumstances, the interests of justice make it essential 
that legal aid be granted.512 
Swedish courts have the right to assign a public defender even after the case 
has passed out of their hands if the defendant needs assistance appealing the 
verdict,513 and if there was already a public defender dealing with the case, they 
can continue to assist in the higher court if the matter is appealed.514
In England & Wales, legal aid granted for trial in the Magistrates’ Court 
is explicitly stated to not include appeals to the Crown Court, for which 
504  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 13 §, para. 1.
505  Lag om rättegång i brottmål, 1997, Chapter 2, 7 §.
506  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 731(1)(f).
507  Ibidem, § 735.
508  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, s.26(2)(b).
509  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 313.
510  Ibidem, § 328.
511  Ibidem, § 102
512  Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962, s. 4.
513  Rättegångsbalken, 1942, Chapter 21, 4 §.
514  Ibidem, 8 §.
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a separate application for legal aid must be made.515 Unlike the position for 
first-instance trials in the Crown Court, appeals to the Crown Court against a 
decision of the Magistrates’ Court are subject to the interests of justice test516 
and the Guidance states that:
If the test was not met in the magistrates’ court in the first instance it is very 
unlikely that it will be satisfied for the appeal case unless there has been a 
material and relevant change in circumstances (e.g. the defendant in fact 
received a custodial sentence when previously loss of liberty was deemed 
unlikely).517 
Appeals to the Court of Appeal are exempt from the interests of justice test and 
from the financial eligibility test.518
Similarly, appeals against conviction or sentence are treated as distinct 
proceedings for the purposes of legal aid in Scotland, and a fresh application 
must be made to the Scottish Legal Aid Board. There are a number of possible 
routes for criminal appeals in Scotland; if the appeal being pursued requires 
the leave of the court, then no additional merits test will be applied by the 
Legal Aid Board, but if there is a right to appeal without needing permission, 
an interests of justice test is applied.519 However, if legal aid is refused on the 
interests of justice ground, the court dealing with the appeal may, either at the 
request of the appellant or of its own motion, determine that the interests of 
justice do require representation and if the court takes this step then the Legal 
Aid Board must immediately make legal aid available to the appellant.520 This 
process mirrors the requirement in the UN Principles and Guidelines, referred 
to above, that: 
A court may, having regard to the particular circumstances of a person and 
after considering the reasons for denial of legal aid, direct that that person 
be provided with legal aid, with or without his or her contribution, when the 
interests of justice so require.521
All the jurisdictions thus provide either automatic assistance in appeals or 
apply an interests of justice test in sifting applications, thus complying with the 
European Court of Human Right’s interpretation of Article 6.
515  The Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013, Regulation 24.
516  Ibidem, Regulation 21.
517  Legal Aid Agency Guidance on the Consideration of Defence Representation Order 
      Applications, p. 15. 
518  The Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013, Regulation 21.
519  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 25.
520  Ibidem, s. 25(2A) and (2B).
521  UNODC 2012, Guideline 1(e).
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3.6 Conclusions
The above comparison of state-funded assistance for criminal suspects and 
defendants has shown differences in the organisation of such help and in the 
merits eligibility tests applied. It has been seen that there is significant variation 
in outcomes for better-off defendants, which may be the main practical 
difference between the public defender schemes and criminal legal aid schemes 
in North-West Europe. However, the financial implications for individual 
defendants are not the only consequence of the choice of system. Whatever 
the extent of the duty to repay upon conviction, there is an important point of 
principle expressed through the public defender schemes: any person accused 
of a sufficiently serious crime is entitled to a defence, which will be paid for 
by the state. The fact that repayment of costs only arises after conviction is a 
practical commitment to the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’. Unlike 
in systems relying on criminal legal aid, no-one wrongly accused of a crime 
will suffer financially through having to fund their defence. Public defence 
attorneys, appointed by the courts irrespective of means, can also be considered 
an indication that representation for defendants is an integral part of the justice 
systems in these jurisdictions; structurally bound into the fabric of the criminal 
justice system as a whole. 
Criminal legal aid schemes, in contrast, position defence work alongside 
civil legal aid. Entitlement depends on a certain level of poverty and thus 
may encourage a view of publicly funded criminal defence as a social welfare 
benefit rather than a fundamental civil right. This may result in a different 
public attitude to criminal legal aid clients and different public and political 
commitment to proper funding for the system. A general awareness that a 
public defender would be appointed for each individual, if ever accused of 
crime, seems likely to engender a more positive appreciation of the system than 
a perception that legal aid takes tax-payers’ money to fund the defence of a 
‘criminal underclass’ who are unemployed and do not themselves pay tax. This 
difference in perception may be exacerbated by the fact that in the UK and 
Republic of Ireland, legal aid is funded by taxes (rather than social insurance 
payments which are also made by employers and government):
It has been argued that a system based on tax-finance, encouraging as it does 
the drawing of comparisons between those who pay into the system and 
those who receive benefits from the system, immediately raises questions of 
stigma and desert, particularly in the context of non-universal services.522
In addition, there may be a difference in public perception of the quality of 
state-funded defence lawyers: a skilled band of public defenders is expected to 
represent any defendant well, whereas legal aid lawyers are only for those who 
cannot afford to pay for a ‘better’ lawyer. In England & Wales and Scotland, 
criminal legal aid is not administered by the courts and this distance between 
522  Byrom 2017, p. 229.
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the criminal justice system and the funding of criminal defence might also 
be considered significant. It could be argued that the right to a defence loses 
symbolic power by being relegated in this manner. 
As seen at the beginning of this chapter, applicable international treaties 
require the provision of free assistance where this is necessary in the interests 
of justice and all the jurisdictions under consideration could reasonably 
claim to base their merits test on this criterion. It is not surprising that all the 
jurisdictions make a connection between the interests of justice and the severity 
of the offence as these are closely linked concepts: the investigation and trial of 
a serious offence are likely to be lengthier and more complex and thus harder 
for a defendant to navigate fairly without legal assistance, and the potential 
consequences of conviction are more momentous. However, other factors may 
also increase the risk of a trial being unfair without representation and all the 
schemes allow for special reasons to be taken into account. Structurally, the 
tests vary, with two main types seen. In the UK jurisdictions and the Republic 
of Ireland, an all-encompassing interests of justice test is applied, with an 
inexhaustive list of factors to be considered when assessing the interests of 
justice provided in the legislation. The public defender schemes provide lists of 
circumstances in which public defenders must be appointed, with an additional 
catch-all provision to provide for special situations. It is therefore evident that 
all the schemes are implementing similar intentions through their various 
combinations of tests, albeit through a range of mechanisms with potentially 
different outcomes in specific cases.
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Case study 1:
Mikkel in Denmark, Mike in Scotland and Mikko in Finland have all been charged with 
assault following a fight outside a bar. All have previous convictions for assault and have 
been released pending trial.
Denmark – Mikkel
While Mikkel was in police 
custody, when the decision 
to  charge  h im wit h  t he 
offence was made, the police 
c ont a c t e d  t h e  c o u r t  t o 
inform them of the situation. 
As it is likely that Mikkel will 
receive a prison sentence 
i f  c onv i c t e d ,  t h e  c ou r t 
appointed a public defender 
without needing to consider 
whether there could be a fair 
trial without defence counsel. 
No means test was applied.
If Mikkel is convicted and 
appeals, defence counsel will 
automatically be appointed 
as long as the appeal is not 
immediately dismissed.
The cost  of  the  defence 
must be paid by Mikkel if 
he is convicted, and will be 
waiting for him as a debt 
when he is released from 
prison.
Scotland – Mike
Whilst in the police station 
under investigation, Mike 
received automatic legal aid 
and was advised by a solicitor 
from the duty rota. On his 
release on bail, he went to see 
a local solicitor who applied 
for legal aid to the Scottish 
Legal Aid Board (SLAB). 
Mike’s means were assessed 
and,  as  the  prosecut ion 
had decided to pursue the 
charge as a summary matter, 
the interests of justice test 
was  appl ied.  SLAB took 
into account the statutory 
criteria and decided that, 
overall, representation was 
necessary in the interests 
of  just ice .  Mike’s  l ike ly 
difficulty in understanding 
the proceedings and the 
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  a  p r i s o n 
sentence were significant in 
the decision.
If Mike wishes to appeal 
a g a i n s t  c o nv i c t i o n ,  h e 
will have to make a fresh 
application for legal aid. He 
will not be asked to repay any 
of the defence costs.
Finland – Mikko
At the police station, Mikko 
refused the services of a 
public defender. He later 
c h a n g e d  h i s  m i n d  a n d 
went to see a lawyer he had 
used previously. Mikko is 
financially eligible for legal 
aid with a 0% contribution 
so the lawyer explained that 
it  makes litt le difference 
whether they apply for her 
to be appointed as his public 
defender or apply for legal 
aid. Either way, the costs 
which in theory should be 
paid back on conviction 
will be assessed at nil due 
to Mikko’s low means. They 
apply for legal aid and the 
application is assessed by 
a Legal Aid Office, which 
decides that as imprisonment 
is likely, legal aid will be 
granted irrespective of the 
other circumstances. The 
legal aid certificate issued 
will  cover the case at al l 
levels of the court hierarchy 
without the need for further 
application.
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4. Chapter 4: Civil legal aid decision-making
4.1 Introduction523
Civil legal aid decisions are very different in different jurisdictions, primarily 
for the obvious reason that the rules of eligibility for legal aid vary dramatically. 
Financial limits and merits tests, as well as the overall scope, are configured 
in myriad ways resulting in a wide variety of schemes. In addition to these 
substantive differences, the structure of legal aid can differ widely both in terms 
of delivery of services and in administration of the system. 
This chapter examines one aspect of the differing administration of legal 
aid: the making and oversight of decisions on applications for civil legal aid. 
Decisions on the granting of government funded assistance at the advice level 
are generally taken by the acting lawyer, who may be a private practitioner or a 
government employee. Above this level, applications are made either to courts 
or to government agencies in all the jurisdictions of the Nordic countries, the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. This has not always been the case, 
as decisions in England & Wales were until 1988 made by the Law Society, 524 
which is the professional body for solicitors in that jurisdiction. Within courts, 
some aspects of legal aid decisions are routinely delegated to administrative 
staff although final responsibility and some more complex decisions rest 
with the judiciary. These modes of working do not vary significantly across 
the courts of the jurisdictions considered in this study. There is, though, 
considerable difference in the distribution of decision-making responsibility 
within the governmental legal aid agencies. Some systems concentrate decisions 
within a central bureaucracy which is not involved in the delivery of legal 
aid services to clients, whilst others delegate decision-making to the public 
organisations providing casework assistance, and to a greater or lesser extent to 
lawyers involved in casework.
Initial grants and refusals of legal aid for representation are thus made by 
civil servants of one kind or another working within various public bodies 
523  This chapter is partly based on the previous published work by the author: Barlow 2017a 
       and Barlow 2017b. Barlow 2017a compares only Finland and England & Wales, and the 
       arguments and analysis are here extended to all nine jurisdictions.
524  In that year the Legal Aid Act 1988 established the Legal Aid Board, a government quango 
      with its own governing board.
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(including courts). The processes involved in an application are markedly 
different, depending on whether an application must be made to a government 
agency or whether the court dealing with the substantive matter can also grant 
legal aid. However, the identity of the decision-maker may conceivably impact 
the content of the decision as well as the procedure for applications. Each 
actor within the system has different priorities due to her particular role and 
responsibilities; potentially conflicting perspectives such as a desire for access 
to justice for the individual, the need to save public money and pressure to 
avoid court inefficiency are all present. Particularly when considered en masse, 
decisions on legal aid have implications not only for the individual concerned 
but also for the public purse and for the smooth operation of the justice system 
as a whole. 
There is no decision-maker without his own perspective, and no completely 
neutral viewpoint can be found. As a decision is needed, but must be 
acknowledged as potentially flawed due to this inherent bias, the possibility of 
re-examination is crucial. External review can counter the risk of inappropriate 
factors being taken into account in legal aid decision-making by balancing 
the interests of the various bodies involved in the process. This improves the 
chance of a proper outcome in the case under consideration and can also 
improve the quality of future decisions if an appropriate feedback mechanism 
is used. In all of the jurisdictions, such procedures are in place although they 
vary considerably: in Denmark the Appeals Permission Board, the body which 
grants leave to appeal to higher courts, also hears appeals from the Legal Aid 
Office of the Department of Civil Affairs; in England & Wales, Independent 
Funding Adjudicators drawn from the profession hear appeals and report back 
to the Director of Legal Aid. In Sweden, independent oversight is extended to 
legal aid decisions made by the courts in addition to those made by the Legal 
Aid Agency; all decisions can be monitored by the Chancellor of Justice who 
has locus standi to instigate appeals to the higher courts. 
Before considering the review and appeals procedures, initial decision-
making must be examined. The jurisdictions under consideration place initial 
civil decision-making responsibility with lawyers, government agencies and/
or courts. These will now be considered in turn, with the government agencies 
sub-divided those which also provide direct legal services to clients, and those 
which are remote from service delivery.
4.2 Initial decision-making patterns
4.2.1 Decisions by private lawyers
With the exception of Iceland, all the civil legal aid systems under consideration 
provide or contribute to the costs of advice as well as casework and 
representation in court. Generally, the decision to grant a particular client 
advice level assistance under legal aid is taken by the lawyer who has been 
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approached for help, who applies financial eligibility, scope and/or merits tests. 
In all the jurisdictions other than Finland and the Republic of Ireland, this 
initial publicly-funded assistance is from a private practitioner, who in most 
cases is authorised to grant legal aid at the advice stage and sometimes also for 
assistance with court hearings (although never formal representation).
Sweden has a distinctive approach to advice, which is available for any 
matter of Swedish law, to both natural persons and legal persons.525 Whilst the 
state pays for or contributes towards the cost of legal assistance at the levels of 
both legal advice and legal aid, it is a necessary pre-condition of legal aid that 
between one and two hours’ legal advice on the issues has been received, unless 
this is clearly unnecessary or there are special reasons why legal aid should 
nonetheless be granted.526 The requirement is strictly applied and decided 
cases show, for example, that the applicant having already been in receipt of 
legal aid for a related matter527 or being outside the country528 will not result in 
preliminary advice being held clearly unnecessary. 
Advice has been held by the Supreme Court of Sweden to be particularly 
meaningful in cases involving relationship breakdown and related matters, as 
an important stage assisting in early resolution and agreement between the 
parties.529 However, where an applicant had a learning disability530 or was a 
mother involved in proceedings brought by the state to establish paternity of 
her child,531 advice was not required before legal aid could be granted. In a 
decision which is referred to several times in the various guidance documents, 
the Legal Aid Board has also emphasised that the requirement for prior advice 
entails at least partial payment by the client.532 It is not clear from the decision 
what the perceived relevance of such payment is, but it is conceivable that the 
reasoning is the same as that concerning the minimum 2% contribution to 
fees in representation cases. In the preparatory documents to the 1996 Legal 
Aid Act, the government stressed the importance of the assisted person being 
aware of the costs of the help being given, through the imposition of easily 
understood contributions.533
The fee for advice given under the Legal Aid Act is paid by the client directly 
to the lawyer providing the advice, although if the client’s means are low 
enough, part of the fee can be paid by the Legal Aid Authority upon application 
by the lawyer. At most half of the fee will be paid, which means that all clients 
525  Legal aid for representation is not usually available in Sweden for legal persons. In the  
       jurisdictions under consideration, it is only in Denmark that legal persons have a  
      general right to apply for legal aid, although in exceptional circumstances they may  
       also do so in Norway, England & Wales and the Republic of Ireland.
526  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 2 §.
527  RH 1998:25.
528  Rättshjälpsnämnden 363-1998.
529  NJA 1999 s.149 I.
530  Rättshjälpsnämnden 46-2001.
531  Rättshjälpsnämnden 682-1998.
532  Rättshjälpsnämnden 216-2000.
533  Prop. 1996/97:9 s. 160-161.
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(with the exception of indigent minors, for whom the Authority will pay the 
whole advice fee) must pay at least half an hour’s lawyer’s fee before entering 
the legal aid scheme. At 2018 rates, this amounts to a payment of at least 
680 Swedish kronor. However, in practice lawyers do not always insist upon 
payment of the fee and some municipalities may pay the advice fee from their 
social security budget if a client cannot afford to pay. As advice is available on 
all areas of law and to all clients regardless of their economic situation, the only 
decision needed at this point is whether to reduce the fee by 50%. This decision 
is made by the lawyer,534 following the guidelines drawn up by the National 
Courts Administration (Domstolsverket). 
In Denmark, civil legal aid is divided into two types: legal advice (retshjælp) 
and legal representation (fri process). The Administration of Justice Act sets 
out three stages of legal advice.535 Step 1 provides, in theory, free oral advice for 
anyone on all subjects and is expected to cover the legal issues in the case and 
also the economic and practical matters which will enable the client to make 
an informed decision about whether to continue with the case.536 Although the 
Act states that this advice is ‘granted’ by the Minister of Justice, there is no 
duty on lawyers to provide such advice and no payment scheme is provided to 
reimburse lawyers if they do so. Generally, step 1 advice is provided through 
voluntary clinics (which are usually open only a few hours per week, staffed 
by local lawyers) or Law Centres, many of which receive grants from the 
government.537 However, coverage is far from complete.
Step 2 advice, which is defined as assistance including letter-writing, and 
step 3 (negotiation) are also ‘granted’ but these types of help are remunerated, 
by way of a fixed fee of which the client pays (in theory) respectively 50% or 
25%.538 Step 2 advice includes applications for legal aid for representation, 
drafting of divorce settlements, simple wills and marriage contracts.539 Advice 
at step 3 should only be undertaken if the lawyer reasonably believes that there 
is a possibility of resolving the dispute by agreement.540 In practice, there are 
very few lawyers providing legal aid at levels 2 and 3, due to concerns about 
the low level of fee and the difficulties of enforcing the fee against clients. It 
may be that work is being carried out pro bono instead at this level to avoid 
the bureaucracy of claiming small fees. However, where advice at levels 2 and 
3 is provided, it is the lawyer carrying out the work who must ensure that the 
matter falls within the scope of the scheme and that the client is financially 
eligible. If legal aid is provided through incorrect application of the rules, the 
lawyer’s request for payment to the Department of Civil Affairs (Civilstyrelsen) 
will be rejected.
534  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 4 §.
535  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 323(1).
536  BEK nr 1463 af 11/12/2017, § 5.2.
537  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 324.
538  Ibidem, § 323(6).
539  BEK nr 1463 af 11/12/2017 § 5.3.
540  Ibidem, § 5.4.
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In the UK, the decision to provide at least initial advice under legal aid funding 
is always taken by the lawyer from whom the advice has been sought. As seen 
in Chapter 3 above, Scotland divides legal aid into three categories: the familiar 
advice class (called Advice and Assistance) and representation but also an 
intermediate category of Assistance by Way of Representation (ABWOR). The 
category which covers representation at court is simply referred to as ‘legal 
aid’. Non-criminal work in Scotland is further divided into civil and children’s 
Advice and Assistance or legal aid. The Law Society has recommended that 
consideration be given to merging these distinct categories into a single 
grant system,541 and has argued more generally for simplification, stating that 
“court users may have difficulty understanding what type of legal assistance is 
available [… and] there are frequent disagreements between solicitors and [the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board] over interpretation of legal assistance regulations”.542 
This call is echoed in the 2018 Independent Strategic Review, which suggests a 
new statutory framework with a single legal aid type.543
Currently, in civil and children’s cases (as well as in criminal matters), 
Advice and Assistance is granted by the solicitor giving the advice,544 subject 
to a financial eligibility test and to the requirement that assistance can only 
be given in a matter of Scots law.545 Not all matters on which a client asks 
advice are necessarily legal questions and the Scottish Legal Aid Board online 
handbook for civil legal aid lists the types of matters which will be accepted as 
legal and about which a solicitor can therefore give advice under civil Advice 
and Assistance. The list can be amended by the Board and suggestions for 
additional categories can be made by solicitors directly to the Board or via the 
Law Society of Scotland.546 ABWOR is administered within the same scheme as 
Advice and Assistance and the statutory basis is the same section of the Legal 
Aid (Scotland) Act.547 As a result, ABWOR is also granted by the solicitor. 
In England & Wales, as part of the contraction of legal aid services following 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), 
access to a legal aid solicitor in some subject areas is only possible by referral 
through the government Civil Legal Advice telephone helpline (‘Gateway 
work’).548 Solicitors are not entitled to take clients other than by such a referral 
in debt, discrimination or education cases unless they are exempted.549 The 
Gateway was introduced to increase access, provide savings and maintain 
541  Law Society of Scotland 2014, p. 34.
542  Ibidem, p. 4.
543  Evans 2018, p. 51.
544  Advice and Assistance (Scotland) (Consolidation and Amendment) Regulations 1996, 
      Regulation 8.
545  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 s.6.
546  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part III para. 1.15. 
547  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 s.6.
548  The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Part 2. This is in addition to the  
      removal of many areas from scope altogether (see Chapter 5).
549  Minors, detainees and those who have already been assessed within the last 12 months on 
      the same matter. The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulation 20.
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quality, but an independent assessment of its operation has suggested that due 
largely to low awareness of the service, “at least in some respects, the Gateway 
may have constituted a barrier to access to justice”, that savings have not 
materialised and that quality is of concern.550
Once a Gateway referral to a solicitor has been made, or in non-Gateway 
case types, the supplier may provide civil legal aid under three main categories: 
Legal Help (advice, correspondence, negotiation); Help at Court (help and 
advocacy at a specific hearing but without formal representation) and Legal 
Representation (full conduct of litigation including advocacy). It will be noted 
that these divisions are essentially the same as in Scotland, although differently 
named. In the first two categories, the solicitor assesses the financial eligibility 
of the client and decides whether the case is covered by their contract. Many 
areas of law are excluded from scope (see Chapter 5). A claim for payment is 
made at the end of the case and, if the Legal Aid Agency on assessing the claim 
decides that the case was in fact not eligible for funding, the solicitor will not 
be paid. 
The classification of cases is slightly different in Northern Ireland, with the 
categories being Advice and Assistance, Representation Lower Courts and 
Representation Higher Courts. Advice and Assistance is granted by the solicitor 
providing the service,551 who applies any relevant financial eligibility test and 
takes responsibility in civil matters for ensuring that the subject-matter is not 
excluded. The self-grant by the solicitor enables advice and assistance up to a 
value of £88,552 after which an application for extension must be made to the 
Legal Services Agency before any further work is carried out. The extension will 
only be granted if it is considered reasonable to incur the further expenditure, 
and will indicate the additional amount awarded.553 
In Norway, legal aid for advice matters is not always granted by the acting 
lawyer. The structure is built through onward delegation of powers granted by 
statute to the Ministry of Justice.554 In all cases the power to decide applications 
for free legal advice has been delegated by secondary legislation to the County 
Governors555 and further, in priority cases (both means-tested and non-means 
tested) the power can also be exercised by the applicant’s lawyer.556 As a result, 
at the level of advice, priority cases are decided by the lawyer providing the 
service and other matters are forwarded to the County Governor for decision. 
However, it should be noted that the lawyer is only authorised to award free 
legal advice to the level of the fixed fee; if further advice is required the County 
Governor must authorise the extension.557 The lawyer is not, either, authorised 
550  Public Law Project 2015.
551  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, s.14(2)(b).
552  Approximately 98€.
553  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 32.
554  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 13.
555  FOR-2005-12-12-1443, § 3-1.
556  Ibidem, § 3-2.
557  Ibidem, §§ 3-4 and 3-5.
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to grant dispensation from the means test and cases where this exception is 
sought must be decided by the County Governor. In the hope of encouraging 
consistency and quality of decision-making by the County Governors, the Civil 
Affairs Authority publishes useful appeal decisions online.558
The Republic of Ireland and Finland both restrict the supply of legally-aided 
services such that they are very largely provided by lawyers employed by the 
state in, respectively, Law Centres and Legal Aid Offices. Decisions made by 
these lawyers are dealt with in the following section. 
4.2.2 Decisions by government agencies
4.2.2.1 Agencies directly delivering services to clients 
The Finnish system places initial legal aid decision-making in the hands of the 
lawyers in the State Legal Aid Offices in both civil and criminal cases, and in 
advice as well as representation situations. The main governing legislation is 
in two parts: the Legal Aid Act of 2002559 and the State Legal Aid and Public 
Guardianship Districts Act560 of 2016. Responsibility for legal aid at government 
level sits with the Ministry of Justice and a small team (4 or 5 dedicated legal 
aid staff, plus assistance from others) oversees the system. However, the 
Ministry has no role in legal aid decision-making and even training on legal aid 
grants, arranged by the Ministry, is delivered by Legal Aid Office lawyers. There 
are 23 Public Legal Aid Offices around the country, divided into six districts, 
each with a director. As described in Chapter 3, a working group of senior 
Legal Aid Office staff has issued recommendations for best practice in decision-
making, published online by the Ministry in a Legal Aid Handbook which has 
advisory status.561 
Legal aid advice work must be initiated at the Legal Aid Office, although it 
can be referred out to private solicitors in certain limited circumstances (see 
Chapter 2 for more detail); representation cases may originate by a client going 
to see a Legal Aid Office or a private lawyer but in the latter case an application 
for legal aid will be made to the Ministry of Justice and decided by a Legal Aid 
Office. However the client makes first contact, and whoever will be dealing with 
the case, all legal aid grants are made by the State Legal Aid Offices.562 Each 
legal aid office will make its own decisions on the cases which it is handling, 
but there is an allocation system for applications made electronically by 
private practitioners. These are dealt with by a smaller number of Legal Aid 
Offices, on a rotating allocation, with the result that there is not necessarily any 
geographical proximity between the lawyer conducting the case and the Legal 
Aid Office deciding the application. A public legal aid attorney at a Legal Aid 
Office may not make the decision on an application for legal aid if he represents 
558  At www.lovdata.no. A subscription is required to access the case decisions.
559  Rättshjälpslag, 2002.
560  Lag om statens rättshjälps- och intressebevakningsdistrikt, 2016.
561  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013.
562  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 11 §, para. 1.
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the other party in the case.563 In order to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest 
between Legal Aid Offices, the district director plays no part in individual 
decisions on legal aid or in individual case management.564
The Republic of Ireland also grants and delivers legal aid mainly through 
a single body, the Legal Aid Board, which is an independent publicly funded 
organisation. The Board is appointed by the Corporate Services Division of 
the Ministry of Justice and Equality, to whom it also reports. Civil legal aid 
was developed much later than criminal legal aid in the Republic of Ireland 
and despite the recommendation of a government committee that such a 
scheme should be set up,565 it was only after the Irish government lost the Airey 
v. Ireland566 case before the European Court of Human Rights that this was 
done.567 Civil legal aid was introduced in 1979 on an executive basis and was 
eventually put on a statutory footing nearly two decades later with the Civil 
Legal Aid Act 1995, which established the Legal Aid Board.
Unlike in Finland, though, the Irish Legal Aid Board operates two separate 
arms: a Head Office which deals with policy, administration, grants of legal aid 
certificates and payments under civil legal aid, and a network of Law Centres 
which deliver most of the services funded under legal aid. Under the provisions 
of the relevant secondary legislation, certificates are to be granted by the 
Board.568 Many decisions on the grant of legal aid are made by the Head Office, 
as will be seen below, but some are within the remit of Law Centre solicitors. 
Law centres have delegated authority to: grant legal advice given by a law centre 
solicitor;569 refuse legal aid for any case on financial grounds;570 grant legal aid 
for clients who will be represented by a Law Centre solicitor in certain family 
cases commencing before the District Court571 and to decide applications for 
legal aid where the client will be represented by a private solicitor (in some 
family, asylum, housing and inquest cases this may be pertinent, as detailed 
in Chapter 2).572 Within the Law Centres, the responsibility for such decisions 
rests with the Managing Solicitor, resulting in a situation which, for these cases, 
is very similar to that in Finland. 
In types of legal aid in the Republic of Ireland in which decision-making 
is not delegated to the Law Centres, it is exercised by the Corporate Services 
team based in Cahirciveen, County Kerry. If the solicitor advising the client 
at the Law Centre believes that the person is entitled to a legal aid certificate, 
563  Ibidem.
564  RP 26/2016 rd, 11.
565  Committee on Civil Legal Aid and Advice 1977.
566  Airey v. Ireland, 1979.
567  See a discussion of the link in Bodnick 2002, pp. 432-433.
568  Civil Legal Aid Regulations 1996, Regulation 5(2).
569  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services 2017, Part 2, p. 2-3.
570  Ibidem, Part 3, p. 3-2.
571  Ibidem, Part 3, p. 3-3. Cases under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, Family Law 
      (Maintenance of Spouses and Children Act) 1976, or Domestic Violence Act 1996 where 
         the proceedings will be taken in the District Court or on appeal to the Circuit Court.
572  Ibidem, Part 3, p. 3-4.
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she submits an application internally and provides her recommendation as to 
whether a certificate should be granted.573 This is “of critical importance … as 
the solicitor is best placed to offer a view on the matter”574 but the decision is 
taken centrally by the Corporate Services team.575 Whichever arm of the Legal 
Aid Board makes the decision, guidance is provided by a detailed Circular on 
Legal Services576 which expands upon the legislation and reminds decision-
makers of their general duties under, for example, administrative law.577 The 
Republic of Ireland thus divides the responsibility for decision-making in 
civil legal aid representation cases between practising lawyers and centralised 
decision-makers, but within the same quasi-governmental agency.
4.2.2.2 Agencies not conducting client casework 
All three jurisdictions within the UK have public bodies which take 
responsibility for all decisions of legal aid grant or refusal for representation 
(as opposed to advice) in civil cases.578 The precise nature of the bodies varies: 
• In England & Wales, the Legal Aid Agency is an executive agency of the 
Ministry of Justice. Previously the legal aid scheme in the jurisdiction 
has been in the hands of the Law Society, then the Legal Aid Board (a 
government quango) and the Legal Services Commission (an executive 
non-departmental public body) from 2000-2013.579 The Legal Aid 
Agency is headed by an executive director who has always to date also 
been designated as the Director of Legal Aid Casework, the statutory 
post-holder with responsibility for legal aid decisions. 
• The Northern Ireland Legal Services Agency is a body of the Northern 
Ireland Executive, which is the administrative branch of the devolved 
legislature for Northern Ireland. The Agency was established in April 
2015 as an executive agency of the Department of Justice and its Chief 
Executive has been since the inception of the Agency also the Director of 
Legal Aid Casework, a statutory post within the Department of Justice.580 
The Scottish Legal Aid Board is slightly further removed from 
government, being an executive non-departmental public body of the 
Scottish Government. Such public bodies are distinct from executive 
agencies of the Scottish Government, are not considered to be part of 
the Government and their staff are not civil servants. However, Board 
members are appointed by government Ministers and the Board reports 
573  Ibidem, Part 3, p. 3-9.
574  Ibidem, Part 5, p. 5-6.
575  Ibidem, Part 5, p. 5-2. See also Value for Money and Policy Review of the Legal Aid Board 2011, para. 2.16.
576  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services 2017.
577  Ibidem, Part 5, p. 5-3.
578  There is a minor exception in respect of delegated power to solicitors to grant emergency 
       legal aid in England & Wales, see below section 5.7.
579  For more history of the English & Welsh system see Hynes and Robins 2009.
580  Legal Aid and Coroners’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 2014, s.2.
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to the Scottish Government’s Justice Directorate. The recent Independent 
Strategic Review proposed that the Board be replaced by an independent 
public interest body, at a still greater distance from government.581
Despite these differences, it can be seen that in the UK jurisdictions the legal 
aid bodies are public bodies within or closely tied to government. In all of the 
jurisdictions, these agencies make (inter alia) all decisions on civil legal aid for 
representation.
In England & Wales, in civil Legal Representation cases, an application for 
a legal aid certificate must be made at the outset of the case to the Legal Aid 
Agency who will make the decisions on both financial eligibility and merits. 
The certificate will indicate the proceedings which are covered, a financial 
ceiling and potentially a particular limitation such as obtaining a barrister’s 
opinion. Decisions are made by caseworkers who are not necessarily legally 
qualified. 
Responsibility for grants582 and amendments583 of civil legal aid certificates in 
Northern Ireland is given by legislation to the Director of Legal Aid Casework. As 
seen above, this role rests for the time being with the Chief Executive of the Legal 
Services Agency, which thus has responsibility for considering applications for 
civil legal aid as well as assessing and making payments for civil and criminal 
legal aid bills.584 When assessing applications, the Agency must apply the 
legislative tests and follow guidance issued by the Department of Justice.585 
Guidance is issued on a topic-by-topic basis as needed and does not cover all 
aspects of the assessment, but when issued is binding on the Agency.
In the same vein, in Scotland, legal aid for representation is granted by the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board in all types of case, including all civil and children’s 
cases. The procedures and criteria for applications are set out in regulations586 
and, as for criminal cases, guidance on how the regulations will be interpreted 
in practice is provided in the online handbooks published by the Legal Aid 
Board.587 
A very different approach is taken in Iceland, where legal aid is decided 
by a committee set up by the Ministry of the Interior, composed entirely of 
lawyers. The chairman is appointed freely by the Minister; one of the other 
two members is nominated by the Association of Judges and the other by the 
Bar Association.588 Applications for legal aid are made freeform in writing, 
581  Evans 2018, p. 93.
582  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 15(2).
583  Ibidem, Regulation 18.
584  Legal Services Agency Northern Ireland 2015, p. 7.
585  The Guidance is issued under powers contained in Article 14 (2A) and (2B) of the  
      Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 and section 3 of the Legal Aid and  
      Coroners’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.
586  Notably the Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 2002, the Legal Aid (Scotland)  
      (Children) Regulations 1997 and the Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 1996.
587  Available at http://www.slab.org.uk/providers/handbooks/.
588  Lög um meðferð einkamála, 1991, Chapter 5, Article 125.
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with supporting documentation required by secondary legislation,589 to the 
Ministry. The application is forwarded directly to the Legal Aid Committee, 
which decides financial eligibility and applies the scope and merits tests. 
The Committee return their decision to the Minister, who then grants or 
refuses legal aid. Whilst in theory the Minister can refuse legal aid even if the 
Committee recommends a grant, this has never happened in practice. This 
system has similarities with Finland and the Republic of Ireland in that legal 
aid decisions are made by lawyers working under the auspices of government. 
However, unlike in those jurisdictions, the Committee in Iceland is not also 
employed by the state to carry out legally-aided casework.
In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, civil legal aid decision-making is shared 
between government agencies and the courts. Uniquely in the jurisdictions 
within this study, Norway places the role within regional, rather than central, 
government. The lead governmental body in civil legal aid in Norway is the 
Civil Affairs Authority (Statens sivilrettsforvaltning), a subordinate agency 
of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The Civil Affairs Authority is 
responsible for policy and makes recommendations to the Ministry of Justice 
on, for example, legislative changes. However, it does not have a decision-
making role itself but acts as a support to the decision-makers, who are the 
courts and the County Governors’ offices. This support includes the publication 
of a Circular on Legal Aid590 which contains detailed non-binding guidance on 
the application of the law, including information on useful caselaw.
This allocation of decision-making powers comes about despite the situation 
on the face of the legislation. Applications for free legal representation are, 
according to the statute, decided by the Ministry of Justice,591 but as with free 
legal advice (see above) the power is delegated by secondary legislation. Legal 
aid in non-priority cases and in cases where exemption from the financial 
eligibility requirement has been requested are to be decided by the County 
Governor.592 Norway is divided into 428 administrative municipalities, which 
are gathered into 18 counties, each of which has a County Governor who is 
a representative of the King and Government. As well as acting as an appeal 
body against municipal decisions, the County Governors also have some 
specific duties, amongst them the granting of much civil legal aid. The legal aid 
staff in the County Governors’ offices are very aware of the need to maintain 
consistency in decision-making, and to this end hold meetings and conferences 
to discuss and agree a common approach. The division of cases between the 
courts and the County Governors is not always straightforward and mistakes in 
selection of the proper recipient of an application for legal aid can, anecdotally, 
cause problems including delay for claimants. 
589  Regulation 616/2012, Article 2.
590  SRF-1/2017.
591  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 19.
592  FOR-2005-12-12-1443, § 4-2. This covers inter alia any matters which will not come before a court.
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The Danish legal aid system is organised such that decisions on applications for 
help with legal representation are decided in some types of case by the court 
and in some types centrally by government. The Administration of Justice Act 
defines certain categories of case for which legal aid will be granted or refused 
by the court dealing with the substantive matter,593 and provides that all other 
matters will be decided by the Minister of Justice.594 In practice, decisions are 
made by the Legal Aid Office within the Department of Civil Affairs, which 
is staffed largely by law graduates, but not by lawyers currently carrying out 
casework of their own. There is an optional application form for legal aid, but 
applications can be in any form, even oral. However, in order to satisfy the 
Legal Aid Office that the conditions for grant of legal aid have been met, it 
is generally considered necessary to provide a comprehensive summary of the 
case and evidence. This provides a conundrum for lawyers conducting cases: 
a well-prepared application has a greater chance of success but if legal aid is 
not granted, the time spent preparing the application will not be compensated 
financially. Decision-makers have access to a book written by the Head of the 
Legal Aid Office which gathers together legislation and practice in an accessible 
format;595 the book is not binding but is a useful tool.
In Sweden, as will be seen below, most cases are decided by the courts. 
The Legal Aid Authority (Rättshjälpsmyndigheten), which is a relatively small 
department based in Sundsvall, decides only applications for legal aid in cases 
which will not involve court proceedings. The Legal Aid Authority does not 
have any policy role or any budgetary responsibility, although all grants of legal 
aid, changes to legal aid certificates and taxations of bills are reported to the 
Authority for collation and analysis.596
4.2.3 Decisions by court
Sweden, Denmark and Norway all rely heavily on courts for assessing 
applications for civil legal aid, in addition to the legal aid agencies or other 
public bodies which make decisions on some types of application.
The strongest reliance on courts as legal aid decision-makers is in Sweden, 
where the courts make the bulk of decisions on applications. The only 
exception is in situations where court proceedings have not been issued and are 
not anticipated, in which case, as seen above, the Legal Aid Authority makes 
the decision. An application for legal aid in most civil cases will be made to the 
court which is or will be dealing with the substantive case.597 The court makes 
the decision taking into account the advisory guidance contained in the online 
handbooks issued by the National Courts Administration and in decided cases, 
593  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 327(1), (2), (3) & (5).
594  Ibidem, § 328(5).
595  Mavrogenis 2012.
596  DVFS 2012:15, §§ 17 & 18. Refusals of legal aid are not so reported, leading to a gap in the 
      information available to the Legal Aid Authority.
597  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 39 §.
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which are also collated into handbooks.598 A grant of legal aid must be given 
in writing599 and a refusal must be accompanied by reasons.600 These decisions 
are independent of the Legal Aid Authority but grants of legal aid must be 
reported to them by the courts.601 The reporting requirement also applies when 
a court case is instituted in a matter for which legal aid has been granted by 
the Legal Aid Authority,602 which is of course not the usual situation as the 
Legal Aid Authority grants legal aid in cases in which court proceedings are 
not anticipated. Decisions on cessation or withdrawal of legal aid by the courts 
must also be notified to the Agency.603 At the conclusion of a court case the 
outcome of the proceedings and the court’s decision on the legal aid costs to be 
paid must be sent to the Legal Aid Authority for payment of the bill.604
In Denmark, the types of cases for which legal aid will be dealt with by the 
courts are prescribed in legislation,605 although the categorisation is not always 
clear and in some types of matter such as child custody cases it can be difficult 
to judge whether the matter is to be decided by the court or not. The court 
is responsible for decisions in cases where there is a presumption in favour 
of legal aid and consequently, as will be seen below in Chapter 6, the merits 
assessment is minimal. This is seen as an important factor to ensure that courts 
are not involved in any pre-judging of merits. In cases where there is no such 
presumption, decisions are made by the Minister of Justice, as seen above.
A similar approach can be found in Norway, where civil legal aid decisions 
made by the courts are those where legal aid is automatic or where the lower 
threshold of ‘not unreasonable’ applies (see further detail in Chapter 6 below). 
The structure of the Norwegian civil legal aid scheme is such that the handling 
of the application is significantly affected by the nature of the case. The Legal 
Aid Act divides cases into priority non-means tested, priority means-tested and 
non-priority types, for both free legal advice606 and free legal aid.607 Free legal 
representation in the Supreme Court is always decided by that court and is not 
subject to a means test,608 but other courts can only grant free legal representation 
in non-means tested priority cases609 and also, by delegated authority, in means 
tested priority cases.610 Other cases, which have a more involved merits test, are 
decided by the Norwegian regional government authorities (see above).
598  Renfors and Arvill 2012.
599  Rättshjälpsförordning, 1997, 12 §.
600  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 39 §.
601  DVFS 2012:15, 17 §.
602  Ibidem, 16 §.
603  Ibidem, 18 §.
604  Ibidem, 19 §; Rättshjälpsförordning, 1997, 30 § places responsibility for payment on the 
       Legal Aid Authority.
605  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 327(1), (2), (3) & (5).
606  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 11.
607  Ibidem, § 16.
608  Ibidem, § 18.
609  Ibidem, § 19.
610  FOR-2005-12-12-1443, § 4-1.
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No civil legal aid decision-making is undertaken by courts in Iceland, Finland, 
the Republic of Ireland, Scotland, Northern Ireland or England & Wales.
4.2.4 Legal aid termination decisions
In addition to granting or refusing legal aid when a claim is made, decision-
making authorities also may have the power to terminate legal aid. Common 
situations where this may be deemed appropriate are if the applicant’s financial 
circumstances have improved, if it is discovered that the grant of legal aid was 
made on incorrect information or if the case is no longer eligible on merits 
grounds, even if it was correctly granted.
The jurisdictions of the UK, and the Republic of Ireland, in their legal aid 
legislation specify the circumstances in which a certificate of legal aid can be 
terminated and divide these circumstances into those where the termination 
will have only future effect and those with retrospective effect. Suspension is 
also possible in some circumstances.
Under the Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 2002, the Scottish Legal 
Aid Board has the power to suspend or terminate civil legal aid after it has been 
granted. Legal aid can be suspended for up to 90 days if, inter alia, the solicitor 
named in the legal aid certificate has ceased to act for the client, the client has 
failed to provide information requested by the Board or while the Board is 
considering whether to terminate legal aid.611 Legal aid can be terminated if a 
change of circumstances means that the assisted person is no longer entitled 
to it (either financially or because they no longer meet the merits criteria),612 
if legal aid was granted in error or if the assisted person has required the 
proceedings to be conducted unreasonably.613 If the legally aided person has 
in their application knowingly made an untrue statement regarding either 
finances or other aspects then the Board can terminate the legal aid such that 
the assisted person will be deemed never to have been assisted and will be liable 
to repay any sums spent on his case up to that point.614
In the Republic of Ireland, the situation is very similar. Legal aid can be 
terminated if the recipient is no longer eligible, has failed to comply with a 
condition of the grant or has behaved unreasonably in respect of the conduct 
of the case.615 If the assisted person has made an untrue statement or failed to 
disclose relevant information, the certificate may be revoked, in which case the 
formerly assisted person becomes liable for costs incurred.616 However, if the 
individual manages to persuade the Legal Aid Board that the error arose even 
611  The Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 2002, Regulation 29.
612  Ibidem, Regulation 30.
613  Ibidem, Regulation 31.
614  Ibidem, Regulation 32.
615  Civil Legal Aid Regulations 1996, Regulation 9(3).
616  Ibidem, Regulation 9(4).
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though she had used due diligence in her application, the certificate may be 
terminated rather than revoked, thus avoiding the costs liability.617
In Northern Ireland, the Legal Services Agency may suspend a legal aid 
certificate in certain circumstances, mostly relating to concerns about financial 
eligibility.618 Terminations of legal aid are divided into two categories: discharge 
and revocation. A certificate may be discharged by the Agency in a number 
of situations, including arrears of financial contributions, failure to instruct 
the acting solicitor, unreasonable conduct of the case or relevant change 
in circumstances.619 The courts may also discharge a certificate, although in a 
narrower range of circumstances. A legal aid certificate can also be revoked by 
the Agency620 or the court621 if it becomes apparent that the applicant made a 
false statement in their application or if they refuse to cooperate with a financial 
assessment. Further, a certificate can be revoked if the beneficiary has failed 
to attend for an interview or to provide information when so required.622 
Discharge has the effect of ceasing the right to assistance through legal aid623 but 
revocation has the more serious consequence, as in the Republic of Ireland, that 
the certificate is deemed never to have been granted and the previously assisted 
person will become liable for all the costs incurred under the certificate.624 
Equivalent rules apply in England & Wales.625 These two jurisdictions have, as 
can be seen, slightly harsher rules than Scotland and the Republic of Ireland, as 
an assisted person can become retrospectively liable for the legal costs incurred 
if they fail to attend an interview or to provide requested information.
The Swedish Legal Aid Act details the provisions for the cessation of legal 
aid for economic and other reasons, and also addresses the issue of whether 
costs must be repaid by the legal aid recipient.626 The authority with the power 
to grant legal aid in the case (the court or Legal Aid Authority) can terminate 
legal aid if: the required financial contributions have not been paid; the 
claimant has provided incorrect information which was decisive in the grant 
of legal aid; the claimant intentionally or grossly negligently provided incorrect 
information for the purpose of obtaining legal aid or a lower contribution; the 
economic circumstances of the applicant have changed; the legal aid lawyer 
is dismissed without another being appointed; or it is no longer reasonable 
for the state to provide legal funding in view of the merits test (see Chapter 
6 below). Whilst the statute simply provides that upon cessation of legal aid, 
617  Ibidem.
618  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 19.
619  Ibidem, Regulation 22.
620  Ibidem, Regulation 26.
621  Ibidem, Regulation 27.
622  Ibidem, Regulation 26.
623  Ibidem, Regulation 24.
624  Ibidem, Regulation 28
625  The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulation 42.
626  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 32 §-37 §.
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the assisted person must reimburse the state’s costs at a reasonable level,627 the 
online handbook clarifies that repayment will not be sought where the reason 
for termination is that the lawyer has ceased to act or the merits assessment has 
changed. Where the contribution has not been paid, it is only this sum which 
will be sought, but in the remaining situations all the legal aid costs will be 
recovered from the assisted person.628
In Denmark, the legislative provisions are less detailed; legal aid can 
be withdrawn if the grounds on which it was granted are found not to have 
existed or if they cease.629 The withdrawal of legal aid is not retroactive and 
the lawyer will be entitled to reimbursement for the work up to the date of 
withdrawal. However, the client may be required to refund the costs of the case 
to the authorities. No guidance is given as to the circumstances in which this 
should occur, but the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) has 
confirmed that recovery of costs is lawful.630 Norwegian legal aid legislation 
only provides for cessation of legal aid and recovery of costs from the assisted 
party in circumstances where that person’s economic circumstances have 
improved.631
In Finland, legal aid can be either amended or terminated by either the 
Legal Aid Office or by the court dealing with the substantive matter if the 
circumstances change or if it becomes apparent that legal aid should never 
have been granted.632 However, the Supreme Administrative Court has ruled 
that this power must not be exercised by the courts so as to reduce access to 
legal aid unless the decision to grant was plainly unlawful. The case concerned 
the termination of legal aid granted to a child whose parents were acting on 
the child’s behalf in the Administrative Court. As the Legal Aid Act does not 
explicitly state whether legal aid can be granted to a child in these circumstances, 
the court was wrong to terminate the grant of legal aid.633 If legal aid is 
terminated, a decision is made as to whether the assisted person must reimburse 
all or any of the costs expended until the point of termination. As with other legal 
aid decisions of Legal Aid Offices, termination and amendment decisions can be 
reconsidered by the court. 
As can be seen, the decision-makers for termination of legal aid are in general 
the same as the decision-makers for grants of legal aid, with the exception that in 
Northern Ireland and Finland, courts can terminate, but do not have the power 
to grant, civil legal aid.
627  Ibidem, 35 §.
628  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, 19.2.1.
629  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 331(7).
630  Mavrogenis 2012, p. 196.
631  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 8.
632  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 16 §.
633  HFD:2017:188.
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4.3 Appeals patterns634
4.3.1 Court oversight of court decisions
Having examined the initial decision-making structures, attention can now 
be given to the review and appeal mechanisms. In order to consider the 
effectiveness of an appeal in counteracting potential inherent bias in the initial 
decision, it is useful to group appeal mechanisms according also to the nature 
of the initial decision-maker whose determination is being challenged.
In North-West Europe, in most situations where an initial decision to grant 
or refuse legal aid is made by a court, refusal of legal aid can be appealed to a 
higher court. The applicable instances are in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 
Despite the different remits, in all three jurisdictions appeals against court 
decisions on civil legal aid are appealable to the relevant higher court.635 
4.3.2 Court oversight of bureaucratic decisions
In a small group of situations, legal aid decisions made by civil servants can be 
appealed to court. The most straightforward example of this is Finland. Refusals 
of legal aid can be submitted to court for ‘reconsideration’636 in a specific 
process outside the normal appeal process for administrative decisions.637 
Under Finnish administrative law, the Administrative Court is charged with 
oversight of administrative decisions but in the preparation of the current legal 
aid legislation it was proposed that this may not always be the best venue for a 
legal aid reconsideration as there may be a court with direct knowledge of the 
substantive case for which legal aid is sought, which would be better placed 
to make a well-informed legal aid decision.638 Thus, if there is a court already 
dealing with the substantive matter or with jurisdiction in the case, that court 
will hear the renewed legal aid application. If the substantive matter is not one 
which is within court jurisdiction, the renewed application will be dealt with 
by the Administrative Court.639 If the Administrative Court overturns a refusal 
of legal aid by the Legal Aid Office, the Legal Aid Office cannot further appeal 
the decision.640 
Within the jurisdictions under consideration, this is the only general right of 
appeal to court from administrative legal aid decisions. Elsewhere, the possibility 
634  See Barlow 2017b.
635  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 43 § (Sweden); Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 27 (Norway);  Retsplejeloven, 2017, 
       § 327 (Denmark) specifies that refusals of legal aid are orders of the court, and thus appealable 
      according to the two-tier principle. It is unclear from Danish praxis whether leave to appeal 
      such refusals is required or not. 
636  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 11 §, para. 1 and 24 §.
637  ‘Besvär’.
638  RP 82/2001 rd, 3.2.4.
639  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 24 §, para. 2. Further appeals against Administrative Court reviews of Legal 
      Aid Office decisions and appeals in relation to substantive matters which can only be appealed 
      to the Supreme Administrative Court can be taken to the latter court, with leave. 
640  HFD:2004:56
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is very limited. In Sweden, in immigration cases, Public Attorneys are 
appointed by the Migration Agency,641 which also processes immigration and 
asylum applications and from which appeals can be made to the Immigration 
Courts,642 which are specialist Administrative Courts. Scotland permits an 
appeal to court against a refusal of legal aid to conduct proceedings (which 
would be judicial review proceedings) against the Scottish Legal Aid Board; 
such refusals can be appealed to the sheriff, who can overrule the Board and 
order a grant of legal aid.643 The result is a grant of legal aid to cover the costs 
of applying for a judicial review to overturn the Board’s decision to refuse legal 
aid for the original case which led the client to seek legal aid. This is clearly a 
very specific set of circumstances and does not provide a general right to appeal 
to court against the refusal of legal aid. 
It should be remembered that decisions on applications for legal aid are 
administrative decisions and, as such, the possibility of review or appeal can 
be expected to follow the pattern for the exercise of administrative power in 
general in a jurisdiction. This is indeed the case broadly speaking but some 
modifications are apparent, for example the situation described above for 
Finland. However, it is the norm for administrative decisions to be appealable 
to court in Finland overall, and thus the same possibility for legal aid decisions, 
albeit adapted somewhat, is not out of keeping.
In the jurisdictions of the UK, and in the Republic of Ireland, the possibility 
of court oversight of administrative decisions is very limited across all areas, 
due to the application of the rule of separation of powers as understood 
there. When a power is conferred by statute upon a Minister or a public body, 
inherent in the grant is “the power to decide freely whether rightly or wrongly, 
without liability to correction, within the area of discretion allowed by the 
law”.644 Thus, as a matter of political principle, reviews of decisions are generally 
only carried out internally in the body to which the decision-making power has 
been granted, as will be seen below. However, if a decision may have strayed 
outside the area of discretion allowed by the law, the courts have an important 
role to play as it is the role of the courts, under separation of powers, to ensure 
that the other arms of government act lawfully, and such a decision would be 
unlawful. Court oversight is exercised through ‘judicial review’, a specific type 
of action discussed further in Chapter 8 below. Judicial review is a possibility 
in legal aid decisions, because of their nature as administrative decisions, but 
it should not be confused with a general right of appeal to court. The nature 
of judicial review as a remedy is such that a challenge can be made to the 
lawfulness of a policy or of secondary legislation, as well as to the lawfulness 
641  Utlänningslag, 2005, Chapter 18.
642  Ibidem, Chapter 14, 8 §.
643  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 14.
644  Wade and Forsyth 2014, p. 207.
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of the decision in a particular case.645 It should furthermore be noted that 
there are barriers to bringing judicial review in England & Wales, in particular 
difficulties in obtaining legal aid to fund cases, which can lead to a suspicion 
that government is attempting to reduce challenges to their legal aid decisions. 
As Moore and Newbury note:
If the state has latterly reduced financial support for the most vulnerable in 
our society, the decision to limit people’s access to judicial review of these 
life-changing decisions seems designed to entrench the resulting social 
inequalities. Add to this that the recent reforms have involved the Lord 
Chancellor having greater oversight of legal aid provision, and the argument 
that legal aid has become an instrument of the state becomes all the more 
persuasive.646
Judicial review is thus not equivalent to a right of appeal to court against legal 
aid decisions of government bodies.
4.3.3 Bureaucratic oversight of bureaucratic decisions
The most usual types of oversight of legal aid decisions made by civil servants 
are non-judicial. However, these vary considerably in nature; some are 
completely independent from the original decision-making body and quasi-
judicial; others are internal to the original authority.
One of the most independent is Denmark, where as seen above, legal 
aid applications which are not legislatively allocated to the court are to be 
decided by the Minister of Justice; 647 in practice the Legal Aid Office within 
the Department of Civil Affairs. Appeals against such decisions can be made 
on any grounds to the Appeals Permission Board,648 which was originally 
established for hearing requests for leave to appeal to higher courts but gained 
legal aid jurisdiction in addition in 2007. When sitting as the appeals instance 
for legal aid, the Board, which is appointed by the Minister for Justice, consists 
of a High Court Judge, a District Court Judge and a lawyer.649 The Appeals 
Permission Board is an independent body administered within the Danish 
Court Administration. Thus, whilst the appeal is in a strict sense bureaucratic, 
the nature of the oversight body is quasi-judicial and it is completely outside 
the legal aid granting body, with responsibilities that extend beyond legal aid. 
In Sweden, as has been seen, the bulk of legal aid decisions are made by 
the courts according to the division described above. The remainder of 
applications are decided by the Legal Aid Authority, a public authority within 
the Department of Justice. Appeals against refusals of legal aid by the Legal 
645  See e.g. R (on the application of Ben Hoare Bell Solicitors and others) v. The Lord  Chancellor, 
       2015 and IS (By the Official Solicitor as Litigation Friend) v. Director of Legal Aid Case Work, 
       2015.
646  Moore and Newbury 2017, p. 2.
647  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 328(5).
648  Ibidem, § 328(5).
649  Ibidem, Chapter 1a.
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Aid Authority can be made to the Legal Aid Board (Rättshjälpsnämnden),650 
a public administrative body which falls within the remit of the Department 
of Justice. The Legal Aid Board is not a court, but shares buildings and 
administration with one of the regional Courts of Appeal651 and is chaired by 
a judge. The Board president and four additional members, two of whom must 
be lawyers, are appointed by the government. Legal Aid Board decisions cannot 
be appealed further.652 This situation is very close to the Danish model, with the 
minor difference that the Legal Aid Board in Sweden only has jurisdiction in 
legal aid appeals, whereas the Danish Appeals Permission Board has a broader 
remit. There is also a difference in the transparency of decision-making, which 
will be discussed below.
Legal aid decisions of the County Governor in Norway are subject to appeal 
to the Ministry of Justice;653 in practice the Civil Affairs Authority. Such appeals 
are to be dealt with according to the provisions of the Public Administration 
Act and are not subject to any further appeal.654 There is thus no possibility of 
a judicial appeal of a Norwegian legal aid decision unless the original decision 
was also taken judicially. Appeal from many civil legal aid refusals in Norway is 
thus to another public body, but in this case the appeal does not involve judges 
or have other features which imply a judicial character to the process.
All of the above bureaucratic appeal mechanisms involve other government 
departments or public authorities. However, some oversight mechanisms are 
administered from within the body making the original legal aid decision, 
albeit with attempts to allow the reviewers to remain independent. 
In Northern Ireland, if an applicant or acting lawyer is unhappy with any 
decision concerning civil legal services they can request a review by the Legal 
Services Agency, the body which, as has been seen, also makes the initial legal 
aid decision.655 If the decision is still not accepted, a further appeal is possible 
in some cases. Following recent legislation, an independent appeal panel is 
available to hear appeals against refusal of legal aid for representation in the 
higher courts.656 The panel consists of one presiding member (a barrister or 
solicitor of at least 7 years’ standing) and two others with relevant knowledge 
or experience, at least one of whom must be a lawyer. There are a number of 
categories of decision which are not capable of appeal, including: extension 
of advice and assistance funding; refusal of an emergency certificate; 
financial eligibility decisions; exceptional funding decisions and statutory 
charge determinations.657 Additionally, decisions on civil legal services for 
representation in the lower courts are excluded and thus the only possible 
650  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 44 §.
651  Hovrätten för Nedre Norrlands in Sundsvall, as directed by Förordning 2007:1079, 5 §.
652  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 44 §, para. 3.
653  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 26.
654  Ibidem.
655  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Reg 14.
656  The Civil Legal Services (Appeal) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Reg 4.
657  Ibidem, Schedule.
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challenge to such decisions is review by the Legal Services Agency. However, 
in decisions which are appealable through the process, the panel provides a 
measure of independence; whilst panel members are paid for their time by the 
Legal Services Agency, they are not employees and the majority of their time is 
spent in independent legal practice. The decision of the panel is binding upon 
the Legal Services Agency.658
England & Wales follows a similar approach, although the detail is somewhat 
different. Appeals against refusals of civil legal aid by the Legal Aid Agency 
are initially internal, by way of review. If the applicant is still dissatisfied, she 
may appeal to an independent adjudicator. These adjudicators are drawn from 
a panel of practising lawyers with at least three years’ experience of legal aid 
work, appointed by the Lord Chancellor.659 Adjudicators hear appeals against 
refusals or withdrawals of civil legal aid 660 and if the decision is that the 
original decision was unlawful or unreasonable the Legal Aid Agency must 
reconsider the decision.661 Although the adjudicator’s view is only binding 
in certain circumstances,662 the Legal Aid Agency does usually follow the 
recommendations. Unless the Legal Aid Agency’s new decision raises novel 
points which can lead to a second appeal to an adjudicator, this is the final 
appeal stage for civil legal aid. Appeals in high cost or complex hearings may be 
heard by a panel of adjudicators, known as the Special Controls Review Panel,663 
whose decisions are only binding if they concern prospects of success.664 There 
is no possibility of judicial appeal in civil legal aid cases. Again, as in Northern 
Ireland, adjudicators are not employees of the Legal Aid Agency and are as such 
independent. However, the powers of the independent adjudicators in England 
& Wales are more restricted that those of the Northern Irish appeal panel, as 
not all decisions are binding upon the Legal Aid Agency.
In the Republic of Ireland, initial decisions on civil legal aid are taken by 
the Legal Aid Board,665 either centrally or through delegated powers at the Law 
Centres. A negative decision can be reviewed666 internally by the Board, in 
theory by the original decision-maker but in practice by a more senior decision-
maker.667 If the review is unsuccessful, an appeal may be made to a committee 
of Board members,668 consisting of a chairperson and four other members of 
whom two were practising barristers or solicitors prior to their appointment 
as Board members. There is no appeal from this decision. The placing of power 
658  Ibidem, Regulation 27.
659  The Funding & Costs Appeals Review Panel Arrangements 2013, Schedule 1, para.1.
660  Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulation 2, ‘Interpretation’ and Regulation 28.
661  Ibidem, Regulation 46.
662  Ibidem, Regulation 47.
663  The Funding & Costs Appeals Review Panel Arrangements 2013, paragraph 1 and  
      The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulation 58. 
664  The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulation 58.
665  A statutory, independent body.
666  SI 273/1996 Civil Legal Aid Regulations 1996, Regulation 12(1).
667  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services 2017, Part 6, p. 6-2.
668  Civil Legal Aid Regulations 1996, Regulation 12.
132
to make appeal decisions with members of the Legal Aid Board itself prevents 
this appeal process being considered independent, although it is an opportunity 
for oversight by senior personnel who had no involvement with the original 
decision.
The internal review of decisions is the only available oversight option in 
some circumstances. The Scottish Legal Aid Board has a statutory duty to 
ensure a right to review of the decision upon refusal of civil,669 children’s670 
or criminal671 legal aid. Reviews are conducted internally by the Board and 
no further appeal is possible. Similarly, as seen above, in lower court cases 
in Northern Ireland, only an internal review is possible. As such reviews are 
conducted within or close to the original decision-making teams, they do not 
add any element of independent oversight to the decision-making process. This 
is similar to the situation in Iceland, where the only way for a legal aid claim to 
be reconsidered is for the applicant to ask for the application to be reopened by 
the Committee; no formal appeal process is in place.
It has been seen in Chapter 3 above that there are instances in criminal 
legal aid in these jurisdictions where no appeal is possible against a negative 
decision. However, in civil cases there is some form of appeal or review against 
all refusals. 
4.3.4 Additional oversight
There is an interesting oversight mechanism operating in Sweden in addition 
to the appeals processes described above. Since 2005, a monitoring role 
previously within the remit of the National Courts Administration has been 
held by the office of the Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekanslern)672 in a move 
to “improve and streamline the [legal aid] payment system and its control 
mechanisms”.673 The function involves receiving reports on particular types of 
legal aid decisions felt to indicate a possible risk to the public purse, such as 
grants made in exception to the usual rules concerning legal costs insurance, 
grants of legal aid in certain exceptional cases and cases where costs exceed 
150,000 SEK.674 Reports come from both the courts675 and the Legal Aid 
Authority and if it is concerned about the decision, the Chancellor’s office 
has locus standi to make an appeal to the Appeal Court or Administrative 
669  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s.14(3). The procedure is contained in Civil Legal Aid 
      (Scotland) Regulations 2002, Regulation 20.
670  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 28H.
671  Ibidem, s. 24(5) (summary proceedings) and 23A(4) (solemn proceedings). The procedures 
      are found in the Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 1996, Regulation 7A(3)(b).
672  At the time of the transfer of responsibility for this task, the Chancellor of Justice  expressed 
            concerns that there might be a perceived conflict of interests between her office and lawyers acting 
         in cases against the state. However, this concern was not sufficient to counteract the benefits 
         of the transfer. Justitiekanslerns remissyttrande över departementspromemorian (Ds 2003:55) 
          Rättshjälp och  ersättning till rättsliga biträden document number 3866-03-80 of 9 February 2004.
673  Ds 2003:55.
674  Approximately 15,600 EUR. DVFS 2016:16.
675  DVFS 2013:7, § 28.
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Appeal Court against the decision in question.676 This standing in appeals is 
a general one and applies equally to decisions for which there is no reporting 
duty;677 however, such decisions are of course highly unlikely to come to the 
attention of the Chancellor in order for an appeal to be contemplated by 
her. The intended effect of this arrangement is not only the saving of funds 
in particular individual cases but also wider benefits to the legal aid system. 
The original decision-makers will in principle think more carefully about their 
high-impact and high-value decisions as they know these are being monitored. 
Furthermore, it is believed that consistency of decisions between the numerous 
courts and the Legal Aid Authority can be improved by having a central 
body scrutinising decisions and taking appeals which will clarify the proper 
application of funding rules. Approximately 2,500 decisions are reported to 
the Chancellor’s office each year and about 35-40 appeals are brought by them 
annually.
In Finland, the Chancellor of Justice also oversees the work of the Legal 
Aid Offices, and has dealt with complaints concerning, inter alia, failure to 
fully inform a client of the reasons for refusal of legal aid,678 the need to take 
account of changed circumstances and re-consider a legal aid refusal679 and late 
submission of court applications by Legal Aid Offices.680 The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman has in addition been called upon on occasion to make findings 
concerning legal aid decisions.681 However, the system is ad hoc and, unlike 
in Sweden, there are no reporting duties to bring legal aid decisions to the 
attention of the Chancellor as a matter of course. In Sweden the Chancellor’s 
role is explicit within the legal aid legislation whereas in Finland the general 
remit of the Chancellor includes legal aid but the role does not form part 
of the legal aid oversight scheme set up in the subject-specific legislation. 
Furthermore, the Finnish Chancellor of Justice has no mandate over the legal 
aid payment system and its control mechanisms, which is the stated purpose of 
the Swedish Chancellor’s involvement. 
4.4 International human rights requirements
The need for a decision-making process for civil legal aid is universal within 
Europe due to the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and other applicable international treaties. Treaty provisions dealing with 
legal aid for criminal and civil proceedings differ significantly, and the explicit 
requirement for criminal legal aid has been dealt with above in Chapter 3. With 
regard to civil matters, the international provisions relevant to legal aid are the 
676  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 45 §.
677  See e.g. Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 45 § and Lag om offentligt biträde, 1996, 8 §.
678  OKV / 708/1/2011.
679  OKV / 856/1/2011.
680  OKV / 1420/1/2015 and OKV / 931/1/2013.
681  E.g. Dnro 1973/4/14.
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more general provisions on fair trial:
International 
Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 
Article 14 (1):
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. 
In the determination of […] his rights and obligations in 
a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. 
[…]
European Convention 
on Human Rights 
Article 6 (1):
In the determination of his civil rights […] everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
t ime by  an independent  and impar t ia l  t r ibunal 
established by law. 
[…]
Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
of the European 
Union, Article 47:
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack 
sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to 
ensure effective access to justice.682
As can be seen, the right to legal aid in civil cases is only explicit in the EU 
Charter. However, decided European Court of Human Rights and UN Human 
Rights Committee cases have established a right to civil legal aid in certain 
circumstances, based on the general provisions for fair trial683 and also on the 
concept of right of access to court developed initially in the 1975 case of Golder 
v. UK.684 This right of access to court has become so thoroughly incorporated 
into understanding of Convention rights that it is often referred to on an equal 
basis with the right to a fair and public hearing685 despite the fact that none of 
the treaties mention it explicitly. The General Court of the European Union 
has “accentuated that access to the courts is one of the essential elements of a 
community based on the rule of law, and that such access is guaranteed in the 
legal order based on the EC Treaty”.686
Access to court does not always require legal aid, but there are two kinds 
of situation in which it may be necessary. Firstly, a formal barrier to access 
to court arises if a lawyer is necessary under national law for a claim to be 
brought (e.g. in appeals to the Court of Cassation in France and Belgium) and 
the potential litigant cannot afford a lawyer. This situation does not arise in any 
of the jurisdictions under consideration in this thesis as there is no bar to self-
representation in any level of court.687 There are however frequent examples of 
the second, informal obstacle that “for most people, the prospect of making 
or defending a civil claim is daunting, and they need or want professional 
682 This study will not consider the impact of Council Directive 2003/8/EC, adopted on 27/1/03, 
        which establishes minimum common rules relating to legal aid in cross-border disputes.  
     This exclusion is due to the specialist nature of such disputes.
683  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14 (1) and European  
      Convention on Human Rights Article 6 (1).
684  Golder v. UK, 1975, para. 36. Confirmed, inter alia, in Roche v. UK, 2005.
685  Walker 1999, p. 5.
686  Bårdsen 2007, p. 103, commenting on Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v. Commission of the European 
       Communities, 2002, see especially para. 41.
687  Aside from a couple of very specific exceptions in Finland and Norway discussed in section 2.3.2 above.
135
assistance”.688 The direction available from the international treaty bodies on the 
question of when civil legal aid will be necessary for the realisation of the right 
to fair trial or access to court will be considered in Chapter 6 below, which 
discusses the merits criteria for civil legal aid. 
In the course of making decisions on the right to fair trial or hearing in 
individual cases, the European Court of Human Rights has also made a number 
of statements which concern the general method of implementation of the 
legal aid aspects of Article 6. The most fundamental question these statements 
address is whether it is necessary for a state to have a legal aid system as such, 
or whether the state can fulfil its obligations by deciding each case on an ad 
hoc basis. A clear in principle answer to this question was given in 1997 in 
Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus: 
The Court notes that whilst Article 6 § 1 of the Convention guarantees to 
litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination of 
their ‘civil rights and obligations’, it leaves to the State a free choice of the 
means to be used towards this end. The institution of a legal-aid scheme 
constitutes one of those means but there are others. It is not the Court’s 
function to indicate, let alone stipulate, which measures should be taken. All 
that the Convention requires is that an individual should enjoy his effective 
right of access to the courts in conditions not at variance with Article 6 § 1. 
The Court [...] considers that the Attorney-General’s ex gratia offer [...] 
provided a solution to help overcome the applicants’ lack of resources.689
Thus, the institution of a civil legal aid scheme is one possible means of 
guaranteeing an effective right of access to the courts, but it is not the only one. 
At the relevant time in Cyprus there was no legal aid scheme for civil cases and 
the prospective claim was an action against the police in respect of the fatal 
shooting of two people in a hostage incident. The inhabitants of Cyprus at the 
end of 1996 numbered approximately 740,000690 and arguably with that size 
of population an ex gratia system might be capable of providing appropriate 
access to justice. However, the fact that the European Court of Human Rights 
found no violation in the case before it does not, of course, mean that the 
overall position in Cyprus at that time was satisfactory. Iceland, which has a 
population considerably lower, does have a formal legal aid scheme, as seen.
Some commentators express the view that the requirement for a system of 
legal aid was established from the outset in civil cases, by the Airey v. Ireland 
case which will be further discussed in Chapter 5. Bårdsen, discussing Airey, 
states that “the right to a fair trial could not at all be fulfilled passively, or by 
incidental, individual measures. It requires structural, multifaceted, continuous 
and coherent governmental action”.691 However, in Airey itself the European 
Court of Human Rights specifically stated that Article 6:
688  Le Sueur 2000, p. 459.
689  Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, 1997, paras. 199 & 200.
690  ACFC/SR(1999)002 rev.
691  Bårdsen 2007, p. 106.
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leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used […]. The institution 
of a legal aid scheme [...] constitutes one of those means but there are others 
such as, for example, a simplification of procedure. In any event, it is not 
the Court’s function to indicate, let alone dictate, which measures should 
be taken.692
Nonetheless, Bårdsen is, it is submitted, correct in assuming that a structured 
system for the provision of legal aid is likely to be required in practice, certainly 
in a jurisdiction of any size. The European Commission on Human Rights held 
in 1980 that, “it is self-evident that where a state chooses a ‘legal aid’ system 
to provide for access to court, such a system can only operate effectively, given 
the limited resources available, by establishing machinery to select which cases 
should be legally aided”.693 This approach is a realistic one and in line with 
the practice of most states including Cyprus, since 2002,694 and Ireland since 
1980.695 
Given the likely demand for legal aid in any other than very small 
jurisdictions, most states choose to set up a system which allows for the 
application of rules, usually set out in primary or secondary legislation, to be 
applied by one or more administrative or judicial bodies. Such a system has 
advantages over an ad hoc scheme: it limits the discretion exercised by the 
decision-makers, who are often unelected bureaucrats; enables the legislature 
to take policy decisions and set parameters for the decision; enables greater 
consistency throughout a jurisdiction where the jurisdiction is so large that 
more than one decision-maker will be needed and gives government better 
control over expenditure. In addition, a system can act as a safeguard against 
inappropriate use of discretion and make it more likely that fair trial rights will 
be secured.
When such a system is in place, the European Court of Human Rights has 
been willing to discuss not only the outcome in the case before it but also the 
criteria which that system should fulfil for the state to comply with its Article 
6 duty. The main criteria established by the Court are that decision-making by 
legal aid authorities must not be arbitrary696 and must ensure the appearance of 
the fair administration of justice,697 applications for legal aid must be dealt with 
diligently698 and reasons must be given for rejection of an application for legal 
aid.699 Of particular relevance to the issue of decision-making structures is the 
repeated statement of the Court that a legal aid system must offer “guarantees 
692  Airey v. Ireland, 1979, para. 26.
693  X v. UK, 1980, para. 16, repeated in e.g. A.W.Webb v. UK, 1983.
694  Legal Aid Law, 2002.
695  A non-statutory scheme which was put on a statutory footing 15 years later with the  
      Civil Legal Aid Act 1995.
696  Gnahore v. France, 2000, para. 41; Del Sol v. France, 2002, para. 26.
697  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 54.
698  Ibidem.
699  Ibidem.
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to protect [applicants] from arbitrariness”.700 
The term ‘arbitrariness’ is one which does not have a single clear and 
unambiguous meaning as applied by international human rights treaty 
bodies. Before the UN Human Rights Committee, arbitrariness is often seen 
as the absence of equality; the Committee has developed “the principle of 
equality before the law as an effective protection against arbitrariness”701 and 
has accepted the concept that “equality is antithetical to arbitrariness”.702 This 
meaning is also occasionally used in the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights703 and is close to the ordinary meaning of the term. 
However, the Human Rights Committee does not only use the term 
‘arbitrary’ in the context of equality before the law and equal protection of the 
law, but also as the converse of ‘reasonable’, such as in cases where requirements 
were found “arbitrary, and consequently a discriminatory distinction between 
individuals”.704 This does not appear to mean ‘unequal’, but rather ‘without 
justification’ or ‘unreasonable’. The European Court of Human Rights also 
appears to use ‘arbitrary’ to mean unreasonable or unwarranted, as in a case 
concerning restrictions on the right to privacy which the state argued were 
necessary in the interests of public security. Here, the Court found that “the 
law must indicate the scope of any […] discretion conferred on the competent 
authorities […] having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, 
to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference”.705 The 
legal aid cases referring to arbitrariness could arguably be using the term in 
either sense: as the opposite of ‘equal’ or as ‘unreasonable’.
The avoidance of arbitrariness requires individual decisions to be appropriately 
made, and protection against arbitrariness can be afforded by establishing 
suitable decision-making structures. The European Court of Human Rights has 
approved of systems which endeavor to provide neutrality or balance in the 
composition of decision-making bodies. For example, in Del Sol706 the inclusion 
of judges and legal professionals as well as neutral members of the public in the 
group making the decision on legal aid, and the possibility of appealing against 
refusal to a judge, appear to have been important in deciding that sufficient 
protection against arbitrariness was in place.
The European Court of Human Rights has also indicated that, in order for 
the requirements of Article 6 to be satisfied, there must be a possibility of a 
grant of legal aid at a later point in proceedings, even if an application was 
correctly refused at an early stage. The refusal of legal aid must remain capable 
700  e.g. Gnahore v. France, 2000, para. 41; Del Sol v. France, 2002, para. 26.
701  Edelenbos 2009, p. 80.
702  Love et al v. Australia, 2003, Individual Opinion of Mr. Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati (concurring).
703  e.g. in Fabris v. France, 2013, para. 60: ‘The Court [...] cannot remain passive where a national court’s 
      interpretation of a legal act [...] appears unreasonable, arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with 
      the prohibition of discrimination established by Art. 14’.
704  Lange v. Czech Republic, 2011, para. 7.3; Klain and Klain v. Czech Republic, 2011, para. 8.3; 
      Jünglingová v. Czech Republic, 2011, para. 7.3.
705  Malone v. UK, 1984, para. 68.
706  Del Sol v. France, 2002.
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of review and revision throughout the proceedings, so that a litigant can obtain 
the necessary assistance for a fair trial, if proceedings become more complex 
than anticipated.707
4.5 Analysis
4.5.1 Indirect public administration in legal aid
It was seen above that decision-making power in civil legal aid in the jurisdictions 
under consideration is not always placed in government departments. Some 
powers are given to bodies outside the State, providing examples of indirect 
public administration within the sphere of legal aid. As decisions to grant or 
refuse legal aid involve the exercise of public power and the performance of a 
public task, it can be concluded that the responsible body or person has “public 
organisational competence”708 which, if performed outside the traditional State 
administrative structures (whether national or local), amounts to indirect 
public administration. 
It is particularly noteworthy that indirect public administration plays a 
significant role in legal aid at the level of initial advice. The authority to grant 
legal aid for advice in civil cases is delegated to the lawyer providing the advice 
in all the jurisdictions other than Iceland (where legal aid is not available for 
advice). Legally-aided advice in criminal matters is also granted by the acting 
lawyer in Northern Ireland, England & Wales and Scotland. In Finland, the 
lawyers making grants of legal aid for both civil and criminal advice are public 
employees and thus the decisions are part of the direct public administration 
in that jurisdiction. However, in all the other jurisdictions the placing of this 
public task with practising lawyers amounts to a system of indirect public 
administration. In Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Scotland, Northern Ireland 
and England & Wales, the lawyers granting legal aid for advice-level civil 
legal aid are in private practice and are thus completely private entities, often 
in some form of partnership or private company. This form of indirect public 
administration is the most extreme, as public powers are in the hands of private 
actors. 
In the Republic of Ireland, the lawyers are staff of the Legal Aid Board, 
which is a corporate body established by statute709 to perform the public task 
of administering legal aid. Although the Board members and chairperson are 
appointed by the Minister for Justice and Equality, and the Board is publicly 
funded, it is an independent non-governmental entity. Thus, its work which 
consists of the exercise of public powers is also indirect public administration. 
This categorisation applies equally to the role of the Legal Aid Board of the 
Republic of Ireland in deciding legal aid applications for civil legal aid for 
707  Granger v. UK, 1990.
708  Suksi 1989, p. 7.
709  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 3.
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representation, and to its administration of the Garda (police) station advice 
scheme. The Legal Aid Board is not an unusual phenomenon in the Republic 
of Ireland, where “there is a complex system of state agencies at national level” 
which “has evolved pragmatically”.710
Legal aid decisions regarding civil representation in the Nordic countries, 
as well as grants of public defender assistance, are often made by the courts, 
as has been seen above. The power to grant criminal legal aid is also with the 
courts in the Republic of Ireland. Whilst this allocation places legal aid grants 
outside government control, the courts are organs of the State and thus the 
arrangement does not amount to indirect public administration.
In the Nordic countries, decisions on civil legal aid for representation which 
are not made by courts are generally made by central or local government 
departments. These are the Finnish Legal Aid Offices, the Norwegian Civil 
Affairs Authority and County Governors’ Offices, the Danish Department of 
Civil Affairs and the Swedish Legal Aid Authority. The Icelandic approach, 
as seen above, is to place decisions in the hands of a committee established 
by statute711 and appointed by the Minister; clearly a public body within the 
Ministry of Justice.
The situation in the United Kingdom is more nuanced: as described 
above, each of these three jurisdictions has a specific public body dealing 
with legal aid administration, either within a government department or 
external to the executive branch. In England & Wales the Legal Aid Agency 
is within government, as is the Northern Ireland Legal Services Agency;712 
both are executive agencies of their respective justice departments. The Scottish 
Legal Aid Board, however, is a ‘non-departmental public body’ with a status 
somewhere between an independent statutory corporate body (as seen in the 
Republic of Ireland Legal Aid Board) and a branch of the executive. In both 
England & Wales and Northern Ireland, tellingly, the statutory powers to 
make decisions on legal aid are given to ‘Directors of Legal Aid Casework’,713 
both of whom have de facto always to date been the executive directors of 
the respective governmental legal aid agencies. The power is not given to the 
agency itself, which operates as the enabling organisation for the exercise of 
the administrative powers of the governmental statutory post-holders, the 
Directors. 
The extent to which indirect public administration has been used in legal 
aid in England & Wales has varied dramatically over time. When the legal 
aid scheme was administered by the Law Society, the administration could 
clearly be characterised as indirect. This remained the case when responsibility 
transferred to the Legal Aid Board, a government quango (in place from 1988), 
710  Smyth 1988, p. 151.
711  Lög um meðferð einkamála, 1991, Article 125.
712  Legal Services Agency Northern Ireland 2015, p. 7.
713  Legal Aid and Coroners’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 2014, s.2 and Legal Aid,  Sentencing 
      and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s. 4.
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but the administration of legal aid moved much closer to government control 
with the introduction of the Legal Services Commission, an executive non-
departmental public body, in 2000-2013.714 At this point it might be argued 
that legal aid became a part of the executive and therefore indirect public 
administration ceased. This is certainly the case since 2013 when the Legal Aid 
Agency replaced the Legal Services Commission.
It thus seems clear that the power to grant legal aid for representation 
in civil cases currently remains a core government function in the Nordic 
countries, England & Wales and Northern Ireland, but falls within the “third 
sphere”715 of indirect public administration in Scotland and the Republic of 
Ireland. This is a notably lower level of use of such structures than for decisions 
concerning civil advice work which, as seen, are routinely delegated to privately 
practising lawyers, as are decisions on legally aided criminal advice in the UK 
jurisdictions. The only jurisdiction within this study not using any indirect 
public administration for legal aid at any level is Finland.
The low use of indirect public administration for representation cases, which 
of course are generally more expensive than advice cases, may be due to the 
fact that such mechanisms “may create a number of problems of accountability 
and control, both political, financial, administrative, and legal”.716 Problems 
of control will be returned to in the following section, which considers the 
possible reasons for the choice of decision-making structure in legal aid.
4.5.2 Reasoning behind choice of initial decision-makers717
It has been seen that there are several types of decision-maker taking initial 
decisions on applications for legal aid for representation. In order to analyse 
possible reasoning behind the placement of decision-making power, three 
groupings will be considered: lawyers acting for the applicant; government 
departments or agencies; and courts. These groupings do not follow the 
division of direct or indirect public administration seen above, but may be 
useful in considering the practical implications of the selection of a decision-
maker.
The choice of a decision-making structure for a legal aid system has 
consequences, not least that the process of considering the documents submitted 
with a legal aid application, assessing compliance with eligibility requirements 
and reaching a conclusion requires human and practical resources which are 
potentially expensive. If structures which already exist outside the specialist 
legal aid arena can absorb the additional task of assessing legal aid applications, 
it may be possible to make costs savings. Making use in legal aid decision-
making of courts, regional governmental administration or the lawyers 
conducting the client work, for example, will reduce the need for specific legal 
714  For more history of the English & Welsh system see Hynes and Robins 2009.
715  Rosas 1988, p. 31.
716  Ibidem, p. 35.
717  See Barlow 2017b.
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aid administration and thus have an impact on the overall cost of a legal aid 
system. Placing legal aid decisions with the acting lawyers (usually in advice 
cases, as seen above), or with the courts dealing with the substantive issue, also 
brings an advantage of speed and simplicity. In these instances legal aid can be 
dealt with seamlessly as part of the proceedings without the need to apply to an 
external party and wait for a response before continuing. Arguably, those with 
an involvement in the case are also best placed to judge whether legal aid is 
needed in the interests of a fair hearing, although they may also be affected by 
sympathy for the applicant, as discussed below.
Mitigating against this ‘outsourcing’ approach is the need of those 
responsible for the final budget for legal aid to control expenditure. Whilst the 
main mechanism for cost limitation is of course amendment of the substantive 
rules of legal aid, keeping individual case decisions within government is often 
seen as enabling additional control. When legal aid systems are changed by 
bringing decision-making closer to central government, the need for greater 
control over expenditure is a common rationale. 
There is a tension here between cost and control which different jurisdictions 
address in different ways. Some jurisdictions seem not to have difficulties with 
escalating expenditure and are content to leave decisions to be made outside 
government with little or no opportunity for government to intervene other 
than by changing eligibility rules. Finland is an example of a system where 
expenditure has remained within acceptable limits despite a very hands-off 
approach to decision-making; only ‘soft’ methods for steering the decisions of 
the Legal Aid Offices are used. Others find that expenditure spirals easily out 
of control unless legal aid decision-making is kept within government. This 
has been the experience in England & Wales where over time decision-making 
has been removed from the legal profession and, via several intermediate 
stages, brought into the Ministry of Justice. Each non-governmental or quasi-
governmental body in turn was found to be unable to exercise adequate control 
over legal aid spend,718 leading to the creation of an executive agency within the 
Department of Justice to administer legal aid.
In some jurisdictions there has also been a concern that it can be difficult to 
achieve consistency of decision-making if legal aid is determined by the courts. 
This may result in a degree of arbitrariness in decisions, which as seen above 
is unacceptable according to the legal aid jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, in addition to being contrary to domestic administrative 
law principles. Centralised government agencies are better placed to maintain 
consistency than disparate first-instance courts across the country. Most legal 
aid decisions do not cause controversy or lead to reported appeals and the 
everyday habits of decision-making may diverge over time in different places. 
718  Magee 2010.
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A further specific issue applies to legal aid decision-making by the courts. 
There are two diverging views on the appropriateness of legal aid being decided 
by a court which is or will be dealing with the substantive case. Civil legal aid 
decisions, as will be seen in Chapter 6, often require some assessment of likely 
prospects of success or other judgment of the merits of a case. Some of these 
criteria involve measuring a case against technical legal standards, and it could 
be argued that a judge would be best placed to evaluate this. A caseworker 
at a legal aid agency may not be legally qualified and will inevitably be less 
legally skilled than the judge. Following this logic, it makes little sense to ask 
a caseworker to make the assessment when a judge is available, particularly 
when the judge already has the documents and is reading them in preparation 
for hearing the case. The opposing view is based largely on a concern about 
pre-judgment of cases. Legal aid decisions take place at the start of a case, or 
even before formal proceedings commence. There is a valid concern that if a 
judge makes an assessment of likely prospects of success, or another merits 
test, this will send a signal to the parties as to the court’s initial view and may 
for example affect settlement negotiations. Many judges are also concerned 
not to make any assessment of a case until they have heard all the evidence; 
even to decide that there are reasonable prospects of success is, for some, an 
unacceptable pre-judgment of a case.
An interesting case study of this dilemma is Norway. As has been seen 
above, some decisions are made by courts and some by the County Governors. 
However, the division of cases between the two has the maybe surprising 
result that courts have very limited discretion (the only element for their 
consideration being the application of a ‘not unreasonable’ criterion in means-
tested matters) whilst cases requiring the greatest exercise of discretion are 
reserved to the County Governor. There is an argument that courts could 
and should deal with all civil legal aid applications as the papers required in 
support of an application are to a large extent replicated in the court papers 
anyway and thus the administrative burden on the applicant and the state 
would be reduced overall. Furthermore, the decisions required in ‘exceptional 
cases’ are complex, including inter alia assessments on whether a case is ‘not 
unreasonable’, the matter is ‘especially pressing for the applicant’ and similar to 
priority case types, and arguably these should not be left to caseworkers. The 
contrary argument, which is currently accepted in Norway, is that as a matter of 
principle courts should not take substantial decisions on legal aid to avoid the 
risk of prejudgment.
A similar situation can be seen in Denmark, where the court only deals with 
cases where there is an assumption of legal aid. Other cases are decided by the 
Civil Affairs Agency who must assess whether there are reasonable grounds to 
litigate.
Whoever makes the initial legal aid decision, there is always the potential 
for error, either due to simple mistake or unconscious bias. The review and 
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appeal mechanisms available should be able to correct both types of error so as 
to reduce the potential for arbitrariness in the legal aid scheme.
4.5.3 Error in decision-making719
4.5.3.1 Human error
The possibility of appeal against a legal aid decision is important for several 
reasons. Of primary importance is the need to correct a wrong decision. Legal 
aid forms part of a system for upholding the core human right to fair legal 
hearings, which in turn is fundamental to the protection of the rule of law. It is 
thus of evident importance that efforts be made to ensure that decisions within 
a legal aid system should be as accurate as possible. Legal aid applications 
are assessed by individuals and as humans are not infallible there is always 
a possibility of error. The availability of a check of some kind is therefore 
important so that there is an opportunity for mistakes to be rectified.
4.5.3.2 The risk of unconscious bias in decision-making
In addition to the risk of occasional poor quality decision-making, there is also 
a possibility of unconscious bias. There are a number of conflicting interests 
involved in legal aid; indeed, one group of actors may even have several 
contradictory interests. Amongst the various groups given the power to make 
decisions on legal aid applications there is ample potential that inappropriate 
factors, i.e. those which do not arise from the statutory eligibility provisions, 
might influence a decision.
Maybe the most obvious potential conflict of interests occurs when decisions 
are made by government. The department which employs the decision-makers 
may also be responsible for the legal aid budget and subject to political pressure 
to ensure that ‘deserving’ claimants receive legal aid and others do not. The 
same government department may in addition be accountable for the proper 
functioning of the justice system as a whole, in which context legal aid has a 
complex interactional functionality. Further pressure will be felt by government 
if international tribunals criticise the legal aid system’s compliance with human 
rights accords. 
Courts, on the other hand, have a different range of interests which are 
relevant when assessing applications for legal aid. In general, courts are 
under considerable pressure of time and therefore speed and efficiency are at 
a premium. Enabling a hearing to go ahead with the minimum of delay and 
in a time-effective manner are important considerations, and may generate a 
positive attitude to legal aid applications. Likewise, the fairness of a hearing 
is of immediate importance to the court and may be a much more evident 
consideration than it would be for a civil servant making a legal aid decision 
in an office away from the parties, whom they have never met. Some judges, 
on the other hand, are reluctant to have a role in legal aid decision-making if 
719  See Barlow 2017b.
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any merits assessment is involved, because of the risk that they will be seen to 
be pre-judging the substantive case as discussed above. Legal aid systems such 
as Denmark and Norway, as seen, deal with this potential problem by giving 
courts jurisdiction over legal aid only where there is minimal, or no, merits 
testing involved.
In situations where the lawyer who may also conduct the case decides 
on legal aid eligibility, there may again be various competing interests. Most 
obviously, a grant of legal aid may result in additional income for a lawyer 
who is not a government employee. However, if demand is very high and the 
available lawyers cannot deal with all the potentially eligible clients, there may 
be a subconscious tendency to reduce the numbers of applicants receiving 
assistance. Against this impetus will be the likely empathy between the lawyer 
and the client before them.
4.5.4 Efforts to reduce arbitrariness720
4.5.4.1 Approaches at the initial decision-making stage
The existence of such potentially conflicting interests results in a risk of 
arbitrariness. It is important for the legitimacy of legal aid decisions that this 
risk is minimised as far as possible. Some jurisdictions make the attempt to 
remove potential conflicts from the decision-making parties. In Sweden and 
Denmark, for example, the government agencies responsible for some legal 
aid decisions (the Legal Aid Authority and Legal Aid Office, respectively) 
intentionally have no target for legal aid spend or budgetary responsibility. 
Likewise, in Finland the Legal Aid Offices, who make initial legal aid 
decisions, do not have any budgetary duties; their own costs are paid on 
a salaried basis and when they assess legal aid applications from lawyers in 
private practice they do so without any duty to consider the effect on the legal 
aid budget. Johnsen is of the view that this structure provides good, unbiased 
decision-making:
The role of the legal aid offices in the administration of the Finnish 
legal aid schemes has several advantages. It secures a competent use of 
the discretionary problem criteria without any commercial interest in 
the outcome. The decision making can be made from a well developed 
understanding of the service needs and an efficient use of the capacity 
and competence available both at the legal aid office and in the private 
profession in the area. They also might function as a detector of weaknesses 
in the schemes and increase the potential for innovation.721
In Iceland the decision-making power is vested in a committee of lawyers, 
which also has no budgetary responsibility. Within the committee, interestingly, 
judges as well as other lawyers are represented. This should also help to reduce 
the risk of arbitrariness, as the judge will understand and possibly promote 
720  See Barlow 2017b.
721  Johnsen 2009a, p. 26.
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the interests of efficiency within the court system, whilst the other lawyers are 
likely to bring an understanding of the needs of litigants themselves.
4.5.4.2 Appeal as a protection against arbitrariness
Despite the attempts in some jurisdictions to enable more neutral first-instance 
decisions, it is the possibility of appeal to a different body which, in most of 
the jurisdictions, reduces the risk of decisions being based on inappropriate 
criteria. 
Appeal or oversight gives the opportunity for a situation to be reconsidered 
by a body which does not share the same inherent interests as the original 
decision-making body. As discussed above, all the players in legal aid have a 
variety of interests which may, albeit subconsciously, affect assessment of legal 
aid applications. However, if the review or appeal body has different vested 
interests to the first-tier decision-maker, any initial unintentional bias stands 
a chance of being neutralised. Additionally, as appeal bodies are often a step 
removed from the case, any bias which that body might have in an initial legal 
aid decision has less force. An example of this is court decisions on legal aid 
which can be appealed to a higher court. Whilst the court of first instance may 
have the interests described above, these largely relate to the dual role of that 
court in dealing with the substantive case as well as the application for legal aid. 
An appeal to a higher court would lead to the legal aid issue being considered 
separately by a court not handling the substantive case, thus removing some of 
the conflicting pressures.
Clearly the success of appeal in overcoming the effects of unconscious bias 
will depend upon the nature of the appeal route, and in particular the identity 
of the appeal body and its similarity to or links with the primary decision-
making body. The European Court of Human Rights has drawn attention to 
the importance of variety in decision-making and appeal bodies in avoiding 
arbitrariness.722
It can be seen from the brief outline above that oversight in the jurisdictions 
under consideration usually involves a decision-maker of similar nature to 
the initial decision-maker. Court decisions, when appealable, are reviewed 
by higher courts. This is of course not surprising as bureaucratic appeal from 
court decisions would be considered fundamentally inappropriate in all the 
jurisdictions. In terms of avoiding arbitrariness, these initial decisions are not 
protected by a change of outlook in the appeal body but rely on the inherently 
impartial nature of the courts. However, as has been seen above, this neutrality 
is not necessarily a given in legal aid decisions, as the court itself has an 
interest. When a court performs the quasi-administrative task of assessing legal 
aid applications only one of the interested parties, the applicant, is present; 
the government does not provide an input to the individual case beyond the 
rules of the scheme. This is in contrast to the courts’ usual task of considering a 
722  Del Sol v. France, 2002, para. 26.
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dispute of one kind or another where opposing parties both present their case. 
The task of assessing legal aid is not one which courts are always comfortable 
with, nor is government always content to allow the courts to have this impact 
on public expenditure in circumstances where they may be inclined to be 
generous. The Swedish oversight by the Chancellor provides a balance to the 
considerable involvement of courts in legal aid decisions in that country. This 
oversight role is cleverly designed in that it does not interfere with the integrity 
of the court process; appeals against court decisions are still to higher courts 
but the government gains an opportunity to be heard as a party.
Bureaucratic decisions on legal aid are also, as seen above, generally 
overseen by other bureaucratic bodies. However, within this overall picture 
there is considerable variation in how far the appeal body is removed from 
the original decision-making body. In the few instances where only internal 
reviews are available, there is no division at all between the initial and 
secondary decision-maker and therefore the protection against arbitrariness is 
weak; all the same vested interests are present at both levels. 
The internal appeals processes in Ireland, Northern Ireland and England 
& Wales are interesting in that an attempt is made to bring an independent 
element into the legal aid bureaucracy at the appeal stage. In all three cases 
reliance is placed on the independence of the legal profession; in Northern 
Ireland and England & Wales the persons dealing with appeals are still 
practicing as lawyers alongside their work for the legal aid bodies. In the 
Republic of Ireland the statutory provision suggests that the appeal committee 
members need only have been practising lawyers before their appointment to 
the Board but in practice, as Board membership is not full-time, they are almost 
certain to be still carrying on their legal practice. However, their position as 
Board members ties their interests closely to the Board in a way which provides 
less independence than in the other two jurisdictions. In England & Wales, 
the recommendation of the Independent Funding Adjudicator is not always 
binding on the Legal Aid Agency and even though in fact it is almost always 
followed, this aspect of the system is significant as it maintains ultimate control 
in the hands of the Legal Aid Agency in many cases.
As has been seen above, the Scottish system of internal review of legal 
aid decisions does not provide independence other than in the specific 
circumstances that legal aid has been refused for proceedings against the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board itself. This lack of independence has been considered 
by the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council in Scotland, as part of a 
review of decisions made by public bodies where there is no, or no satisfactory, 
right of appeal. In response to the suggestion that an independent review body 
should be established, the Scottish Legal Aid Board countered that:
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The Board is […] required to balance a range of potentially competing 
interests: those of the applicant, the courts, the opponent (if relevant), the 
wider public and the taxpayer. This balance is essential to the preservation 
of a sustainable legal aid system, but it is hard to see an independent review 
body having regard to this full range of interests, including financial 
considerations.723
In the view of the Board, the fact that the Board itself is independent of 
government renders it unclear ‘why a further independent body would be 
needed to review its decisions’.724 Furthermore, the Board suggested that, for 
legal aid decisions, judicial review is an appropriate and accessible remedy 
because:
the nature of legal aid decision-making is different to other types of 
administrative decision-making. The very detailed Act and regulations, 
supported by comprehensive guidance, and the fact that the Board interacts 
exclusively with lawyers for many aspects of its decision making, means that 
the general principle set out in the paper does not apply to legal aid decision 
making.725
The argument suggests that the nature of legal aid decisions and of the Board 
itself are such that, unlike other administrative bodies, it can be trusted to take 
fully balanced, objective decisions and that thus no general independent appeal 
mechanism is needed. This is an idealistic argument, which denies the presence 
of any vested interests at the Board. Even if this were the case, which seems 
highly unlikely, two further factors make independent appeal desirable. Firstly, 
over time it is very possible that patterns of habit develop which gradually 
diverge from the intended application of the material rules; independent 
appeals can help to ensure that first instance decision-makers stay within the 
appropriate parameters over time. Secondly, even if it were the case that the 
Board’s decisions are completely objective, decisions by administrative bodies 
must not only be fair but should be perceived as fair, and independent appeals 
can increase trust in the decision-making structures.
The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council in Scotland, whilst 
accepting some of the Board’s arguments, nonetheless concluded that a 
strong case can be made for reviews of the refusal of legal aid being heard by 
a committee which, whilst under the auspices of the Board would consist of 
external, independent members. Furthermore, the possibility of review by such 
committee should be a matter of right.726 This recommendation has not, to date, 
been implemented.
The Norwegian structure is unusual in that appeals from regional government 
decisions on legal aid go to central government. Whilst the interests of these 
two bodies differ, it is the appeal body which arguably has a stronger interest 
723  Scottish Legal Aid Board 2012, para. 31.
724  Ibidem, para. 11.
725  Ibidem, para. 23.
726  Scottish Committee of the Administrative Justice & Tribunals Council 2012, p. 52.
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in controlling overall costs of the legal aid system. Thus, appeal is to a less 
financially neutral organisation. However, because the bodies are not mutually 
dependent in the way that the UK and Irish decision-making and appeals 
bodies are, it may be that greater protection against arbitrariness is achieved.
In both Sweden and Denmark, the appeals bodies are positioned within 
the court structure, although they are not themselves courts. Both are staffed 
by senior judges and lawyers. The level of separation from the governmental 
initial decision-making bodies is significant and the vested interests are not 
shared. Indeed, by keeping the appeal body separate from the courts as well, 
even greater neutrality should be assured. Thus, whilst nominally of the 
same basic nature, the appeal bodies do not share the vested interests of the 
initial decision-making body and it can be presumed that protection against 
subjectivity is good.
The oversight of bureaucratic legal aid decisions by courts, as seen in Finland 
and, to a lesser degree, Sweden and Scotland, is a very evident protection 
against influence from inappropriate factors, as it places the oversight in the 
hands of a completely separate body with different interests. However, in the 
context of neutrality it is interesting that the Finnish government rejected the 
option of oversight through the normal administrative court route in favour of 
oversight by the court in the substantive matter. The reasoning was to ensure 
that the court taking the decision on appeal had as much expertise in the 
matter as possible, but the corollary effect is necessarily to reduce impartiality, 
as the court re-considering the legal aid application will have all the vested 
interests applying to first-instance decisions by courts discussed above.
4.5.5 Improving future decision-making727
The impetus for an individual appeal comes from an individual who is 
dissatisfied with the outcome of their application, in most cases,728 and the 
motivation for the appeal is the hope that the decision will be reversed and 
legal aid granted on the terms sought. A successful appeal implies that the 
original decision in that case was incorrect, for one of many possible reasons. 
If the reason for the error is only specific to that particular case then the appeal 
decision is of little benefit beyond that case unless it points to a training need 
for a particular decision-maker. However, in many cases an appeal decision may 
have relevance to potential future decisions because it addresses one or more 
issue of general importance. For example, the interpretation of the applicable 
legal aid rules may be considered, with an indication that the approach of 
the first-tier decision-making body hitherto has been flawed. Likewise, an 
appeal body may find that the wrong weight is being given to various factors 
in decisions, or even that extraneous circumstances are inappropriately being 
taken into account. Such findings are an opportunity for future decisions to be 
727  See Barlow 2017b.
728  But see the role of the Swedish Chancellor of Justice, above.
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improved if steps are taken to feed the results back into the primary decision-
making structure. Improving future decisions not only improves the quality of 
outcomes in individual cases but also reduces systemic costs by lessening the 
risk of future appeals. 
The various appeal routes considered above show different levels of 
commitment to this potential for improvement. In Norway, the hope of 
encouraging consistency and quality of decision-making by the County 
Governors has led the Civil Affairs Authority to publish useful appeal decisions 
online.729 In Sweden, decisions of the Legal Aid Board and the higher courts 
on appeal from initial legal aid determinations are considered by the National 
Courts Administration730 and useful decisions are added to the online legal 
aid handbook used by the first-instance courts and the Legal Aid Agency in 
assessing legal aid applications.
In stark contrast in Denmark, the Appeals Permission Board does not give, 
let alone promulgate, the reasons for its decisions, which makes it very difficult 
for the Legal Aid Office to improve its practice following Board decisions. The 
reasoning behind this relates to the original purpose of the Board, before it 
gained its legal aid function. The Board was set up to decide cases where there 
is no automatic right to appeal to a higher court but leave is required. It was 
felt that it was advantageous to keep this function separate from the court 
which would hear the substantive appeal, and to not release detailed reasons 
for the decision to grant or refuse leave, to avoid any possible influence over the 
substantive case. When the legal aid appeal function was added to the Board’s 
remit, it was decided that these cases should be dealt with in the same manner, 
and the Minister of Justice confirmed that this meant that legal aid decisions 
would not include detailed reasons.731 
Where courts hear legal aid appeals or renewed applications, their decisions 
are of course public records and available for learning or training purposes. As 
most of the decisions appealed come from lower courts it may be assumed that 
judges in the lower courts will simply take note of superior court judgments 
in the usual way and amend their practice accordingly. Likewise, in Finland, 
lawyers dealing with initial applications for legal aid have access to the decisions 
of courts in previous cases, for guidance as necessary.
The more internal oversight mechanisms found in the UK jurisdictions can 
also be used to improve the quality of initial decision-making. In Northern 
Ireland the new appeals panel is developing a feedback loop to this end, 
although in England & Wales there is currently no such system. It is to be 
expected that reviews within the Scottish legal aid system influence future 
decision-making, although the lack of independent input to review decisions 
reduces the utility of this mechanism for improving the quality of decisions. 
Likewise in the Republic of Ireland, decisions on internal appeals to the Board 
729  At www.lovdata.no. A subscription is required to access the case decisions.
730  Domstolsverket.
731  Justitsministeren 2010.
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have the potential to be used to improve future decisions, within the inherent 
limitations of such internal review processes. 
4.6 Conclusions
The decision-making frameworks for civil legal aid in the Nordic countries, the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland are varied, as has been described. There seem 
to be two main rationales for the choice of initial decision-maker: control of 
expenditure and appropriateness within the justice process. As a costs control 
measure, keeping legal aid decisions close to government does not appear 
to be entirely effective.732 The jurisdictions of the UK all have public bodies 
within or closely tied to government taking initial decisions on legal aid and 
yet the highest spender on legal aid, Northern Ireland, is in this group. Overall, 
these jurisdictions have legal aid expenditure which is high within Europe 
as a whole and similar to the rest of the group of comparator jurisdictions. 
The jurisdictions with high reliance on courts for legal aid decision-making, 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway, do not as a group show a higher spend on 
legal aid. It thus seems that keeping decision-making away from courts is not 
a direct solution for high spending. Other factors are clearly also important 
in determining the costs of legal aid, although it is of course possible that an 
expensive scheme might be even more costly if decisions were in the hands of 
the courts.
The concern to ensure that courts are not placed in the improper position 
of pre-judging aspects of a case also appears simplistic, when looked at in 
the wider legal context. In at least some of the jurisdictions where legal aid 
decisions are kept away from courts, there are other procedures which require 
courts to make an initial broad-brush assessment of a case. One example is 
systems for appeals where leave is required; another is applications for judicial 
review where an initial ‘leave to appeal’ stage filters out unmeritorious cases 
according to certain criteria which vary according to jurisdiction. Such instances 
clearly indicate that it is sometimes considered acceptable, even desirable, for 
courts to pre-judge aspects of a case to ensure that the merits are sufficiently 
strong before it is allowed to continue. Furthermore, as the nature of judgments 
in such situations are close to the means test for civil legal aid in many cases 
(see Chapter 6 below) it is difficult to see why the decisions are considered 
legally demanding and necessitous of the skills of a court in some situations, 
but as administrative issues when connected with legal aid.
Of course, the current state of play in the structures of legal aid is the result 
of progression over time and of political decisions made by successive 
governments. There can be no certain conclusions drawn as to the reasons why 
the systems are as they are without detailed study of the history of each scheme, 
which is not achievable here. However, it is possible to hold the structures as 
732  See detailed discussion of the costs of legal aid in section 8.2.1 below.
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they currently stand to account against the requirements of international law, 
which in this chapter has been done particularly in the context of the need 
to avoid arbitrariness. It has been seen that conflicting interests are present 
in initial decisions on legal aid, whoever makes them, and it has been argued 
that the presence of reviews and appeals conducted by parties with differing 
interests are an important element in decreasing arbitrariness.
The short overview has revealed considerable variation in the legal aid 
appeal and oversight processes. Some systems are relatively simple, with 
review and appeal kept within the original decision-making bureaucracy, in 
some cases using outside legal expertise brought to conduct an ‘independent’ 
appraisal. Equally straightforward are the processes where court decisions 
on legal aid are appealable to a higher court. Whilst having the advantage of 
simplicity, these schemes do not necessarily provide a good balance between 
the various competing interests in the legal aid system, nor do they provide 
the best protection against arbitrariness. As discussed, if the vested interests 
of decision-makers at the initial and appeal stages are the same, there is a risk 
that inappropriate factors may influence decisions, and that inadvertent bias 
goes unchecked. It is not suggested that decisions in such jurisdictions are 
routinely partial; however, it is submitted that there is a real risk of both actual 
and perceived bias in any system which does not acknowledge and counter 
potential impartiality. 
A number of imaginative approaches to oversight improve neutrality in the 
jurisdictions considered. The use of the Appeals Permission Board in Denmark 
adds a clearly independent review mechanism; whilst the Board only reviews 
bureaucratic initial decisions, its position outside both government and the 
courts insulates it against vested interests when considering legal aid appeals. 
Renewal of legal aid applications before the court in Finland, after the initial 
decision by the Legal Aid Office, also provides a very clear change of inherent 
interests in the review process.
The system with the most finely-tuned checks and balances, however, is 
Sweden. As in Denmark, there is a quasi-judicial appeal body for governmental 
decisions on legal aid, but this is supplemented by over-arching oversight 
by the Chancellor of Justice, which applies to both bureaucratic and judicial 
legal aid decisions. The Office of the Chancellor of Justice is an independent 
administrative organ and the Chancellor herself is a non-political civil servant 
appointed by the government. This politically independent governmental role 
provides objectivity when the Chancellor is considering legal aid decisions 
made by the Legal Aid Authority, and also enables some governmental input on 
court decisions on legal aid, which are otherwise appealable to higher courts. 
Furthermore, Legal Aid Authority decisions are subject to appeal to the Legal 
Aid Board in addition to oversight by the Chancellor, and thus a quasi-judicial 
perspective is also provided. Thus both judicial and non-judicial initial legal aid 
decisions are subject to appeal or oversight by a court or quasi-judicial body, 
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and by the Chancellor. Whilst the reporting duties are limited, the categories 
of case which must be notified to the Chancellor can be and from time to time 
are altered by regulation; if it was considered necessary, the reporting grounds 
could be broadened. As the ability of the Chancellor to intervene as a party 
and institute an appeal extends to all legal aid decisions,733 not just those which 
must be reported, her role thus provides, in theory at least, comprehensive 
oversight.
Whatever the success of an individual appeal system in rectifying arbitrariness 
in individual decisions, its reporting and feedback process can magnify the 
positive effect by ensuring that future decisions avoid repeating the failings 
identified. This important role is not realised in all the jurisdictions considered, 
and should be developed wherever possible. Various methods have been 
used, most commonly the publishing of appeal decisions (in Sweden and 
Norway) and the collation of useful decisions in handbooks or other practical 
texts (in Sweden, Denmark and Norway). A feedback mechanism is under 
development in Northern Ireland, with an exact nature still to be determined. 
Appeal decisions in situations where courts are overseeing courts may also, as 
suggested above, influence future decision-making through normal channels. 
The Appeals Permission Board in Denmark is in stark contrast to the 
other appeals bodies, in that it does not give reasons for its decisions, thus 
preventing future lessons from being learned. As well as being unhelpful, 
this lack of reasons is striking given the statutory right to written grounds 
for administrative734 as well as court decisions,735 and hinders further appeal. 
The reason for the stance is seemingly consistency between the different 
functions of the Board, but it can be questioned whether this aim is sufficiently 
compelling to justify the negative impact on legal aid quality improvement.
It must be remembered that the pursuit of good legal aid decisions is only 
part of the puzzle within a legal aid system, and what is achievable is limited 
by financial restraints. The choice of decision-making structure in general, 
and appeals in particular, may be constrained by budget; both the cost of the 
structure and the control it gives over the total cost of the legal aid system. 
However, actual and perceived legitimacy of decisions is necessary for public 
faith in legal aid to be maintained. Structural changes to decision-making and 
appeals processes could in some jurisdictions improve the quality of legal aid 
decision-making, and increase trust in the system. 
733  Lag om rätt för Justitiekanslern att överklaga vissa beslut, 2005; Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 45 §.
734  Forvaltningsloven, 2014, § 22.
735  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 218.
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Case study 2:
Anne in the Republic of Ireland, Anita in Northern Ireland and Anja in Norway have 
all been sent court papers saying that their landlords have applied to evict them from 
their rented homes.
Republic of Ireland – Anne
To obtain publicly-funded 
legal help, Anne must 
attend a Law Centre run 
by the Legal Aid Board. 
Her means will be tested 
before any further steps are 
taken. There may be a long 
queue (several months) 
for an appointment but if 
the wait is over 4 months, 
Anne will be offered a triage 
appointment within a month 
for emergency advice.
Once she has reached the 
front of the queue, Anne 
will see a solicitor who will 
complete an application for 
legal aid and send it to the 
Corporate Services Team 
within the Legal Aid Board. 
If legal aid is refused, Anne 
can ask for a review by the 
Legal Aid Board and then, 
if still unsuccessful, lodge 
an appeal with the appeals 
committee of the Board.
Northern Ireland – Anita
Anita can get help from any 
private solicitor willing to 
take her case. The solicitor 
will check that she meets 
the financial eligibility 
requirements and grant 
‘Advice and Assistance’ 
worth up to £88. As part 
of this work the solicitor 
will help Anita complete 
an application for legal aid 
for representation, which 
will be sent to the Legal 
Services Agency for a means 
and merits assessment. If 
legal aid is not granted, 
Anita can ask for a review 
by the Agency. A further 
appeal will only be possible 
against refusal on the merits 
grounds, and only if the case 
is being heard in a higher 
court (which is unlikely 
in such a case). Appeals 
would be to the independent 
appeals panel.
Norway – Anja
Tenancy termination cases 
are means-tested priority 
cases and therefore if Anja 
goes to see a private lawyer 
about the case, that lawyer 
can grant legal aid for advice 
up to the fixed fee amount, 
as long as Anja meets the 
financial requirements. 
If more advice is needed, 
an application for more 
time can be made to the 
County Governor but as the 
landlord has already issued 
proceedings it is more likely 
that an application for legal 
aid for representation will 
be made straight away. 
This application will be to 
the court dealing with the 
possession proceedings 
(because it is a priority 
matter) and a minimal ‘not 
unreasonable’ test will apply, 
in addition to the means 
test. Appeal against refusal 
would be to a higher court.
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5. Chapter 5: Civil legal aid scope
5.1 Introduction
One of the ways in which the civil legal aid systems in the Nordic countries, the 
Republic of Ireland and the UK vary is in the breadth of subject coverage they 
provide. Some jurisdictions permit legal aid for almost all civil case types whilst 
others severely restrict the matters for which legal aid is available. Reducing 
the scope of legal aid is a simple and effective way to reduce the number of 
legal aid grants; decisions tend to be straightforward compared to merits 
assessments and lawyers are unlikely to even request legal aid in excluded case 
types, thus reducing administration costs as well as expenditure on cases. Most 
of the systems under comparison take the approach of excluding some types 
of case, but Norway and England & Wales instead list the case types which are 
included. This is an easier approach for those jurisdictions, as they are very 
restrictive in the case types covered.
Pertinent international human rights obligations suggest that removing 
some categories from scope altogether may be unacceptable, and many schemes 
allow for excluded case types to be funded in exceptional circumstances. Such 
provisions are of variable effectiveness, as will be seen. 
5.2 The usual approach: exclusion of some case types
Schemes which operate by excluding certain case types provide varying 
coverage across jurisdictions, which is often also different at the levels of advice 
and representation.
The starting point regarding scope in Finland is the statement of purpose 
at 1 § of the Legal Aid Act that legal aid will be given if there is a ‘need’ for 
expert assistance. As a matter of overarching principle all types of matter will 
be covered but specific provisions at 6 § set out a number of types of case for 
which legal aid will generally not be provided, on the basis that such matters do 
not require the help of an attorney. Three civil case types are explicitly excluded: 
cases related to membership of a municipality or other public body; tax matters; 
and cases involving the registration of documents and records. In the latter two 
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categories, legal aid can nonetheless be granted if there are especially weighty 
reasons for providing it.736 None of the exclusions are absolute, though, as in all 
three categories advice and assistance with preparation of documents can be 
provided.737 The scope of legal aid is also restricted by some other legislation, 
in particular the Aliens Act, which provides that legal aid representation is not 
available during an initial asylum interview.738 
Thus, all questions of Finnish law can be the subject of legally aided 
assistance at the advice level, and representation is available in almost all types 
of case. The non-binding handbook referred to in earlier chapters suggests 
some case types which will not normally be funded as they do not generally 
result in a need for legal assistance. These are few in number but include simple 
debt settlement cases and initial applications for asylum.739 It should be noted 
that although these case types are not normally funded, assistance can be given 
if there is a need for expert help.
A similar structure for initial assistance can be found in Sweden, where 
any legal question can be the subject of publicly funded advice.740 However, 
in respect of representation, scope is more limited than in Finland, and the 
list identifying types of matter which are completely excluded from scope is 
considerably longer: the preparation of certain documents such as tax returns, 
marriage contracts and wills; registration of a property upon inheritance; 
debt restructuring; land registration and some other property related matters; 
registration of commercial shipping; the division of property after divorce or 
separation (apart from appeals against the decision of a division of property 
official);741 and cases seeking compensation from an insurance company for 
personal injury following a traffic accident. 742 
A further group of matter types is excluded unless there are special reasons 
to grant legal aid:743 divorce and child support matters, tax and customs issues, 
matters worth below a certain sum744 and cases which will be dealt with outside 
Sweden. The interpretation of ‘special reasons’ is a matter for the decision-maker, 
but guidance is available from the online handbook published by the National 
Courts Administration. Examples of special circumstances which may justify 
a grant of legal aid in divorce cases and child support cases are: subsequently 
arising disputes over the care of children;745 issues of right to reside in the family 
736  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 6 §.
737  Ibidem. 
738  Utlänningslag, 2004, 9 §.
739  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013, section 2.2.1.
740  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 4 §.
741  See Chapter 8 for more information about this role.
742  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 10 §.
743  Ibidem, 11 §.
744  Half the “prisbasbelopp”, which in 2018 is 45 500 Swedish kronor, with a resultant   
      minimum value of case for legal aid of 22 750 kronor, or about 2 250€. Rättshjälpslag, 
      1996, 11 §, para. 4 and Rättegångsbalken, Chapter 1, 3d §.
745  RH 1998:66, 1998 and Ö 1754-99, 2000.
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home;746 the existence of domestic violence747 or of an injunction prohibiting 
contact between the parties.748 However, the fact that the applicant was an 
asylum seeker with limited knowledge of the Swedish language749 or in another 
case that there was no known address for the respondent750 did not amount 
to special grounds for the granting of legal aid. The length of time taken by a 
lawyer in ultimately dealing with the divorce is also relevant; in a case where 
this was under five hours the Court of Appeal decided that the matter cannot 
have been so complex that special reasons existed.751
In Iceland, the scope assessment is included as part of the merits test; 
regulations set out together the various considerations to be taken into account 
when the legal aid committee evaluates an application for legal aid.752 The 
relevant factors include that the case is of such a nature that it is acceptable 
that it be paid for by public funds, and a list is given of matter types for which 
legal aid should as a rule not be granted unless special reasons allow for legal 
aid. These are: that the dispute concerns the business of the applicant and the 
applicant has by his own actions or inaction caused the dispute; that the case is 
between closely related individuals; and certain other features which are related 
more closely to merits and will be dealt with in Chapter 6 below. 
In Denmark, scope is more restricted at the advice stage than for 
representation. Stage 1 advice covers any legal query, but as has been seen 
above in Chapter 4 there is no duty on lawyers to provide such advice, and 
no payment by the state for it, rendering the theoretical entitlement to free 
legal advice at this stage somewhat academic. At advice steps 2 and 3 there 
is a short list of excluded case types. Inter alia, assistance for cases before an 
administrative board of appeal or private complaints board is out of scope.753 
In cases concerning the actions of an administrative authority it is intended 
that the duty to advise, which applies to all administrative authorities,754 
should suffice. Whilst this is understandable as a policy position, there are 
some concerns that the conflict of interests between the authorities and their 
customers may make the provision of good, impartial advice unlikely.755 If a 
complaint against the actions of an administrative authority is contemplated, 
advice is available under legal aid.756 Commercial and business cases, debt 
matters and criminal matters are excluded from scope at advice levels 2 and 
3.757 
746  Ö 1209-01, 2001.
747  Rättshjälpsnämnden 401-1999.
748  Rättshjälpsnämnden 227-1999.
749  NJA 1999 s.149 I.
750  RH 1998:9.
751  RH 1998:33.
752  Regulation 45/2008, Article 5.
753  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 323(4)(4).
754  Forvaltningsloven, 2014, § 7.
755  Ellersgaard Nielsen et. al. 2012, p. 35.
756  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 323(5).
757  Ibidem, § 323(4)(1)-(3).
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Beyond advice, legal aid for representation in Denmark covers in principle any 
type of case. As was seen above in Chapter 4, legal aid for certain case types 
is to be decided by the court758 but there is an open power to the Ministry 
of Justice to grant legal aid for all other matters subject to a merits test (see 
Chapter 6 below).759 However, it should be noted that since the introduction of 
the small claims procedure, it has been established through case precedent that 
legal aid can be refused in such cases on the basis that the costs of taking the 
case are insignificant in relation to the claimant’s income.760 In practice, small 
claims are now routinely refused legal aid, which results in a large number 
of enquiries concerning such cases to private legal aid institutions, as the 
process can be confusing despite being a simplified version of full litigation.761 
In business cases and defamation actions, legal aid can only be granted in 
exceptional circumstances, unless the defamation is grave or widely published. 762
The statutory frameworks for deciding scope in the Republic of Ireland, 
Northern Ireland and Scotland are very similar. In these jurisdictions legal 
aid for representation is constrained to cases before certain venues, widely 
drawn. In the case of the Republic of Ireland, these are all the normal civil 
courts (the District Court, the Circuit Court, the High Court and the Supreme 
Court) as well as any other courts or tribunals which have been prescribed by 
the Minister for Justice and Equality.763 At present only the Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal has been so prescribed,764 with the consequence that cases before any 
other tribunals are excluded. 
In Northern Ireland, the legislation states that legal aid may not be granted 
except in proceedings being heard before one of the listed courts or tribunals. 
This list is relatively comprehensive and includes the Supreme Court, Court 
of Appeal, High Court and County Court, the criminal courts when dealing 
with certain civil matters related to the proceeds of crime, and a number 
of tribunals.765 Unlike in the other two similar jurisdictions, in Northern 
Ireland there is, within the rules on which venues are covered, a list of types 
of proceedings which will be in scope before the courts of first instance. This 
aspect is inclusive rather than exclusive, in contrast to the main pattern which, 
as will be seen below, is to exclude matters from scope. This element of the 
Northern Irish legal aid scheme thus to a small extent shares the inclusiveness 
characteristic with the schemes in Norway and England & Wales. 
The Scottish arrangement for legal aid for representation is, again, very 
similar to those in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The overall 
scope of civil legal aid is provided by Schedule 2 of the Legal Aid (Scotland) 
758  Ibidem, § 327.
759  Ibidem, § 328.
760  Mavrogenis 2012, p. 74; Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 325(2).
761  Ellersgaard Nielsen et. al. 2012, p. 39.
762  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 328(4).
763  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 27.
764  Civil Legal Aid (Refugee Appeals Tribunal) Order 2005.
765  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, Schedule 2, para. 2.
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Act, which first sets out the courts and tribunals for which legal aid may be 
granted and then lists types of case which are excluded from civil legal aid. 
Included courts are the Supreme Court, Court of Session, Lands Valuation 
Appeal Court, Scottish Land Court, Sheriff Appeal Court and the sheriff court. 
In addition, the Lands Tribunal for Scotland, Employment Appeal Tribunal and 
Upper Tribunal for Scotland are included.766 
In all three schemes, after delineating the courts and tribunals covered by 
legal aid for representation, the legislation goes on to exclude from scope some 
subject areas. Lists of excluded case types are provided separately for legally 
aided advice.
The Republic of Ireland, for instance, excludes defamation, small claims, 
conveyancing, class actions (which are not generally permitted under Irish 
law) and licensing from the scheme for legal aid for representation.767 There 
is a general bar on legal aid for disputes over land but this is mitigated by a 
number of exceptions.768 At the level of advice, the same category restrictions 
apply, with the addition of criminal law matters, although advice may be given 
on conveyancing questions arising from other funded proceedings (presumably 
most often family breakdown related matters).769
A short list of matters is excluded from scope for representation in Northern 
Ireland: criminal defence matters; defamation; relator actions (where the 
Attorney General is participating on behalf of a member of the public); cases 
under electoral law and uncontested debt recovery matters.770 The government 
has published proposals on scope; it is not intended to restrict the case types 
for which legal aid is available as much as has been done in England & Wales, 
but there is an aim to make some additional restrictions and to re-structure 
so that a list of specifically included case types, rather than an excluded list, 
is provided.771 The statute gives the power to make such changes by regulation 
rather than primary legislation.772 If these changes are made, the scheme will be 
closer in structure to England & Wales, as seen below.
Advice and assistance can be given on any area of Northern Irish law 
other than those specifically excluded: conveyancing, boundary disputes, 
wills, trust law, defamation or malicious falsehood, company or partnership 
law, or business-related issues.773 The Access to Justice Review (2) proposed 
that welfare benefits, debt and damages claims should also be removed from 
scope but this has not yet been implemented.774 In making the proposals, the 
government was working on an assumption that the introduction of alternative 
766  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 Schedule 2 Part I.
767  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 28(9).
768  Ibidem, s. 28(9)(c).
769  Ibidem, s. 26.
770  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, Schedule 2, para. 4.
771  Stutt 2015, Recommendation 57, para. 23.57.
772  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 s. 12(6).
773  Ibidem, Schedule 2, para.1.
774  Stutt 2015, Recommendation 57, p. 18.
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funding arrangements will maintain access to justice in these areas.775 
In Scotland, having slightly circumscribed the judicial venues for which legal 
aid may be afforded, the statute lists excluded case types; namely defamation, 
some debt and bankruptcy matters, election petitions, simple divorce applications 
and small claims cases.776 Maybe somewhat surprisingly, the Law Society of 
Scotland has suggested that consideration be given to removing some other 
areas from scope to reduce pressure on legal aid, as long as a well-funded non-
lawyer advice sector can be maintained.777 The Advice and Assistance scheme is 
very generous in terms of scope as it covers advice on any question of Scots law. 
It should be noted that Scotland operates a separate legal aid scheme for 
certain proceedings relating to children under the name ‘children’s legal aid’. 
This is legal aid for proceedings relating to children, rather than legal aid for 
children, notwithstanding the name. The recipient of children’s legal aid may 
be the child who is the subject of proceedings778 or a ‘relevant person’,779 i.e. 
a parent or other person with parental responsibility for the child.780 Some 
children’s legal aid is available as of right, without a merits or means test but in 
many cases a merits test and modified means test do apply. The merits tests for 
children’s legal aid will be addressed in Chapter 6 below.
As seen in Chapter 4, advice and assistance in Scotland is intended to cover 
pre-court work and legal aid is intended to take over when court proceedings are 
commenced. However, the middle category of Advice By Way of Representation 
(ABWOR) has become quite important due to its flexibility. The basic legal aid 
system is set out in legislation which is over 30 years old781 and subsequent 
changes in other legislation have left gaps in the coverage by Advice and 
Assistance and legal aid. As ABWOR is able to be extended by regulation 
without further primary legislation,782 the Scottish Legal Aid Board has been 
able to increase coverage of the overall legal aid scheme by extending the 
applicability of ABWOR. However, the results of this approach are a complex 
mix of coverage; for example in proceeds of crime cases if forfeiture is sought 
civil legal aid will cover the matter, if confiscation is sought this will be 
covered by criminal legal aid and an interested third party can have help under 
ABWOR. 
It can thus be seen that despite the existence of the technique specific to 
the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Scotland of specifying included 
courts and tribunals, all the jurisdictions under comparison other than Norway 
and England & Wales share an approach of restricting scope by excluding 
certain case types. 
775  David Ford, Minister of Justice, speech in the Northern Ireland Assembly 3 November 2015.
776  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, Schedule 2 Part II.
777  Law Society of Scotland 2014, p. 39.
778  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s.28D.
779  Ibidem, s. 28E.
780  Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s. 200.
781  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986.
782  Ibidem, s.9.
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5.3 Norway: scope limited to priority cases
Several schemes do not have a starting point that all case types are eligible, and 
apply exceptions; rather, the base assumption is that a case will not be eligible 
for civil legal aid, but specific case types are selected for inclusion in legal 
aid. Within the jurisdictions under consideration in this thesis, the relevant 
examples are Norway and England & Wales, although there are indications that 
Northern Ireland may adopt the approach in future, as seen above.
As was seen in Chapter 4, in Norway the Legal Aid Act divides cases into 
priority non-means tested, priority means-tested and non-priority types, for 
both free legal advice and free legal aid. Lists are provided of all four priority 
case categories. Non-means tested free advice is available in the following cases: 
child welfare; certain immigration cases; compensation claims for wrongful 
prosecution; claims for compensation by victims of violent crime against the 
perpetrator; some cases concerning military conscription; advice for victims 
of domestic abuse and forced marriage cases.783 In representation cases, some 
of the advice categories are repeated (victims of violent crimes, conscription 
and forced marriage cases) and in addition non-means tested representation 
is available in inter alia: conscientious objection to military service cases; 
objection to an order for compulsory medical treatment; some other 
immigration test cases; public guardianship and to provide representation in 
child custody cases for a person suspected of child abuse.784 
For both advice and representation, there is an additional list of cases for 
which assistance will be provided subject to a means test. For advice, these are: 
some family cases, some property matters on relationship breakdown, personal 
injury, termination of tenancy, private sector employment dismissal claims, 
some compensation claims by victims of violent crimes and social security 
appeals.785 All but the last two categories are also included as means-tested 
priority cases for representation.786 
This method of categorisation is relatively simple to administer but has been 
criticised as having an urban bias and leading to “differential treatment of cases 
of equal significance”.787 The preciseness of the provisions can lead to some 
surprising and seemingly illogical results, such as that tenancy termination 
cases are covered if due to a breach of contract but not if due to a gross breach 
of contract, and deportation cases are included in the scheme if they occur 
in consequence of a breach of immigration law but not if the trigger was a 
breach of criminal law.788 Criticisms were acknowledged by the Ministry of 
Justice in 2009789 and suggestions for the addition of other case types as well 
783  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 11(1).
784  Ibidem, § 16(1).
785  Ibidem, § 11(2).
786  Ibidem, § 16(2).
787  Johnsen 2009a, p. 23.
788  Halvorsen Rønning 2018, p. 21.
789  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009), para. 9.1.
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as first-line advice in all cases were recommended790 but these changes were 
not implemented by Parliament. A coalition of NGOs in 2015 called for the 
list of priority cases to be extended to include, inter alia, school bullying 
cases, discrimination, patients’ rights and all domestic violence matters.791 
The fact that these categories are not currently covered may seem surprising, 
particularly as discrimination and domestic violence cases are among the 
few case types still seen as serious enough to warrant legal aid in England & 
Wales, despite the recent severe scope restrictions there. Amongst the cases not 
covered by legal aid are also many money cases and social welfare cases. 
As well as domestic criticism, the restricted scope of Norwegian civil legal 
aid has caused international concern, with the UN Human Rights Committee 
in 2011 recommending that “the State party should review its free legal aid 
scheme to provide for free legal assistance in any case where the interests of 
justice so require”.792
Scope in Norway is very limited, with the areas in scope presenting an 
inventory of the legal issues which are felt to be particularly important in 
individuals’ lives. This is clearly, and naturally, a culturally specific choice, 
as can be seen by the inclusion for example of cases concerning military 
conscription.
5.4 England & Wales: radical reduction in scope
Prior to 2013, the situation regarding scope in England & Wales was already 
relatively strict in the context of the group of jurisdictions being compared 
here, with a group of excluded matters similar to that in Northern Ireland. At 
the advice level, the categories outside scope were personal injury and damage 
to property, boundary disputes, conveyancing, defamation, the making of wills, 
trust law and business cases. Legal aid could cover representation for any case 
before the county court, the High Court, the Court of Appeal, the Supreme 
Court and family matters before the magistrates’ court, but excluded tribunal 
proceedings and coroners’ courts.
However, dramatic changes to scope took place in 2013, when the legal 
aid provisions in Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) came into force. A considerable reduction in the 
types of case for which civil legal aid is available was one of the key elements 
of the legislation. As will be discussed further in Chapter 8, as part of the 
consideration of legal aid in times of austerity, the changes brought about by 
LASPO were explicitly about saving money:
790  Ibidem, para 9.3.3 and 9.3.1
791  Rettshjelpsordningen må styrkes, 2015.
792  CCPR/C/NOR/CO/6, para. C6.
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The Government is committed to controlling public expenditure to reduce 
the deficit. But we also believe in light of the way the scheme has expanded 
since its establishment, that it is right in principle to reduce its scope. We 
have concluded that it is no longer affordable to provide legal aid for the 
extensive range of issues for which it is currently available.793
The policy was indeed successful at reducing expenditure, as confirmed by the 
National Audit Office:
The reforms have reduced the number of cases the Agency funds. In 2013-
14 the Agency funded more than 400,000 fewer legal help matters (a drop 
of 70%) and granted more than 42,000 (28%) fewer certificates for legal 
representation than it had in 2012-13.794
The government’s reasoning when selecting cases which would be removed 
from scope under LASPO is focused on political policy, as will be seen in the 
conclusions at the end of this chapter, and almost completely fails to consider 
the need for fair hearings in civil cases. The new scope limitations apply to all 
levels of civil legal aid and thus where a solicitor is granting Legal Help (advice 
and assistance pre-court) to a client, they must ensure that the matter is within 
scope, as well as applying a merits test. If Legal Help is provided when a matter 
is out of scope, there will be costs penalties for the lawyer.
Instead of excluding certain areas, the new legislation provides that legal 
aid is only available for the listed types of case. The scope of the civil legal aid 
scheme is set out in Schedule 1 of LASPO, but unfortunately it “is not easy to 
understand and requires a certain amount of cross-referencing and double or 
even triple negatives to be navigated to understand whether a case is in fact in 
or out of scope”.795 The Schedule first lists case types which are in scope, then 
sets out some specific exclusions within these case types and finally excludes 
some courts and tribunals. Given the fundamental nature of questions of 
subject coverage within a civil legal aid scheme, this convoluted construction is 
most unfortunate. 
Whilst the complexity of the current scope provisions makes it inappropriate 
to attempt a detailed audit here, some of the removals from scope are 
particularly noteworthy. In 2017 the Law Society of England & Wales reviewed 
the first four years of operation of LASPO and summarised the losses:
Until 2012, legal aid was available for almost all areas of law, subject to 
specified exceptions. LASPO Part 1 changed the system, transforming it 
overnight to a system focusing on a much smaller and more specific list of legal 
areas which are eligible (or in scope) for legal aid.
793  Ministry of Justice 2010, para. 4.3.
794  National Audit Office 2014, p. 21.
795  Ling and Pugh 2017, para. 3.5.
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Areas removed from scope included private family law, such as divorce and 
custody battles; most clinical negligence cases; most employment law, non-
asylum immigration law, where the person is not detained; some debt and 
housing cases, and most welfare benefit issues. In legal areas that are now 
no longer in scope, people now have a stark choice: to pay for their own 
legal advice, represent themselves, or be excluded from the justice system 
altogether.796
The National Audit Office has pointed out that the pressure on more people 
to represent themselves in court or give up on their case altogether has had 
unquantifiable financial consequences for the state, both inside and outside the 
justice system:
The published evidence on the impact of litigants in person on court 
resources indicates that cases involving litigants in person increase costs to 
the courts. If, as has been estimated, cases involving litigants in person take 
50% longer, the impact of increased numbers of litigants in person in family 
courts could be £3 million. This estimate does not include additional costs 
in civil courts.797 
Individuals who have civil legal issues may experience a range of adverse 
consequences if they cannot resolve their problem. […] 50% of respondents 
who were eligible for legal aid reported that their civil legal problem had a 
negative effect on their health and wellbeing. Where legal problems remain 
unresolved, the cost may be met by the taxpayer through additional costs to 
the NHS or welfare programmes.798
As early as two years after the changes were implemented, the House of 
Commons Justice Committee was highly critical of the reforms:
The Ministry of Justice has failed in three of its four objectives for LASPO: it 
has not discouraged unnecessary and adversarial litigation at public expense 
because the courts and tribunals are having to meet the costs of a significant 
rise in litigants in person and a corresponding fall in mediation; it has failed 
to target legal aid at those who need it most because it has failed to properly 
implement the exceptional cases funding scheme; and it has failed to prove 
that it has delivered better overall value for money for the taxpayer because 
it has no idea at all of the knock-on costs of the legal aid changes to the 
public purse. The Ministry of Justice has made significant savings in the cost 
of the scheme but we conclude that it could have achieved greater savings if 
it had reduced the knock-on costs of the reforms.799
 
796  Law Society 2017, p. 6.
797  National Audit Office 2014, p. 17.
798  Ibidem, p. 19.
799  House of Commons Justice Committee 2015, para. 181. 
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Many parties now believe that the changes have led to such serious problems 
with access to justice that they must be at least partially reversed. Forceful 
arguments to this end have been made by the Law Society, as seen above, 
and by the Bach Commission, which was composed of respected experts and 
funded by the politically left-wing think tank the Fabian Society.800 The Bach 
Commission argued that at least “all law concerning children, and some aspects 
of family law and immigration law” should be returned to scope. A government 
review of the first four years of operation of LASPO is currently underway.801
One of the most contentious changes to scope introduced by LASPO was 
the removal of all private law family cases unless evidence of domestic violence 
could be provided.802 As the Bach commission pointed out, “the scale and 
impact of these changes has been enormous. There are nearly a quarter of a 
million fewer people now receiving legal help in family cases each year than 
there were in 2009-2010”.803 Internationally, this change has not gone unnoticed 
and the UN Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
has commented critically:
The Committee is concerned that the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act of 2012 unduly restricts women’s access to legal aid 
because it removes access to legal aid for litigation concerning, among 
others, divorce, property disputes, housing and immigration matters. While 
noting that legal aid remains available for some private family law issues, 
the Committee is concerned that the Act conditions legal aid upon proof of, 
among others, abuse suffered by victims of violence.804
Entitlement to legal aid for family matters under LASPO was initially dependent 
on having one or more specified forms of evidence of domestic violence having 
occurred within the previous 2 years.805 Following a concerted campaign which 
provided evidence that 43% of women did not have the prescribed forms of 
evidence to access family law legal aid,806 some changes were made slightly 
relaxing the evidence requirements. However, following an application for 
judicial review, the regulation imposing the 24-month time limit was held 
invalid by the Court of Appeal because it frustrated, in part, the purpose 
of the Act.807 The evidential time limit was subsequently amended to 60 
months808 and the government has now removed the time limit altogether.809 
 
800  Bach Commission 2017, p. 31. 
801  Cm 9486.
802  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Schedule 1, Part 1, para. 12.
803  Bach Commission 2017, p. 31.
804  DAW/C/GBR/CO/7, p. 4, para. 22.
805  The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulation 33.
806  Rights of Women 2014.
807  R (on the application of Rights for Women) v. The Lord Chancellor, 2016, para. 45.
808  Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2016.
809  The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2017, in force 8 January 2018.
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Despite this relaxation of the evidential rules, the general principle remains 
that legal aid will not be available for most private family law matters, such as 
disputes between parents over the arrangements for children, unless there has 
been domestic violence. Given that the case in the European Court of Human 
Rights which established a right to civil legal aid in some cases was a private 
law family case where there had been domestic violence,810 it is unsurprising 
that the UK government did not remove these cases from the scope of civil 
legal aid in England & Wales, despite the dramatic scale of cuts undertaken 
overall. 
Clearly aware of the risk of censure from international bodies following the 
reforms, the UK government kept open the possibility of obtaining legal aid in 
out-of-scope exceptional cases; one of a number of similar provisions dealing 
with special circumstance in the jurisdictions under consideration. These will 
now be considered in more detail.
5.5 Exceptional cases
It has been seen above that a common formulation of scope restrictions is to 
provide that certain categories are not funded unless there are special reasons 
for granting legal aid. This provides a legal aid safety net if the matter type is 
not deemed a priority but the applicant or the particular factors of that case 
mean that a fair hearing cannot be achieved without legal assistance. In the 
Republic of Ireland and Scotland there are no general saving provisions; the 
few case types excluded from civil legal aid scope cannot be funded whatever 
the other circumstances, other than in relation to defamation in Scotland as 
described below. However, in all the other jurisdictions there are provisions for 
exceptions to be made to the usual exclusions.
In Finland, for example, even within the excluded categories of taxation and 
the registration of documents, legal aid can be granted if there are especially 
weighty reasons.811 There remains an absolute bar on cases concerning 
membership of municipalities or other public bodies, but it can be assumed 
that this is a very small number of potential cases. In Sweden the list of 
absolutely excluded cases is longer, but divorce and child support matters, tax 
and customs issues and low value cases can be granted legal aid if there are 
special circumstances.812 
Unlike in Finland and Sweden, the Icelandic system provides that any type 
of case may be given legal aid if there are special reasons. A similar result is 
seen in Denmark, where legal aid is in any event available for almost any type 
of matter, with exclusions only for business matters or minor defamation. 
Nonetheless there is a specific statutory provision that the Minister of Justice 
810  Airey v. Ireland, 1979.
811  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 6 §.
812  Ibidem, 11 §.
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may upon application grant a party free legal aid in any case when special 
reasons speak for it.813 This especially applies in cases which have fundamental 
importance or general public importance or which have significant importance 
for the applicant’s social or business situation.814 
As has been seen, in Norway any cases not listed as priority case types can 
only be granted legal aid in exceptional cases, which in most instances requires 
a similarity to the listed categories. The Circular issued by the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security provides that the same approach is to be taken to 
exceptional cases in both free legal advice and free legal representation cases.815 
The Legal Aid Act is to be understood as narrowing the availability of legal 
aid in unlisted case types; the general rule is that legal aid will only be granted 
in listed types of case. The exception applies where the matter “seen from an 
objective point of view is especially pressing for the applicant.”816 This does not 
mean that the applicant herself considers the problem particularly pressing, 
but that the matter would generally be considered to affect people personally 
to a particularly strong degree.817 Similarity with the listed case types is to be 
given weight, according to both the Act818 and the Circular,819 and this is in 
practice the main factor in deciding whether legal aid will be granted for non-
priority cases. The Circular goes on to provide examples, stating for example 
that child welfare cases falling outside the list will normally be considered as 
of great personal importance for the individual but that employment cases 
will generally not. The latter stance is interesting; private sector dismissals 
are included in the priority list but public sector employment cases rely on 
inclusion as similar cases where the matter is particularly pressing. Given that 
the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed, as seen below, that there 
is an assumption that Article 6 applies also to public sector employees, the 
diversion of approach is hard to justify. It is noteworthy, also, that the exception 
does not appear to cover cases where the unusual need for legal assistance 
arises out of the characteristics of the individual rather than the case type.
Northern Ireland and England & Wales share a very precise approach to 
exceptional cases of any case category, explicitly aimed at preventing breaches 
of international human rights law. In Northern Ireland, outside the usual rules 
on matter types and merits, legal aid may be granted under what is known as 
‘exceptional case funding’; apart from where there is a wider public interest 
in designated types of inquest, such funding will only be granted if failure 
to provide legal aid would be a breach of the individual’s rights under the 
813  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 329.
814  If free legal aid is rejected, the rejection may be appealed to the Danish Board of Appeal 
         Permission within 4 weeks after the applicant having received the rejection.
815  SRF-1/2017, para. 7.5.1.
816  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 11(3) and § 16(3).
817  SRF-1/2017, para. 7.5.1.
818  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 11(3) and § 16(3).
819  SRF-1/2017, para. 6.5.1 and 7.5.1.
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European Convention or enforceable EU rights or if the risk of such a breach 
makes funding appropriate.820 
Similarly, in England & Wales, section 10 of LASPO allows the Director 
of Legal Aid Casework to make an ‘exceptional case determination’ and grant 
legal aid in a case for which it would otherwise be unavailable, if the failure 
to provide legal aid would amount to a substantial risk of breach of the rights 
within the European Convention on Human Rights or enforceable EU rights.821 
Legal aid must be granted where failure to do so will be a breach of such rights, 
and may be granted where there is a risk of such a breach. From the first years 
of operation of LASPO, it was apparent that the exceptional case criteria were 
being very strictly applied. The House of Commons Justice Committee findings 
bear repeating at some length:
The exceptional cases funding scheme was designed to ensure that the legal 
aid reforms did not put the Government in breach of its duty to protect 
individuals’ European Convention or European Union rights. During the 
passage of the Bill the scheme was described as a ‘safety net’ to compensate 
for the Government’s narrowing of legal aid. It was also presumably 
intended to further the Government’s objective of ‘targeting legal aid to 
those who need it most.’
During the passage of the Bill through Parliament, the [Ministry of Justice] 
estimated that 5,000–7,000 applications for exceptional cases funding would 
be made annually, of which around 3,700 (74%–53%) would be granted. 
The latest figures from the Legal Aid Agency, however, show that only 151 
(7.2%) of the 2,090 applications for exceptional case funding made between 
April 2013 and September 2014 were granted […]
We heard of a number of cases where, on the facts available to us, it appears 
surprising that exceptional case funding was not granted. Details of cases 
refused exceptional cases funding include an illiterate woman with learning, 
hearing and speech difficulties facing an application which would determine 
her contact with her children; parents with learning difficulties who wished 
to contest their child’s adoption but were £35 a month over the eligible 
financial limit; a woman with “modest learning difficulties” who the judge 
in the case told us was unable to deal with representations from the lawyer 
on the other side as a result of which she “now faces possibly not seeing 
her child again”; and a destitute blind man with such profound learning 
difficulties he lacked litigation capacity. In July 2014, at the beginning of our 
820  The entry into force of the rules was convoluted: s. 12A(3) Legal Aid and Coroner’s 
      Court Act (NI) 2014 substituted Article 12 in the Access to Justice Order with a new 
      Article 12A. However, Article 12 of the Order was still uncommenced in the Access to 
      Justice Order and was subsequently brought into operation on 1 April 2015 by The 
       Access to Justice (2003 Order) (Commencement No. 7, Transitional Provisions and Savings) 
        Order (Northern Ireland) 2015, at which point that part of the 2014 Act  became effective. 
821  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s.10.
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inquiry, the number of grants of exceptional funding for cases not involving 
inquests was sixteen. Julie Bishop of the Law Centres Federation, observed 
to us “Sixteen cases is not a safety net”.
The number of exceptional cases funding applications granted has been far 
below the Ministry of Justice’s estimate. We have heard details of cases where 
the refusal of exceptional cases funding to vulnerable litigants is surprising 
on the facts before us. We conclude therefore that the low number of grants 
together with the details of cases refused exceptional cases funding means 
the scheme is not acting as a safety net.822
The difficulty appears to have been the guidance issued by the Ministry rather 
than s.10 itself. The guidance at that time stated, in relation to exceptional case 
funding applications:
It would not […] be appropriate to fund simply because a risk (however 
small) exists of a breach of the relevant rights. Rather, section 10(3)(b) 
should be used in those rare cases where it cannot be said with certainty 
whether the failure to fund would amount to a breach of the rights set out at 
section10(3)(a) but the risk of breach is so substantial that it is nevertheless 
appropriate to fund in all the circumstances of the case. This may be so, for 
example, where the case law is uncertain (owing, for example, to conflicting 
judgments).823 
This interpretation was challenged by way of several applications for judicial 
review by campaigning organisations. The Court of Appeal agreed with the 
applicants and held that “the Guidance is not compatible with article 6(1) of 
the Convention and article 47 of the Charter. It impermissibly sends a clear 
signal to caseworkers and the Director that the refusal of legal aid will amount 
to a breach only in rare and extreme cases”.824 The guidance was subsequently 
amended and now offers three questions to be considered by caseworkers in 
assessing applications for exceptional funding:
1 Does the case involve the determination of civil rights or obligations?  
2. If yes, will withholding of legal aid mean the applicant will be unable to present 
his or her case effectively, or lead to an obvious unfairness in the proceedings?  
3. If yes, what are the minimum services required to meet the legal obligation 
to provide legal aid? 825
It has been suggested that the “focus remains on only granting exceptional legal 
aid where it is absolutely necessary to do so, and then only to the minimum 
extent possible”.826 However, applications and grants have increased, with recent 
822  House of Commons Justice Committee 2015, para. 30-33. 
823  As quoted in the Gudanaviciene judgment; the original guidance is no longer in publication.
824  Gudanaviciene, et al. v. The Director of Legal Aid Casework and the Lord Chancellor, 2014, para. 181.
825  Lord Chancellor’s guidance - exceptional case funding (non-inquests), p. 3.
826  Ling and Pugh 2017, para. 4.28.
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figures showing an application rate of over 2,500 per year and a grant rate of over 
50%.827
In Scotland, where defamation is excluded from scope, such cases can 
nonetheless be funded if the case has a “degree of exceptionality […] the same, 
or approximately the same, as in the facts found in cases where the Court of 
Session, the Supreme Court or the European Court of Human Rights has given 
an indication that the absence of public funding for representation violates one 
or more of the Convention rights as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998”.828
5.6 Coverage in individual cases and appeals
The scope of civil legal aid systems overall varies by jurisdiction, as has been 
seen. In addition, the scope of one particular civil legal aid certificate may differ 
from another, although the possibility of limitations on certificates is used more 
in some jurisdictions than others. There are two clear approaches; to issue all 
certificates to cover certain steps and/or amount of costs, or to issue certificates 
which implicitly cover all the steps in proceedings unless specifically limited 
when issued. As will be seen, the first approach is usual in the UK and Republic 
of Ireland; the second is typical of the Nordic countries.
A legal aid certificate in the Republic of Ireland must specify “the steps 
which the applicant is authorised to take, whether and to what extent the 
services of counsel may be engaged, whether, and to what extent, the fees or 
expenses of any expert or any witness may be paid, or such other matters as are 
deemed appropriate by the Board.”829 In other words, the Irish system issues 
certificates which are always expressly restricted, albeit potentially to the whole 
of a case. An appeal against a judgement of a trial court to the relevant appellate 
court is not usually authorised by a legal aid certificate but where a decision is 
appealed to another judge of the same court it will be covered unless explicitly 
excluded. Where it is not covered by the original certificate, legal aid for an 
appeal can only be obtained through a fresh application for legal aid.830 The 
initial certificate will not cover enforcement action relating to the proceedings 
unless an amendment is obtained to this effect.831
In Northern Ireland, a civil legal aid certificate can be limited to a period 
of time, a particular set of proceedings or to part only of the proceedings832 
and it is quite common for a certificate to be limited to obtaining a barrister’s 
opinion on the case, at which point an application can be made to extend the 
certificate if the opinion is favourable. Civil legal aid certificates cannot cover 
827  UK government legal aid statistics for April 2017 to March 2018 show a total of 2628 
         applications and a grant rate of 54%. Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Statistics quarterly, 
         England and Wales, January to March 2018.
828  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, para. 4.116.
829  Civil Legal Aid Regulations 1996, Regulation 8(3).
830  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services 2017, p. 3-12.
831  Ibidem, p. 3-13.
832  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 s. 14(4).
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both a case at first instance and appeal proceedings relating to the same case;833 
a new certificate must be sought if a party wishes to appeal the decision of the 
court of first instance. All Scottish legal aid certificates are subject to a costs 
limitation.834 Appeal proceedings are generally considered as free-standing 
matters for the purposes of legal aid and an application must be made for a 
fresh certificate. However, a first-instance legal aid certificate may be extended 
to cover an appeal which relates only to an interim matter.835
Civil legal aid certificates in England & Wales must specify a financial limit 
and may impose other conditions or limitations which must also be stated 
on the certificate.836 As a general rule they do contain limitations, typical 
restrictions being that work is limited to obtaining a barrister’s opinion on the 
merits of the case, or to a particular preliminary hearing.837 Interim appeals838 
and initial advice on appealing a final order are covered by the existing 
certificate, but pursuing an appeal by taking a barrister’s opinion or any other 
steps would require amendment of the certificate.839
Denmark stands as a good illustration of the alternative approach in the 
Nordic countries. There, “free legal aid comprises the entire case with the 
instance in question, including the procedure that is necessary in order to 
obtain a new hearing of the case before the same court and the enforcement of 
the decision”.840 If the legally aided party is wholly or partly successful at first 
instance but the other party appeals to a higher court, legal aid for the appeal 
will also be included in the original certificate.841 However, if the legally aided 
party loses the case at first instance and wishes to appeal, a new application for 
legal aid is required. Legal aid certificates may be limited, but not by restricting 
the extent to which the proceedings will be covered; rather, there may be a limit 
on the type of benefit conferred. Legislation provides that a grant of legal aid 
confers: exemption from court fees; payment of lawyers’ fees and other costs 
of the case; and exemption from paying costs to the other side if the assisted 
person loses in the proceedings.842 However, a grant of legal aid may be limited 
to just some of these benefits.843
In Norway, the situation is similar; the entire first instance case is always 
covered by a legal aid certificate and this also extends to defending the case 
upon appeal where the appeal is brought by the other party and the assisted 
person was wholly or partly successful in the lower court.844 Other appeals are 
not in scope.
833  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 15(8).
834  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, para. 6A.1.
835  Ibidem, para. 4.91.
836  The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulations 15 and 35.
837  Ling and Pugh 2017, para. 5.127.
838  Civil Finance Electronic Handbook, p. 16.
839  Ibidem, p. 152.
840  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 331(3).
841  Ibidem, § 331(4).
842  Ibidem, § 331(1).
843  Ibidem, § 331(2).
844  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 22.
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A Finnish legal aid certificate covers work on the case at all levels of the court 
hierarchy; thus, appeals are covered by the same certificate.845 However, legal 
aid is limited to 80 hours’ lawyer time in most cases and if work on the appeal 
cannot be completed within this limit, an application must be made for a time 
extension of up to 30 hours at a time. This will be granted if there are special 
reasons, taking into account the person’s need for access to justice and the 
nature and extent of the matter.846 As it is not possible in Sweden to limit legal 
aid to only one judicial instance, appeals are included as long as the time limit 
(100 hours in Sweden) is kept to or extensions obtained, as in Finland. Legal 
aid continues until a case is concluded, which presupposes that the last court 
decision has come into effect (i.e. that the time limit for appeals has passed and 
no appeal has been lodged).847 Although legal aid does not cover enforcement 
following a successful case, legislation provides that a person in receipt of legal 
aid will not be required to pay the fees usually required by the enforcement 
agency.848 
Iceland is dissimilar to the other Nordic countries and aligned with 
the UK and Republic of Ireland as regards coverage for appeals: a legal aid 
certificate does not extend beyond the court decision at first instance and a 
fresh application must be made for legal aid for an appeal.849 Whilst there is a 
statutory possibility of legal aid being limited to a certain amount of money or 
to a specialist’s report,850 this is not usual.
5.7 Time scope: emergency legal aid and retrospectivity
All civil legal aid schemes are based on an application process, the administration 
of which is not instantaneous. Circumstances therefore sometimes arise in which 
a client provides instructions so late that there is no time to wait for the legal 
aid application to be processed before steps must be taken by the lawyer to 
protect the client’s position. In the Nordic countries, this problem is addressed 
through retroactivity of legal aid but this is not a facet of the UK and Irish 
schemes; instead, they provide amended, faster processing mechanisms in such 
cases.
In an urgent civil situation in Northern Ireland, an applicant can request 
an emergency certificate.851 Such a certificate may be granted if it is in the 
interests of justice,852 but only where the Legal Services Agency finds it likely 
that the applicant will be found to be eligible for legal aid both financially and 
845  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 13 §, para. 1.
846  Ibidem, 5 §, para. 2.
847  Renfors and Arvill 2012, p. 25.
848  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 19 §.
849  Regulation 45/2008, Article 5(2)(b).
850  Lög um meðferð einkamála,1991, Article 127(1).
851  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 17.
852  Ibidem, Regulation 17(3)(b).
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on the merits of the case.853 An emergency legal aid certificate operates in the 
same way as a full certificate854 with two important exceptions: it is temporary, 
lasting only a limited period as specified on the certificate within which the 
emergency steps are able to be taken; and if the full certificate is refused or if 
an offer of legal aid is made which the applicant refuses, all the fees and costs 
incurred under the emergency certificate must be repaid to the Legal Services 
Agency.855 Ordinary legal aid certificates are not retrospective; only work 
carried out after the issue of the certificate will be paid for by the Agency.856 
However, the Director when issuing an emergency certificate has the discretion 
to specify that is has effect from an ‘appropriate’ date,857 which appears to open 
the possibility of a retrospective emergency certificate. 
Scotland also provides a scheme for emergency certificates which requires 
the solicitor to take steps to satisfy themselves that the client is likely to be 
eligible financially. In situations of ‘special urgency’, emergency work can be 
carried out to protect the client’s position without seeking advance authority 
from the Board.858 A list is provided of urgent steps which may be taken 
“actually, necessarily and reasonably […], due regard being had to economy” 
in order to protect the client’s position; in other situations approval must 
be sought before commencing work. If a client is subsequently found to be 
financially ineligible, they will be required to pay a contribution set by the 
Board towards the costs incurred.859 
A very similar emergency procedure is available in the Republic of Ireland, 
but due to the introduction of a very fast electronic process for assessing full 
applications and carrying out means assessments, the emergency procedure 
is largely obsolete.860 However, if an emergency certificate were issued in the 
Republic of Ireland, the same provision would apply that if it subsequently 
transpires that the client is not financially eligible, all costs paid out must be 
refunded by the client.861 
In England & Wales, the contract issued to providers gives delegated power 
to the solicitor to grant legal aid in emergencies in most cases (the exceptions 
include judicial review cases and those falling under the ‘exceptional cases’ 
category discussed above).862 This takes the place of emergency legal aid, as 
utilised in Scotland and Northern Ireland, although an emergency certificate 
procedure remains in place to deal with the areas which fall outside the 
devolved powers. If the full financial assessment subsequently carried out by
853  Ibidem, Regulation 17(3)(a).
854  Ibidem, Regulation 17(7).
855  Ibidem, Regulation 28. 
856  Civil Legal Services (Financial) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 14.
857  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015,  Regulation 17(5).
858  The Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 2002, Regulation 18.
859  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, para. 6.3.
860  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services 2017, p. 3-7.
861  Civil Legal Aid Regulations, 1996, Regulation 10.
862  Standard Civil Contract Specification 2013, para. 5.2 – 5.3.
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the Legal Aid Agency shows that the solicitor was wrong in assessing the client 
as financially eligible the certificate will be revoked863 and the client will have to 
repay any costs already incurred.864 
Turning to the Nordic countries, Finnish legal aid can be granted 
retrospectively,865 although as a general rule an application should be made as 
soon as possible and in any event before the case is concluded.866 In Sweden, 
work carried out before the date of the application for legal aid can be paid for 
under the legal aid bill but only to the extent that it was urgent or small-scale.867 
In Norway, an application for legal aid can even be made after the case has 
been concluded,868 although as a general rule legal aid should be sought before 
assistance is given.869 
It is not possible to wait until the conclusion of the case to apply for legal 
aid in Denmark. Whilst legal aid in that jurisdiction explicitly includes work 
reasonably carried out in order to prepare the case before the grant of legal aid 
was made,870 the legal costs to be paid are fixed by the court at the conclusion 
of proceedings871 and it is at this point that it must be clear whether the costs 
are to be paid privately or by legal aid. Thus, it is possible to apply at a late stage 
in the proceedings as long as sufficient time is allowed for the application to be 
processed before the end of the case.872 Applications can however take some 
months to be assessed and so some care is needed to ensure that the paperwork 
is in order before the costs decision by the court 
5.8 Analysis
5.8.1 International requirements
Scope restrictions, then, are a very usual method of limiting the extent and 
expense of legal aid. It is far from clear, however, that such restrictions comply 
with the international obligations of states.
The relevant international human rights provisions applying to civil legal 
aid have been set out in Chapter 4 above. It was seen that if a set of legal 
proceedings is not classified by the international treaty bodies as criminal, 
there will still be protection (albeit weaker) if the matter amounts to “the 
863  The Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, Regulation 52.
864  The Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013, Regulation 47.
865  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 13 §, para. 1.
866  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013, section 1.4.
867  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 27 §, para. 3. The Supreme Court has confirmed that this rule will 
      be strictly applied; where the reason for the delay in application was that the applicant 
         was awaiting the outcome of a claim for legal expenses insurance, the lawyer could only be  
      paid under legal aid for 6 hours’ work, as there was no particular urgency: Högsta 
      Domstolens avgörande Ö 5072-14, 2015.
868  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 6.
869  SRF-1/2017, para. 2.7.
870  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 331(3).
871  Ibidem, § 334(4).
872  Mavrogenis 2012, pp. 51 and 186.
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determination of [an applicant’s] rights and obligations in a suit at law”873 
or “the determination of his civil rights and obligations”.874 There have been 
a number of cases before the treaty bodies which explore the line between 
criminal and civil proceedings, and also consider which proceedings might not 
fall within either category. 
Chapter 3 above addressed the first of these issues and it was seen that, 
even if national law defines a set of proceedings as civil, the nature of the 
proceedings and the severity of the potential penalty may lead to the action 
being categorised as criminal with respect to the international rules which 
apply. An example which led to categorisation of a matter as civil is Aerts v. 
Belgium,875 where proceedings concerning incarceration in a mental hospital 
were held not to amount to criminal charges but “the outcome [...] was decisive 
for civil rights, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 [because] the right to 
liberty, which was [...] at stake, is a civil right.”876
In some situations, national law defines certain proceedings as falling 
outside both criminal and civil categories. Unsurprisingly, the European Court 
of Human Rights has not been prepared to find the domestic categorisation 
decisive. In Stran Greek Refineries877 the Court had an opportunity to consider 
the meaning of this part of Article 6. It held that:
the concept of ‘civil rights and obligations’ is not to be interpreted solely by 
reference to the respondent State’s domestic law. Article 6 para. 1 applies 
irrespective of the status of the parties, of the nature of the legislation which 
governs the manner in which the dispute is to be determined and of the 
character of the authority which has jurisdiction in the matter; it is enough 
that the outcome of the proceedings should be decisive for private rights 
and obligations.878
It was concluded in the matter before the Court that:
 the applicants’ right under the arbitration award was ‘pecuniary’ in nature, 
as had been their claim for damages allowed by the arbitration court. Their 
right to recover the sums awarded by the arbitration court was therefore 
a ‘civil right’ within the meaning of Article 6, whatever the nature, under 
Greek law, of the contract between the applicants and the Greek State.879
The European Court of Human Rights has however conceded that some 
categories of case fall outside the protection of Article 6 altogether, being 
classified as neither criminal nor decisive of civil rights or obligations. This is the 
873  ICCPR Art. 14(1).
874  ECHR Art. 6(1).
875  Aerts v. Belgium, 1998.
876  Ibidem, para. 59.
877  Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994.
878  Ibidem, para. 38.
879  Ibidem, para. 40.
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case with certain immigration matters as: “decisions regarding the entry, stay 
and deportation of aliens do not concern the determination of an applicant’s 
civil rights or obligations or of a criminal charge against him, within the 
meaning of Article 6 § 1.”880 Similarly, “tax disputes fall outside the scope of 
civil rights and obligations, despite the pecuniary effects which they necessarily 
produce for the taxpayer”.881
One line of caselaw882 suggested for some time that employment disputes 
concerning civil servants were not covered by Article 6. However, the Grand 
Chamber of the Court in Vilho Eskelinen & ors. v. Finland limited the exclusion 
significantly:
There can in principle be no justification for the exclusion from the guarantees of 
Article 6 of ordinary labour disputes, such as those relating to salaries, allowances 
or similar entitlements, on the basis of the special nature of relationship between 
the particular civil servant and the State in question. There will, in effect, be a 
presumption that Article 6 applies. It will be for the respondent Government to 
demonstrate, firstly, that a civil-servant applicant does not have a right of access 
to a court under national law and, secondly, that the exclusion of the rights under 
Article 6 for the civil servant is justified.883
Within the constraints set out concerning the meaning of ‘civil rights and 
obligations’, Article 6 applies. It has been seen in this chapter that states often 
limit the availability of civil legal aid by removing some categories of case 
from scope and the European Court of Human Rights has had the opportunity 
to consider the acceptability of such a mechanism in two cases concerning 
defamation proceedings in the UK. The decisions of the court indicate that it 
is not acceptable that a whole area of civil law is excluded from the remit of a 
legal aid scheme. 
In the UK, defamation proceedings were previously completely excluded 
from eligibility from legal aid, leading to several challenges before the European 
Court of Human Rights. In McVicar v. UK,884 the Court first set out the general 
principles:
880  Maaouia v. France, 2000, para. 40.
881  Ferrazzini v. Italy, 2001, para. 29.
882 See e.g. X v. UK, 1980. 
883  Vilho Eskelinen & ors. v. Finland, 2007, para. 62.
884  McVicar v. UK, 2002.
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Article 6 § 1 may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance 
of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for effective access to 
a court, either because legal representation is rendered compulsory, or by 
reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case. [...] The question 
whether or not that Article requires the provision of legal representation 
to an individual litigant will depend upon the specific circumstances of 
the case and, in particular, upon whether the individual would be able 
to present his case properly and satisfactorily without the assistance of a 
lawyer.885 
In that case, neither the fact that the defamation proceedings were held before 
a High Court judge and jury, or the fact that the burden of proof was on the 
applicant were decisive and the absence of legal aid had not resulted in a breach 
of Article 6(1).886 
McVicar left open the issue of whether legal aid could ever be required in 
defamation proceedings and the question was returned to in Steel & Morris 
v. UK.887 That case concerned defamation proceedings brought against Ms. 
Steel and Mr. Morris by McDonalds in a case which involved 40,000 pages of 
documentary evidence, 130 oral witnesses and a trial lasting 313 days. The 
judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeal together ran to over 1,100 
pages. The legal and factual complexity of the issues was considerable. 
It was acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights, following 
McVicar, that “the general nature of a defamation action, brought to protect 
an individual’s reputation, is to be distinguished, for example, from an 
application for judicial separation, which regulates the legal relationship 
between two individuals and may have serious consequences for any children 
of the family”. However, the Court noted that in this case “the applicants did 
not choose to commence defamation proceedings, but acted as defendants 
to protect their right to freedom of expression, a right accorded considerable 
importance under the Convention [and that] the financial consequences for 
the applicants of failing to verify each defamatory statement complained of 
were significant”.888 The Court considered the extent to which the applicants 
were able to bring an effective defence despite the absence of legal aid and held 
that “in an action of this complexity, neither the sporadic help given by the 
volunteer lawyers nor the extensive judicial assistance and latitude granted 
to the applicants as litigants in person was any substitute for competent and 
sustained representation by an experienced lawyer familiar with the case and 
with the law of libel”.889 Considering that the issue would have been the same if 
legal aid had in theory been available for defamation actions but refused to the 
applicants for another reason, the Court held:
885 Ibidem, para. 47 and 48.
886  Ibidem, paras 52 and 53.
887  Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2005.
888  Ibidem, para. 9.
889  Ibidem, para. 15.
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In conclusion, therefore, the Court finds that the denial of legal aid to the 
applicants deprived them of the opportunity to present their case effectively 
before the court and contributed to an unacceptable inequality of arms with 
McDonald’s. There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention.890
It is submitted that Steel & Morris establishes the principle that the blanket 
exclusion of a category of cases from eligibility for legal aid is not acceptable; if 
the complexity of the case, the importance of the issue at stake and the personal 
circumstances of the applicant are such that legal aid is required in the interests 
of a fair hearing, it must be provided.891 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
UK government settled cases which would have tested the situation with regard 
to the absence of a civil legal aid scheme in Guernsey,892 and the absence of 
legal aid for Privy Council appeals against detention pending deportation 
in Gibraltar.893 Kiraly and Squires have suggested that, for EU states, the EU 
Directive on Legal Aid also prohibits legal restrictions concerning the subject 
matter of cases which will be covered by legal aid.894 
Some jurisdictions, in addition to the shared international requirements, 
have a domestic constitutional obligation to provide legal aid in at least some 
civil cases. It can be seen from the introductory chapter to this thesis that none 
of the constitutional provisions are sufficiently specific to affect the scope of a 
civil legal aid scheme, although they may necessitate the existence of such a 
scheme. 
As has been seen above, jurisdictions often provide that exceptional cases 
of any subject category may be eligible for legal aid funding. This is sometimes 
expressly done to meet the requirements of Article 6. However, it is a 
continuing theme of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
that rights must be afforded in practice, not just in theory, and the presence of 
an exceptional cases scheme will not protect a state against a finding of con-
compliance with Article 6 if there are in practice still cases where an individual 
is refused legal aid and thus denied access to court or a fair hearing. This raises 
questions in particular about the exceptional cases scheme in England & Wales 
which has garnered much criticism as outlined above.
5.8.2 Variation in scope between advice and representation
As has been seen, the scope of legal aid in a jurisdiction often diverges between 
advice and representation. Unlike in criminal cases (see above, Chapter 3), 
in civil matters there is no specific indication from the international human 
rights bodies as to the stage of proceedings at which legal aid must be granted. 
However, it has been established that the state must provide legal assistance 
890  Ibidem, para. 18.
891  See also McBride 1998, p. 262.
892  Faulkner v. UK, 1999; a civil legal aid scheme has since been established in Guernsey.
893  Duyonov & ors. v. UK, 2001.
894  Kiraly and Squires 2011, p. 35. Denmark is not party to this Directive.
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early enough to ensure that a subsequent hearing is fair.895
Iceland is a special case within the jurisdictions under consideration because 
it does not provide legal aid for advice at all; there is thus no advice work 
in scope, whilst the scope for representation, as set out above, is relatively 
generous. Denmark also has stricter scope requirements for advice than those 
for representation, as advice cannot be obtained for commercial, debt or most 
administrative matters whilst representation is in principle available for all case 
types. In all the other jurisdictions under consideration, advice is available for 
a greater range of case types than representation, or there is no difference in 
scope for advice and representation.
In England & Wales, the scope is the same for advice and for representation, 
as both are included within ‘civil legal services’ and subject to the operation of 
LASPO Schedule 1.896 However, the included category definitions may refer to 
the stage a case has reached, which in practice excludes early advice in some 
cases whilst including the representation and incidental advice at the stage 
when proceedings are imminent (see below). 
The Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Norway have different lists 
of exclusions for advice and for representation. In Norway, on balance, the 
overlapping priority lists for advice and for representation probably result in 
slightly more generous scope for advice. Likewise in the Republic of Ireland 
the advice scheme is slightly more generous as some conveyancing advice is in 
scope. 
In Sweden, Scotland and Finland, advice is available for all questions of 
law but at the level of representation there are some scope restrictions. The 
restrictions are very minor in Finland thus creating a scheme which is more 
generous than but comparable to that in the Republic of Ireland, with very 
similar scope for advice and for representation. In Sweden and Scotland a 
significant list of matters is out of scope for representation, including (in 
Scotland) defamation, some debt matters, simple divorce and small claims and 
(in Sweden) marriage contracts and wills, some debt, property and probate 
matters and first-instance disputes on property upon relationship breakdown. 
These two schemes therefore have much more generous scope for advice than 
for representation. 
It can thus be seen that advice services are not always available for the same 
types of cases as representation work. There can be a range of reasons for such 
differential scope. Advice may be useful in legal questions which do not relate 
to a dispute, for example if a co-habiting couple want to know how their legal 
position will change if they marry, or if a consumer has been asked to sign 
a credit agreement but wants help understanding its terms. Advice without 
a view to representation may also be pertinent in a situation where the 
possible dispute resolution process is extra-judicial, for example in written 
895  Campbell & Fell v. UK, 1984, para. 107.
896  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s.8 and 9. 
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administrative procedures. In such instances, legal help with representation will 
be irrelevant and lack of availability of such assistance will not be problematic. 
Thus, some cases can without ill effect be in scope for advice but out of 
scope for representation. Equally, though, for these cases to be in scope for 
representation would not add any pressure to the legal aid system as there 
would be no take-up.
Aside from specific situations where only advice is relevant, the variation in 
scope between advice and representation may reflect government priorities on 
legal aid spending, and tactical decisions on cost effectiveness. 
The Law Society of England and Wales, commenting on the impact of the 
scope restrictions in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act has made a strong case for increasing scope at advice level, calling for the 
government to “bring early advice for housing benefit, and rent arrears and 
mortgage problems arrears back into scope of the legal aid scheme”.897 They 
point out that removing advice at the early stages of disputes can be a false 
economy: 
Legal aid is still available to defend possession proceedings but only at 
the point where loss of the home is imminent and the landlord is seeking 
an order for possession. Legal aid is not available to deal with issues such 
as rent and mortgage arrears that may ultimately result in possession 
proceedings. Some disputes could be resolved more quickly and cheaply 
if legal aid were available for early advice rather than having to wait for 
possession proceedings to be issued.898
The economic logic of this argument is compelling, but unlikely to prompt 
a change in policy. Indeed, the government in its proposals for the Act had 
anticipated the point but was not minded to act accordingly:
We recognise that there are arguments that withdrawal of legal aid for any 
issue could lead, by a chain of events, to serious consequences. But our 
consultation proposals for the future scope of legal aid focus on cases where, 
in the case at hand, there could be very serious direct consequences for the 
client. We consider that this is the appropriate way to target resources and 
do not propose to devote limited public funds to less important cases on the 
basis that they could, indirectly, lead to more serious consequences for the 
litigant.899
This statement illustrates the opposing policy view; that citizens may be able to 
resolve lesser problems themselves or obtain help from family and friends or 
community groups and thus legal aid funding should be focused on intractable 
legal problems which require intensive professional legal input. This would be 
an explanation for the situation in Denmark, for example.
897  Law Society of England and Wales 2017, p. 28.
898  Ibidem, p. 27. 
899  CP12/10, para. 4.20.
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In the relatively rare situations where legal aid is available for representation 
but not for advice, the main effect is on the timing of help. In such circumstances 
the boundary between advice and representation is unlikely to be clear-cut 
as in order to be able to represent a client in a case the lawyer will have to 
take instructions and must also advise on the case. Common sense indicates 
that this will be so, and there may well be professional duties on the lawyer to 
ensure that they give the client all the information they need to make informed 
decisions about their case, which will of course include advising them (not 
simply going ahead with representation without discussing the case and likely 
outcomes with the client).900 
5.8.3 Hidden scope restrictions: exclusion of tribunals and courts
As seen above, restrictions to the scope of legal aid take two main forms; 
restrictions by subject or restrictions by judicial venues covered. In particular, 
the systems of Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland exclude 
many tribunals which hear appeals relating to administrative decisions on 
matters including social security, care standards, immigration and asylum, 
and war pensions. Outside the administrative sphere, tribunals in these 
jurisdictions also deal with most employment cases at first instance and 
appeal. Excluding a tribunal from the scope of legal aid indirectly removes the 
corresponding subject area from scope. It is thus important not to overlook 
venue restrictions in a consideration of scope.
In addition to cases before the regular courts, Northern Ireland allows 
representation to be legally aided before the Mental Health Review Tribunal, 
Lands Tribunal for Northern Ireland, First-Tier Tribunal (certain immigration 
and nationality matters only), and the Upper Tribunal on appeal from the 
First-Tier Tribunal in the same group of cases.901 This means legal aid is not 
available for representation before the First-Tier or Upper Tribunal in any 
other type of case, thus excluding social security and child support, care 
standards and war pension matters, inter alia. There is no legal aid available for 
representation before any of the other tribunals such as the Industrial Tribunal, 
Fair Employment Tribunal, Pensions Appeal Tribunal, Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Appeal Tribunal or Special Educational Needs and Disability 
Tribunal. Advice is, however, available for matters which fall under the remit 
of these tribunals; as a result, a solicitor may under legal aid help a client 
prepare for an appeal but not arrange for her to be represented at the hearing. 
Theoretically this should not present a problem, as tribunals are intended to 
be informal and accessible to the public, but as will be seen in Chapter 8, the 
extent to which this is still true can be questioned.
900  See e.g. in England & Wales the Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct Chapter 1.
901  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, Schedule 2, para. 2.
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Similarly, Scotland includes matters relevant to all tribunals within legally aided 
advice, as all areas of Scots law are in scope at this level. ABWOR can cover 
cases before the Employment Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Tribunal, 
Mental Health Tribunal, Upper Tribunal for appeals against administrative 
decisions, and appeals to the first-tier or Upper Tribunal against decisions of 
the Pensions Regulator. Some tribunals are also in scope for representation, 
notably the Lands Tribunal for Scotland, Employment Appeal Tribunal and 
Upper Tribunal for Scotland. However, some tribunals are not covered beyond 
advice, including the Social Security and Child Support Tribunal, and many 
cases before the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland (with jurisdiction over some 
housing, property and tax issues). In these tribunals, as a result, applicants will 
not be able to obtain assistance at court paid for by the state. 
In the Republic of Ireland, the only tribunal covered by legal aid at the 
level of representation is the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. Most other tribunals 
have been replaced by specialist courts or other boards, which are not in 
scope for representation. Thus, whilst advice may be obtained on employment 
law matters, representation is not available before the Labour Court (or, for 
that matter, the Workplace Relations Commission which decides labour 
disputes at first instance). In social security disputes, advice can be sought 
but representation is not available before the Social Welfare Appeals Office. A 
further appeal on a point of law can be brought to the High Court and a social 
security case may therefore be within scope at this stage.
England & Wales has taken a cautious three-stage approach: specifying the 
precise actions which are to be included within the scope of civil legal aid; 
excluding some case types which may overlap with the included categories; and 
finally, excluding all advocacy unless it is in specified courts and tribunals. As 
is the case for much of the legislation, the provisions are extremely detailed, 
resulting in long lists of precise situations. For example, advocacy is in scope 
“in proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal under (a) section 40A of the British 
Nationality Act 1981, or (b) regulation 26 of the Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006, but only to the extent that the proceedings 
concern contravention of the Equality Act 2010”.902 The meticulous nature of 
the categorisation has the effect of specifying scope by reference to each and 
every possible action, once all three stages of the scope test are applied. This is 
qualitatively different to the use of venues as a selection tool for deciding scope 
over a broad range of cases; the English & Welsh approach uses the forum as 
one of the identification markers to ensure that the particular case is correctly 
allocated as in or out of scope.
In the Nordic countries, public funding for administrative cases is also 
limited, but generally through different mechanisms. In Denmark, though, 
exclusion at the advice stage of cases before an administrative board of appeal 
or private complaints board means that most administrative cases are out of 
902  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Schedule 1, Part 3, para. 12.
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scope. This technique of excluding by forum is similar to the approach seen 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and also to Iceland, where legal aid only 
applies to court cases, and consideration is given to whether the individual has 
tried to resolve the matter through one of the many administrative committees 
available for resolution of administrative disputes.903 
In Finland, administrative courts generally decide cases on the papers and 
thus legal aid for representation is a moot issue in many situations, although 
hypothetically in scope. In cases such as child protection, compulsory mental 
health treatment, asylum and residence permit cases there may more often be 
hearings, which would be covered by legal aid. In Sweden, whilst administrative 
matters are theoretically in scope, decisions are generally made on the papers 
as in Finland, and the non-binding guidance issued suggests that they will 
generally not qualify under the criteria that there should be a ‘need’ for legal 
representation.904 This is said to be due to the nature of such cases and the duty 
of the Administrative Courts to ensure the cases have been fully investigated 
and properly prepared by the authorities,905 which also applies in Finland.906 
In the words of the relevant online handbook, “in the General Administrative 
Court legal aid is currently rare”.907 Decided cases in the collection published by 
the National Courts Administration include a decision that where negotiations 
with social services about the care of a child were ongoing, there was no need 
for a legal representative.908 However, detailed guidance is given on the types 
of cases before the Administrative Court which have been accepted as needing 
representation, for example defending a high value claim for repayment to the 
National Insurance office.909 Legal aid has also been granted in a complex case 
where repayment was sought of an alleged overpayment of a large sum of social 
security benefit.910 
Norway does not explicitly limit the courts or tribunals before which 
representation can be funded. However, the specificity of the matters which are 
in scope includes, in several cases, reference to the legislation under which the 
case must fall, which implicitly indicates the use of certain courts.
903  Regulation 45/2008, Article 5(2)(b).
904  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 7.2.1.
905  The result being that most indviduals are unrepresented before the Administrative Court, 
      which anecdotally may in fact be problematic for the proper presentation of their case.
906  See further details in section 8.3.3.2 below.
907  Kanslihandbok allmän förvaltningsdomstol, para. 4.2.1. 
908  Rättshjälpsnämnden 69-1999.
909  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 7.4, referring case Rättshjälpsnämnden 33-2009.
910  Rättshjälpsnämnden 405-1998.
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5.8.4 Scope restrictions in family cases and extra-judicial resolution   
                mechanisms
As will be seen in Chapter 8 below, many jurisdictions have structures in 
place to encourage the resolution of family cases without the need for court 
involvement. The scope of legal aid in family matters might be expected 
to harmonise with the extent to which legal proceedings are the norm for 
resolving family difficulties. However, this is not always the case. It is the 
Nordic countries, particularly Sweden and Denmark, but to a lesser extent 
Norway and Finland, which rely on non-court dispute resolution processes 
after relationship breakdown, yet in all these jurisdictions legal aid is available 
for advice and representation for family matters to some extent. In Denmark 
and Finland, all family matters can be the subject of legally aided advice and 
representation, despite the existence of extra-judicial dispute mechanisms for 
family cases in these jurisdictions. 
Norway requires couples to undergo mediation before commencing court 
proceedings and provides an administrative alternative to court resolution 
of disputes if the parties choose this route. Legal aid is also available for 
financial settlements on divorce and issues relating to children such as parental 
responsibility, residence of children and access disputes.
In Sweden, there is good coordination between legal aid and family dispute 
resolution procedures. Legal aid is not available for the division of property 
after relationship breakdown, as this is not a matter for the courts; rather, a 
‘division of property official’ makes an initial assessment. Appeals to court 
against this division may qualify for legal aid. Divorce and child support 
matters are only in scope for legal aid if there are special circumstances which, 
as seen above, are relatively broadly interpreted in family cases. Thus, legal aid 
is likely to be available for disputes which cannot be resolved by the division of 
property official.
Harmonisation is much less in evidence in England & Wales, where there is 
a significant mismatch between the availability of legal aid and the usual modes 
of dispute resolution. The government dramatically reduced the availability of 
legal aid for family law matters with the introduction of LASPO. Public law 
matters, where the state is attempting child protection measures, are still in 
scope as are private law cases where domestic violence is a factor, but all other 
private law family cases are no longer covered for legal aid at the level of advice 
or representation. Advice connected with mediation is still in scope, in line 
with the government’s stated aim to encourage resolution of family matters 
outside court, in particular through the use of mediation.911 Unfortunately, this 
policy appears to have been unsuccessful, as reported by the Law Society:
911  CP12/10, para. 4.69. 
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The government predicted the number of family mediations would increase 
as families tried to resolve their problems outside of court. They predicted 
an increase of 9,000 mediation assessments and 10,000 mediation cases 
for the year 2013-14. There was actually a decrease of 17,246 or 56% in 
mediation assessments in the year after the reforms. In addition, the number 
of mediation cases starting fell by 5,177 cases, or 38% in the same period.
We believe that this has a simple explanation: the government failed to take 
account of the fact that solicitors providing early advice were a significant 
source of referrals to mediation, and that removing access to early advice 
from a solicitor would, therefore, adversely affect uptake of mediation.
We believe that without early advice from a solicitor, many people do not 
know that the option of mediation exists, or how to access it.912
The outcome has therefore been that those with family law disputes in England 
& Wales continue to seek resolutions through court proceedings, but without 
legal aid, causing an increase in litigants in person and damaging access to 
justice and the prospects of a fair hearing. 
5.9 Rationales for scope limitation
It has been seen that there are a number of mechanisms used for reducing 
the scope of legal aid, which may or may not comply with the international 
obligations of a state and may or may not appear logical in light of the other 
justice arrangements in a jurisdiction. Whatever the method used, the decision 
on which actual case types are to be covered by legal aid is a reflection of the 
policy principles underlying that legal aid scheme. Each jurisdiction decides 
which cases it thinks are worth prioritising over others and therefore which 
to fund when there is a limit to how many cases can be afforded. Approaches 
differ between jurisdictions, but some common factors and patterns can be 
identified which appear to have varying force in different legal aid schemes. 
The UK government set out their policy on criteria relevant to scope in the 
consultation document which preceded LASPO. This indicates many, but not 
all, of the patterns which can be seen in the selection of cases for funding in all 
the jurisdictions under comparison:
The need to reduce public spending, and provide access to public funding 
for those who need it most, has required some very difficult choices to be 
made about where publicly funded legal assistance is no longer affordable. 
In making these proposals, we have applied the factors we set out [above] to 
determine whether funding is justified:
912  Law Society of England and Wales 2017, p. 20. 
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• the objective importance of the issue, taking into account the matters at 
stake; 
• the litigant’s ability to present their own case; 
• the availability of alternative sources of funding; and 
• the availability of other routes to resolution, and the advice and assistance 
available to individuals to help them achieve a resolution, including the 
extent to which the individual could be expected to work at resolving the 
issue themselves.913
The last three points all go to the issue of whether the client needs legal aid 
or whether they can manage without, either because of the availability of 
other help or because no help is needed. Clear and explicit motivations for 
choices on scope thus include coverage of areas of particular importance to the 
client and exclusion on the basis that legal assistance is not needed. However 
it is suggested that other possible rationales can also be detected from the 
commonly excluded case categories and the express justifications given by 
other governments for their policy on scope. These include removal from scope 
on grounds of public policy and refusal to pay for matters which arise through 
the fault or choice of the individual.
Maybe the most common starting point for exclusion from scope is to 
identify cases which the individual should be able to manage without formal 
legal assistance. This is the basis of the current legal aid scheme in Sweden, 
where the principle is expressed as a primary consideration in the legislation.914 
The effect on scope is explained thus:
Legal assistance should in principle be available in any legal matter, whether 
dealt with by a court, administrative authority or relating to legal advice 
unconnected with a public procedure. With this point of departure, legal aid 
has a very wide field of application. Certain restrictions have therefore been 
made in order to concentrate society’s resources on the areas where the need 
is greatest.915
The common exclusion of small claims cases and matters concerning 
straightforward documentation also point to this motivation, as does the non-
inclusion of representation before tribunals in the UK. 
In Finland, the issue of what an individual can be expected to achieve 
unrepresented was also considered in the preparation of legal aid legislation, 
but the conclusion reached was that, whilst parties themselves can manage 
simple legal matters, court processes have developed in such a way that the 
responsibility for collating and presenting evidence lies with the parties, and 
qualified legal assistance is needed.916 As has been seen, very few types of 
matter are excluded from legal aid in Finland, as a consequence. 
913  CP12/10, para. 4.146.
914  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 7 §.
915  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 10.
916  RP 82/2001 p. 43.
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A related issue is that some problems exist on the periphery of what can be 
considered ‘legal’. Debt and social security issues are typical examples of 
problems which can be treated as legal or non-legal issues. Unsurprisingly, 
governments are often keen to classify these issues as non-legal to avoid 
spending on legal aid, whilst lawyers practising in the fields, and other 
parties,917 point to complex legislation, difficult to navigate administration and 
the potential for difficult appeals to argue that legally experienced advisers are 
needed.
In Scotland, the dividing line between legal and not legal is very significant 
because all matters of Scots law are in scope for legally aided advice. However, 
not all matters on which a client asks advice of a lawyer are necessarily legal 
questions and a lawyer must take care only to provide legally aided advice and 
assistance on truly legal issues. The Scottish Legal Aid Board online handbook 
for civil legal aid lists the types of matters which will be accepted as legal and 
about which a solicitor can therefore definitely give advice under civil Advice 
and Assistance,918 but “the fact that your client’s problem is not specifically 
shown on the list of approved subject matters does not necessarily mean that 
you cannot give them advice and assistance”.919 The handbook provides a 
shortcut so that lawyers do not need to consider whether a subject is legal if it 
is on the pre-approved list; if it is not, the lawyer takes the risk that the Legal 
Aid Board will not approve the claim for payment if they do not agree with 
the lawyer’s assessment that the matter was legal. In an interesting example of 
cooperation between the legal professional body and the legal aid authority, 
suggestions for additional approved categories can be made directly to the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board or to the Law Society of Scotland, who have consulted 
with the Board on the list.920 
Even within systems where not all legal matters are within scope, the 
question of whether a matter is legal can be an important justification for policy 
on scope. This was a common theme in the preparatory work for LASPO:
The Government is of the view that very significant sums are currently 
spent on providing legal advice for issues where individuals are in fact 
looking for practical advice rather than the specific professional expertise 
offered by a lawyer. We have explored whether there are alternative forms 
of advice or assistance available to help individuals to resolve their issues, 
instead of seeking expensive legal advice, which may not be needed. For 
example, several voluntary sector organisations offer advice on welfare 
benefits, housing and other benefits. Where there are alternative forms of 
advice and assistance in a particular area of law and there is no reason to 
believe that these will cease to be available, we consider that it is proper to 
917  Bach Commission 2017, p. 29. 
918  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, para. 1.18.
919  Ibidem, para. 1.17.
920  Ibidem, para. 1.15.
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take them into account in deciding how high a priority should be accorded 
to the provision of publicly funded legal advice and representation in that 
area of law.921
This is an interesting paragraph because it ultimately categorises the subjects 
under discussion as ‘areas of law’ but still concludes that legal advice is not 
needed. It can also be seen that the fact that advice might be available from 
other sources was seen as highly relevant. This can again be related to the 
question of whether there is a need for legal aid. Jurisdictions in which legal 
expenses insurance play an important role, such as Sweden, use the same 
concept to refuse legal aid for any case where the individual has insurance; legal 
aid is not needed if the case can be funded another way.
Reference is made in several jurisdictions to the importance of the matter 
for the client, which is also an element of merits testing in individual cases, 
as will be seen in Chapter 6. Significance to the client was seen in the listed 
criteria in England & Wales, and also featured in two recent reviews of Access 
to Justice in Northern Ireland. The first, reporting in 2011, considered the 
scope of civil legal aid from a wide-ranging perspective. Practical difficulties 
for clients and courts, policy on appropriate methods of dispute resolution and 
the significance of the subject matter for the individual were all considered 
relevant. In respect of private law family proceedings, for example, the review 
concluded:
There is a strong public policy argument in favour of helping ensure that, 
once [relationship] breakdown has occurred, it is managed in a way that 
minimises conflict and produces sustainable solutions benefiting both 
parties and, more importantly, any children. We believe that, so long 
as the current legal framework applies, this is most likely to be achieved 
through the availability of legal advice, negotiation between solicitors and, 
if needed, mediation or collaborative intervention, with recourse to court if 
that is the only way of securing a resolution. This increases the likelihood 
of domestic violence or child protection issues being identified at an early 
stage. Also, from our own observations in court, it was apparent to us that 
with highly congested lists, the judges’ ability to manage the business and 
encourage agreed solutions was greatly enhanced where the parties were 
legally represented. However, while we recommend that private family law 
should remain within scope for the financially eligible, legal aid needs to 
be structured in a way that facilitates resolution but does not involve the 
taxpayer in funding parties to use the courts as a means of perpetuating and 
exacerbating disputes.922
Within a different subject area, the review concluded that most money claims 
should be removed from scope, but this proposal had not yet been implemented 
at the time that the second Access to Justice review reported. By this point, in 
921  CP12/10, para. 4.26.
922  Access to Justice Review Northern Ireland, 2011, para. 5.80.
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2015, the need to save money had become more urgent, the proposals with 
regard to scope were hardening and it was recommended that the “scope of 
civil legal aid should in future be defined by what remains in scope, not what is 
excluded”,923 i.e. an approach similar to that in Norway and in England & Wales. 
Further, “the categories of non family cases retained within scope should reflect 
priorities based on their constitutional significance, the importance of the 
proceedings to the client or the need to protect children or vulnerable adults”.924 
There was also an interesting suggestion of a possible change in approach to the 
identification of areas in scope:
Historically, there has always been a tendency for legal aid and justice 
policy to consider priorities according to the nature of the case or type 
of procedure involved. Increasingly, justice issues are being considered 
according to the needs of particular clients or client groups.925
This possibility, of defining qualifying groups of clients rather than subjects, has 
been considered and rejected by the Norwegian government.926 The emphasis 
there is slightly different as it is the overall purpose of the legal aid system 
which is called upon to assist in choosing subject areas to be in scope. When 
considering possible changes to the legal aid scheme (which in the end were not 
implemented), the government commented in 2009 that they were sympathetic 
to calls for advice under legal aid to be extended to cover all case types. 
However, with regard to assistance beyond advice it was felt that universal 
coverage would unacceptably increase costs and that this would “neither be a 
proper use of public resources nor in accordance with the principle that legal 
aid should be concentrated on matters of great importance for the welfare of 
the individual”.927 In developing a new scheme, however, consideration could 
be given to expanding the areas within scope, and “particular consideration 
should be given to the principle that the legal aid scheme should be a social 
support scheme, and to the role of the legal aid scheme in the fight against 
poverty”.928
Some commonly excluded areas of law cannot be explained according to 
these theories of importance to the individual and need for legal assistance only 
available through legal aid. In particular the categories of business and land 
disputes and bankruptcy are ones where the consequences for an individual 
are likely to be considerable, the law may be complex and there is unlikely 
to be free assistance available from other sources. Whilst at first it might be 
thought that individuals with these problems (or at least the first) should be 
able to pay privately for legal assistance, this is not necessarily the case. In any 
923  Stutt 2015, p. 17. 
924  Ibidem.
925  Ibidem, p. 246, para. 26.18.
926  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009), para. 9.3.3.8. 
927  Ibidem, para. 9.3.1. 
928  Ibidem.
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event, the financial eligibility criteria for legal aid will ensure that only those of 
sufficiently low means will qualify for assistance. Whilst it is possible to see a 
connection with the Norwegian focus on legal aid as a social welfare scheme, 
the suspicion regarding the other jurisdictions excluding these and similar 
matters is that there are felt to be public policy reasons against spending money 
on legal aid for such cases. It could well be unpopular with the public to spend 
taxpayers’ money on these case types. The Icelandic exclusion of business 
disputes caused by the actions or inaction of the legal aid applicant themselves 
may be an example of such an approach.
It might be possible to make a case for limiting legal aid to cases where the 
individual has no choice but to be involved in legal proceedings. The European 
Court of Human Rights in Steel & Morris v. UK found, as seen above, that it was 
relevant that the parties did not choose to bring proceedings, but had to engage 
in proceedings brought against them in defence of their right to freedom of 
expression.929 This theory is supported by the UK government statement 
that “in many matters, we would expect individuals to work to resolve their 
own problems, rather than resorting to litigation at a significant cost to the 
taxpayer”.930 According to such logic, defending proceedings would be covered, 
as would taking proceedings which were essential, such as proceedings to 
gain contact with children or to force a landlord to make essential repairs to 
a rented home. This would explain the exclusion of conveyancing (there is 
no obligation to buy or sell a house) and the writing of wills (which is not 
mandated). However, it is far from a complete explanation and would not, for 
example, explain a bar on probate work, which must be carried out by someone 
after a death. Furthermore, the social and financial value of such a choice is 
questionable; if the individual is forced to take action unassisted in order to 
put his everyday affairs in order, he may make mistakes which could lead to an 
absolute need for more expensive legal proceedings later. Much work which is 
currently excluded would doubtless need to be included if this were the guiding 
principle, suggesting that although this approach may have some influence on 
choices of scope, it is not an overriding theme. 
Indications can also be found that there is a moral element in some 
decisions on scope. These are most explicit in the proposals leading to LASPO. 
Inter alia, the UK government argued:
We have also considered the extent to which the individual’s personal 
choices have played a part in the issue arising and the extent to which they 
might be expected to resolve it themselves. The Government recognises that 
there are many types of dispute where individuals may need to rely on legal 
aid to assist them in matters where external factors beyond their control 
have affected their lives. For example, an individual who has been detained 
because of their mental health may wish to challenge matters relating to 
their detention. 
929  Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2005.
930  CP12/10, para. 4.3.
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However, there is a range of other cases which can very often result from 
a litigant’s own decisions in their personal life, for example, immigration 
cases resulting from decisions about living, studying or working in the 
United Kingdom. Where the issue is one which arises from the litigant’s 
own personal choices, we are less likely to consider that these cases concern 
issues of the highest importance.931 
The element of moral judgment discernible in the arguments should have 
no place in the selection of cases, according to international human rights 
obligations described above. In addition, the arguments are inconsistent as 
many of the areas removed from scope such as the social welfare law categories 
cannot be argued to have arisen due to the individual’s choices, unless the need 
to rely on the state for an income and for other support is seen as a failure 
rather than as misfortune. It is also surprising to conflate the issue of individual 
choice with the importance of an issue; having a family is for most a choice, but 
resulting legal difficulties are generally agreed to be of very high importance.
5.10 Conclusions
As has been discussed at various points in this thesis already, one of the main 
objectives of a legal aid scheme is to limit public expenditure, whilst ensuring 
an appropriate and acceptable measure of access to justice for the indigent. 
This is not an easy balancing act, and how it is performed depends on political 
and public policy considerations. As expressed by the second Northern Ireland 
Access to Justice Review, “reducing the scope of legal aid is an effective way to 
make savings but can severely reduce access”.932 Finland is the only one of the 
jurisdictions under consideration which does not use scope as a significant cost 
limiter; all the others, to varying degrees, delimit the reach and therefore cost 
of legal aid by restricting scope. It has been seen that there are various methods 
for achieving this, in organisational terms. The most common is the operation 
of an exclusion system whereby all cases are in scope unless barred; exclusion is 
then generally by case type. Alternatively, an arrangement can be made where 
cases are only in scope if positively identified by means of a list of included case 
types or venues. In several jurisdiction venues are included and then subject 
areas excluded. It is also possible to combine all the elements, as in England & 
Wales, where there are included case types, excluded case types, excluded work 
types (advocacy) and included venues.
The political motivation behind the choice of subjects to be excluded from 
scope is not always clearly explained or justified, although some indications 
have been presented in this chapter. To be in line with the spirit of international 
human rights obligations, rationales should focus on the need for the individual 
to have assistance in order for the hearing to be fair, as confirmed in McVicar 
931  Ibidem, para. 4.18 and 4.19.
932  Stutt 2015, p. 10. 
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v. UK.933 Even backed by appropriate reasoning, though, absolute exclusion 
of any category (other than tax or some aspects of immigration status) is not 
compliant with Article 6 unless a functioning system for exceptional cases in in 
place, as it may be characteristics of the individual, rather than the case type, 
which makes assistance necessary. The suggestion in Northern Ireland that 
identifying groups who are likely to need help rather than subjects with which 
it will be needed may provide better targeting in accordance with the approach 
of the European Court of Human Rights. This could be a good thing for proper 
access to justice and might improve the likelihood of a fair hearing in all civil 
matters rather than just limited types selected by government.
Case study 3:
John in Wales, Jan in Sweden and Jonas in Denmark were all wrongly accused of 
misconduct at work and summarily dismissed a month ago, possibly unlawfully. The 
financial problems caused by the loss of work have led them into debt and the landlord is 
now threatening possession proceedings if the rent is not paid soon. The stress has caused 
arguments at home and the wives of all three men have moved out, taking the children 
with them and so far refusing contact. There is a need for help in a classic ‘bundle’ of 
problems: employment, social security, debt, housing and family. 
Wales – John
As his home is at risk, John 
will be able to obtain some 
publicly funded assistance 
with his debt problems, by 
contacting the government 
C i v i l  L e g a l  A d v i c e 
telephone helpline.934 He is 
unlikely to be able to obtain 
further assistance with debt 
given his circumstances 
as a non-homeowner. If 
his landlord actually takes 
possession proceedings, 
these are then in-scope 
h o u s i n g  p r o c e e d i n g s 
but  ear l ier  attempts  to 
resolve or negotiate would 
n o t  b e  f u n d e d .  Jo h n’s 
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s s u e s 
are out of scope unless, 
h a v i n g  a p p e a l e d  t o  a 
tribunal without advice 
or assistance, he appeals 
f u r t h e r  t o  t h e  Up p e r 
Tribunal. No legally aided 
advice or representation 
will be available for his 
employment case or for his 
family problems. 
Sweden – Jan
Jan can obtain legal advice 
of up to 2 hours on all of 
his matters from a lawyer, 
but he will have to pay for 
this. Up to half the fee will 
be paid by legal aid if he is 
financially eligible, but at 
least half will be expected 
from him unless the lawyer 
waives this part of the fee. If 
the problems continue and 
he needs representation, 
debt restructuring and the 
division of the property 
if he and his wife divorce 
wi l l  not  be  el ig ible  for 
legal aid. His employment, 
social security and housing 
matters, and family disputes 
regarding  the  chi ldren 
will be in scope. If he is 
unhappy with the decision 
of the division of property 
official, legal aid to appeal 
to court will also be within 
scope. 
Denmark – Jonas
Advice under legal aid is 
available to Jonas on his 
employment, housing and 
family matters, if he can 
f ind a  lawyer  prepared 
to act or has access to a 
private legal aid institution. 
His social security should 
be dealt with by the local 
authority and thus is not 
i n c l u d e d  i n  s c o p e  f o r 
advice unless he wishes 
to make a complaint; his 
debt  problems are  a lso 
out of scope for legal ly 
aided advice. If he cannot 
resolve his problems and 
t h e y  e s c a l a t e  t o  l e g a l 
proceedings, all the aspects 
will  be in scope, except 
any debt matters which are 
dealt with as small claims. 
Whether  he  is  ac tual ly 
granted legal aid will of 
course depend on satisfying 
the merits and means tests.
933  McVicar v. UK, 2002.
934  See Chapter 4.
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6. Chapter 6: Merits criteria for grants of civil legal  
  aid
6.1 Introduction935
The previous chapter examined the restriction of civil legal aid to certain types 
of case, varying according to jurisdiction. Even within eligible case types, 
there is very often an additional prerequisite for an administrative decision to 
grant legal aid, in the form of a merits test. These also vary considerably in 
the jurisdictions under consideration, both in type and extent. As will be seen, 
Finland and Norway apply modest requirements regarding the merits of cases 
eligible for legal aid funding; at the other end of the scale, England & Wales 
applies an extensive and complex set of overlapping tests.
After a consideration of the overall extent of merits testing in each 
jurisdiction, the various types of test applied will be considered in turn: 
probabilis causa litigandi; reasonableness of being involved in proceedings or 
of the state funding such proceedings; comparison with a reasonable privately 
paying individual; prospects of success; proportionality of cost and benefit; 
the need for representation; the significance of the matter for the individual 
making the application for legal aid and a few lesser-used additional tests. 
Whilst merits tests are almost universal, legitimate questions can be 
asked about the acceptability of such tests. Practical problems arise from the 
element of prediction involved in many merits tests and there are also valid 
concerns as to the extent merits testing may affect the realisation of the right 
to a fair hearing. These and other implications will be considered alongside an 
examination of the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights.
935  This chapter is based in part on the author’s article Barlow 2017c.
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6.2 Merits tests for civil legal aid
6.2.1 Extent of use
Within our group of jurisdictions, Finland places least reliance on merits 
assessment in deciding applications for civil legal aid. As has been seen in 
previous chapters, the Finnish legal aid scheme has considerable breadth of 
purpose, being intended to provide expert assistance to those who cannot 
otherwise afford the help needed in a legal matter.936 Legal aid is assessed 
by lawyers at the Legal Aid Offices and in in-scope matters will generally be 
provided to financially eligible persons regardless of the merits of their case. 
The only caveat is that assistance will not be provided if: the matter is of minor 
importance to the applicant; it would be manifestly pointless in proportion 
to the benefit that would ensue to the applicant; pleading the case would 
constitute an abuse of process; or the matter is based on an assigned right and 
there is reason to believe that the purpose of the assignment was to receive 
legal aid.937 Unlike in other jurisdictions, no additional guidance is provided 
by the Ministry of Justice and no secondary legislation contains any merits 
tests. However, the handbook described in earlier chapters, designed to assist 
consistency of application of the law, suggests an agreed interpretation, arising 
from practice, of the relevant paragraphs.938 
The Norwegian approach to merits in civil legal aid cases is also minimal, in 
comparison with the other jurisdictions. However, the explanation of purpose 
in the Norwegian Legal Aid Act, unlike that in Finland, includes an element 
of merits assessment; legal aid is available “to meet a need for legal aid that 
is of great importance to [applicants’] persons and their welfare”.939 The test 
of ‘great importance’ is not an assessment which is left to the decision-maker 
in each case (the County Governor or court, see Chapter 4 above); rather, 
the legislation itself clarifies which types of cases are to be deemed important 
enough. The majority of merits testing is thus delivered through the subject 
limitations described above in Chapter 5, and there is no additional merits 
testing in non-means tested priority cases (for which legal aid decisions are 
made by the courts). In other cases some merits testing is required as part of 
the administrative decision by the County Governor as legal aid can only be 
granted in non-priority cases where the matter “seen from an objective point 
of view is especially pressing for the applicant”,940 and in means-tested priority 
or non-priority representation (rather than advice) cases there is an additional 
test that it must not be unreasonable for assistance to be paid for from public 
funds.941 The Ministry of Justice Circular clarifies that the statutory explanation 
936  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 1 §, para. 1.
937  Ibidem, 7 §.
938  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013, section 2.2.2.
939  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 1.
940  Ibidem, § 11(3) (advice) and § 16(3) (representation).
941  Ibidem, § 16(5).
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of purpose provision is to be used as an interpretative guide in the application 
of the Act.942 
The legal aid scheme in Iceland is, as seen in earlier chapters, established by 
the Act on Civil Procedure.943 This provides that legal aid shall be granted if the 
applicant has sufficient reason to initiate proceedings or defend himself in civil 
proceedings in court in Iceland and either: the applicant‘s financial situation 
is such that he could not afford to defend his interests and the case is of such 
a nature that it is considered appropriate that legal aid in the case would be 
financed by public funds; or the outcome of the case would have great general 
significance or matter greatly to the employment, social status or other personal 
status of the applicant.944 In the latter category, the economic resources of the 
legal aid applicant are not relevant. Under statutory powers contained in the 
Act, the Minister has issued a Regulation945 which provides further structure to 
the decision-making process. The Regulation augments the statute by adding 
some scope restrictions, as described in Chapter 5 above, and also substantially 
expands the merits test. 
Under the Regulation, the Icelandic Legal Aid Committee in deciding an 
application is to have regard to: whether the nature of the case is such that it 
is acceptable for it to be paid for by public funds; whether it is clear enough 
that the case is necessary and at the appropriate point to be brought before 
the courts; whether the case seems to be likely to succeed at court; and 
whether there is a sufficiently similar case already going through the courts, 
the outcome of which should be awaited before granting legal aid in the 
current case.946 The first element, that it is acceptable for the case to be publicly 
funded, includes elements of scope discussed in the preceding chapter, but 
also excludes cases where the dispute concerns insignificant interests and the 
costs are disproportionate to the likely benefit. Furthermore, the application 
will be refused if there are serious evidential problems arising from the gross 
negligence of the applicant. The factors are to be looked at overall, i.e. it is not 
necessary for all the conditions to be met, if the Committee decides that overall 
the criteria are satisfied. No guidance is issued on the interpretation of the Act 
and Regulation.
The primary merits criteria governing legal aid for civil representation in 
Sweden are that the applicant has a need for a legal representative which cannot 
be met in another way947 and that it is reasonable for the state to pay the legal 
costs, having regard to the type, importance, value and other circumstances of 
the case.948 Certain types of case are only eligible for a grant of legal aid if there 
942  SRF-1/2017, para 2.1.
943  Lög um meðferð einkamála, 1991, Chapter 20. 
944  Ibidem, Article 126. 
945  Regulation 45/2008.
946  Ibidem, Regulation 5.
947  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 7 §.
948  Ibidem, 8 §.
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are special reasons, as described in the preceding chapter.949 In addition, legal 
aid will not be granted if the matter can wait until the outcome of a similar case 
currently going through the courts or if the claim relates to rights which have 
been transferred to the legal aid applicant where the transfer appears to have 
been for the purpose of obtaining eligibility for legal aid.950 These criteria apply 
equally to all decisions whether being taken by the courts or by the Legal Aid 
Authority. 
In Denmark, three categories of civil case are set out, each with their own 
merits criteria. Firstly, there are certain categories of case for which legal aid 
will be granted or refused by the court dealing with the substantive matter.951 
Legal aid for these cannot be granted if “it is obvious that the applicant will 
not succeed in the case”.952 In all other cases, legal aid applications are to be 
decided by the Minister of Justice (in practice the Legal Aid Office within the 
Department of Civil Affairs) and legal aid will be granted if “the applicant 
is deemed to have reasonable grounds to litigate”.953 There is additionally a 
possibility of legal aid for exceptional cases where there are special reasons.954 
Scotland applies a merits test which is expressed relatively simply in 
the primary legislation. In order for an application for civil legal aid to be 
successful, the Scottish Legal Aid Board must be satisfied that the applicant 
has probabilis causa litigandi and that it is reasonable in the particular 
circumstances of the case that they should receive legal aid.955 The primary 
legislation itself does not provide a definition of either probabilis causa 
litigandi or ‘reasonable’ and there are no pieces of secondary legislation 
setting out further detail on the meanings of the terms or how they should 
be applied. However, the Scottish Legal Aid Board publishes guidance on 
their interpretation of the terms in the online handbook for practitioners. An 
Independent Strategic Review commissioned by the government recommended 
in 2018 that the merits test should be subject to Ministerial approval, codified 
and regularly updated;956 for the present, however, the interpretation which 
provides the detail for the test is set by the decision-maker, the Scottish Legal 
Aid Board, itself.
The civil legal aid scheme in Northern Ireland applies a similar, but slightly 
extended, merits test to that in Scotland. The statutory provision states that 
legal aid may be granted where there are “reasonable grounds for taking, 
defending or being a party to the proceedings”.957 Furthermore, legal aid may be 
949  Ibidem, 11 §. Examples include divorce and ancillary matters and child maintenance.
950  Ibidem, 10 §
951  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 327(1), (2),(3) and (5).
952  Ibidem, § 327(4).
953  Ibidem, § 328.
954  Ibidem, § 329.
955  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, section 14.
956  Evans 2018, p. 51.
957  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 37(1)(b) 
     (Lower Court representation) and 43(1)(a) (Higher Court representation).
197
refused if it would be unreasonable to grant a certificate958 or, in Lower Court 
proceedings, if “only a trivial advantage would be gained”959 or if the matter 
is so simple that a lawyer would not ordinarily be employed.960 The test is 
administered by the Northern Ireland Legal Services Agency, applying binding 
guidance issued by the Department of Justice. 
In civil cases in the Republic of Ireland, the Legal Aid Act sets out three 
tests which must be satisfied for legal aid or legal advice to be granted: an 
overarching principle test, a means test and a merits test. At either advice or 
representation level the overarching principle test states that legal aid can 
only be granted if a ‘reasonable privately paying individual’ test is satisfied.961 
In respect of representation it must be shown in addition, inter alia, that the 
applicant has as a matter of law reasonable grounds for being a party to the 
proceedings; that the applicant is reasonably likely to be successful in the 
proceedings, assuming that the facts put forward by him or her in relation to 
the proceedings are proved before the court or tribunal concerned,962 and that 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case963 (including the probable 
cost to the Board, measured against the likely benefit to the applicant) it is 
reasonable to grant legal aid.964
The merits test for civil legal aid in England & Wales deserves special 
mention for its complexity. Unlike the other systems, with a relatively 
straightforward test contained in primary and secondary legislation, potentially 
expanded upon in official guidance, the English & Welsh criteria contained 
in secondary legislation are extremely complicated and multifaceted. The 
relevant legislation is the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, as 
amended by eight further sets of regulations.965 Binding guidance on applying 
the tests is issued by the Lord Chancellor.966 The test is applied by caseworkers 
at the Legal Aid Agency when making administrative decisions on applications 
for legal aid.
958  Ibidem, Regulation 37(2)(a) and 43(2)(a).
959  Ibidem, Regulation 37(2)(b).
960  Ibidem.
961  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 24.
962  Other than in proceedings concerning the welfare of a child or sex offenders register order cases, 
      see section 28(3).
963  Other than in proceedings concerning the welfare of a child or sex offenders register order cases, 
      see section 28(3).
964  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s.28.
965  Most significantly the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2015 
      and the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) Regulations 2016.
966  Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, 2018. 
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The Regulations are structured as follows. First, various tests are set out and 
defined, including a ‘reasonable private paying individual’ test,967 a proportionality 
test968 and a ‘prospects of success’ test.969 The Regulations go on to state that to be 
eligible for civil legal aid an applicant must fulfil the ‘general merits criteria’ as 
adapted later in the Regulations to that type of case, and also a personal conduct 
test which provides that legal aid will not be granted unless it is reasonable 
to do so in the light of the conduct of the applicant in this and previous 
applications or cases.970 An additional test is given for high cost cases,971 that 
it must be reasonable to fund the case in the light of present and likely future 
demands upon the legal aid fund.972
Next, the ‘general merits criteria’ are set out for the various levels of legal aid 
which are available: Legal Help, Help at Court and so on (see Chapter 4, above). 
With regard to Legal Representation, which is the type of assistance available for 
court proceedings, there are standard criteria for Legal Representation973 and 
additional criteria for the two sub-categories: Investigative Representation974 
and Full Representation.975 
Finally, the Regulations go through some (but not all) of the types of cases 
for which legal aid is available and provide ‘specific merits criteria’ for each. 
These set out which parts of the general merits criteria apply, usually also 
adding additional tests, for example the proportionality test or ‘reasonable 
private paying individual’ test. These two tests do not appear as part of any 
of the standard criteria but are imported as part of some of the specific case-
type tests. Within some categories, such as public law and family law, subject-
specific ‘standard’ criteria are set by adaptation of the general merits criteria 
and then these subject-specific standard criteria are in turn adapted for each 
type of case within that field. In some instances, separate provisions are set out 
for Investigative and Full Representation. If an application is made in a type of 
case which is eligible for legal aid but is not listed separately in the Regulations, 
the general merits criteria for that level of help will apply, in addition to the 
personal conduct test.
The merits test at the level of advice and assistance is considerably simpler. 
At this level there is a requirement that it be reasonable to provide such help 
having regard to any other sources of funding available to the client, and that 
there is likely to be sufficient benefit to the client to justify the cost of providing 
legal help.976 
967  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 7.
968  Ibidem, Regulation 8.
969  Ibidem, Regulation 5.
970  Ibidem, Regulation 11(6). No assistance with interpreting this requirement is given in the Regulations.
971  Cases which are likely to cost at least £250,000 and do not involve life or liberty or public law 
      Children Act issues.
972  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulations 11(7) and (8).
973  Ibidem, Regulation 39.
974  Ibidem, Regulation 40.
975  Ibidem, Regulations 41-44.
976  Ibidem, Regulation 32.
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6.2.2 Case types exempted from merits tests
Merits tests are not always consistently applied across all case types. It has been 
seen, for example, that the Norwegian legal aid system depends very largely 
on scope restrictions for the selection of cases for funding. Within this system, 
a whole group of case types, non-means tested priority cases, are not subject 
to merits testing at all. In England & Wales only a very small group of cases 
is exempted from merits testing. These are listed in regulation and consist 
of: assessment of suitability for mediation; EU and international agreements 
concerning maintenance and Hague Convention child abduction cases.977 In 
Iceland, there are also some types of case which are exempt from merits testing, 
notably child protection and adoption cases.
In other jurisdictions, parts of the merits tests are deemed satisfied in 
certain types of case, such as in Denmark, where some cases are deemed to 
have reasonable grounds to litigate. However, these cases are still subject to the 
merits test and the presumption may be overridden by other factors. 
6.2.3 Types of merits test
6.2.3.1 Probabilis causa litigandi
Several of the jurisdictions make it explicit that legal aid will only be granted 
where the applicant has probabilis causa litigandi, otherwise known as probable 
cause. The phrase refers to substantial grounds for commencing or defending 
litigation and the intention is to ensure that legal aid is not granted to persons 
who have no legal cause of action or legal defence (as the case may be). These 
are the types of cases (or defences) that would be at risk of being struck out 
by courts without full hearings as they cannot in law amount to an action, or 
legally count as a defence.
The test is explicit in three of the considered jurisdictions, as seen above. 
In Iceland, all legal aid applicants must show “sufficient reason to initiate 
or defend proceedings”; in the Republic of Ireland, in order for legal aid to 
be granted for representation it must be shown that the applicant has as a 
matter of law reasonable grounds for being a party to the proceedings; and 
before granting legal aid the Scottish Legal Aid Board must be satisfied that 
the applicant has probabilis causa litigandi. According to the Scottish Legal 
Aid Board, “probable cause is quite a low threshold. It means ‘a plausible 
case’. It covers, for example, jurisdiction, title to sue and the legal basis for the 
action.”978
Whilst the issue is not set out in terms in the other jurisdictions, this should 
not be taken to suggest that cases without probable cause would be funded 
elsewhere, as the same effect is obtained through other means. In Finland, 
for example, legal aid cannot be granted if pleading the case would constitute 
977  Ibidem, Regulation 11(9).
978  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part 2, para 1.22.
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an abuse of process979 and in Northern Ireland, the requirement that there 
must be “reasonable grounds for taking, defending or being a party to the 
proceedings”980 would exclude cases without probable cause as well as those 
where the factual, rather than legal, basis was insufficient. 
All the systems which apply a prospects of success test will by default 
exclude cases which show no reasonable cause, as these by definition have no 
chance of succeeding. Thus for example applications for legal aid decided by 
the Danish courts cannot be granted if “it is obvious that the applicant will not 
succeed in the case”,981 which will be the case if there is no probable cause. The 
Swedish and English & Welsh prospects of success tests are also relevant in this 
regard. 
In Norway, case types are very restricted as has been seen in Chapter 5 
above, and in non-means tested priority case types there is no rule equivalent to 
a need for probable cause. As these case types are in the main public law non-
money cases such as objection to an order for compulsory medical treatment 
or public guardianship matters,982 there would presumably be little incentive 
for a person to bring a claim vexatiously; most people will be responding to 
claims made against them by the state and it may be felt as a matter of policy 
that everyone should be able to make their case with the help of a lawyer even if 
the legal basis of the defence is weak. In all other cases there is a provision that 
legal aid will not be granted if it is unreasonable for assistance to be paid for 
from public funds,983 which could be used to bar cases without probable cause.
6.2.3.2 Reasonableness 
6.2.3.2.1 Reasonable grounds to pursue a case
Reasonableness appears in three ways in the merits tests for civil legal aid in 
the jurisdictions under consideration. Some jurisdictions apply a requirement 
that it must be reasonable for the applicant to be involved in the proceedings; 
others award legal aid only if it is reasonable for the public purse to fund the 
case. In addition to these two tests, a further use of reasonableness as a marker 
addresses the question of costs and asks whether a reasonable person would 
pay privately for representation in the case if they had the financial means to 
do so.
As summarised above, in Denmark, some applications for civil legal aid 
are decided by the courts, in accordance with a test relating to prospects of 
success, which will be discussed further below. In all other cases, legal aid 
applications are decided by the Legal Aid Office within the Department of 
Civil Affairs and legal aid will be granted if “the applicant is deemed to have 
979  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 7 §.
980  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 37(1)(b).
981  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 327(4).
982  Ibidem, § 16(1).
983  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 16(5).
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reasonable grounds to litigate”.984 The Act itself provides guidance on some 
of the factors which should be taken into account when assessing reasonable 
grounds to litigate. The non-exclusive list comprises: the significance of the 
case for the applicant; the prospects of the applicant being successful in its 
action; the size of the subject matter; the amount of the expected costs and 
the possibility of having the case settled by an administrative committee or a 
private complaints board or approved appeals committee.985 This list introduces 
a wide variety of factors under the umbrella of ‘reasonableness’, many of 
which are present as independent tests in the merits requirements in other 
jurisdictions. The significance of the matter for the client, prospects of success 
and issues concerning the cost of the case, likely benefit and the relationship 
between them will all be considered below as discrete tests. There is however 
a qualitative difference in the Danish test, which utilises these tests only as 
possible ways of indicating whether it is reasonable for the individual to be 
involved in litigation. The overriding test remains reasonableness.
Some types of case (essentially housing repossession, employment and 
personal injury) are to be deemed as involving reasonable grounds to litigate 
unless the prospects of success, size of the subject matter or costs, or availability 
of one of the other settlement options clearly speak against it.986 The case is 
assumed to be sufficiently significant for the applicant for it to be reasonable 
for him to litigate and the other factors are only relevant if they evidently 
contradict this assumption.
In the Republic of Ireland, as outlined earlier in this chapter, a number of 
merits tests co-exist, and these are different for advice and for representation, 
although the overarching ‘reasonable privately paying person test’ applies 
to both levels of assistance. In respect of representation, one element of the 
merits assessment is that the applicant must have, as a matter of law, reasonable 
grounds for being a party to the proceedings.987 Furthermore, the proceedings 
under consideration must be the best means of achieving the desired result,988 a 
test which is also, it is suggested, related to the issue of whether it is reasonable 
to take the proceedings proposed. The reasonableness of the applicant in 
being involved in the litigation is also pertinent in the Republic of Ireland, in 
some requirements relating to the conduct of the individual. Even if all the 
other criteria are fulfilled, the Legal Aid Board may still refuse legal aid if the 
applicant has behaved unreasonably with respect to legal aid in a previous 
matter989 or is behaving in such a way that costs are likely to be unnecessarily 
high in the current case.990 This last requirement is closely mirrored in the 
‘personal conduct test’ applicable to all civil legal aid applications in England & 
984  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 328.
985  Ibidem, § 328(2).
986  Ibidem, § 328(3).
987  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 28(2)(b).
988  Ibidem, s. 28(2)(d).
989  Ibidem, s. 28(4)(b).
990  Ibidem, s. 29(6).
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Wales. This provides that legal aid can only be provided where it is reasonable 
to provide services in the light of the conduct of the applicant in previous 
or current legal aid applications or grants or in civil legal proceedings in 
general.991
6.2.3.2.2 Reasonable for the state to fund the case
There is a different approach to reasonableness in some civil legal aid merits 
tests; the test addressed in the previous section looked at reasonableness 
from the perspective of the potential litigant whereas this test considers the 
perspective of the public purse. 
As outlined above, the merits test for civil legal aid in Scotland is relatively 
simple: the applicant must have probable cause and it must be reasonable in 
the particular circumstances of the case that they should receive legal aid.992 
In place of further statutory regulation, the Scottish Legal Aid Board issues 
an online manual for solicitors, which is not legally binding but indicates the 
approach which will be taken by the Board when assessing applications. The 
manual indicates the types of case in which it might or might not be considered 
reasonable for a client to be funded, and the evidence which should be provided 
to establish reasonableness in the various types of matter for which legal aid 
might be sought. The manual states that:
The reasonableness test provides us with a very wide discretion. It is 
impossible to give an exhaustive list of circumstances in which questions 
of reasonableness may apply. We have identified certain situations where it 
may not be reasonable to grant legal aid and in addition, we have provided 
information on certain factors that may be taken into account in deciding 
whether or not it is reasonable to grant legal aid. There are, however, many 
factors that we need to take into account in assessing whether an application 
is reasonable so we cannot provide a definitive list of those factors.993
The general guidance applicable to all case types indicates that factors to be 
considered include: the nature and timing of the legal application; whether 
other resolution methods are appropriate; the balance between the likely 
cost and the likely benefit; whether a reasonable offer of settlement has been 
made and the strength of the available evidence. The courts have confirmed 
that the Board should carry out a “balancing exercise, involving the cost of 
the litigation, the possible benefit to be gained and the Board’s views as to the 
prospects of success”, and that it is for the Board to decide the weight to be 
attached to the various factors.994
991  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 11(6).
992  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 14.
993  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part 4, para 3.3.
994  McTear v. Scottish Legal Aid Board, 1995.
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The Swedish merits test for civil legal aid is that the applicant has a need 
for a legal representative which cannot be met in another way995 and that it 
is reasonable for the state to pay the legal costs, having regard to the type, 
importance, value and other circumstances of the case.996 A similarity with 
the structure of the Danish test can be seen; in both jurisdictions the overall 
test is reasonableness but statutory provisions list elements to be considered in 
assessing reasonableness, thus limiting the discretion of the decision-maker. 
However, the Danish test applies the test of reasonableness to the grounds to 
litigate, rather than to the payment by the state of the legal costs.
The non-binding Swedish online handbook provides assistance with the 
interpretation of the reasonableness requirement, the starting point being the 
nature of the case including prospects of success.997 The assessment will be more 
generous towards a respondent in proceedings than to the individual seeking 
to bring the claim.998 A matter which has already been decided by a court and 
in which no relevant new circumstances exist may be refused on the grounds 
that funding is not reasonable,999 even where the original court decision is 
not being honoured by the opponent.1000 However, a wider public interest can 
make funding reasonable in cases which otherwise would not be eligible.1001 
As elsewhere in the handbook, specific examples are given of decided cases 
in which legal aid has and has not been authorised. It appears that to some 
extent a common usage approach is taken to the term ‘reasonable’; legal aid has 
for example been refused for a dispute over a leisure boat1002 and for a claim 
for compensation for negligent advice from a stockbroker.1003 Interestingly, in 
Sweden the reasonableness test replaced the earlier probable cause test, as it 
was felt that the latter was not sufficient to ensure that a thorough assessment 
of legal aid applications was carried out and that resources were directed where 
they were most needed.1004 In Scotland, as has been seen, the reasonableness 
requirement is in addition to the requirement of probable cause. 
In the Republic of Ireland, when awarding civil legal aid for representation, 
the Legal Aid Board must be satisfied, inter alia, that having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case (including the probable cost to the Board, measured 
against the likely benefit to the applicant) it is reasonable to grant legal aid.1005 
In cases concerning the welfare of a child (broadly interpreted) and sex 
offenders register order cases the criterion does not apply.1006 
995  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 7 §.
996  Ibidem, 8 §.
997  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 8, para. 8.2.
998  Ibidem.
999  Ibidem.
1000  Rättshjälpsnämnden 677-1998.
1001  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 8, para. 8.2.
1002  Rättshjälpsnämnden 58-1999.
1003  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 8, para. 8.2, referring case RN  58/1999.
1004  Ibidem, para 8.1.
1005  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s.28.
1006  Ibidem, s. 28(3).
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The reasonableness test in Northern Ireland is expressed in the negative; legal 
aid may be refused if it would be unreasonable to grant a certificate.1007 The 
applicable, binding guidance focuses on prospects of success and the cost-
benefit analysis, both of which will be considered further below, as the main 
elements in deciding whether it is unreasonable to grant legal aid.
The test is also a negative one in certain cases in Norway. For cases concerning 
representation at court, of listed types which are means-tested or exceptional 
cases, there is a single merits test which is that legal aid will not be granted if it 
is unreasonable for assistance to be paid for from public funds.1008 Guidance in 
the Circular on the interpretation of this requirement states that the provision 
is to be considered as an exception to the main principle of subject-based 
eligibility and as such should be applied with caution. It is a safety valve to 
enable the authorities to refuse legal aid where it is clear that it should not be 
granted.1009 Examples of circumstances which can be taken into account include 
the value of the claim (legal aid should not be issued for trifling matters); the 
responsibility of the applicant for the circumstances leading to the dispute and 
previous (especially repeated) litigation in the same matter. Cases between 
close relatives or neighbours are unlikely to be given legal aid as it is considered 
reasonable that they should solve their disputes out of court. 
In the 2009 review of legal aid, the Ministry of Justice proposed that the 
reasonableness test should be extended to cover legal advice (but not the first 
interview) and that more detailed guidance on its application should be given. 
The latter would include a consideration of reasonable proportionality between 
how important the matter is and the likely costs; the possibility of resolving 
the dispute through other means; the prospects of success; whether the change 
sought to an existing court order is significant (where relevant); and whether 
the claim has arisen through the fault of the applicant.1010 It was acknowledged 
that the extension of discretionary assessment would involve additional 
administrative expenses but suggested that the benefits of a better targeted legal 
aid system outweighed this problem.1011 This recommendation, however, along 
with the rest of the 2009 proposals, has not been implemented. 
An interesting twist to the reasonableness test is found in England 
&Wales, where legal aid must be refused for high cost cases1012 if the decision-
maker is not “satisfied that, having had regard to the present and likely future 
demands for the provision of civil legal services under Part 1 of the Act, it is 
reasonable to provide the individual or legal person with civil legal services in 
all the circumstances of the case including, but not limited to, the particular 
1007  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015,  Regulation 37(2)(a).
1008  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 16(5).
1009  SRF-1/2017, Section 7.6..
1010  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009), para. 10.3.
1011  Ibidem.
1012  Predicted costs over £250,000, with the exception of cases relating to the life or liberty 
        of the individual or his family and public law children cases.
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circumstances of the individual or legal person”.1013 This explicit permission to 
consider future demands on the legal aid fund appears to permit budgetary 
pressures to affect individual case decisions, potentially without any policy 
consideration at a governmental or parliamentary level.
6.2.3.2.3 The reasonable privately paying individual
In an explicit attempt to mirror the behaviour of privately-paying clients, several 
jurisdictions in the cohort apply a ‘reasonable privately paying individual’ test as 
part of the merits assessment for civil legal aid. 
In the Republic of Ireland, such a test is the main element of the merits 
assessment for civil legal aid. The ‘general criteria for the grant of legal aid and 
advice’ is that a ‘reasonably prudent person’ would be likely to pay privately for 
the services if his means were such that the cost would represent a financial 
obstacle (but not undue hardship) to him, and that a solicitor or barrister 
acting reasonably would be likely to advise him or her to obtain such services 
at his or her own expense.1014 In considering how a reasonably prudent person 
might behave, consideration will be given to “the average member of society 
– not a well off person”.1015 The second element of the test, uniquely within 
the jurisdictions under consideration, requires consideration of whether a 
legal professional would be likely to recommend taking action if the potential 
litigant was relying on her own resources. In practice, this part of the test is 
rarely relied upon, although it can in theory be used to refuse legal aid to those 
who wish to take a case which objectively would be unreasonable, but which 
they feel strongly about. There is clearly an overlap with the requirement, in 
the first test, to use a reasonably prudent person as the benchmark, but with 
the addition of an element of professional understanding; the outcome of the 
combined test in representation cases approximates a decision made by an 
averagely well-off reasonable person acting on legal advice. 
The professional adviser test includes elements of other merits test and “is 
important because we do not have a limitless budget and cannot fund persons to 
take cases of little value and/or prospects of success”.1016 There is a free-standing 
prospects of success test for representation cases but not for advice cases in the 
Republic of Ireland, so the professional adviser test is needed if the Legal Aid 
Board is to be able to consider prospects of success in advice cases. However, the 
Circular suggests that “in practice it would be extremely rare that an application 
[for legal advice] would be refused on the merits criteria”;1017 “if the applicant is 
found financially eligible, then legal advice is usually granted”.1018 
1013  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 11(8). Note that  
        legal persons may only obtain legal aid in exceptional circumstances.
1014  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 24.
1015  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services 2017, Part 2, p. 2-1.
1016  Ibidem.
1017  Ibidem.
1018  Ibidem, p. 2-3.
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According to the wording of the statute, in the Republic of Ireland, all the 
elements of the merits test must be fulfilled. Thus, for a grant of legal aid 
for representation, other criteria such as reasonableness to grant legal aid, 
reasonable grounds for proceeding with the case and the prospects of success 
test must also be met. However, the guidance given in the Circular indicates 
that compliance with the overarching ‘reasonable privately paying individual’ 
test may lead to a grant even if the other criteria are not met,1019 departing 
somewhat from a strict reading of the statutory provisions. 
In England & Wales, the reasonable privately paying individual test is not 
one of the standard criteria for civil legal aid, but forms part of the subject-
specific merits test in some cases. In particular, the test applies to some private 
law family cases and to cases not of significant wider public interest which are 
not primarily money claims. The test as set out in regulation states: 
For the purposes of these Regulations, the reasonable private paying 
individual test is met if the Director is satisfied that the potential benefit to 
be gained from the provision of civil legal services justifies the likely costs, 
such that a reasonable private paying individual would be prepared to start 
or continue the proceedings having regard to the prospects of success and 
all the other circumstances of the case.1020
As can be seen, the question to be considered also demands consideration of 
some of the other aspects of merits testing, within the ‘reasonable privately 
paying individual’ test. The prospects of success, in particular, must be 
considered here as well as independently in the important test discussed below. 
In applying the test, a combination of subjective and objective approaches is 
required:
This test is applied objectively according to whether a reasonable person 
would be prepared to risk his or her own money and bear the risk of having 
to pay the costs of the other side. […] The fact that the individual may feel 
very strongly about the case or be determined to go to court […] is not in 
itself relevant. The notional individual being considered under this test is, in 
general, a person with reasonable but not super-abundant means, such that 
he or she could afford to litigate privately but to do so would be something 
of a sacrifice. However, in assessing the potential benefits to be gained 
from the proceedings from the applicant’s standpoint it may be important 
to have regard to the actual circumstances of the applicant. For instance, 
1019  Ibidem, p. 5-7.
1020  Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 7.
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establishing an individual’s entitlement to welfare benefits may be justifiable 
even if the sums involved appear on their face modest in relation to the 
likely costs required.1021
In Finland, whilst there is no ‘reasonable privately paying person’ test on the 
face of the legislation, the requirement that legal aid cannot be granted if 
the matter is of minor importance to the applicant1022 incorporates a similar 
principle. The relevant legislative proposal provides that in applying that 
criterion, consideration must be given to how much an average person would 
be willing to risk in legal fees to bring the case.1023 The interpretation indicated 
by the handbook is that the case will be funded only if a reasonably prudent 
person would bear the costs of taking the case privately, bearing in mind 
the advantage sought and the means of the applicant.1024 This approach to 
interpretation may have also been behind the refusal of legal aid in the asylum 
case described below in section 6.2.3.4.2 relating to the need for assistance. 
6.2.3.3 Prospects of success
Many jurisdictions place considerable importance on an assessment of the 
prospects of success in decisions on civil legal aid. There is a connection 
with the tests discussed in preceding sections, based on an assumption that a 
reasonable person will pay close attention to the chance of winning, in deciding 
whether to instigate or defend an action. Whilst this may be true in many cases, 
it does not take account of the extent to which the importance of the matter 
may increase an individual’s willingness to take risks in litigation, nor does it 
address the need for fair court hearings in all cases, regardless of the respective 
chances of each party. The jurisdictions under consideration vary significantly 
in the extent to which they rely on a prospects of success test, and the following 
descriptions build from the lowest to the highest use of the criterion.
In Finland, as seen above, the legal aid eligibility criteria do not include any 
measure of likelihood of success and thus legal aid is also available for very 
weak or even hopeless cases. However, a grant of Finnish legal aid does not 
protect against inter-parties costs if the case is lost, and it appears that the risk 
of having to pay the other side’s costs acts as a deterrent to clients wanting 
to pursue cases with low chances of success. The previous rigid requirement 
in Finland to pay the winning party’s costs was found by the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee to be a breach of the fair trial rights contained in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1025 and a subsequent 
amendment to the Code of Judicial Procedure allows the judge discretion to 
reduce the payment liability if it would be manifestly unreasonable to make the 
1021  Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, 2018, paras. 4.2.5 and 4.2.6.
1022  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 7 §.
1023  RP132/1997 rd, p. 23.
1024  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013, section 2.2.2.
1025  Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 1997, para 7.2.
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costs order.1026 This is, however, an exception to the general rule, which appears 
in practice to act as a deterrent.
Prospects of success are also of minimal relevance in Norway. In cases 
concerning representation at court, in means-tested priority types and non-
priority cases, there is a single additional merits test which is that legal aid 
will not be granted if it is unreasonable for assistance to be paid for from 
public funds.1027 The guidance on the reasonableness test explicitly states that 
applications must not be decided purely on the question of whether the party 
is likely to succeed in the action.1028 Whilst the nature of the disputed interest 
will be relevant in the overall assessment, its weight will depend on its objective 
personal importance to the applicant,1029 rather than the chance of succeeding. 
The resistance to prospects of success as a determinative factor in civil legal aid 
in Norway is evidently strong; even when reforms were proposed to tighten the 
merits test, prospects of success consideration was to be limited to the issue of 
whether there were any legal requirements which could not be met.1030 This is a 
much less demanding test than many of those considered below.
In Sweden, as seen above, the prospects of success is relevant as part of 
the interpretation of the requirement that it must be reasonable in all the 
circumstances for the state to pay for legal representation. The online handbook 
states that the starting point for the assessment of reasonableness should be the 
nature of the case including prospects of success1031 and it is advised that cases 
where the chances of success are very low may be refused legal aid. However, 
unlike the Scottish position, which will be described below, no further detail 
on the interpretation of this element of the test is given. Instead, as with other 
elements of the eligibility tests, specific examples are given of decided cases in 
which legal aid has and has not been authorised, including a proposed case in 
Iran relating to custody of children where the prospects of success were so small 
that it was not reasonable for the state to contribute to the costs. As a group, 
medical negligence cases are said to be of a kind where legal aid may often 
be refused due to low chances of succeeding. Praxis relating to the previous 
Legal Aid Act is also referred to as relevant, and provides an explanation that 
when the court which is dealing with the substantive matter is assessing a legal 
aid application, it must be careful to comply with the general principle that a 
court must not form an opinion on a case before hearing all the evidence and 
arguments. This makes assessment of chances of success sensitive, and only in 
cases where the case is evidently hopeless or of meaningless value should legal 
aid be refused on this ground.1032 The Swedish approach to prospects of success 
is thus that only cases with some chance of success will be funded; those which 
1026  Rättegångsbalk, 1734, Chapter 21, § 8c.
1027  Rettshjelploven, 1981, § 16(5).
1028  SRF-1/2017, para. 7.6.
1029  Ibidem, para 7.5.1.
1030  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009), para. 10.3.
1031  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 8, para 8.2.
1032  Ibidem, Chapter 8.3, referring case NJA 1982 s.175, I and II.
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are hopeless will be excluded from legal aid regardless of any other factors.
In Denmark, in the categories of case for which legal aid will be assessed 
by the court, legal aid cannot be granted if “it is obvious that the applicant 
will not succeed in the case”.1033 In other cases, the merits test is that there 
are reasonable grounds to litigate which, as seen above, is to be interpreted 
according to a list of statutory criteria including the prospect of the applicant 
being successful.1034 The Danish tests on prospects of success thus differ 
depending on whether it is a court-granted type of legal aid, in which case only 
matters with some prospect of success can be funded, or of a case type where 
the Legal Aid Office assesses the application, in which case the prospects of 
success in general are a relevant factor in the decision.
Beyond the statutory provisions, there is no official guidance on the 
application of the merits criteria, although decisions in appeal cases can assist 
in interpretation. The unofficial guidance provided in the interpretative book 
by the Head of the Legal Aid Office expands on the provision. It is said that the 
more likely a person is to obtain a favourable outcome, the easier it is to argue 
that there are reasonable grounds to litigate.1035 However, the nature of the 
case and its subject-matter may make the prospects of success less relevant in 
deciding reasonableness. It is always the overall reasonableness which is to be 
decided, in the light of the other factors. In considering likelihood of success, 
the available and permissible evidence, correct selection of the respondent and 
wider advantages and disadvantages of litigation in the particular case will be 
relevant.1036
Similarly, in Iceland, the likelihood of success is one of the elements used 
to determine whether it is reasonable that the case be funded by the public. 
Article 5 of the Regulation on Legal Aid and the Legal Aid Committee instructs 
the committee to consider, inter alia, whether the case seems to be likely to 
succeed at court in deciding whether to grant legal aid. Assessment of chance 
of success can include consideration of the outcomes of similar cases. ‘Likely to 
succeed’ is taken to mean more likely to succeed than to fail.
The Republic of Ireland is at the point on the scale which marks the first 
jurisdiction in which prospects of success is a free-standing merits test which 
must be satisfied in addition to the other tests. This is the situation in the 
Republic of Ireland for representation cases. The other merits criteria include 
that the applicant has reasonable grounds for being a party to the proceedings 
and also that it is reasonable to fund the case, but unlike in Sweden, Denmark 
and Iceland the prospects of success test is not subsumed within consideration 
of reasonableness but is separate and must be satisfied independently. The 
Circular gives an indication of how the test is applied in practice. When 
submitting an application for civil legal aid, the solicitor must provide their 
1033  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 327(4).
1034  Ibidem, § 328(2).
1035  Mavrogenis 2012, para. 6.5.
1036  Ibidem.
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analysis of the case including “on the basis of the facts established at the time of 
the application what prospects of success the applicant has in the proceedings, 
in the solicitor’s professional judgement”,1037 potentially with reference to 
counsel’s opinion. The analysis must be followed by a recommendation to grant 
or refuse legal aid, and the importance of prospects of success is emphasised: 
It is not acceptable to make a positive recommendation having conducted 
an analysis and the conclusion made pointing towards a negative 
recommendation/refusal. In particular, you should not make a positive 
recommendation knowing that the applicant’s prospects of success are poor. 
In these cases, you must recommend a refusal.1038
Nonetheless, if the recommendation is to refuse, the solicitor “must be able to 
back up this opinion. In this case the Statement of Facts must state the facts 
grounding the negative opinion and that this opinion must be supported by 
reference to the law and the relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations”.1039 
Thus the decision must be made carefully and professionally, with legal 
reasoning, as to whether the claimant is ‘reasonably likely to succeed’ in the 
case. This recommendation will then be considered by the decision-maker 
as one of the elements of the merits verdict. The decision must be made 
independently and it is explicitly stated in the Circular that “it is not enough 
to simply ‘rubber stamp’ the recommendation made […] by the solicitor”.1040 
The outcome of this system is thus that civil legal aid will only be granted if 
there are reasonable chances of success as assessed by the Legal Aid Board. 
Prospects of success are emphasised as an important element of the solicitor’s 
recommendation to the Board and may well be the deciding factor. However, it 
seems that the test of ‘reasonable prospects’ may be applied in such a way that 
it equates to ‘not poor prospects’ which, in comparison to some of the other 
systems, is relatively forgiving. 
The position of the prospects of success test in Northern Ireland is interesting 
because the criterion does not appear in statute or regulation but nonetheless 
forms an important part of the selection of cases for legal aid. As has been 
seen above, the merits test in this jurisdiction is that there must be “reasonable 
grounds for taking, defending or being a party to the proceedings”,1041 it must 
not be unreasonable to grant a certificate,1042 there must be more than a trivial 
advantage to be gained1043 and the matter should not be so simple that a lawyer 
would not ordinarily be employed.1044 However, binding guidance on the 
assessment of applications for legal aid includes directions on the application 
1037  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services 2017, p. 3-9.
1038  Ibidem, 3-10.
1039  Ibidem.
1040  Ibidem, p. 5-2.
1041  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 37(1)(b).
1042  Ibidem, Regulation 37(2)(a).
1043  Ibidem, Regulation 37(2)(b).
1044  Ibidem.
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of a prospects of success test.1045 The guidance is not explicit on the point, but 
it can be assumed that the test is intended to contribute to the question of 
whether it would be unreasonable to grant legal aid. 
Echoing the approach in the Republic of Ireland, prospects of success 
is said to be “an objective legal test as to how likely the case would be to 
succeed before the judge or other tribunal”.1046 It is accepted that “estimating 
prospects of success can never be an exact science, particularly at the early 
stages of litigation. Therefore, it is a matter for the legal representative to use 
their judgement and experience”.1047 The lawyer acting for the client must, 
in the application, estimate the chances of success as falling within one of 
six categories: Very Good (80% chance or more of obtaining a successful 
outcome); Good (60%–80% chance); Moderate (50%–60% chance); Borderline 
(where the prospects of success are not poor, but, because there are difficult 
disputes of fact, law or expert evidence, it is not possible to say the prospects 
of success are better than 50%); Poor (prospects are clearly less than 50% ); 
and Unclear (the case cannot be put into any of the above categories because 
further investigation is needed).1048 Most types of case will only be funded if the 
prospects of success are at least 50% and funding is likely to be refused where 
the prospects of success are poor,1049 although cases of wider public importance 
or overwhelming importance to the client or which are of a priority case type 
may be funded if the prospects of success are borderline.1050
It is noteworthy that the Northern Irish guidance recognises the difficulty 
of predicting prospects of success to a greater degree than the other legal aid 
schemes considered here. When defining the meaning of the Unclear category 
it is acknowledged that “the prospects of success could be said to be ‘unclear’ 
in almost every case as only limited information is available at the outset of a 
case and the prospects of success may only become clear shortly before trial”.1051 
Despite this, it is still necessary for a prediction which differentiates within 
narrow bands of likelihood to be given by the conducting lawyer, at the time 
of the legal aid application. Civil legal aid in Northern Ireland will only be 
awarded if the prospects of success are 50% or higher, in most types of cases; 
the chance of winning the case is a decisive factor.
Similarly, in Scotland, prospects of success is “an important factor in 
deciding whether it is reasonable to grant civil legal aid”.1052 Lawyers applying 
for legal aid on behalf of their clients must estimate, with reasons, the chances 
of the case being successful, both expressed as ‘excellent’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, or ‘poor’ 
1045  Department of Justice Northern Ireland 2016. The Guidance is issued under powers contained 
        in Article 14 (2A) and (2B) of the Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 and 
       section 3 of the Legal Aid and Coroners’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.
1046  Department of Justice Northern Ireland 2016, para 3.2.
1047  Ibidem, para 5.2.
1048  Ibidem, para 5.1.
1049  Ibidem, para 5.3.
1050  Ibidem, para 5.4.
1051  Ibidem, para 6.2.
1052  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part 4, para 3.23.
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and on a scale of 1-10. In non-family cases where the prospects of success 
are assessed as ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ (between 1 and 6 on the ten-point scale), the 
application is likely to be refused unless there are any other significant factors 
that would warrant the granting of civil legal aid. In family cases it must be 
shown that there is “some purpose in the applicant continuing with the 
proceedings” for legal aid to be granted despite a ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ prospects of 
success assessment. In addition to this general guidance the online handbook 
further sets out detail of the approach to particular categories of case, which 
may also involve assessments of prospects of success. For example, “in any 
application for proceedings before the Supreme Court, we should be satisfied 
there are not only significant prospects of success, but also that the appeal 
raises a point of general public importance”.1053 Prospects of success, whilst 
not mentioned in legislation, is thus considered by the Scottish legal aid 
administrative authorities to be a central element in deciding whether it is 
reasonable for the applicant to receive legal aid, and must usually be above 60% 
(on the assumption that the ten-point scale can be equated to percentages). 
Very similar legislative rules in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Sweden 
have thus been applied very differently, with a much more cautious approach to 
denying legal aid because of poor prospects of success in Sweden. It can be argued 
that this approach, which protects against the risk that the party with the weaker 
case will often be unrepresented, improves the chances of a fair hearing across a 
broad range of cases. The Scottish and Northern Irish technique of inserting a 
strict prospects of success test in the guidance moves these jurisdictions towards 
a commercial risk assessment approach, as discussed below.
In the introduction to this chapter, the complexity of the merits test in England 
& Wales was outlined. The structure of the test means that it is not possible to give 
a definitive overall answer as to the applicable prospects of success test; different 
criteria apply to different types of cases according to a detailed classification. 
It is clear, though, that the test holds a central place in the assessment of civil 
legal aid applications. A detailed ‘prospects of success’ test as set out in the 
regulations1054 lists factors to which regard can and cannot be given when 
determining prospects of success, and then defines bands as follows: ‘very good’ 
prospects of success are those where the likelihood of success is 80% or more; 
‘good’ means 60-80%; ‘moderate’ 50-60%; ‘marginal’ 45-50% and ‘poor’ under 
45%. Further categories of ‘unclear’ and ‘borderline’ are described, respectively, 
as cases where there are investigations which could enable a reliable estimate 
of prospects of success to be made, and cases where this is not the case but 
disputes of law or fact make it impossible to judge the prospects. The bands 
are similar to, but slightly more numerous than, the Northern Irish bands. The 
applicable level is applied to each type of case using these categories. In general, 
1053  Ibidem, Part 4, para 4.92.
1054  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 5, as amended by the Civil 
          Legal Aid (Merits Criteria)(Amendment)(No. 2) Regulations 2015, Regulation 2, and the Civil 
        Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, Regulation 2.
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for applications for ‘full representation’, the prospects of success must be very 
good, good or moderate; or marginal or borderline, if the case is of significant 
wider public interest or is of overwhelming importance to the individual.1055 
The complexity described above makes it impossible here to expound on 
the applicable prospects of success test for each case type. In June 2016 the 
Legal Aid Agency confirmed that the test applies to most civil cases and issued 
clarification following a court decision1056 that: “The Court of Appeal found 
that it is lawful for the prospects of success test to have a 50% threshold, and 
this does not breach a client’s rights. As a result, we are now no longer funding 
any applications for civil legal aid that are subject to a prospects of success 
test where the prospects are assessed as poor or borderline.”1057 Despite this 
announcement, regulations1058 were introduced in 2016 which allowed for the 
granting of legal aid in borderline and marginal cases in the areas of domestic 
violence,1059 child protection,1060 private law children matters and certain 
cases relating to EU and international agreements. In other cases, legal aid for 
representation will only be granted in borderline or marginal cases where the 
case is of significant wider public interest or, for family cases, overwhelming 
importance for the client or the case relates to a potential breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.1061 The merits test for civil legal aid 
in England & Wales thus includes as a determining factor that prospects of 
success must be above half for most types of case, and involves consideration 
of prospects of success as an element in deciding whether legal aid should be 
granted also in cases with a higher chance than this.
The percentage prospects of success test is a core element of the subject-
specific merits tests in England & Wales and requires, it is submitted, a very 
difficult assessment indeed. To estimate prospects of success in this detail might 
almost be said to require levels of clairvoyance, given the various unpredictable 
factors which can affect outcomes in court cases. Furthermore, to define one 
category as indicating only a 5% range of likelihoods of success seems at best 
highly ambitious, and in light of the discussion on percentage predictions 
below, arguably meaningless. All these assessments are being made by civil 
servants who do not necessarily have any legal training.
Prospects of success features in civil merits testing in England & Wales not 
only as a free-standing test but also as an element of the proportionality test, 
which reads: “For the purposes of these Regulations, the proportionality test is 
met if the Director is satisfied that the likely benefits of the proceedings to the 
individual and others justify the likely costs, having regard to the prospects of 
1055  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 43.
1056  Director of legal aid casework and Lord Chancellor v. IS, 2016.
1057  Legal Aid Agency Civil news: change in approach to assessing civil merits, June 2016.
1058  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) Regulations 2016.
1059  Ibidem, Regulation 2(10).
1060  Ibidem, Regulation 2(9).
1061  Ibidem, Regulation 2(11).
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success and all the other circumstances of the case.”1062 In addition, as shown 
above, the reasonable private paying individual test requires a consideration of 
the likely prospects of success.1063
The jurisdictions can to some extent be grouped together at various points 
on a scale. Finland stands alone with no reference to prospects of success, 
followed by Norway, also alone in specifying that prospects of success cannot 
be decisive. Next, Sweden and Denmark can be paired as having very similar 
approaches. The phrasing that a case must be ‘evidently hopeless’ (Sweden) 
to rule out legal aid on grounds of chances of success is very similar to, and 
likely to cover the matters where it would be ‘obvious that they will not succeed’ 
(court determinations in Denmark). In other cases prospects of success are 
to be taken into account in deciding whether there are reasonable grounds to 
litigate (administrative legal aid determinations in Denmark) and may be the 
starting point for a decision as to whether it is reasonable for the state to fund 
the case (Sweden).
Iceland also requires a decision on whether it is reasonable for a case to be 
funded by the public, which includes consideration of whether the individual 
‘seems likely to succeed at court’. This test goes further than Sweden and 
Denmark in implying that the case must be more likely than not to succeed, 
i.e. a 50% chance of success. However, this is just one of the factors to be 
considered and there is no explicit bar on granting legal aid even for hopeless 
cases although it seems likely that these would not be funded.
The Republic of Ireland and Scotland have comparable approaches to 
prospects of success. In the Republic of Ireland civil legal aid will only be 
granted in cases which are reasonably likely to be successful and in Scotland 
prospects of success are an important factor and applications are likely 
to be refused if the prospects are 60% or under. The Irish test is stricter in 
providing an absolute bar on funding cases which are not reasonably likely to 
be successful but the Scottish test is harsher in setting 60% as the usual cut-off 
point. Northern Ireland can also be considered to be at about the same level of 
reliance on prospects of success; in most cases a 50% or higher chance will be 
needed for a grant of legal aid to be made.
The test in England & Wales is the strictest as there is an explicit absolute 
bar on funding for cases with under 50% chance of success, in most case types.
6.2.3.4 Other tests
6.2.3.4.1 Proportionality between cost and benefit
One of the common elements of a merits test is a consideration of the relationship 
between the expected cost of the case and the degree of benefit sought. In 
everyday language, the test seeks to ascertain whether bringing the case is worth 
it or not. If limited to a purely financial comparison this is inapplicable to cases 
1062  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 8.
1063  Ibidem, Regulation 7.
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where the benefit sought cannot be expressed in financial terms. Some cases 
are clearly non-financial, such as those concerning arrangements for children, 
and some combine financial and non-financial elements, such as litigation 
to determine whether a family can remain in their home or must move. In 
response to this difficulty, some jurisdictions do not require a strict comparison 
between two sums of money, but include the costs and benefit as part of a wider 
consideration of whether it is reasonable to bring a case. Other jurisdictions 
use a strict cost-benefit comparison but only for certain types of case. A further 
difference between jurisdictions is that some include the consideration of cost 
and benefit in the legislation, whether primary or secondary, whilst others 
introduce it as part of the guidance on interpretation of broader statutory tests.
Jurisdictions using a comparison of cost and benefit as part of an overall 
reasonableness assessment include Scotland, Northern Ireland, Denmark, 
Sweden and the Republic of Ireland.
In Denmark, as seen above, legislation sets out the test of reasonableness 
and indicates some factors to be considered in the assessment, including the 
size of the subject matter and the amount of the expected costs.1064 There is no 
express requirement to balance these two elements directly against each other; 
both are just statutory elements of the reasonableness test. Similarly, in Sweden, 
there is a statutory reasonableness test and a statutory list of relevant factors, 
which includes a consideration of the value of the case in determining whether 
it is reasonable for the state to pay the legal costs.1065 
The statutory civil merits test in the Republic of Ireland includes an explicit 
cost benefit analysis in most representation cases, but not in proceedings 
concerning the welfare of a child or sex offenders register order cases. In all 
other applications for legal aid for representation, the decision-maker must be 
satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the 
probable cost to the Board, measured against the likely benefit to the applicant, 
it is reasonable to grant legal aid.1066
In Scotland and Northern Ireland it is governmental guidance which 
introduces a cost benefits test into the assessment of the statutory reasonableness 
test. When determining whether it is reasonable in the particular circumstances 
of the case to grant legal aid in Scotland,1067 the general guidance indicates that 
the Board will give consideration to the balance between the likely cost and the 
likely benefit, amongst other factors.1068 The Department of Justice guidance in 
Northern Ireland introduces a complex cost-benefit test which is not present 
in the legislation. The guidance, presumably addressing the statutory tests that 
it must not be unreasonable to grant a certificate and that there must be more 
1064  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 328(2).
1065  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 8 §.
1066  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s.28(2)(e).
1067  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 14.
1068  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part 4, para 3.3.
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than a trivial advantage to be gained,1069 sets out a multi-layered cost benefit 
consideration which must be applied by the Legal Services Agency. In order to 
be able to assess cost benefit correctly, each case must be categorised as one of 
the following:
(a) Quantifiable claims – in these cases it is likely that funding will only 
be granted for cases which satisfy specific damages to costs ratios which 
vary according to the prospects of success.
(b) Unquantifiable claims – in these cases the test is whether the benefits 
to be gained from the proceedings justify the likely costs, such that a 
reasonable private paying client would be prepared to litigate, having regard 
to the prospects of success and all other circumstances.
(c) Public interest cases – in these cases the test is a general one that the 
likely benefits of the proceedings must justify the likely costs.1070
Where the ratios apply, these are as follows: if the prospects of success are very 
good (80% or more) the likely damages must exceed likely costs; if the prospects 
of success are good (60%–80%), the likely damages must exceed likely costs by 
a ratio of 2:1; if the prospects of success are moderate (50%–60%), the likely 
damages must exceed likely costs by a ratio of 3:1.1071
This is a complex and sensitive test, which differentiates between various 
types of case as to the appropriate regard to be given to the relationship between 
cost and benefit. It is impossible to know whether this reflects how a decision-
maker would in any event act if simply asked to consider reasonableness, having 
regard to cost and benefit. The detailed approach to the direction of decisions is 
in keeping with the general approach in Northern Ireland and England & Wales 
overall.
In addition to these examples of the cost benefit test as part of a reasonableness 
test, the former is also a free-standing statutory element of merits testing in 
Iceland and England & Wales. In Iceland, the regulations provide that it will not 
as a general rule be acceptable to grant legal aid in a dispute which concerns 
‘insignificant interests’ where the costs of bringing the matter to court are 
disproportionate to the likely benefit.1072
The binding Lord Chancellor’s Guidance alerts practitioners in England & 
Wales to the “three separate cost benefit criteria for full representation that 
might be applied depending on the type of case concerned”.1073 The first of these 
applies to cases which are primarily seeking money damages but where there is 
not a significant wider public interest. This test combines prospects of success 
and the ratio of the likely cost of the case and its likely benefit in a manner 
similar to that in Northern Ireland:
1069  The Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 37(2).
1070  Department of Justice Northern Ireland 2016, para. 7.2.
1071  Ibidem, para. 7.5.
1072  Regulation 45/2008, Regulation 5(1)(c).
1073  Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, 2018, para. 4.2.1.
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if the prospects of success of the case are very good, the Director must be 
satisfied that the likely damages exceed likely costs;
if the prospects of success of the case are good, the Director must be 
satisfied that the likely damages exceed likely costs by a ratio of two to one; 
or
if the prospects of success of the case are moderate, the Director must be 
satisfied that the likely damages exceed likely costs by a ratio of four to 
one.1074
Secondly, the reasonable private paying individual test, as set out above, inserts 
a cost-benefit assessment to a number of cases. Lastly, the proportionality 
test applies to cases under the general merits criteria with significant wider 
public interest and is the test usually applied to cases under the specific merits 
criteria.1075 This test requires that “the likely benefits of the proceedings to the 
individual and others justify the likely costs, having regard to the prospects of 
success and all the other circumstances of the case”.1076
The much simpler merits test for legal aid for advice and assistance also 
includes a cost benefit analysis. At this level there must be likely to be sufficient 
benefit to the client to justify the cost of providing legal help.1077 The test 
“recognises that, at these levels of service, even in a matter with poor prospects 
of success, it may well be considered worthwhile for an individual to pay for 
initial advice, including the advice that the case is not worth pursuing further. 
The more legal help is provided, however, the more that the benefits deriving 
from the costs incurred will need to be taken into account”.1078
In Finland, legal aid will not be granted in a case where it would be “obviously 
inappropriate in comparison to the benefit the applicant receives”.1079 This test 
does not appear to be very significant in practice and is not expanded upon 
in the handbook, other than to confirm that legal aid can be refused on this 
ground even if the applicant considers the claim to be worthwhile.1080
6.2.3.4.2 A need for representation
The question of whether an individual needs assistance in the form of legal 
services in order to deal with a problem is one which is fundamental to the 
provision of legal aid, from many perspectives. Whether someone needs legal 
aid in order to ensure a fair hearing is the primary concern of the human rights 
treaty bodies in considering international obligations to provide legal aid. As 
has been seen in the preceding chapter, scope restrictions are often determined 
1074  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 42.
1075  Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, 2018, para. 4.2.1.
1076  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 8.
1077  Ibidem, Regulation 32.
1078  Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, 2018, para. 4.2.14.
1079  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 7 §, para. 2.
1080  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013, section 2.2.2.
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by the perceived lack of need for legal assistance in certain types of case. In 
addition, the question of need for assistance or representation is relevant in a 
discussion of merits criteria as some jurisdictions apply an individual check in 
each application that the applicant is in need of the assistance sought. 
The primary civil representation merits criteria set out in Swedish statute is 
that the applicant has a need for a legal representative which cannot be met in 
another way.1081 Guidance in the online Legal Aid Handbook explains that the 
starting point for the assessment is the consideration of whether, without help, 
the applicant will be able to safeguard their interests in the case; the difficulty 
of the case is to be weighed against the applicant’s own abilities.1082 However, all 
the personal circumstances of the applicant are relevant, including their family 
situation, as “those who are ill, inexperienced or alone have in general greater 
difficulty than others in enforcing their rights”.1083 
As has been seen in previous chapters, both the Finnish and Norwegian legal 
aid schemes include the concept of need in their statutory statements of purpose 
for legal aid and in both systems the criteria could be used in assessing individual 
legal aid applications. However, the Norwegian system pre-determines need 
through scope limitations; need is assessed on a general level through statute and, 
as a result, does not play a large part in individual decisions on legal aid. The 
Finnish system aims for a much higher level of coverage than the Norwegian and 
incorporates very little general needs assessment through scope restriction, but 
in making administrative decisions on individual cases it is possible to use the 
fact that the applicant is able to protect their interests and rights themselves 
to decide that a legal aid attorney will not be required and refuse legal aid. In 
making this decision, particular attention must be paid inter alia to the severity 
of the case, legal complexity, evidence requirements and age and personal 
characteristics of the applicant as well as to the objective interest of the 
applicant in the case.1084 A recent court case has indicated that this provision 
may at times be used quite flexibly to avoid funding cases which in other 
jurisdictions might fail a reasonableness test. The case in question concerned 
an asylum seeker who had previously received legal aid for several unsuccessful 
applications for residence and who had returned to Finland despite a ban on 
entering the entire Schengen area. The Legal Aid Act 1 §, para. 1 on need and 7 
§, para. 1 which bars funding for cases of minor importance to the client, were 
together used to uphold the refusal of legal aid.1085
One of the standard criteria for civil representation in England & Wales is that 
“there is a need for representation in all the circumstances of the case including: 
the nature and complexity of the issues; the existence of other proceedings; and 
1081  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 7 §.
1082  Domstolsverkets handböcker, Rättshjälp, Chapter 7, para. 7.1.
1083  Ibidem, Chapter 7, para. 7.2.
1084  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013, section 2.2.
1085  HAO 17/0811/3.
219
the interests of other parties to the proceedings”.1086 As with many of the merits 
tests in this jurisdiction, there is overlap with other tests in the application of 
the rule; according to the Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, this is a “test of whether 
legal representation as a form of service is appropriate in all the circumstances 
of the proceedings, having regard again to whether a reasonable client paying 
privately would wish to fund representation”. For example, the “straightforward 
nature of some proceedings, such as an undefended divorce, may make 
representation unnecessary”.1087
If a merits test of need for representation is applied in such a way that legal 
aid is always granted if there is a need for legal assistance in order to obtain 
access to court and a fair hearing, the international human rights requirements 
would, by definition, be satisfied (see below). 
6.2.3.4.3 Significance of the matter for the client
A factor which is used in merits assessment to a larger degree than a specific 
‘need’ test in the jurisdictions under consideration is the issue of how important 
the issue is for the client. This goes not to the question of whether an individual is 
able to achieve a fair hearing or access to justice without legal assistance, but how 
important it is that a fair process is achieved. This is a distinction without basis 
in the international human rights treaties, which apply to all determinations 
of qualifying civil rights and obligations, not only those which are particularly 
important to the individual.
There is an overlap between the question of scope restrictions and the 
significance of the matter for the client, particularly around cases of minimal 
value. A case with very low value may be excluded from scope as in Sweden 
or excluded because of the low significance for the client, as in Finland.1088 In 
this latter jurisdiction, as indicated by the statutory wording, the test is to be 
applied subjectively, i.e. by considering whether for that individual the matter 
is particularly important despite its objectively low value.1089 However, there 
is also a provision that legal aid should be refused if a grant would be clearly 
meaningless in relation to the benefit to be gained, which according to the 
suggested interpretation should include cases where “the benefit to the 
applicant is objectively estimated to be so low, that legal aid would not be 
appropriate”, even if the applicant considers the claim important.1090 This is 
seemingly not the same as a cost-benefit test, as the rule makes no reference to 
the cost of the case. Beyond the exclusion of low value matters from scope in 
Sweden, the type, importance and value of the case are factors which must be 
1086  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 39(e).
1087  Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, 2018, para. 7.23.
1088  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 7 §.
1089  Oikeusavun käsikirja 2013, section 2.2.2.
1090  Ibidem.
220
taken into account when deciding whether it is reasonable for the state to pay 
the legal costs.1091 
In Norway, all cases must fulfil the stated purpose of the Act and the 
Circular points out that this means cases of negligible value would not usually 
be considered to qualify. Furthermore, in non-priority cases legal aid will only 
be granted if the matter “seen from an objective point of view is especially 
pressing for the applicant”.1092 This does not mean that the applicant herself 
considers the problem particularly pressing, but that the matter is generally 
considered to affect people personally to a particularly strong degree,1093 
directly contradicting the Finnish approach. Similarity with the listed case 
types is to be given weight, according to both the Act and the Circular, and 
the latter also points out that here, too, reference should be made to the 
purpose of the Act such that de minimis cases would not usually qualify. 
Similar approaches are taken in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In the latter 
jurisdiction there must be more than a trivial advantage to be gained if legal aid 
is to be granted.1094 In Scotland, “as a general proposition, litigation that would 
have little or no material benefit to the applicant or is brought simply to satisfy 
vague demands for justice or principle would not be reasonable”.1095 
The significance of the case for the applicant is of more consequence 
for the civil legal aid merits assessment in Denmark, where it is one of the 
statutory factors to be considered overall when assessing reasonable grounds 
to litigate.1096 In addition, if a case falls outside the usual rules there will still be 
a possibility of legal aid for exceptional cases where there are special reasons, 
stated as particularly including cases of fundamental importance, general 
public interest or significant importance for the applicant’s social or business 
situation.1097 
The Act on Civil Procedure in Iceland provides that legal aid should be 
provided in two different ways according to the level of importance of the case 
to the individual. If the applicant is within the financial eligibility limits, legal 
aid is available if the case is “of such a nature that it is considered appropriate” 
for public funds to finance the case.1098 The introduction of the concept of the 
‘nature’ of the case suggests that the importance of the matter for the client 
could be relevant. In addition, however, if “the outcome of the case would have 
great general significance or matter greatly to the employment, social status or 
other personal status of the applicant”, legal aid can be granted regardless of 
means.1099 It should be noted that this second route to legal aid eligibility has 
1091  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 8 §.
1092  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 11(3) (advice) and § 16(3) (representation).
1093  SRF-1/2017 , para 6.5.1; Ot.prp. nr. 91 (2003-2004), s.54.
1094  Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 37(2)(b).
1095  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part 4 para 3.22.
1096  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 328(2).
1097  Ibidem, § 329.
1098  Lög um meðferð einkamála, 1991, Chapter 20, Article 126. 
1099  Ibidem.
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been politically contentious and has been revoked and then reinstated according 
to the political nature of successive governments. There is a current proposal 
to, again, revoke this section of the Act, which may be brought into force 
imminently. The objections are based on the argument that it is not appropriate 
to provide non-means tested legal aid; legal aid should support only those of low 
means.1100 Interestingly, this view takes a social law approach to legal aid, viewing 
it as a benefit which should only be given to those who can be shown financially 
to need it, whilst reducing the availability of legal aid to enforce other social 
rights by removing the absolute right to legal aid in cases of great significance 
to, inter alia, the social status of the individual.
 
6.2.3.4.4 Compliance with international obligations
Some jurisdictions, notably those which have experienced negative decisions 
from the European Court of Human Rights in respect of their legal aid 
coverage,1101 specifically provide that legal aid must be granted if there is 
otherwise a risk of breaching international obligations. In the Republic of Ireland 
the catching provision is within the merits assessment, which contains the 
proviso that: “notwithstanding the outcome of these merits tests, legal aid must 
be granted if it is necessary in order for Ireland to comply with its international 
obligations.”1102
Chapter 5 above on the scope of civil legal aid includes a consideration of the 
exceptional case rules in Northern Ireland1103 and England & Wales,1104 which 
can be used to obtain funding for cases which would otherwise not be eligible, if 
legal aid is necessary to avoid a breach of the European Convention on Human 
Rights or enforceable EU rights. In both jurisdictions, an exceptional case 
determination overrides both scope restrictions and merits assessment; thus, if a 
case is in scope but would otherwise be refused on the merits, a potential breach 
of international requirements will equate to satisfaction of the merits criteria 
and legal aid will be granted.
The other jurisdictions appear content to allow their main merits tests to 
catch cases which might lead to difficulties with international obligations if 
legal aid were refused.
6.2.3.4.5 Properly prepared case
A further criterion is applied as part of the merits assessment in some of 
the jurisdictions: whether preparatory stages of the case have been properly 
conducted. This is particularly emphasised in Iceland, where civil legal aid 
decisions must include consideration of whether the case is clearly necessary 
and whether it is appropriate to bring the matter before the court, bearing in 
1100  Antonsdóttir 2018, p. 136.
1101  E.g. Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2005 and Airey v. Ireland, 1979.
1102  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 28(5)
1103  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 s. 12A(3)
1104  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s.10.
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mind: whether the circumstances and arguments are sufficiently clear that the 
case is ready to be handled by the courts; whether the individuals concerned 
have attempted to resolve the matter outside the court system; and whether 
all documents have been acquired and a court case is necessary at this point 
in time.1105 Additionally, if there is a sufficiently similar case already before the 
courts, which will be likely to set a precedent, it is permitted to refuse legal aid 
until that other case has been decided.1106
A related approach is taken in Scotland, according to the guidance; in 
deciding on the reasonableness of granting legal aid, the Legal Aid Board will 
include a consideration of the availability of evidence in the proceedings1107 
and whether sufficient attempts have been made to resolve the dispute prior to 
litigating.1108 Likewise, in England & Wales, the applicant must have “exhausted 
all reasonable alternatives to bringing proceedings including any complaints 
system, ombudsman scheme or other form of alternative dispute resolution”1109 
before legal aid will be granted.
6.3 The acceptability and implications of a merits test
6.3.1 The European Court of Human Rights: access to court, fair hearing and 
equality of arms
Article 6 of the ECHR provides an entitlement to a ‘fair hearing’ in the 
determination of civil rights and liabilities. At least two distinctive approaches by 
the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) to this provision can be seen.
The first and most common approach has been to address an aspect of the 
right to a fair hearing which is only implied by the Convention; the right of 
access to court. As early as 1975 the Court confirmed that “the right of access 
constitutes an element which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 para. 
1”.1110 This principle has been approved consistently and frequently since.1111 It 
is plain that there is good reason to ensure that the Convention is interpreted 
this way; without a right of access to court, a state could sidestep the obligation 
to provide a fair hearing by refusing any hearing at all. The problem has been 
described by the Court thus: “it would not be consistent with the rule of law 
in a democratic society, or with the basic principle underlying Article 6 § 1 
– namely that civil claims must be capable of being submitted to a judge for 
adjudication – if a State could, without restraint or control by the Convention 
enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range 
1105  Regulation 45/2008, Regulation 5.
1106  Ibidem.
1107  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part 4, para. 3.15.
1108  Ibidem, Part 4, para. 3.5.
1109  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, 104/2013, Regulation 39(d).
1110  Golder v. UK, 1975, at para 36. Confirmed, inter alia, in Roche v. UK, 2005.
1111  E.g. Roche v. UK, 2005.
223
of civil claims”.1112
The development of a right of access to court, though, leads to a further 
difficulty in practical application. Each jurisdiction has laws defining the 
circumstances and situations in which a civil case may be brought, thus curtailing 
the right of access to court. The acceptability of such laws was, inevitably, 
confirmed by the Court, which has noted that “Article 6 does not itself guarantee 
any particular content of substantive law of the Contracting Parties”1113 and 
thus that “the right of access to the courts is not absolute but may be subject to 
limitations”.1114 
However, in order to ensure that a state could not go full circle and avoid 
fair trial by setting excessive demands for civil proceedings:
the limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the access left to the 
individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of 
the right is impaired [... and a limitation ...] will not be compatible with 
Article 6 para. 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be achieved 1115 
The formulation of a right of access to court in civil cases, as carved out by 
the Court under Article 6, has thus annexed the jurisprudence on limitations 
familiar under Articles 8 to 11. As Article 6 fair trial rights are not capable 
of limitation according to the text of the treaty, this is notable and potentially 
problematic. The effect is to divide Article 6 in civil cases into two types of 
rights: rights involved in getting a civil case before the courts, which are capable 
of limitation; and the right to a fair hearing once a case is at court, which is not 
capable of limitation. Legal aid has usually been discussed within the former 
category, with the result that restrictions to civil legal aid have been readily 
accepted by the Court. Thus, under the implied right of access to court, “it may 
… be acceptable to impose conditions on the grant of legal aid based, inter 
alia, on the financial situation of the litigant or his or her prospects of success 
in the proceedings”,1116 although such limitations must “not [be] arbitrary or 
disproportionate, or [impinge] on the essence of the right”.1117 
Given this willingness to limit access to court, it is not surprising that in 
situations where there is no legal bar to appearing unrepresented, limitations 
to legal aid in civil cases have been very readily accepted by the ECHR treaty 
bodies. As argued by the European Commission on Human Rights:
1112  A v. UK, 2002.
1113  Roche v. UK, 2005.
1114  Ashingdane v. UK, 1985, para. 57. 
1115  Ibidem. This principle has been applied in many cases since, e.g. Levages Prestations Services v. 
         France, 1996; Tabor v. Poland, 2006; Laskowska v. Poland, 2007 and Dachnevic v. Lithuania, 2012.
1116  Tabor v. Poland, 2006, para. 40.
1117  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 62.
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Article 6 (1) does not require that legal aid be provided in every case, 
irrespective of the nature of the claim and supporting evidence. Where an 
individual is refused legal aid in a particular case because his proposed civil 
claim is either not sufficiently well grounded or is regarded as frivolous or 
vexatious the burden would then fall on him to secure his ‘access to court’ in 
some other way such as, for example, bringing the action himself or seeking 
assistance from some other source […] such a situation would not normally 
constitute a denial of access to court1118
The praxis has settled on a reliable formula for summarising the Court’s 
position on legal aid and access to court, typified the case of Laskowska v. 
Poland.1119 In this civil, family maintenance case, the Court stated that the 
right of access to court could be subject to legitimate restrictions on condition 
that such limitation “pursued a legitimate aim, and there was a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be achieved”.1120 This is strikingly similar to the test applied by 
the General Court of the European Union when applying Article 47 of the 
Charter in GREP v. Freistaat Bayern; the pertinent question was “whether 
the conditions for grant of such aid constitute a restriction of the right of 
access to courts and tribunals which infringes the very essence of that right, 
whether they pursue a legitimate aim and whether there is a reasonable degree 
of proportionality between the means used and the aim pursued”.1121 It is 
submitted that this line of reasoning and indeed the line of cases emphasising 
the right of access to court ignores the need for this right to be meaningful, as 
confirmed in the Airey case:
The Government contend that the application [sic] does enjoy access to the 
High Court since she is free to go before that court without the assistance 
of a lawyer.
The Court does not regard this possibility, of itself, as conclusive of 
the matter. The Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. This is 
particularly so of the right of access to the courts in view of the prominent 
place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial. It must therefore 
be ascertained whether Mrs. Airey’s appearance before the High Court 
without the assistance of a lawyer would be effective, in the sense of whether 
she would be able to present her case properly and satisfactorily.
1118  X v. UK, 1980, para. 16.
1119  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007. 
1120  Ibidem, para. 52
1121  GREP v. Freistaat Bayern, 2012.
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[...] litigation of this kind, in addition to involving complicated points of 
law, necessitates proof of adultery, unnatural practices or, as in the present 
case, cruelty; to establish the facts, expert evidence may have to be tendered 
and witnesses may have to be found, called and examined. What is more, 
marital disputes often entail an emotional involvement that is scarcely 
compatible with the degree of objectivity required by advocacy in court.
For these reasons, the Court considers it most improbable that a person in 
Mrs. Airey’s position can effectively present his or her own case. 1122
This judgment epitomises the second line of reasoning, which is a focus on fair 
hearing. The Court refers to several concepts: access to court, effective access 
and fair hearing. The emphasis, however, is on ensuring that the individual can 
satisfactorily present her case either without assistance or, if that is not possible, 
with assistance paid for by the state. Access to court must be effective. The 
approach has been followed in some later cases where the Court has found the 
relevant question to be “whether, in all the circumstances, the lack of legal aid 
operated to deprive the applicant of a fair trial and breached his right to present 
an effective defence”.1123 The ‘access to court’ approach ignores this fundamental 
aspect of the right to a fair hearing by concentrating on access to court rather 
than what happens at court. Applied to legal aid, this may cause a significant 
problem when considering outcomes for individuals. 
One further significant theme can be found in Article 6 cases concerning 
legal aid; that of ‘equality of arms’. This concept is well-established in other 
types of cases under Article 6 and the principle has been described thus: “the 
requirement of ‘equality of arms’ […] implies that each party must be afforded 
a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence - under 
conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his 
opponent”.1124
Whilst the concept has not been often discussed in decisions concerning 
legal aid, despite its evident relevance, there are some notable exceptions, in 
particular the Steel and Morris decision discussed above in Chapter 5. As a 
preliminary pointer, the Court stated that “it is not incumbent on the State to 
seek through the use of public funds to ensure total equality of arms between 
the assisted person and the opposing party, as long as each side is afforded 
a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case under conditions that do 
not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the adversary”.1125 
However, in that case “the disparity between the respective levels of legal 
assistance enjoyed by the applicants and [the other party] was of such a degree 
that it could not have failed [...] to have given rise to unfairness, despite the 
best efforts of the judges”.1126 Accordingly, the Court found a violation of 
1122  Airey v. Ireland, 1979, para. 24.
1123  McVicar v. UK, 2002, para. 51.
1124  Inter alia Dombo Beheer v. The Netherlands, 1993, para. 33.
1125  Steel and Morris v. UK, 2005, para. 62. See also Laskowska v. Poland, 2007,  para. 54.
1126  Steel and Morris v. UK, 2005, para. 69.
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Article 6 on the grounds that “the denial of legal aid to the applicants deprived 
them of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the court and 
contributed to an unacceptable inequality of arms”.1127
Equality of arms is an element of the right to fair hearing which, it is 
submitted, should be explored more fully when considering the limits which 
may be placed upon legal aid. Arguably, on a strict interpretation of the 
Convention, legal aid is required in any case where representation is necessary 
for a hearing to be fair, taking into account the need for equality of arms. The 
text of Article 6 does not allow limitations and thus a fair hearing must in 
theory be allowed in respect of any matter which in domestic law qualifies as 
‘civil rights and obligations’. 
Shipman, in reviewing the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights 
post-Steel and Morris, summarises:
Refusal to fund publicly civil litigation may lead to a violation of Art. 6(1) 
in three situations. First, if the applicant has been unable consequently to 
pursue a case in the courts, this may constitute a beach of the right of access 
to a court. Secondly, applicants may conduct their own case but the court 
may find that there is a denial of the opportunity to present an effective 
case. Thirdly, the lack of provision may lead to inequality of arms, such that 
there is a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the adversary.1128
Unfortunately, the three situations are not consistently given equal attention by 
the European Court of Human Rights, and the two main approaches of access 
to court and fairness of hearing produce consequences for the administration 
of legal aid which are not mutually compatible. As has been seen, access to 
court is a weak basis for arguing the need for civil legal aid: in most cases it is 
possible to bring or defend proceedings without representation and therefore 
legal aid is not required for the realisation of the right of access to court. The 
imposition of even quite harsh eligibility tests on merits, including prospects 
of success, would therefore be acceptable. A concentration on fairness of 
hearing produces a different result as the implication is that both sides in a civil 
dispute should be able to present their side of the dispute effectively. This would 
logically appear to be the case whatever the value of the case, cost of providing 
legal assistance or the strength of the respective positions of the parties. 
However, the ‘need for representation’ merits test is clearly directly relevant and 
if properly applied as a free-standing qualification for legal aid should ensure 
fair hearing in any in-scope case.
It is interesting at this juncture to note that the approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights largely overlooks the social law perspective which 
is, as will be seen in the conclusions chapter, a strong focus in some national 
justifications for legal aid. This may be inevitable as the European Convention on 
Human Rights has a civil and political rights focus, and it is in the context of the 
1127  Ibidem para. 72.
1128  Shipman 2006, p. 8.
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civil right to a fair trial that legal aid is considered by the Court. Nonetheless, 
the status of the Convention as the human rights treaty with the strongest 
enforcement mechanism means that its approach is disproportionately 
important compared to the statements of international bodies dealing with 
social, economic and cultural rights. The Global Study on Legal Aid of 
UNODC and UNDP, for example, emphasises the “linkages between access 
to justice, poverty and inequality, accountability and the rule of law, and 
ensuring equitable development”,1129 but is not accompanied by an enforcement 
mechanism which would exert real pressure on states to ensure legal aid on 
this basis. The equality of arms line of reasoning from the European Court of 
Human Rights comes closest to acknowledging the wider societal importance 
of legal aid, but this is the approach which is least emphasised in the Court’s 
praxis, as seen above.
6.3.2 Application of European Court of Human Rights praxis to merits  
 tests
It has long been clear from the praxis of the international human rights treaty 
bodies that they will not object to selection of cases for legal aid based not only 
on the nature of the case, but also on its strength. As early as 1980, the (then) 
European Commission on Human Rights confirmed that “Article 6 (1) does not 
require that legal aid be provided in every case, irrespective of the nature of the 
claim and supporting evidence”.1130
In Laskowska, the need to control expenditure was found to be a legitimate 
aim in limiting access to legal aid.1131 This is particularly pertinent in view 
of current fiscal policies resulting in reduced public spending across many 
jurisdictions. However, the manner in which cases are selected for funding 
must “be shown not to have been arbitrary or disproportionate, or to have 
impinged on the essence of the right of access to a court”,1132 thus leaving legal 
aid schemes open to challenge even if limitations are made for budgetary 
reasons. Considering the various types of merits test discussed above in turn, 
the Laskowska decision can be used to assess whether the European Court is 
likely to accept these limitations on legal aid. 
Probabilis causa litigandi is a basic threshold test, which is not likely to 
conflict with Article 6; if any merits limitations are acceptable, which they are 
according to praxis, this test must be tolerated.
All the various reasonableness criteria are also likely to be accepted. 
Reasonableness is a core concept in the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, and if a claimant was acting unreasonably in pursuing a case, 
or if it would be unreasonable for the state to fund the case, it is difficult to 
imagine that the Court would intervene. A note of caution should be sounded, 
1129  UNODC/UNDP, 2016, p. 5.
1130  X v. UK, 1980, para. 16.
1131  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 52.
1132 Ibidem.
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however, by way of a reminder that the Court will ultimately consider whether 
overall the right to a (fair) tribunal was impaired in the particular case, and 
thus absolute merits criteria which do not allow for the balancing of other 
factors may be found wanting. Given the generous interpretation of Article 6 
by the Court, it is also likely that the reasonable privately paying individual test 
would be found acceptable although, as argued below, theoretical objections 
can be made. 
The prospects of success test has caused some difficulties at the European 
Court of Human Rights, where in the context of justice systems which require 
legal representation at appeal concern has been expressed that legal aid 
authorities should not, in assessing an application, pre-judge a case. There 
is here a clear difference between situations in which legal representation is 
necessary, under domestic law, in order to bring a claim before a particular 
court and those where it is possible to appear unrepresented. Where it is only 
possible to make a court application through a legal representative, such as 
before the Courts of Cassation in France and Belgium, refusal of legal aid to a 
person who may be unable to afford to pay a lawyer has the effect of absolutely 
preventing that person accessing the court. The application of a prospects of 
success test in such circumstances is particularly problematic, as the legal aid 
decision has the effect of a leave to appeal decision. As the Court pointed out 
in one such case:
It was not for the Legal Aid Board to assess the proposed appeal’s prospects 
of success; it was for the Court of Cassation to determine the issue. By 
refusing the application on the ground that the appeal did not at that time 
appear to be well-founded, the Legal Aid Board impaired the very essence of 
[the] right to a tribunal.1133
However, in Del Sol1134 the Court was willing to accept a similar provision in 
France, seemingly because of the judicial nature of the body making the legal 
aid decision. There, the possibility of refusing legal aid on the ground of lack 
of arguable ground of appeal on points of law was “undoubtedly intended to 
meet the legitimate concern that public money should only be made available 
to applicants for legal aid whose appeals to the Court of Cassation have a 
reasonable prospect of success”.1135 Nonetheless, poor chances of success 
will not be an acceptable ground for refusing legal aid if other factors make 
representation necessary for a fair hearing.1136
This problem rarely arises in the jurisdictions under consideration but there 
are some circumstances in which legal representation is obligatory. In Finland, 
it is necessary to have representation in Supreme Court cases concerning 
1133  Aerts v. Belgium, 1998, para. 60.
1134  Del Sol v. France, 2002.
1135  Ibidem, para. 23 
1136  Ibidem.
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procedural errors1137 and in Norway, the Supreme Court can require a party to 
obtain representation if they are unable to properly present the case unaided.1138 
However, the primary importance of this line of decisions is that it indicates 
that even when access to court will be prohibited without representation, 
the Court is prepared to countenance the refusal of legal aid to an indigent 
party and thus deny such access. Even more so in cases where access to court 
can theoretically be achieved by an individual acting unrepresented, then, 
selection according to prospects of success is likely to be acceptable as a general 
principle.
As was seen above, in the Laskowska case the European Court of Human 
Rights held that the selection process within a legal aid system must not be 
‘arbitrary or disproportionate’1139 and thus the familiar European Court of 
Human Rights test of proportionality is relevant. Precisely how this can apply 
to a legal aid system is not clear, however. It is suggested that proportionality 
between cost and benefit might fall within this general approval. Nonetheless, 
as will be argued below, this criterion may fall foul of the need for a fair trial, 
which is in the Convention not limited to cases of larger value.
The questions of need for representation and the significance of the matter 
for the client were core in the Airey case discussed above. In that case the 
need for representation was denied by the government and the Court decided 
against them on this point, thus demonstrating that a state’s view of whether 
representation is necessary is not conclusive. A legal aid scheme which 
allows for a grant where representation is ‘needed’ will only be acceptable on 
the international level if it is found to be effective in identifying cases where 
there is such a need. The requirement that a case must be properly prepared 
before legal aid is granted may also fall under this conceptual heading; an 
individual does not yet need help with litigation if they are not yet ready 
to litigate. However, this comes with an important caveat that there may be 
a duty to provide state-funded advice to enable a person to prepare the case 
for an application for assistance with representation, as acknowledged in the 
Guidance on the sufficient benefit test for advice and assistance in England & 
Wales described above.
Compliance with international obligations is clearly a merits test specifically 
designed to ensure that Article 6, amongst other provisions, is complied with, 
and if properly applied will by definition not breach the Article. 
1137  Lag om ändring av 15 och 31 kap. i rättegångsbalken, 2011, 1 §.
1138  LOV-1915-08-13-6, § 3-2.
1139  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 52.
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6.3.3 Problems with the prospects of success criteria
6.3.3.1 Percentage likelihoods of success1140
As seen above, some jurisdictions (in this study Northern Ireland and England 
& Wales) explicitly use percentages when judging prospects of success for the 
purpose of civil legal aid eligibility. This introduces scientific language into the 
exercise, lending an aura of reliability and objectivity but it is far from clear 
that the terminology is properly understood or that the logical conclusion of 
adopting percentages has been fully considered. 
It is useful to consider the meaning of the mathematical language which has 
been adopted. ‘Percent’ literally means ‘in every hundred’; thus, if a case has a 
60% chance of success this means that if it were possible to find 100 identical 
cases and follow their progress, 60 of them would win. Statistics works best on 
large numbers and we would not expect the figures to work out exactly with only 
100 cases and much less so with a sample of ten, but if we could amass 10,000 
cases then we would expect to find 6,000 of them winning. It seems unlikely 
that this mathematical meaning is what is in the minds of the practitioners 
making the legal aid applications; many may not even understand the statistical 
implication. Lawyers in general are likely to be much more comfortable with 
phrasing such as ‘reasonably likely to succeed’ (Republic of Ireland) or ‘likely 
to succeed at court’ (Iceland) than with the true meaning of the language of 
percentages in this context. However, if the ranges of percentage prospects of 
success are small, only a genuinely mathematical meaning can make sense. It is 
very difficult to explain the difference between 50% and 60% likely to succeed 
unless the statistical definition is used; both are roughly equal chances of 
success or failure, both might be thought reasonably likely to succeed. Given 
the discussion below about accuracy of predictions, it seems highly unlikely 
that there is in fact a 10% difference in how many cases actually succeed, 
depending on whether they are predicted to have a 50% or 60% chance of 
success, but this is what is being asserted through the application of such a test. 
The logical conclusion of the use of statistical language raises a further 
concern. Taking an assumption that a given system of legal aid requires there 
to be a 50% chance of success before an individual will be funded, it is clear 
that a person with a 40% chance of success would not be assisted. However, 
statistically speaking, 40% of such persons would be successful in their cases 
if they proceeded. These people are faced with the choice of not proceeding 
with their litigation, in which case many claims which would succeed are not 
brought, or going ahead unrepresented under potentially unfair conditions. 
Even if it is felt that limiting access to court to those with strong cases is 
acceptable, restricting fair hearing to those with strong cases seems counter-
intuitive; those with very strong cases are less in need of legal assistance than 
those with borderline cases, as expert legal argumentation is less likely to make 
the difference between success and failure. 
1140  Barlow 2017c.
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A final concern arising from percentage prospects of success is that, statistically, 
the chances of the two possible outcomes must add up to 100%; i.e. if one party 
has a 60% chance of success, mathematically the chance of the other party 
winning must be 40% (unless the circumstances are such that it is possible for 
both to succeed, see below). Several of the jurisdictions prefer to fund only 
cases with at least a 50% chance of success, but unless the chances are exactly 
50% for each party, only one of the parties will meet this requirement. If both 
parties are indigent, this raises the likelihood that in most cases only one party 
will be legally aided and thus represented. The risk of an unfair hearing is thus 
increased through the use of percentage prospects of success tests, in many 
cases.
If the use of percentages is a genuine exercise in funding cases with a 
statistically reliable outcome, these issues need to be addressed; if not, the 
cloaking of subjective judgment in scientific language is inappropriate.
6.3.3.2 Accuracy of prediction1141
The use of prospects of success tests presupposes that it is possible to predict 
outcomes of legal cases. In the case of the Northern Irish and English & 
Welsh tests, there is an assumption that very detailed and precise prediction, 
expressed as a percentage likelihood, is possible, and in Scotland a similar 
assessment is required, although expressed as a scale of 1-10 rather than a 
percentage. The issue of predictability of the outcome of litigation has received 
considerable attention in the field of conditional fee arrangements.1142 In that 
context, Higham concluded that “lawyers can predict the prospects of success 
in litigation in a way which is useful and valid. What they cannot do is a sum 
in objective probability”.1143 One study of lawyers’ predictive ability in the 
context of legal aid decisions in England suggested that in fact lawyers are bad 
at forecasting likelihood of success.1144 Predictions were approximately double 
the actual success rates across the range: of cases predicted as having above 
an 80% chance of success only 47% succeeded; of those predicted as having 
a 60-80% chance of success only 34% were successful and of those predicted 
as 50-60% likely to succeed, 30% were in the event successful. The accuracy 
of prediction varied substantially depending on the type of case, with lawyers’ 
forecasts being much more successful in inheritance and probate cases than in 
business disputes, for example.1145
Some intriguing research is beginning to explore whether Artificial 
Intelligence can be used to accurately predict the outcome of cases. A recent 
study found that computer models were able to predict the outcome of cases 
at the European Court of Human Rights with an accuracy significantly 
1141  Ibidem.
1142  Higham 2003, p. 20.
1143  Ibidem, p. 30.
1144  Goriely, Das Gupta et. al. 2001.
1145  This study took place before the scope limitations of LASPO. 
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higher than that found in the predictions of lawyers in the legal aid study.1146 
Analysis of the text of European Court of Human Rights decisions enabled 
a 79% accurate prediction of whether a violation of the convention would 
be found, with the factual background in the ‘Circumstances’ section of the 
judgment proving the most important part of the text in predicting outcome. 
The researchers openly accept the limits of the findings, and there is at present 
no suggestion that Artificial Intelligence can predict the outcome of a first-
instance case at the early stage that an application for legal aid would usually 
be made. Experience suggests that the determinative element in many cases is 
the finding of facts by the judge, which can be difficult to predict particularly 
if it is dependent on how believable the parties are as witnesses. The Artificial 
Intelligence research did not address this issue as factual disputes very rarely 
occur at the European Court if Human Rights and, in any event, the computer 
predictions were made on the basis of the descriptions of the facts as set out 
by the judges in their decisions. However, given the distinct possibility that 
lawyers are very bad at predicting outcomes, the future possibilities of Artificial 
Intelligence may be relevant if prospects of success continues to be a central 
element of merits testing. 
Given the centrality of lawyer predictions to the grant of legal aid in UK 
jurisdictions, the fact that the reliability of such judgments is unknown is 
alarming. It is not acceptable that decisions which have significant impact on 
individuals’ lives and on the realisation of fair trial rights are made on such an 
apparently unreliable basis and more research is urgently needed to consider 
whether the predictions of prospects of success correlate to actual outcomes 
over a larger sample. If they do not, selection on this basis is at worst arbitrary 
and at best a subjective assessment of how optimistic the particular lawyer feels 
at that moment. 
A less fundamental, but nonetheless important, issue is the need for 
clarification of whether the prediction is of the chance of success with 
representation, or the chance of success without. Representation may make a 
material difference to prospects of success and in the schemes which have been 
described above it is unclear whether the advantages of representation are 
to be assumed when making the forecast. As the first indication of chance of 
succeeding is almost always given by a lawyer representing the applicant, it can 
perhaps be assumed that they will estimate the chances if they are permitted to 
continue assisting the client. However, this important issue is not addressed in 
the legal aid systems studied.
6.3.3.3 Defining success 
A prospects of success test must be based on an assumption that it is always 
possible to identify a concrete outcome in a legal case which can be defined as 
‘success’ and that all other possible outcomes are ‘failure’. This would be easier 
1146  Aletras et. al. 2016.
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if there were only two possible, opposite outcomes. Whilst in criminal cases 
this can be argued, in civil cases it is often not the case and defining ‘success’ is 
very nuanced. In a housing repossession case, the landlord may seek immediate 
possession and the tenant may argue that there are not grounds for forcing 
him to leave at all. If possession is awarded but with a delay of three months, 
enabling the tenant to find alternative accommodation for his family, it could 
be argued that each side was successful, although neither was granted all they 
wanted. Likewise, in a contractual dispute if the claimant seeks 20,000 € and 
receives 10,000 €, who was successful is debatable. 
Northern Ireland has given considerable attention to this issue. The 
Guidance dedicates a whole chapter to the question of what is meant by ‘a 
successful outcome’1147 and advises that in money cases a successful outcome 
for the claimant is the award of any sum which is more than nominal and 
for the defendant the case will have been successfully concluded if the case 
is dismissed or an amount is awarded which is substantially smaller than that 
claimed. This definition appears appropriate and is likely to mirror the sense 
of a litigant as to whether they were successful. It does however raise the 
interesting proposition that both sides may be successful, where a money claim 
is reduced substantially but not to a purely nominal level.
Some attention has also been paid to the question in the Lord Chancellor’s 
Guidance in England & Wales: 
the question of what an applicant may reasonably consider a successful 
outcome to proceedings may not directly equate to whether the court 
finds in the applicant’s favour […] a reasonable claimant would not view 
succeeding on liability but failing to beat an [earlier offer] as a successful 
outcome. Conversely, a defendant might reasonably view a substantial 
reduction in damages claimed against him or her as constituting success in 
the proceedings.1148
Whilst these attempts to define ‘success’ are useful and realistic, they result in 
an awareness that success can be somewhat amorphous, adding to the difficulty 
of precise prediction of the ‘prospects of success’. 
6.3.4 Mirroring commercial behaviour
The difficulty of defining success also has a consequence for the attempt made 
in some systems to mirror in legal aid the behaviour of those who pay for their 
own representation. The English & Welsh ‘reasonable private paying individual 
test’ is one explicit application of the approach. As seen above, the applicable 
test1149 requires likely cost, likely gain and the chance of succeeding to be 
balanced in order to conclude whether a reasonable private paying individual 
would litigate. Similarly, in the Republic of Ireland a case can only be funded 
1147  Department of Justice Northern Ireland 2016, Chapter 4.
1148  Lord Chancellor’s Guidance, 2018, para. 4.1.2.
1149  The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, Regulation 7.
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if a reasonably prudent person would be likely to take the action at his or her 
own expense.1150
However, it is submitted that an outright bar on funding cases with lower 
than a certain chance makes it impossible to mirror normal risk-taking 
behaviour. Firstly, as the reasonable private paying individual rule above 
accepts, there are three major elements in such a decision: cost, gain sought 
and risk of losing. This means that a number of different behaviours would 
be reasonable according to the circumstances. In a case where the costs are 
likely to be very high, and the benefit sought is modest, the chances of success 
would need to be very high to justify the risk. However, if the hoped-for gain 
is significant and the costs modest, it would be reasonable to take the risk 
even if the chances of success were relatively low. The Irish test limits one of 
the variables by clarifying the level of cost to be assumed: the cost of the case 
should be deemed to represent a financial obstacle to the individual but not to 
impose undue hardship. This leaves the risk of losing and the gain sought as the 
factors to be balanced, presuming the cost will be difficult but not impossible 
to meet. Even with this limitation on the exercise, it is submitted that some 
potential gains will be so considerable that a reasonable person would 
proceed with a lower than 50% chance of success. Furthermore, a reasonable 
person may take a risk which appears objectively unreasonable in extreme 
circumstances. Commercial risk assessment is relevant in commercial cases but 
not necessarily in the types of case for which legal aid is often sought. A person 
might well invest a significant sum of money in trying to keep their home, even 
if the chance of success was less than half. The alternative may be worse than 
the risk.
6.4 Conclusions
The merits tests in the Nordic countries, the UK and the Republic of Ireland 
vary in complexity, content and structure. In some jurisdictions it is necessary 
to go through primary and secondary legislation to binding or non-binding 
guidance or even recommended interpretation to ascertain exactly which 
criteria will be applied to an application for civil legal aid. Furthermore, 
some jurisdictions have varying tests depending on the nature of the case. 
However, despite this variety, the overall number of different types of merits 
test is relatively limited. The following chart illustrates which criteria apply in 
which jurisdiction, as well as whether the test is statutory, contained in binding 
guidance or recommended. The statutory criteria are further divided into 
those which are free-standing tests and those elements which are factors to be 
considered when assessing another criterion.
1150  Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, s. 24.
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Fig. 2. Chart showing the use of merits test for civil legal aid
TPL = test in primary legislation 
TSL = test in secondary legislation 
D = dominant test  
LF = legislative factor to be considered when applying one of the tests 
BG = binding guidance on interpretation of statutory provisions 
RI = recommended interpretation/notification of how the state agency will apply 
the test  
* costs must be considered but there is no explicit comparison between costs 
and benefit 
** depending on type of case 
*** only the exhaustion of alternatives to court is considered, not the preparation 
of this legal case
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It can be seen from the table that reasonableness in some form is present within 
the merits tests in all the jurisdictions. It has also been seen in this Chapter 
that several jurisdictions such as Sweden, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
have reasonableness as the main factor in merits testing, with other criteria 
serving largely to assist in deciding reasonableness. It is not surprising that 
reasonableness might be a unifying factor in merits tests in North-west Europe; 
the concept is an appropriate response to the realities of legal aid provision. 
According to a strict reading of international human rights obligations, 
and indeed also a stringent adherence to the rule of law, all hearings of civil 
(as well as criminal) cases must be fair. For this to be achieved, the parties 
must benefit from approximate equality of arms, and each party must be able 
to properly present his or her case. Depending on the complexity of law and 
procedure in a jurisdiction, it may be that a very large proportion of litigants 
cannot adequately prepare and present their cases without professional help. 
Even if this is in theory possible, whenever one party is either represented 
or significantly better informed or more experienced than the other, 
representation may be necessary for there to be equality of arms. These 
arguments apply irrespective of the costs of representation, the value of the case 
or indeed any other variables; all hearings should be fair, without exception. 
Such a strict application of the right to fair hearing would be unacceptably 
expensive for any modern state. Therefore the principle is not fully applied and 
restrictions are made; in practice not every hearing is to be made fair at the 
expense of the state. The examination of the merits tests above suggests that 
the typical initial response to the dilemma is to consider which cases it would 
be reasonable to fund, and which it would not. Some jurisdictions take the 
approach of leaving this question itself as the selection criteria, and provide 
legal aid when it is judged overall to be reasonable to fund in the circumstances 
of each individual case. Other legal aid systems limit the discretion of the 
decision-maker by listing criteria which must be considered when assessing 
reasonableness, whilst some break down the reasonableness test into additional 
discrete tests which must be met. Both these latter approaches attempt to steer 
the answer to the question of reasonableness by categorising the case types 
(as seen in Chapter 5) and/or the qualities and circumstances which will be 
used to determine which cases are, as a matter of policy, reasonable to fund. 
The various merits tests, however, are not equal in the extent to which they 
endanger the right to a fair hearing and it is suggested that some, though 
common, would be best avoided if proper respect is to be given to the rule of 
law.
The merits tests are more or less effective in upholding Article 6 rights 
depending which of the theoretical approaches of the European Court of Human 
Rights described above are followed. Consequently, the choice of merits tests 
can be used as an indication of which aspects or aspects of fair trial each state 
is most concerned to protect: access to court, fair hearing or equality of arms. 
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Exhibiting a very low level of merits assessment, the Finnish system displays a 
desire to ensure that, if a person is determined to go ahead with a case despite 
the inter-partes costs risk, the hearing will be fair as legal aid will ensure 
a level of equality of arms if the individual is unable to afford private legal 
representation. Legal aid will also allow access to court, again with the proviso 
that the costs risk may be a deterrent.
England & Wales provides a contrasting illustration. Of the jurisdictions we 
are considering it is clear that the English & Welsh gives the most attention to 
the prospects of success test. The test is very detailed and applied in a case-
specific way with the aim of ensuring that money is spent where it is most 
needed. However, the result is that all the focus is on the implied access to court 
element of Article 6; access to court is facilitated but with restrictions which the 
government believes to be a proportionate response to the legitimate aim of 
protecting public funds. Fair trial itself is not protected by this approach, as an 
individual who, despite a refusal of legal aid, goes ahead with a court hearing, 
is likely to be in a position of inequality of arms and may well not be able to 
effectively present his or her own case. The dichotomy leads to the result that a 
person who is refused legal aid is in a better position if she continues to court 
unrepresented than if she feels unable to continue with proceedings. In the first 
situation the right to a fair hearing is absolute and no reasonableness factor 
applies; if the hearing as a whole is unfair, due to the lack of representation and 
consequent inability of the individual to effectively present her case, there will 
have been a breach of Article 6. In the second scenario the individual might 
argue that her access to court has been denied by the failure to grant legal aid. 
However, this claim may fail if the state can show that it was reasonable in the 
circumstances to refuse legal aid.1151 
A strict ‘prospects of success’ test thus can be seen to suggest a concentration 
on access to court at the expense of fair trial and equality of arms. It has been 
seen that the jurisdictions under consideration, all high spending on legal aid 
in European terms, have differing approaches to the use of prospects of success 
as an element of the civil legal aid eligibility test. The variation is such that they 
can be positioned along a scale reaching from no use of the criterion (Finland) 
to considerable reliance on it (England & Wales). It is notable that the Nordic 
jurisdictions are grouped at the former end of the scale and those of the United 
Kingdom at the latter end, with the Republic of Ireland between these two 
groups. The variation of approach within the Nordic jurisdictions is, however, 
very considerable. It appears that the Nordic countries are putting into practice 
a deeper commitment to fair trial and equality of arms, arguably in keeping 
with the welfare state model. The statements of purpose in the Finnish and 
Norwegian legal aid legislation strengthen this argument. The UK jurisdictions, 
to the contrary, appear to be attempting to replicate a commercial decision-
making and risk-taking outcome with a much lower welfare element to their 
1151  See also Shipman 2006, p. 10.
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legal aid policy, despite policy statements of, for example, the Scottish 
government that legal aid has an important role in poverty reduction.1152
It is submitted that prospects of success should not be permitted to be the 
determinative factor in any application for legal aid. At their worst, such tests 
apply imprecise terminology (‘reasonable likelihood’) or badly understood 
mathematics (percentage chances) to an inexact science (prediction of 
chance of success) as applied to an undefined concept (‘success’). Even if 
these problems could be solved, the inevitable result is that many cases which 
would win are not legally aided, interfering with both access to court and fair 
hearing rights by reducing them to an exercise in commercial risk assessment. 
It is unfortunate that the European Court of Human Rights has enabled this 
approach through its focus on access to court rather than fair trial, and by 
allowing reasonable and proportionate limitations to become a major element 
in a right which in the Convention text is not capable of such limitation.
Turning to other merits criteria, the test of probabilis causa litigandi does 
not, it is submitted, contradict access to court, fairness of hearing or equality 
of arms. Where there is no legal argument, in many jurisdictions a case can be 
dismissed by a judge before the matter proceeds to hearing and legal aid should 
not be required to be granted in such cases. By its very nature, probable cause 
should not interfere in any case where there are legal arguments or preparations 
required; the judge should be able to identify cases where there is as a matter 
of law no case or defence possible without the need for any complex debate. 
There is of course a need for the legal aid decision-maker to have the necessary 
skill to also identify such cases and to allow legal aid for cases where there is a 
possibility to argue that a valid case exists.
If a legal aid system is focused on equality of arms, but is unable to afford 
representation for all parties, the reasonable privately paying individual 
test may be an appropriate way to proceed. In a matter where neither party 
can afford representation, the test will approximate the situation if they 
did have financial means; if the case is sufficiently important to justify the 
cost of representation, this will be provided. If not, the parties can proceed 
unrepresented, still with equality of arms. If one party is privately represented, 
the other will be funded only if a privately paying individual would consider 
this necessary and worthwhile. Whilst this may sometimes lead to an inequality 
of arms, so long as the test is applied in a realistic manner, such cases should 
be limited to those where for some reason, although it is worth bringing 
or defending the proceedings, representation is not sufficiently valuable 
to be pursued. The success of the test rests on a realistic assessment of how 
individuals do behave when faced with litigation, and caution is needed to 
prevent the test becoming a smokescreen behind which governments can hide 
their views on how they would like people to behave.
1152  Scottish Legal Aid Board Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16, p. 2. See further  
        discussion in section 9.6.2.2.
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Proportionality between cost and benefit, both as an element of the privately 
paying individual test and also as a freestanding test, should be applied with 
caution if the intention is to realistically replicate individual decision-making. 
The combination of prospects of success, which have been seen to be unreliable, 
with precise ratios of cost to benefit, as seen in Northern Ireland and England 
& Wales, are far too rigid to reflect natural human behaviour.
The ‘need for representation’ criterion is evidently closely related to the 
right to fair hearing; this test provides that legal aid will pay for representation 
where the individual cannot properly present his case unrepresented. It does 
not necessarily ensure equality of arms, as a case may concern one party who 
is well able to present their case unassisted and another who requires help. In 
these circumstances only one needs, and therefore receives, legal aid, resulting 
in a hearing with one represented and one unrepresented party; inequality of 
arms. Nonetheless, as the decisions on legal aid will have been designed to 
ensure that the proceedings were fair, there should be equivalence between 
the parties, although not overt equality, and the capable unrepresented party 
should be able to adequately hold her own against the represented party. 
Access to court should be satisfied as long as the assessment of need occurs 
early enough in the proceedings to ensure that the potential litigant in need 
of assistance obtains this help to take the steps leading to the hearing, not just 
help at a hearing. Not all cases or litigants do require representation and thus 
some cost limitation will be achieved. For significant impact on expenditure, 
though, this criterion should be combined with concerted attempts to divert 
cases away from contentious court procedures, and to make the law itself and 
legal procedure as simple as possible so that as large a proportion as possible 
of the population is able to navigate the legal system without professional help.
Significance of the matter for the individual making the application is 
a selection criterion which equally affects access to court, fair hearing and 
equality of arms. In cases judged to be of lower importance, none of the 
rights are protected. The policy perspective which can be inferred from this 
test is an acceptance that these rights cannot be vouchsafed in all cases but 
that the selection will be based on helping those for whom the legal cases 
are particularly important. Norway epitomises this approach, and is a useful 
example here even though the selection is largely scope-based. In priority cases 
both sides, whatever the respective strengths of their arguments, will have 
representation paid for by the state if they are financially eligible, thus ensuring 
access to court, fairness of hearing and equality of arms. In exceptional cases 
which are, unusually, covered by virtue of their similarity to priority case types 
and their pressing nature, the approach can also, on balance, be considered to 
be one of equality of arms as it is explicit that even cases with poor chances 
of success must be allowed representation if the other factors point to the 
necessity for assistance. Outside the priority and exceptional case types, access 
to court, equality of arms and fairness of hearing are not guaranteed as legal aid 
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is not available and the financially weaker party may find itself unrepresented 
against a represented party, whatever the strength of the case or its importance 
to the individual. The ‘significance of the matter for the individual’ criterion 
would overall be more consistent with the Article 6 jurisprudence if applied 
subjectively rather than objectively, i.e. with attention to the effect on the 
particular individual applying for legal aid, not the expected impact on people 
in general. 
The selection and arrangement of merits criteria for civil legal aid is the 
result of a compromise between cost and principle. However, some merits 
criteria, whilst effective in saving money, seriously undermine the principle of 
fair trial which legal aid is designed to defend.
241
Case study 4:
Dmitri, Danil and Denis are all Russian nationals who are openly gay. Having been subject 
to persecution, they have fled Russia to, respectively, Iceland, England and Norway. Their 
initial applications for asylum were refused and they now want to appeal.
Iceland – Dmitri
Dmitri can consult a lawyer 
and apply for legal aid. This 
should, according to the 
legislation, be granted if the 
Committee decides that the 
case is of such a nature that 
it is considered appropriate 
for public funding, or the 
outcome of the case would 
matter greatly to the social status 
or other personal status of the 
applicant. Consideration will 
be given to whether the case is 
properly prepared and likely 
to succeed at court. Media 
reports suggest that Dmitri 
is unlikely to be successful in 
his application as legal aid for 
asylum appeals is routinely 
refused.1153 
England – Danil
To obtain legal aid, Danil must 
not have acted in previous 
proceedings or under previous 
legal aid in such a way that it 
would be unreasonable to grant 
him legal aid. Then, he must 
show that:1154
he has no other funding 
possibilities; there is a need 
for representation in all the 
circumstances including the 
nature and complexity of the 
proceedings; if the case is not 
of significant wider public 
interest, the reasonable private 
paying individual test is met;
if the case is of significant 
wider public interest, the 
proportionality test is met;
the prospects of success are 
very good, good or moderate, or 
borderline or unclear if there is 
significant wider public interest, 
overwhelming importance to 
the individual or the substance 
of the case relates to a breach of 
Convention rights (which in this 
case is very possible).
Norway – Denis
Asylum appeals are non-
means tested priority cases 
and therefore Denis will 
automatically be entitled to legal 
assistance paid for by the state.
1153 Iceland Review, ‘Lack of Lawyers for Asylum Seekers’, November 24, 2016.
1154 The criteria are to be found in The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, 
        Regulations 11, 39 and 60. Additional criteria apply but only those which may have a bearing 
        on the facts of this case have been listed.
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7. Chapter 7: Reach and content of legal aid
7.1 Introduction
The previous four chapters have set out in some detail the procedural and 
material content of administrative decisions on applications for legal aid and 
public defence assistance in the Nordic countries, the jurisdictions of the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland. From the perspective of this thesis, these 
decisions form the core subject which will be compared and analysed in 
Chapter 9. Before undertaking this final analysis, it will be useful to give some 
perspective as to the meaning of the decisions in practice. Chapter 8, following, 
will consider the macro context of legal aid; its cost and position within the 
justice systems of the jurisdictions concerned. This chapter, though, will take 
a micro approach and examine the possibility and consequences of a grant of 
legal aid or a public attorney in any particular case. For an individual, it is not 
the total spend within their jurisdiction or the level of demand overall which 
is important, but rather their own ability to obtain assistance when needed. 
Whether a person is able to obtain legal aid and what help this affords them are 
what matters at the point of crisis.
For access to justice to be increased through legal aid on an individual 
level, the person concerned must both be entitled to help and have access to 
it. Eligibility factors relating to the nature of the case have been considered 
in previous chapters; here the focus is on factors relating to the client, namely 
financial eligibility and residence or nationality requirements. Access also 
requires that legal professionals are able, willing and physically present to carry 
out the necessary advice and/or representation work and supplier availability 
will also be considered in this chapter.
In addition to the reach (who has access to legal aid), the content of legal aid 
(what it provides for those to whom it is granted) will be considered. Both these 
elements are relevant to an administrative law comparison, as a system which 
covers a small proportion of the population will be subject to fewer pressures 
than one which covers most of the population. Similarly, if a grant of legal aid 
confers only modest benefits, each decision will be of less consequence than in 
a system which is generous with lawyer assistance. The advantages conferred 
by legal aid which will be considered here are the provision of an amount of 
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lawyer time and, potentially, protection against the risk of paying the legal 
costs of the opponent. The amount paid to the lawyer is also relevant as it may 
affect the amount of time spent on the case as well as the lawyer’s willingness to 
undertake the work at all.
The elements under consideration in this chapter are very complex and 
a detailed examination of the situation is not possible here. This, and the 
following, chapter aim to give a brief overview to enable the analysis in Chapter 
9 to be more meaningful. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive guide 
to eligibility criteria and the provision available under legal aid in the nine 
jurisdictions. 
7.2 The reach of legal aid
7.2.1 Financial eligibility
7.2.1.1 Criminal matters
Financial eligibility tests vary significantly between jurisdictions, and there is 
often also a difference between the eligibility rules for criminal and civil cases 
within a jurisdiction. In general, where there is such a difference, the test is 
more generous for criminal cases. Under international provisions relating to 
legal aid, the financial eligibility limits are a matter for the state, but it is for 
the treaty bodies to assess in an individual case whether the applicant had 
‘sufficient means to pay’ if this is disputed.1155
In criminal matters, as discussed in Chapter 3 above, the Nordic countries 
are uniform in operating systems whereby public defence counsel are provided 
free of charge to all, regardless of means, and no payment will be required 
for this service unless the assisted individual is convicted. Upon conviction, 
however, repayment of some kind is imposed. 
The jurisdictions in the UK and the Republic of Ireland do not have public 
defender schemes and take a variety of approaches to financial eligibility for 
criminal legal aid. In the Republic of Ireland there is no specified financial 
eligibility test for criminal legal aid; the court must decide whether “the means 
of the person charged before it with an offence are insufficient to enable him 
to obtain [private] legal aid”.1156 In assessing financial eligibility, a judge may 
require an applicant to provide a written statement of means1157 and, if the judge 
is not convinced by the truth of the statement, he or she may call the defendant 
to the witness stand to verify it. The provision of false statements of means is a 
criminal offence liable to a fine and/or up to six months’ imprisonment.1158 In 
practice, the assessment is carried out with consideration of the likely cost of 
the defence, as well as the means of the defendant:
1155  Croissant v. Germany, 1992. See also Ashworth 1996, p. 62 and McBride 1998, p. 259.
1156  Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act 1962, s.2(1)(a).
1157  Ibidem, s.9.
1158  Ibidem, s.11.
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The capacity of an accused to pay for their own representation is contingent 
on such factors as the anticipated length of the trial, the complexity of the 
trial, the seriousness of the charges preferred and the actual means of the 
accused, all of which are intermeshed, thus making the introduction of 
[financial] guidelines impractical as the matter is indeterminable.1159
Following this reasoning, the 2002 review of criminal legal aid concluded that 
the system should not be significantly changed,1160 although there are some 
anecdotal concerns about consistency of decision-making in this area. If a legal 
aid certificate is granted, there is no contribution scheme and the assistance will 
therefore be entirely free to all defendants who are found to have insufficient 
means to pay privately for representation. 
A very similar means test is applied to criminal legal aid in Northern 
Ireland. Eligibility is not dependent on any fixed income levels; rather, the 
court can grant legal aid if the defendant’s means are ‘insufficient’ to enable 
him to obtain legal assistance privately.1161 When a defendant is in receipt of 
social security benefits, it is usual to conclude that he cannot afford to pay a 
representative privately. Where this is not the case, the rule allows flexibility to 
the judge to take account of the likely cost of representation (which will alter with 
the seriousness of the charge) as well as the means of the applicant, in deciding 
whether he has sufficient means to pay for a defence lawyer. There is, however, 
provision in the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 allowing regulations to 
introduce a fixed means test. The first of two recent Access to Justice reports 
recommends that this be done1162 and also suggests that responsibility for the 
financial assessment should pass to the Legal Services Agency at that point, as 
“wherever possible decisions with expenditure implications should be taken by 
the spending body”.1163 Advice at the police station is not means tested. 
For criminal legal aid in Scotland, other than ‘automatic’ criminal legal 
aid (see Chapter 3), the statutory financial eligibility test is that “the expenses 
of the case cannot be met without undue hardship to [the defendant] or his 
dependants”.1164 The assessment includes the income and capital of the applicant 
and any spouse or partner living with them.1165 In interpreting the statutory 
provision, the Scottish Legal Aid Board has established a detailed test for both 
income and capital. The income test is based upon the civil financial eligibility 
test1166 whilst the capital upper limit is set to match the capital threshold 
for Advice and Assistance.1167 Despite the similarity with the civil financial 
1159  Criminal Legal Aid Review Committee 2002, p. 10.
1160  Ibidem.
1161  Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, paras. 28(1), 29(3), 30(3)(a).
1162  Access to Justice Review Northern Ireland, 2011, para. 4.18.
1163  Ibidem, p. 6.
1164  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 s. 23A and 24(1)(a).
1165  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook Part III para. 12.1.
1166  Ibidem, para. 12.2.
1167  Ibidem, para. 12.5.
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eligibility test, there are no provisions for the payment of contributions1168 and 
even if the income or capital are over the upper level, legal aid may be granted 
if the Board decides that paying her own legal costs would cause the defendant 
undue hardship.1169 It is worth noting that for both criminal and civil legal aid, a 
recent independent review found that the financial eligibility and contributions 
system is inconsistent and complicated, and should be simplified.1170
Thus, in Scotland, the statutory position is very similar to that in Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland but the administrative legal aid authorities 
have implemented a policy which results in a specific test similar to that 
in England & Wales. The outcome is that the criminal legal aid schemes 
administered by courts have loosely defined financial eligibility tests whilst 
those administered by government agencies use specific, exact tests.
Detailed financial eligibility criteria apply to almost all types of legal aid in 
England & Wales, including within the criminal sphere. The main exceptions 
are police station advice, special Children Act proceedings and cases before 
the Mental Health Tribunal, all of which are completely free from means 
testing and do not require any contributions or post facto payments from the 
assisted individual. In criminal matters, advice and assistance is subject to a 
means test which involves assessment of both income and capital. The client 
will automatically be deemed financially eligible if in receipt of certain social 
security benefits.1171 In other cases all capital assets and resources (including the 
value of a home above a certain limit, and the capital of any partner) and the 
total weekly income (less certain allowed deductions relating to certain types of 
income and for dependents)1172 must not exceed set limits.1173
The financial eligibility test for representation in criminal proceedings is 
complex but assisted by an online calculator.1174 For representation before the 
Magistrates’ Court, the test applies to income only and no contributions system 
is in place; in the Crown Court capital is also relevant and a contribution may 
be payable. As with advice and assistance, recipients of some social security 
benefits are automatically financially eligible,1175 as are children.1176 
7.2.1.2 Civil matters
In civil cases, all the jurisdictions under consideration apply financial eligibility 
tests, although some cases may be exempted from means testing. The generosity or 
otherwise of such tests is difficult to compare; amongst other problems, changing 
currency exchange rates and different standards of living make it difficult to 
1168  Other than in Advice and Assistance.
1169  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook Part III para. 12.2 and 14.
1170  Evans 2018, p. 50.
1171  The Criminal Legal Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 2013, Regulations 14 and 2.
1172  Ibidem, Regulations 11 and 12.
1173  Ibidem, Regulation 8.
1174  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/criminal-legal-aid-means-testing.
1175  The Criminal Legal Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 2013, Regulation 23.
1176  Ibidem, Regulation 22.
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meaningfully analyse the differences. The main variable elements of a system of 
financial eligibility for civil legal aid in the jurisdictions under consideration are as 
follows: 
a) whether some cases are exempted from means testing;
b) whether decision-makers can override the usual financial eligibility 
rules in some types of cases (i.e. whether there is any element of 
discretion in applying the tests);
c) whether there is an upper income limit above which an individual will 
be ineligible for legal aid;
d) likewise, but in respect of capital;
e) whether financial allowances are made for dependents;
f) whether clients can be asked to make contributions to the costs of 
their legal aid from their income;
g) likewise, but relating to capital;
h) whether the level of contributions varies with the cost of the case;
i) whether the level of contributions varies depending on the means of 
the assisted person;
j) whether persons of particularly low means are exempt from paying 
contributions (i.e. does anyone receive completely free legal aid?);
k) whether contributions which would normally be imposed can be 
waived or reduced in given circumstances;
l) whether the costs of legal aid are recovered from assets recovered 
through the assisted proceedings;
m) whether there is an ongoing duty on the assisted person and/or their 
lawyer during the life of the case to disclose to the relevant authorities 
any change in financial circumstances; and
n) whether legal aid can be withdrawn if the assisted person become 
financially ineligible during the life of the case.
The pattern of usage of these mechanisms is shown in the table below, in which the 
questions have been posed so that the more generous systems will answer in the 
affirmative (shaded light grey) and the less generous position will require a negative 
answer (shaded dark grey):1177 
1177  Whether varying contributions with means or with costs of case is more or less generous 
       will depend on the level of contributions required. For the purposes of this table 
         it has been assumed that contributions which are calculated as a proportion of the cost of 
           the case are less generous than a fixed level contribution, as variable contributions may 
       become much higher than most fixed rates. Furthermore, it has been assumed that 
        systems where contributions increase with the wealth of the assisted individual are more 
        generous as they tend to require smaller contributions from those of lowest means than 
        is the case in fixed contribution systems.
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Fig. 3. Chart showing use of financial eligibility tests for civil legal aid
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* The Icelandic means test, beyond the income limit, is very flexible and elements of all 
these factors can be applied by the Committee depending on how it uses its discretion. 
It can readily be observed that the jurisdictions have very varied approaches. 
The main common elements are that all have a requirement that the applicant’s 
income must be below a certain amount and that all have a system providing 
for the payment of contributions from income. In Denmark, however, income 
contributions only apply to advice cases; contributions are not required towards 
legal aid for litigation. Furthermore, the income contributions systems vary 
in that in some jurisdictions, namely Sweden and the Republic of Ireland, all 
clients must pay a contribution regardless of how low their income is, whereas 
all the other jurisdictions have a lower income level below which no contribution 
is payable. In all systems other than Norway and Denmark, contributions are 
linked to income so that those with higher incomes pay a greater contribution; 
in Norway and Denmark there is a fixed level of contribution for all those above 
the lower income limit but below the upper limit at which income becomes too 
high to qualify for legal aid at all. In Iceland, the provisions allow considerable 
latitude to the Legal Aid Committee. Legal aid can be restricted to a proportion 
of the legal costs or to a fixed amount if, inter alia, the applicant’s financial 
circumstances are such that this would allow then to afford the remaining 
expense.1178 Most systems make deductions for dependents from the assessed 
income before applying the financial limit (the exception being Norway).
Some of the other variations have at least a partial correlation with the 
bloc in which the jurisdiction is found. Thus, capital limits are a feature of all 
four systems in the UK and Republic of Ireland but largely absent in the Nordic 
countries, with the exception of Norway. Correspondingly, contributions from 
capital are required in the UK and Republic of Ireland but generally not in the 
Nordic countries. Interestingly, however, this time Finland is the exception; whilst 
there is no upper level of capital which will disqualify a person from receiving 
legal aid, half the value of capital over 5000 € is required as a contribution to 
legal aid.1179 This clearly means that an individual with high capital in a low cost 
case may have to pay most or all of the cost in contributions, but they will 
benefit from the lower legal aid rates charged by lawyers. In Norway, there is 
an upper capital limit but no scheme for contributions from capital; anyone 
with capital of under 100 000 Norwegian kronor,1180 with a low enough income, 
will be entitled to legal aid and will not have to use any of his capital to pay 
towards the legal aid costs, but anyone with capital over this amount will not be 
entitled to legal aid at all. The Icelandic Legal Aid Committee may, in applying 
the flexible provision on proportionate legal aid described above, grant a legal 
aid certificate which in effect requires the assisted person to pay some of their 
legal costs from their capital. 
1178  Reglugerð um skilyrði gjafsóknar og starfshætti gjafsóknarnefndar, 2008, Article 9.
1179  Some types of capital are excluded from the calculation.
1180  Approximately 10 000 €.
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There is also a bloc correlation in whether the level of contributions varies 
with the cost of the case; in the UK and Republic of Ireland contributions 
are based solely on income and capital levels whereas in the Nordic countries 
generally they are calculated as a percentage of the costs of the cases (although 
the percentage itself varies with income in Sweden and Finland, as seen above). 
The exception is Denmark, where the contributions are not explicitly related to 
the cost of the case, but as contributions only apply to advice cases, which are 
paid by a fixed fee, in effect the amount paid by the client does not vary, being 
fixed at 25% of the level 2 advice fee or 50% of the level 3 advice fee.1181 In 
practice these contributions, which are collected by the acting lawyer, are often 
not enforced. 
Another common feature of the UK and Republic of Ireland is the application 
of the ‘statutory charge’, a system for recovering the costs of legal aid from the 
winnings in a case where the assisted person has been successful in litigation. 
This is not generally the case in the Nordic bloc; whilst it is possible in 
Denmark1182 it is rarely enforced, and in Sweden can only occur through re-
calculation of the contribution. Norway is alone in the Nordic jurisdictions 
in having a standard procedure for recovering costs in a similar way to the 
statutory charge.
Some aspects of financial eligibility rules vary across the jurisdictions with 
no discernible pattern. Sweden, Finland and Scotland means-test all types of 
civil cases whereas the other jurisdictions exempt certain categories of case, 
usually certain types of serious case involving children. However, in Sweden an 
individual has the right to non means-tested assistance from a Public Attorney 
in such cases, and thus whilst all legal aid cases are means tested, the same 
effect is achieved as in systems where such cases are included under legal aid 
but not means-tested.
A decision-maker has authority to override the financial eligibility rules in 
all cases (on specified broad grounds) in Iceland, and in some types of cases 
in Norway, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Contributions can be reduced or 
waived in Finland, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, although in 
the latter two there is also discretion to increase the contribution in certain 
circumstances. The contributions possibility in Iceland is defined such that the 
Legal Aid Committee has discretion whether to grant only a proportionate legal 
aid certificate, rather than the discretion to override fixed contribution rules.
Whilst it is an extremely crude measure, it is also interesting to note that 
there is no clear division into more generous or less generous systems; different 
combinations of measures are used to restrict access to legal aid through financial 
tests but all the jurisdictions use several mechanisms. However, as will be seen 
below, the level at which the financial limits are placed lead to very different 
1181  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 325. The most recent rates are set in Bekendtgørelse om  
        offentlig retshjælp ved advokater, 2017, § 6.
1182  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 332(2).
251
results and thus while the tests are structurally equivalent, the outcomes vary 
considerably in their generosity.
7.2.2 Proportion of population financially eligible for legal aid
The mechanisms used for financial eligibility assessment were briefly addressed 
in the preceding section, but the actual impact on individual applicants for 
legal aid depends on the q uantitative content of the rules compared to their 
own circumstances. Taking the income limit as an example, the level at which 
this is set varies considerably in the various jurisdictions. Some apply a gross 
income limit; some apply a net limit after deduction of various allowances and 
some have both:
Fig. 4. Income eligibility limits for a single person, 2018.
 
The net figure is calculated after tax and other deductions at source such as 
national insurance and pension contributions. Certain allowed expenses are 
also deducted, commonly a selection from: rent, childcare expenses, child 
maintenance payments, identified social security benefits and fixed allowances 
for a partner or children.
Because of the differences in the allowances and the precise nature of the 
calculations, even comparison of net income limits does not provide conclusive 
information. Furthermore, the relative wealth of a country and differences in 
standards of living could make the same actual limit more or less generous 
in different jurisdictions. However, information on the proportion of the 
population which is financially eligible for civil legal aid gives an insight 
into the breadth of access to legal aid. The relevant data is not collated in all 
jurisdictions but some indication is available for Norway, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Scotland and England & Wales.
In Norway, the civil eligibility limits were last amended in 2009, since 
when average incomes have increased significantly, as a result of which the 
proportion of people eligible for legal aid has decreased. The current levels have 
been criticised as unduly strict;1183 when the current limits came into force the 
1183  See e.g. Rettshjelpsordningen må styrkes, 2015.
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Ministry of Justice estimated the number of eligible households at 32% and 
almost immediately proposed a further increase which would raise eligibility 
to 56% of households,1184 but this was not acted upon. The eligible proportion 
is now inevitably much lower than 32% but recent estimates of the exact figure 
are not available.
Denmark adjusts the financial eligibility limits annually in line with inflation 
and cost of living increases. The intention is that the proportion eligible should 
remain constant, but there are no very recent studies verifying this. In 2007 just 
under half of the Danish population was within the financial eligibility criteria 
for legal aid.1185
The proportion of the population eligible for legal aid in Sweden was 
intentionally reduced by the 1996 Legal Aid Act1186 which introduced significant 
changes in a successful effort to bring legal aid costs under control.1187 An 
assessment of the effectiveness of the Act in 2003 concluded that “the reforms 
have produced reduced legal aid costs for the country, state aid only when 
needed, increased consciousness of costs and more predictability of legal aid 
law”.1188 The fixing of financial eligibility provisions is delegated to the National 
Courts Administration1189 and levels have not changed since 1999.1190 As 
a result, the proportion of the population eligible can be assumed to have 
dropped as incomes have increased, although up-to-date percentage eligibility 
estimates are not available. In 2013 it was estimated that approximately 43% of 
the Swedish population was eligible for legal aid.1191
In Finland, reforms in 2002 increased the proportion of the population 
eligible for legal aid from 45% to 75%.1192 Since then, financial eligibility limits 
have been increased several times, most recently in 2009. Government statistics 
show that wages have not increased significantly in real terms since 20001193 and 
thus it is likely that approximately the same proportion of the population is still 
eligible for legal aid, some with a high percentage contribution.
Eligibility in Scotland was increased substantially in 2009, and it was 
estimated in 2014 that approximately 75 per cent of people in Scotland are 
currently eligible for civil legal aid either with or without a contribution.1194 
This estimate appeared still to be accepted in 20161195 but in 2018 the estimated 
1184  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009), para. 8.2.5.
1185  Ellersgaard Nielsen et. al. 2012, p. 15.
1186  Rättshjälpslagen, 1996.
1187  The costs of the legal aid scheme almost halved from 348 million Swedish kronor in1997 to 188 
           million Swedish kronor in 2010. This was achieved despite an increase in hourly rates paid to lawyers. 
1188  Utvärdering av rättshjälpslagen (1996:1619) – redovisning av ett regeringsuppdrag, Domstolsverkets 
         rapport 2001:6 as summarised in Ds 2003:55.
1189  Rättshjälpsförordning, 1997, 6 §.
1190  DVFS 2012:15 4-11 §§.
1191  SOU 2014:86, p. 26.
1192  Rosti et. al. 2008, p. 92.
1193  Statistics Finland.
1194  Law Society of Scotland 2014, p. 37.
1195  O’Neill 2016, p. 294.
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percentage was slightly lower, at 70%.1196
Official figures on percentage eligibility are not produced in England & 
Wales, but a request to the government statistics office led to the response:
In 2015, we estimate that around 25% of the population is financially 
eligible for free or contributory civil legal aid. This is based on outputs 
from DWP [Department of Work and Pensions], informed by the Family 
Resources Survey (FRS) and DWP’s Policy Simulation Model (PSM). Our 
modelling involves a number of assumptions, which bring uncertainty to 
the estimate.1197
Thus it can be seen, for the jurisdictions for which figures are available, that 
percentage eligibility levels are very varied, from 75% in Scotland and Finland 
to 25% in England & Wales,1198 and probably a similar figure in Norway. The 
discussion of legal aid spend in Chapter 8 will show that, maybe surprisingly, 
there is not a correlation between higher percentage eligibility for legal aid and 
higher per capita spend on legal aid.
7.2.3 Residence and nationality requirements
In keeping with the importance of equality before the law, legal aid in the 
jurisdictions under consideration is not subject to any nationality test; all 
persons present in the jurisdiction and requiring help with domestic law are 
entitled to apply for legal aid. 
In an exception to this general position, the UK government made a 
proposal in September 2013 to introduce a residence test in civil legal aid so 
that only those who had been lawfully resident in the UK for 12 months (with 
limited exceptions) would be eligible. However, this was challenged and the 
Supreme Court ruled that primary legislation would be required to introduce 
such a test.1199 Arguments were also made before the court that such a rule 
would be unlawfully discriminatory, but no ruling was made on this point. No 
subsequent attempt has been made by the government to introduce a residence 
test through legislation.
7.2.4 Supplier availability
7.2.4.1 Organisational factors
Being financially eligibly for legal aid is no guarantee of obtaining publicly 
funded assistance; obtaining legal assistance funded by the state will be 
dependent on finding a lawyer willing and able to take the case under the terms 
which the state imposes. Relevant factors include which lawyers are permitted 
to carry out legal aid work under the scheme established by each government, 
1196  Evans 2018, p. 18.
1197  Email from legal aid statistics.gov, 31 May 2017.
1198  The percentage eligibility in England & Wales has dropped dramatically over time,  
        from a high of 81% in 1979. See Goriely 2002.
1199  R (on the application of The Public Law Project) v. Lord Chancellor, 2016.
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as discussed in Chapter 2, and whether lawyers with such permission are accessible 
and prepared to take on the work. 
Governments have at least partial control over some of the factors affecting 
access to legal aid lawyers but other aspects are entirely within the power of 
the legal profession. Within the boundaries set by governments for the delivery 
of legal aid work, lawyers themselves have some leeway to affect availability of 
and access to legal aid. Lawyers directly employed by the state to perform legal 
aid work are of course more restricted, but private practitioners are not obliged 
to take on work on the terms set by the legal aid scheme and can reduce or 
increase access by their response to the conditions offered.
7.2.4.2 Supplier behaviour
7.2.4.2.1 Reducing access
The willingness of lawyers to carry out legal aid work is necessary for legal 
aid delivery. In some jurisdictions the poor terms on which legal aid is offered 
lead to reluctance to take legal aid work unless no other income streams are 
available. 
In Denmark, for example, less than one in five lawyers is willing to take 
legal aid cases1200 due to an impression that since the legislative changes in 
2007, the administrative burden has increased at the same time as pay has 
decreased.1201 The reluctance of lawyers to carry out legally aided work means 
that there are significant geographical differences in access, as larger towns are 
more likely than small towns and rural areas to be served by public legal aid 
institutions. The shift since the legislative changes is illustrated by a 76 percent 
drop in lawyers’ legal aid and an increase of 56 percent in the cost of legal 
aid institutions.1202 The Danish Institute for Human Rights has called upon the 
government to carry out research on the extent to which citizens have “proper 
access” to the legal system.1203
One of the main challenges for the legal aid scheme in Finland is also 
access;1204 due to large geographical distances particularly in northern and 
eastern Finland, it can be very difficult for potential clients to get to a Legal Aid 
Office, which is necessary to obtain publicly funded legal advice (as has been 
noted above, private lawyers in Finland can generally only act in legal aid cases 
which are in court or likely to proceed to court). If the opposing party in a case 
has already consulted the nearest Legal Aid Office, the rules on conflicts of 
interests will mean an even longer journey unless the Legal Aid Office can refer to 
a private practitioner. It is hoped that video conferencing and other technological 
solutions will help to alleviate the access problems. Further legislation1205 on 
1200  Ellersgaard Nielsen et. al. 2012, p. 13.
1201  Ibidem.
1202  Ibidem. See also Danmarks Nationale Menneskerettighedsinstitution 2016, Chapter 5.1.
1203  Danmarks Nationale Menneskerettighedsinstitution 2016, p. 49.
1204  Rissanen and Rantala 2013.
1205  Lag om statens rättshjälps- och intressebevakningsdistrikt, 2016.
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reorganisation of the Legal Aid Offices came into force on 1st October 2016 but this 
does not appear to have had an effect on access as the main change has been the 
consolidation of back office functions and the introduction of joint working with 
the guardianship offices.1206 
In England & Wales, relationships between the relevant government bodies and 
the profession have been very poor over the last decade at least, arising largely 
from tensions over the cost-cutting exercise which has seen real rates of pay 
decline whilst administration costs have increased. The reduction in numbers of 
providers, particularly in civil work where the total fell by 50% in the five years after 
LASPO,1207 have also caused alarm in the profession. On the criminal side the plans 
(currently shelved) to introduce price competitive tendering have caused great 
mistrust and anger.
The relationship between the profession and the government on legal aid has 
always been challenging in Northern Ireland.1208 Criminal legal aid was introduced 
in its earliest form in 19451209 but civil legal aid was first available in 1965,1210 
about fifteen years after the equivalent legislation in England & Wales. Prior to 
this, the profession operated a ‘Poor Man’s Lawyer Scheme’ and there was some 
resistance within the profession even to the introduction of a formal civil legal 
aid scheme. Clear evidence of ongoing difficulties can be seen from the recent 
reduction in Crown Court fees for criminal work,1211 which was the subject of an 
18-month dispute between the profession and the government, including a strike 
and an application for judicial review by the Law Society and Bar Council. A 
mediated settlement in February 2016 resulted in some amendments to the fees.1212 
During the strike, access to criminal legal aid in the Crown Court was of course 
detrimentally affected. The Norwegian Bar Association has also in the past resorted 
to strike action in a dispute over fees, withdrawing access to legal aid services for a 
week in the Spring of 2015.1213 
The legal profession in Scotland criticises the civil legal aid system in particular 
for being “overly complex, inefficient, outdated and under-funded”.1214 The criminal 
legal aid scheme for summary cases is said to be “overly complex and could benefit 
from being simplified”1215 whilst the solemn criminal case legal aid fee scheme 
should, it is argued, be re-structured to encourage early resolution.1216 However, 
in general the profession is continuing to provide services; the Scottish Legal Aid 
Board carried out a monitoring exercise in December 2015 which concluded that 
“for the majority of the areas of law considered, there is no evidence which indicates 
1206  RP 26/2016 rd, 11.
1207  Ling and Pugh 2017, para. 2.25.
1208  Hewitt 2010, Chapter 5.
1209  The Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945.
1210  The Legal Aid and Advice Act (Northern Ireland) 1965.
1211  The Legal Aid for Crown Court Proceedings (Costs) (Amendment) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2015.
1212  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016, paras. 3.7 - 3.9.
1213  Rønning 2018, p. 24.
1214  Law Society of Scotland 2014, p. 5.
1215  Ibidem, p. 19.
1216  Ibidem, p. 22.
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the existence of systemic access problems”.1217 The only subject areas in which 
there was evidence of systemic access problems were homelessness law and 
public and administrative law.1218
In the Republic of Ireland, there are 33 Law Centres around the country 
which can potentially supply all civil legal aid services, employing barristers 
where necessary for representation.1219 However, there has been a significant 
problem of demand outstripping supply resulting in considerable and 
unacceptable delay. At its worst, this undersupply led to clients waiting up 
to 24 months for a first appointment with a solicitor at a Law Centre in non-
priority cases.1220 This was found by the High Court to “[amount] to a breach 
of the constitutional entitlements of the plaintiff [...] It is not enough to set up a 
scheme for the provision of legal aid to necessitous persons and then to render 
it effectively meaningless for a long period of time”.1221 Whilst it was stated in 
2015 that the aim was to “provide a first consultation within a maximum of 
2-4 months”,1222 delay remained a problem and indeed in a Value for Money 
and Policy Review, timeliness of service provided was “the main issue to be 
considered”.1223 The issue proved difficult to resolve with limited resources and 
in 2012 a ‘triage’ system was put in place. This operates such that if waiting times 
at a Law Centre exceed 4 months, a new client will be offered a first meeting 
with a solicitor within one month,1224 at which other options will be signposted 
and ways to prepare for the next meeting will be suggested.1225 By this technique 
the wait is moved back so it is between the first and second appointments, but 
arguably meaningful access to services is still subject to unacceptable delays 
which interfere with proper access.
7.2.4.2.2 Increasing access
Unwillingness of the profession to engage in legally aided work can reduce 
access and costs, but there may also be an opposite effect if legal aid work 
appears preferable to other available types of work. In addition, the level of 
protectionism shown by the legal profession will impact upon availability as 
barring other potential providers from taking on legal aid work gives the legal 
profession considerable control over access.
Blankenburg suggests that the differences in legal aid expenditure in Europe 
may relate to the behaviour of the legal profession in each jurisdiction, in 
particular “their traditional policy with respect to the services to be rendered 
1217  Scottish Legal Aid Board 2015, p. 5.
1218  Ibidem.
1219  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services, 2017, Part 5, pp. 5-18 and 5-19.
1220  Priority case types are given immediate or near-immediate attention. Law Society of Ireland 2012.
1221  O’Donoghue -v- Legal Aid Board & ors, 2004, as per Mr Justice Kelly.
1222  Value for Money and Policy Review of the Legal Aid Board 2011, p. 4. By November 
         2015 the aim was to provide advice within a month; Legal Aid Board Circular on  
         Legal Services, 2017, Part 2, p. 2-3.
1223  Value for Money and Policy Review of the Legal Aid Board 2011, para. 4.6.
1224  Legal Aid Board Circular on Legal Services, 2017, Part 2, p. 2-3.
1225  Law Society of Ireland 2012, p. 13.
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by advocates and […] how far they manage to maintain a privileged monopoly 
keeping other professions out of offering similar services”.1226
The possibility that the nature and behaviour of the legal profession has 
a significant impact on legal aid is also considered by Bevan, in the specific 
context of potential “supplier-induced demand” in the UK.1227 His suggestion is 
that the changing market for legal services in a jurisdiction produces changing 
opportunities and challenges for lawyers which affect both the types of cases 
which they take on (including the funding types) and also how long is devoted 
to each case:
The principal (as a third-party payer) is concerned about the opportunity 
costs of professional services: the opportunities forgone by using resources 
on one case as compared with another, the trade-offs of providing legal 
services at all, or of increases in the volume of service supplied on a 
particular case. This means that at the heart of a concern over supplier-
induced demand is that, what ought to be social rationing decisions, are 
being made through the application of professional criteria. The current 
system provides a casual basis of rationing: for example, escalation in costs 
in one [sub-national geographical] region results in subsequent national 
reductions in eligibility.1228
In examining whether supplier-induced demand could be proved, Bevan 
applies a “target income hypothesis”: that a lawyer will seek and manage work 
so as to secure a target income, which is likely to be the same as, or an increase 
on, past income.1229 Applying this hypothesis to changes in legal aid expenditure 
over time, he finds considerable evidence for the hypothesis. For example, 
changes in expenditure on different categories of legal aid are found by him to 
be “the products of decision by lawyers and not the payers”;1230 when legal aid 
for advice was subjected to a strict cost per unit of advice, but with eligibility 
assessment by solicitors, the volume of cases increased. Unit cost could not 
be pushed upwards but providing advice to more clients offered solicitors 
additional income to replace losses from falling levels of private income. Bevan 
considered relative needs for legal advice in various geographical regions of the 
UK and concluded that levels of expenditure do not reflect relative need.1231 In 
conclusion (in 1996), Bevan found that “the current system of legal aid enables 
lawyers to secure a target income rather than encourage a fair and efficient use 
of limited resources”.1232 Further:
1226  Blankenburg 1992, p. 110.
1227  Bevan 1996.
1228  Ibidem, p. 105.
1229  Ibidem, p. 107.
1230  Ibidem, p. 110.
1231  Ibidem, p. 112.
1232  Ibidem, p. 114.
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Spend on legal aid, within the current system, is not simply determined by 
the eligible populations and the fee rates decided by the Lord Chancellor. A 
crucial determinant of expenditure is lawyers’ willingness to take on legal 
aid work, and this in turn depends on the numbers of lawyers and scope 
for private work. The current system encounters the endemic problem of 
entitlement based on rights, that at any level of financial eligibility, “need” 
and the degree to which this is met can exceed what the Government can 
afford. Legal aid thus requires a system of social rationing to be in place.1233
This study is now outdated in England & Wales, as very significant changes 
to the structure of legal aid have been made since it was completed, but 
nonetheless the arguments are interesting and may have application in other 
jurisdictions.
One specific way in which the structure of the legal profession impacts upon 
not access but legal aid expenditure is that in jurisdictions with a bifurcated 
profession (solicitors and barristers), at least two lawyers are involved in many 
cases before courts. Whilst the bulk of advice and case preparation will be 
carried out by a solicitor, a barrister may also advise the solicitor and client 
together in the preparatory stage, and at hearings the advocacy in higher courts 
will generally be conducted by a barrister, with the solicitor attending the 
hearing to assist the barrister and client. In serious cases, a senior barrister 
may be instructed, who will be accompanied by both a solicitor and a junior 
barrister at hearings. This system is in place in the Republic of Ireland and all 
the jurisdictions of the UK. In Northern Ireland, for example, a certificate of 
criminal legal aid, in addition to covering the work of a solicitor, also covers 
representation by a barrister and, in Crown Court cases, permission can be 
sought from the court for a second barrister to be appointed. Historically, the 
proportion of Crown Court defendants represented by two barristers was over 
half, but had fallen to under 20% by 2015 following the introduction of new 
rules.1234
7.3 The content of legal aid
7.3.1 Amount and cost of work
Having secured the services of a legal aid lawyer, a client may well find that 
the amount of assistance they are given as a result of their grant of legal aid is 
rationed. The quantity of lawyer help may be limited and the individual may or 
may not be protected from a potential inter-partes costs risk. The latter aspect, 
which may well affect the demand for legal aid from potential litigants, will be 
considered below, but in this section the amount of lawyer work provided to a 
legally-aided party will be examined. This issue is evidently relevant to the cost 
1233  Ibidem, p. 114.
1234  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016, para. 3.13 – 3.14.
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of the legal aid scheme overall, as well as providing context to the decision in 
each individual case. 
Legal aid rarely provides the same service that a client would obtain if they 
were paying privately and were of unlimited means. This is to be expected; 
the state has limited resources and legal aid is not always a high priority for 
spending. Limits to the amount of work carried out on a particular case can 
be applied very explicitly, by the application of a ceiling for hours worked, or 
more covertly through lawyer payment mechanisms in the form of fixed fees. 
The latter schemes assume that some cases will be more expensive for the 
lawyer than the relevant fixed fee but some will be less expensive; on average 
the fee is expected to be correct. In practice such fee schemes are likely to 
result in some rationing of work by the lawyer conducting the case to ensure 
that their business is financially viable. The hourly rates paid to lawyers under 
legal aid are often lower than private fee rates, which does not act as a direct 
cap on amount of work carried out for a particular client but does impact on 
willingness of lawyers to engage in legal aid work, and thus availability of legal 
aid assistance for potential clients.
In states operating a salaried lawyer scheme (Finland and the Republic of 
Ireland), legal aid lawyers are not subject to hourly limits per case. However, 
they may have significant pressure of work including large caseloads and long 
waiting lists, which act as controls on the amount of time which they can afford 
to spend on each case.
In Finland, when work is carried out by Legal Aid Offices, the issue of 
hourly rates of pay does not arise; the offices have a fixed budget and thus a 
fixed staff complement, and the work carried can be divided between both staff 
and cases as the Legal Aid Office sees fit. The work of the offices is monitored 
against lawyer targets of 230-250 cases per year, including advice matters. 
Whilst the Ministry of Justice does not interfere in the conduct of individual 
cases, it hosts working groups and discussions with and between Legal Aid 
Office leaders to try to ensure that access is available for as many clients as 
possible.
The work of a private lawyer will be covered to a maximum of 80 hours 
in most Finnish cases (civil and criminal); however, the court dealing with 
the case may extend legal aid for up to 30 hours at a time if there are special 
reasons, taking into account the person’s need for access to justice and the 
nature and extent of the matter.1235 Within these time limits, legal aid will 
pay for work that is “necessary in view of the nature and extent of the matter, 
the value of the object of the dispute and the circumstances as a whole”.1236 
The case fee ultimately paid to a private lawyer should be “a reasonable fee 
for the necessary measures”1237 and is calculated under a scheme set out in 
1235  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 5 §, para. 2.
1236  Ibidem, 5 §, para. 1.
1237  Ibidem, 17 §, para. 1.
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regulations.1238 Factors such as the age of the client and his language capabilities 
can be taken into account when deciding which steps were necessary.1239 
Whilst a Legal Aid Office granting legal aid can limit this to certain steps in 
proceedings or preparations for proceedings,1240 it cannot limit the number of 
hours covered by the certificate; that is for the discretion of the court when 
assessing the costs to be paid at the conclusion of the case.1241
The starting-point for calculation of fees is the time spent1242 but only time 
reasonably spent with regard to the nature of the case and the work carried 
out will be reimbursed.1243 In simple criminal cases only 5 hours preparation 
will be allowed unless there are special circumstances.1244 The current hourly 
rate, which has been in force since 2014, is 110€1245 (which is about half the 
usual private rate) but the lawyer can upon request be paid a fixed fee instead. 
These rates are set at six different levels depending on the type of matter, the 
court in which it is heard and the length of the final hearing.1246 The lawyer’s 
fee can be increased by up to 20% in certain circumstances1247 or reduced if the 
representative is not fully qualified, if the case is one of several related matters 
being handled by the same representative or if the case was not properly 
handled.1248 
Bills are assessed by the court or (in asylum cases, or other non-court 
matters dealt with outside Legal Aid Offices) by the Legal Aid Offices. The costs 
assessment takes place at the same time that the final ruling is given in the 
matter and the conducting lawyer is responsible for ensuring that the court has 
all the information it needs to make the assessment; later submission of costs 
information or claims will not usually be accepted1249 and the court has no duty 
to prompt the attorney to make a claim.1250 However, if the attorney can show 
that there was no realistic opportunity to submit on time, the court may accept 
a late bill.1251 In criminal cases, the prosecutors comment on the defence bill of 
costs as part of the court’s assessment,1252 but the final decision is made by the 
judge. It is unlawful for the lawyer for a legally-aided client to receive any fee 
from the client other than the percentage contribution.1253 
1238  Statsrådets förordning om grunderna för arvoden vid allmän rättshjälp, 2008.
1239  HFD 20.9.2013/2979.
1240  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 5 §, para. 1.
1241  HD 2012:15.
1242  Statsrådets förordning om grunderna för arvoden vid allmän rättshjälp, 2008, 2 §.
1243  Ibidem, 4 §, para. 1.
1244  Ibidem, 4 §, para. 2.
1245  Ibidem, 6 §.
1246  Ibidem, 7 §.
1247  Ibidem, 8 §.
1248  Ibidem, 9 §.
1249  HFD:2014:178.
1250  HFD:2014:177.
1251  HFD:2013:16.
1252  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 17 §, para. 1.
1253  Ibidem, 17 §, para. 2.
261
The Finnish time limits for legally aided cases are thus generous, but the fees 
are relatively low. It is not generally felt that access is affected by these elements 
of the system, geographical access to Legal Aid Offices and reluctance to risk 
inter-partes costs being more significant factors.
In Sweden, where a private practitioner is involved in civil cases, there are 
limits on the amount of time which may be claimed for their work. Legal advice 
has a maximum of two hours, after which the client must move onto legal 
aid if further assistance is needed. Under legal aid for representation, there 
is a standard ceiling of 100 hours of work,1254 although this can be extended 
by the granting authority (court or Legal Aid Authority)1255 by a number of 
hours to be specified in the decision. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, 
the legislation does not give any indication of the factors which should be used 
to determine whether an extension should be granted.1256 The Court clarified 
that the possibility of extension should amount to no more than a safety valve 
in a small number of cases; bearing in mind the need to save money, the 
option should be used sparingly. Particular attention will be given to whether 
the lawyer has used an inordinate amount of time in the case hitherto1257 and 
whether any previous extensions of time have resulted in an improvement in 
the client’s position.1258 Where the opposing side is responsible for causing delay 
in the matter, a limited extension may be awarded.1259 These time allowances 
are generous, and extension is possible when needed, the practical result being 
that a person in receipt of legal aid in Sweden will have access to as much legal 
assistance as is required for the case to be properly prepared and presented. 
However, a lawyer acting under legal aid must be cautious because bills 
are carefully, and sometimes strictly, assessed at the end of the case. Only 
work which was “reasonable” will be reimbursed1260 and the rule of thumb 
used by the Legal Aid Authority is that the amount of time which would 
have been required by a reasonably experienced lawyer for the work will be 
allowed. Reductions are made on the basis of an overall percentage drop with 
the result that it can be difficult, in the event of an unfavourable assessment, 
for the lawyer to know which parts of the work claimed were found to be 
unreasonable.
In criminal cases, the amount to be paid to public defence counsel, who are 
also lawyers in private practice, is based on the overall principle that:
1254  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 15 §.
1255  Ibidem, 34 §.
1256  Högsta domstolen Ö722-00, 2000.
1257  Ibidem; see also Rättshjälpsnämnden 20-2000.
1258  Rättshjälpsnämnden 50-2000.
1259  Arbetsdomstolen B 52/00.
1260  Rättshjälpslag, 1996, 27 §.
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Public defence counsel shall receive reasonable compensation from public 
funds for work and time and for disbursements made in connection with the 
assignment. Compensation shall be determined on the basis of, as a starting 
point, the time taken that is reasonable with regard to the nature of and 
extent of the assignment and applying the hourly costs norms determined 
by the government.1261 
The authorities are empowered to “prescribe the fee schedule to be followed 
in certain cases and issue rules on the computation of compensation for 
time lost”,1262 which in practice leads to the calculation of fees using a system 
of fixed fees for various elements of the defence work carried out. Public 
Attorneys in non-criminal cases are paid on an hourly rate for work reasonably 
required.1263 The hourly rates paid to lawyers under the civil legal aid scheme 
and under the Public Attorney schemes are the same,1264 and considerably less 
than a lawyer would usually charge in civil cases. The rates were last set in 
secondary legislation in 20091265 but with a provision that the National Courts 
Administration shall each September provide the government with the basis 
for calculation of the following year’s hourly rates.1266 The fee levels are then 
published each year in the booklet “Legal aid and tariffs”.1267
In Denmark, fees are fixed for civil advice work but in representation cases 
the amount to be paid is calculated in the same way as in privately-paying cases. 
Legal advice from private lawyers is reimbursed partially by the state. The fixed 
fees for step 2 and 3 work are set out in legislation1268 and are adjusted annually 
in line with the governmentally-fixed index.1269 The client is responsible for 
payment of part of the fee but may not always pay. The resulting fees for the 
lawyer, if the client does not pay their contribution, are very low, amounting to 
only 780 DKK for level 2 advice and 1195 DKK at level 3.1270
The fee level for legal aid representation is set by the court in the same way 
as for non-legally aided cases,1271 according to the value of the case. Bands 
are fixed and allocated a fee which is a starting point for the costs decision 
of the court in the specific case.1272 In family cases, there is a set figure which 
is to be taken as a starting point but which may be adjusted in the light of 
circumstances, and in other civil cases the rules provide a band of possible
1261  Rättegångsbalk, 1942, Chapter 21, 10 §.
1262  Ibidem.
1263  According to lag om offentligt bitrade, 1996, 5 §, the rules set out in rättshjälpslag,  
       1996, 26-29 §§ apply also to Public Attorneys.
1264  See e.g. Förordning om särskild företrädare för barn, 1999, 3§; Lag om  målsägandebiträde, 1988, 5 §.
1265  Förordning om timkostnadsnorm inom rättshjälpsområdet, 2009.
1266  Ibidem, 3 §.
1267  In 2019 the hourly rate is 1380 SEK, approximately 135 €.
1268  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 323(6).
1269  Ibidem, § 326(1).
1270  Approximately 105 and 160 €, respectively.
1271  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 332(1).
1272  The lists are available at https://www.domstol.dk/OESTRELANDSRET/ 
        TAKSTEROGSALAEER/Pages/default.aspx.
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costs awards from within which the judge will determine the amounts to be 
paid. However, unlike in privately-paying cases, a legally aided lawyer may not 
request further fees from the client1273 and as a result the final fees received by 
the lawyer are usually significantly lower in these cases. Civil legal aid bills are 
processed and paid by the district court local to the lawyer whose bill is being 
submitted.1274
The banded fee arrangements mean that a lawyer will always be paid more 
for cases of a higher value. This has a deterrent effect against taking cases for 
poorer litigants which are of small value, but may be complicated. This may 
cause difficulties in finding lawyers willing to take legal aid cases where, for 
example, an employment case in which six months’ pay is recovered may 
result in a very low fee for the lawyer. Public defenders are paid by the State 
Treasury1275 at a level decided by the court and may not receive additional 
payment from the client.1276
Civil legal aid for advice (but not representation) in Norway is usually paid 
on a fixed fee basis, at between 2 and 12 hours’ work, depending on the type 
of case.1277 For many cases this is generous compared with the advice limits in 
Denmark and the UK. A higher fee will only be paid if the actual time spent 
is or will be twice the usual limit, in which case the County Governor can 
authorise payment for the whole case on an hourly basis.1278 The intention is 
that the fixed fee will work as a reasonable average for all cases carried out, 
some of which will be shorter, some longer. However, as the decision is only 
made upon submission of the final bill for payment, there can be considerable 
uncertainty for the lawyer during the case as to whether the fixed fee or an 
hourly fee will be paid, which may well have an impact upon the conduct of the 
case. If a case takes 2 hours or less, the full fixed fee will not be paid; instead a 
fee of 1 ½ times the hourly rate will be paid.1279 
Representation under civil legal aid can be subject to fixed fees,1280 but these 
have only been set for a small number of case types.1281 Other cases are paid on 
an hourly rate and all necessary and reasonable work will be allowed; the same 
test as for private bills. In cases where the grant of legal aid has been made by 
the court, the court will also assess and pay the lawyer’s bill at the end of the 
case (albeit reimbursed by the Ministry of Justice). In cases where the County 
Governor granted the free legal representation then that will also be the body 
which assesses and pays the bill, on the same basis.
1273  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 334(5).
1274  Bekendtgørelse om offentlig retshjælp ved advokater, 2017, § 9.
1275  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 741.
1276  Ibidem, § 741(1) and § 334(5).
1277  FOR-2005-12-12-1442, § 5.
1278  FOR-2005-12-12-1443, § 3-5.
1279  FOR-2005-12-12-1442, § 5.
1280  FOR-2005-12-12-1443, § 4-4.
1281  FOR-2005-12-12-1442, § 6.
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In Norwegian criminal cases, official defence counsel are paid by the state.1282 
Payment is a combination of fixed fees and hourly assessment, depending on 
the complexity of the case. Simpler cases are generally paid at a fixed rate but 
if a case becomes complex or takes longer than usual, an application can be 
made by the lawyer to be paid on an hourly basis. However, this application is 
made at the same time that the bill is submitted and, as a result, the lawyer does 
not know during the conduct of the case what the payment basis will be. This 
can lead to difficult decisions about the extent of defence preparations for trial. 
Cases in which the trial lasts over a week are always paid on an hourly basis, 
with a rule of thumb in assessment that one and a half hours of preparation 
time are required for every hour in court. Work claimed above this amount 
must be justified. Official defence counsel are not entitled to receive any 
additional payment from the client.1283 The hourly rate is the same for civil and 
criminal work, and is set from time to time by the Ministry of Justice.1284 From 
1st January 2017 the rate is 1020 NOK1285 compared with common commercial 
rates between 1500 and 5000 NOK per hour.
The Scottish legal aid fees scheme is complicated and consists of a mixture 
of fixed fees and hourly rates. Criminal advice and assistance is subject to two 
main separate initial limits of £35 and £90, depending on the type of case.1286 
However, other additional limits are also in place, depending on the type of 
criminal advice and assistance or ABWOR being used.1287
The standard initial limit of authorised expenditure in civil advice and 
assistance is £95, although an initial limit of £180 applies for advice and 
assistance or ABWOR where the solicitor is satisfied that the matter is likely 
to go to court and that the applicant is likely to qualify financially for civil 
legal aid.1288 In children’s legal advice and assistance, the basic initial limit is 
£95.1289 Any of these limits can be exceeded but only with prior authority of the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board.
Within crime, 95% of cases are heard as summary offences before a Justice 
of the Peace or in a Sheriff Court without a jury. The majority of these cases 
are legal aid fixed fees covering work up to and including the first 30 minutes 
of trial. The level of fee payable depends on various factors and is set out in 
regulations.1290 Only 5% of criminal matters are solemn cases heard by a sheriff 
and jury or at the high court and these, together with some summary cases 
1282  Straffeprosessloven, 1981, § 107.
1283  Ibidem, § 107.
1284  FOR-1997-12-03-1441, § 2.
1285  This is approximately 105 €. Rundskriv G-12/2016. 
1286  Advice and Assistance (Financial Limit) (Scotland) Regulations 1993, Regulation 3(c).
1287  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook, Part III, para. 2.1.
1288  Scottish Legal Aid Board Civil Legal Assistance Handbook, Part III, para 2.10.
1289  Scottish Legal Aid Board Handbook: Children’s Proceedings under the Children’s   
           Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, Part II, para. 2.12.
1290  The Criminal Legal Aid (Fixed Payments) (Scotland) Regulations 1999. See also  
        Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook, Part V, Chapter 1.
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exempted from fixed fees, are paid on an hourly basis for both solicitors and 
any involved barristers.1291 As was seen above in Chapter 3, there is a risk of 
perverse incentives within the fees structure affecting the choice of a client to 
plead guilty or not guilty. The police station duty scheme has been criticised 
for resulting in the situation that solicitors can only be paid for advising their 
own clients in a police station if they also agree to advise other clients who 
are without representation. Due to the very low level of fees for the duty work 
at police stations, it has been argued that accepting such duties is “simply 
unsustainable”.1292
Civil and children’s fees vary according to the type of case and whether it is 
a defended action. Non-defended matters such as divorce petitions are usually 
paid on a fixed-fee basis and the payment for defended actions is often made up 
of a selection of fixed-fee items plus hourly rates for some aspects of a case. The 
fee structure is complex and there are seven separate schedules to the relevant 
regulations1293 which set out the various payment levels. The intricacy of 
payment arrangements adds to the administrative burden on lawyers providing 
the service, making legal aid work additionally unattractive. 
In Northern Ireland, the level of the fee paid to defence lawyers in criminal 
legal aid is set by the government, and account must be taken of certain factors 
when setting the fees.1294 These criteria include the time and skill required, 
as well as the need to secure value for money. The vast majority of criminal 
matters are dealt with at magistrates’ court, under a system of standard fees,1295 
and since 20051296 most cases at the Crown Court are also paid on a standard 
fee basis. The fee is paid by the Legal Services Agency upon submission of an 
invoice by the lawyer. 
In civil cases a basic division exists: High Court fees are paid on an hourly 
basis, whilst in the County Court there is a scale of fees which depends on 
the value of the claim.1297 In some types of case,1298 the solicitor can choose 
whether to claim a fixed fee or an hourly rate.1299 The scale of costs is set by the 
County Court Rules Committee and applies to private bills as well as legal aid 
bills. The use of the scale saves administrative time checking submitted bills 
but does lead to the costs being out of the control of the Legal Services Agency 
when the Rules Committee periodically updates the fee scale. Currently, Family 
Proceedings Court fees are assessed on an itemised basis, making them very 
1291  The Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) (Fees) Regulations 1989, Schedules 1 and 2.
1292  Law Society of Scotland 2014, p.3.
1293  The Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) (Fees) Regulations 1989, as amended, which deal  
        with fees for both civil and children’s legal aid.
1294  Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, para. 37.
1295  The Magistrates’ Courts and County Court Appeals (Criminal Legal Aid) (Costs)  
        Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009.
1296  Legal Aid for Crown Court Proceedings (Costs) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2005.
1297  The County Court (Amendment) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2013, Schedule 2.
1298  Such as those under the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995.
1299  The Civil Legal Services (Remuneration) Order (Northern Ireland) 2015, Schedule 3,Part 2.
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unpredictable. Overall, “the current remuneration framework is a complex 
matrix of statutory and non-statutory standard and composite fees, which sit 
alongside the submission of time based claims by legal representatives … The 
complexity of these arrangements has imposed a significant administrative 
burden upon the Agency”.1300 As a result, the Ministry of Justice is trying to 
negotiate standardised fees, initially in family cases at all levels and subsequently 
in all civil cases.1301 The complexity inevitably also causes administrative burden 
for suppliers, but fixed fees are often unpopular amongst providers as rates of pay 
tend to be relatively low.
A civil legal aid certificate when issued covers only solicitor work; the 
solicitor must apply to the Legal Services Agency for authorisation if they wish 
to engage a barrister for the case.1302 If this is not sought, or if it is refused but 
the solicitor nonetheless employs a barrister, the solicitor will be responsible 
for paying the barrister’s fee. Particularly in the Family Proceedings Court, 
authority for instructing a barrister is rarely given. Currently only 1% of these 
cases are certified for counsel.1303
In general terms, legal aid in England & Wales pays the bill of the lawyer 
conducting the case, court fees and other costs such as experts’ fees. However, 
these payments are limited to rates set by the government at levels usually 
considerably lower than those paid privately. Advice at the police station is 
covered by a fixed fee which may be increased if the actual cost exceeds an 
Escape Fee Threshold.1304 Criminal Advice and Assistance covers work up to 
a value of £300,1305 after which the solicitor can apply to the Legal Aid Agency 
for an extension if further work is still required and the client has not yet been 
charged with an offence. Other criminal work is paid through a system of fixed 
fees applying to different types of cases, with hourly rates for cases which fall 
outside the fixed fee schemes.1306 There have been reductions in criminal fees 
for advocates since 2007, which are even more substantial in real terms, leading 
to criminal work being increasingly less financially attractive to lawyers. 
Within the civil legal aid scheme, all advice and assistance matters are paid 
on a fixed fee, with additional recompense only available if costs exceed three 
times the fixed fee.1307 The fixed fees for advice are such that, if converted into 
hours’ work, the amount paid for would be around three to five hours’ work.1308 
Almost all civil litigation funding certificates (for representation) are granted 
1300  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016, para. 3.20.
1301  Ibidem, para. 3.21.
1302  Civil Legal Services (General) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, Regulation 11.
1303  Review of Civil and Family Justice in Northern Ireland, Review Group’s Report on  
        Family Justice, 2017, para. 10.23.
1304  The Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, Schedule 4.
1305  Approximately 340 €. The Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013,  
        Schedule 4, para. 3.
1306  The Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, Schedules 1,2 and 4.
1307  The Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, Schedule 1, Table 1. 
1308  Calculated using fixed fees and hourly rates contained in the Civil Legal Aid   
           (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, Schedule 1.
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subject to two limitations: a particular step in the proceedings (which might be 
all steps up to the hearing) and a costs limitation, most usually £2,250.1309 These 
limitations can be amended on application to the Legal Aid Agency or in some 
emergency situations by the solicitor.1310 Fees for the solicitor conducting the 
case are paid on a series of standard and graduated fees, at payment rates which 
vary according to the level of help being given and the subject-matter of the 
case.1311 The certificate allows the solicitor to instruct a barrister in the case, as 
long as costs are kept within the limit, but if a second more senior barrister is 
sought, prior approval from the Legal Aid Agency is needed. The barrister will 
be paid according to a schedule of fixed fees in family cases and inquests,1312 
and on an hourly rate for other advocacy.1313 Civil legal aid certificates cover 
experts’ fees and other out-of-pocket expenses such as court fees, but these are 
increasingly subject to fixed rates.1314 
In the Republic of Ireland, Law Centre solicitors can only conduct civil 
cases; they are paid a salary and no fixed cost per case is applied. In criminal 
cases, legal aid is granted to private practitioners and covers the fees of a 
solicitor and up to two barristers, depending on the circumstances. Experts’ 
fees and other fees, costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and conduct 
of the defence are also included. Fees are paid on the basis of fixed fees, with 
a set payment for preparation and the first day of a hearing, and an additional 
fee for each day in court thereafter. The exact amounts depend on which court 
is hearing the case, and vary for solicitors and barristers. Civil legal aid also 
pays barristers and privately-practising solicitors (when used) a variety of fixed 
fees. Fees are felt to be low, particularly at the District (lowest) Court. Indeed, 
over past years fees have dropped considerably in line with the financial crisis 
experienced by the country: fees were reduced by 8% in 2009, 8% in 2010 and 
10% in 2011. Whilst the reductions in civil servants’ pay over the same period 
are now being reversed, no increases have yet been made to legal aid fees, an 
issue which has been discussed in Parliamentary Committee.1315 
A previous section of this chapter examined how the behaviour of the legal 
profession can affect access to legal aid for clients. The fee structures briefly 
outlined here are clearly relevant to the willingness of lawyers to take on legal 
aid work. As described above, there may be lack of provision in certain places 
or subject areas if lawyers do not feel the work is financially sustainable; 
conversely some legal aid work may be reimbursed in a way which lawyers can 
use to their advantage, particularly if other work is in short supply. In addition 
to the overall question of supply, though, payment schemes and particularly 
1309  About 2570 €. Ling and Pugh 2017, para. 5.128.
1310  Ibidem, para. 5.130.
1311  The Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, Schedule 1.
1312  Ibidem, Schedules 3 and 4.
1313  Ibidem, Schedule 2.
1314  Ibidem, Schedule 5 as amended.
1315  Committee of Public Accounts, 12 November 2015. The discussion related in particular 
        to fees for acting for the State.
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limits on the amount of work which will be paid for by the state, also impact on 
the significance of a grant of legal aid for an individual. If a legal aid certificate 
entitles a client to up to 100 hours of assistance, it is more meaningful for a 
client (as well as more expensive for the state) than if only 5 hours’ work are 
routinely covered. 
Amongst the legal aid schemes under comparison, Finland and Sweden are 
particularly generous with lawyer time, allowing 80 and 100 hours respectively. 
The Norwegian advice time limit of 7 hours is relatively generous compared 
to the Danish advice fees but for representation these jurisdictions both 
use the same system for settling legal aid bills as for private cases. However, 
a prohibition on charging additional fees to clients means that the actual 
resulting sums received by lawyers under legal aid are much lower than the 
amounts received if a client pays privately. The jurisdictions of the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland apply complex fees provisions to legally aided work 
by private practitioners, at low levels which cause much dissatisfaction within 
the legal profession. In addition to potential problems of access arising from 
lawyers refusing to take legal aid cases, low fixed fees or financial limits on 
certificates also impact on the amount of work which can be realistically 
carried out on a case. In some circumstances the limitation may be quite severe 
and lead to very restricted work being carried out on a case. For example, 
in England & Wales the fixed fee for some domestic violence cases is £608, 
representing about 12 hours’ work at the very low nominal hourly rates for 
legal aid. This is very significantly lower than the hourly limits in Finland and 
Sweden, and it is hard to believe that this will not impact on the time taken in 
preparing and conducting a case.
7.3.2 Protection against inter-partes costs
Access to justice in practice also depends on the individual being willing to 
take on any associated risks, in particular the risk of being found liable to pay 
the costs of the opposing party if that party wins the case. In some jurisdictions 
a grant of legal aid reduces this risk or removes it altogether, whereas in others 
no such protection is offered. 
In Denmark, a legally aided party who loses the case is protected entirely 
against paying the other party’s costs in civil cases. Civil legal aid includes 
exemption from court fees, payment of lawyers’ fees from the state Treasury, 
reimbursement of reasonable costs and exemption from paying the other side’s 
costs,1316 although the legal aid certificate may be limited to only some of these 
benefits.1317 The winning party’s costs will be paid by the state.
In the UK jurisdictions, protection is not total, but it is unusual for costs 
to be awarded against a legally-aided party. In Scotland, a court making a 
costs award can limit the legally-aided party’s liability to an amount which is 
1316  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 331(1).
1317  Ibidem, § 331(2).
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reasonable in all the circumstances1318 and award the remaining costs to be paid 
from the legal aid fund.1319 The position in England & Wales is very similar.1320 
Likewise, in Northern Ireland, if a legally-aided party loses in a civil case, she 
will be partially protected against having to pay the costs of the other party.1321 
Costs awarded must be limited to the amount which is reasonable for her to 
pay, and caselaw has established that the overriding factor will be the financial 
means of the legally aided party.1322 The court may award the winning party’s 
costs to be paid instead by the Legal Services Agency.1323 
In Norway, if the assisted person is unsuccessful, it will be usual for costs 
to be awarded against them. In this situation the legally-aided person can 
apply to the Civil Affairs Authority to have the liability for costs covered by the 
state,1324 although such applications are rarely granted. In practice, therefore, 
an unsuccessful legally aided party will have to pay the other side’s legal costs.
A grant of Finnish legal aid does not protect against inter-parties costs if 
the case is lost and it appears that the risk of having to pay the other side’s 
costs acts as a deterrent to clients wanting to pursue cases with low chances of 
success. The situation in Sweden, Iceland1325 and the Republic of Ireland is the 
same; legal aid has no effect on the need to pay the other side’s legal costs in the 
event that the legally-aided person loses the case. However, in Sweden the other 
party’s costs will be paid (up to a certain limit) by legal expenses insurance; a 
useful additional bonus for those whose cases are funded this way.
The issue of inter-partes costs may have a significant impact on a legal aid 
system, as the risk may deter people from accessing court. If the potential 
liability is large, there may be a deterrent effect even if chances of winning the 
case are relatively high. In systems which do not include prospects of success as 
a criterion for civil legal aid eligibility (such as Finland), the risk of inter-partes 
costs operates as a prospects of success test self-imposed by clients. However, 
it should be noted that there appear to be other factors at play which affect the 
impact which a costs risk has on the choice to proceed; in Finland, this is felt 
to be a significant deterrent, whilst similar rules in Norway appear to have little 
restraining effect. It may be that cultural differences in willingness to take risks, 
or in attitudes to legal cases overall, are present.
As has been seen above, many jurisdictions pay court fees from legal aid 
or exempt a legal aid recipient from court fees. This is in accordance with 
the interpretation of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights by the Human Rights Committee, which has held that some 
system is required to ensure court fees are not a barrier to access to court for 
1318  Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 18.
1319  Ibidem, s. 19.
1320  The Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.
1321  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, Article 18.
1322  McGucken v. McGucken, 1991.
1323  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, Article 19.
1324  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 22.
1325  Lög um meðferð einkamála, 1991, Article 128(3).
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the indigent.1326 Whilst this could be achieved in various ways, and the state can 
choose its method, it is plainly appropriate for legal aid recipients to be excused 
court fees.
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter has given a brief summary of the reach and content of legal aid. 
It has been seen that the extent to which the population is financially eligible 
for legal aid varies considerably within the jurisdictions of North-West Europe. 
The details of the financial eligibility criteria have not been elaborated upon, 
for reasons of space, but it can be seen that there are numerous possible 
mechanisms for rationing legal aid according to the means of the applicant. 
The effects of such restrictions are two-fold: for the individual contemplating 
legal proceedings, a harsh financial eligibility test for legal aid may mean that 
they are refused legal aid although unable to afford to pay a lawyer privately. In 
theory, such an eligibility criterion might violate international human rights 
requirements, and in practice would force the individual to abandon their 
case or go ahead at a disadvantage, without representation. Secondly, a harsh 
financial test from the state’s perspective can restrict the amount of money 
which must be spent on legal aid and represents a relatively easy to administer 
option for cost reduction. 
The availability of legal aid to a particular individual also depends on her 
finding a lawyer willing to take her case, which may not be a given if legal 
aid fees are low in comparison with the income available to lawyers from 
private clients. As has been seen, this is almost universally the case; even in 
systems which assess legal bills the same way in all cases, a prohibition on 
taking additional fees from legal aid clients means that lawyers earn more from 
their private cases. Only where lawyers are employed by the state to carry out 
legal aid work, which within our jurisdictions applies mainly to Finland and 
the Republic of Ireland, will they be unable to earn more by taking privately 
paying clients. In these circumstances the choice has been made by the lawyer 
when choosing a job, to earn less than would be possible elsewhere. Thus, in 
all jurisdictions where sufficient other work is available, legal aid is dependent 
upon some lawyers taking a principled stand and choosing to act for poor 
clients. Reducing fees for legal aid work is another way for governments to 
save money on legal aid, but such a policy can lead to access problems either 
through a steady decline of willing lawyers or through abrupt cessation of 
services if relationships with the profession break down to the extent that 
strikes are called.
1326  CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 11; Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 1997, para. 7.2.
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8. Chapter 8: Comparative legal aid in context
8.1 Introduction
The core of this thesis has been a comparative examination of nine legal aid 
systems, considered from an administrative law perspective. The focus has 
therefore been on the statutory framework, administrative organisation and 
material content of the schemes, giving particular attention to the decision-
making structures and parameters. This is a relatively narrow concentration on 
a specific set of public administrative actions, and it has been seen that these 
vary considerably in the jurisdictions concerned. However, in the comparison 
care is needed to ensure that any conclusions reached are not unwarranted. 
Whilst from a descriptive point of view the comparison is of like with like, from 
a functional perspective this may be only partially true. In every jurisdiction 
within the study, legal aid is only part of the state’s response to several 
overlapping requirements. It has a role to play, inter alia, in: the functioning 
of the justice system as a whole; the upholding of the rule of law; the provision 
of access to justice; the guarantee of a fair trial; the relief of poverty and 
the promotion of equality. The way in which legal aid is perceived within a 
jurisdiction and the size and nature of the role it is designed to fulfil will have 
an effect on its organisation and also on the extent to which it can be judged 
as successful. Two identical systems in two different jurisdictions would not be 
equally appropriate or effective, yet different systems could be equally effective 
if they fit their context well.
An equivalent argument applies to the comparisons of government spend 
on legal aid. As will be seen below, the cost of legal aid can be controversial 
and both governments and the media are wont to draw comparisons between 
jurisdictions as ammunition for arguments in favour of reducing legal aid 
spend. This is ill-conceived without an understanding of the wider context. 
On a very basic level, for example, the costs of legal aid in a state cannot be 
profitably compared with expenditure in another state unless it is understood 
that one country has an extensive parallel system which deflects a large 
proportion of cases from the court system and thus from legal aid, or that a 
whole judicial branch is run in such a way that representation is not the norm 
for any party.
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This is a significant limitation of a study such as this, and prevents the drawing 
of any conclusions which would suggest that one system is ‘better’ than another. 
Instead, the question must always be whether another system might work 
well, or better than the existing system, in a given jurisdiction, in light of the 
different context of legal aid in the two places. It may be possible, however, as 
will be seen in the conclusions in Chapter 9, to consider how well various legal 
aid systems comply with international human rights standards, and to compare 
the extent to which they are internally consistent and meet stated national aims.
As set out in the introductory chapter, the definition of legal aid in this 
thesis is the provision by the state of legal help and representation by lawyers, 
either through state employees or by paying for private lawyers. These schemes 
fund lawyers to provide advice, assistance and advocacy for current or potential 
future interaction with the formal legal system of the state. They represent the 
equivalent of a person of means engaging a private lawyer to assist with a legal 
problem; what is being examined is the provision in each jurisdiction for an 
indigent person to enable them to achieve some sort of parity with a privately 
represented party. There are however other methods available for states to 
improve access to justice and fair trial. These include keeping disputes out of 
the court system so far as possible; making adjustments to court procedure 
to improve fairness without the need for legal representation or finding other 
ways to fund legal assistance for those who cannot afford to pay privately. 
The extent to which these other mechanisms are in use in a jurisdiction is an 
important part of the context for legal aid, without which a comparison can be 
misleading. 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of this context for legal aid in the 
nine jurisdictions under study. First, the economic context of legal aid decisions 
will be examined. Then, how the wealth of the country and poverty levels in the 
population may interact with the cost of providing legal aid and a functioning 
judicial system will be noted, along with a consideration of measures which 
may indicate levels of litigiousness. 
Attention will finally turn to the systemic context of legal aid and 
differences in the overall judicial systems in the jurisdictions. To understand 
the importance of legal aid in each jurisdiction requires an appreciation of 
the other elements of access to justice provision as they vary across states. 
Alternatives to the formal justice system play a large role in some jurisdictions 
and these will be examined, as will the variations within the formal justice 
system which reduce the need for legal representation and/or for legal aid.
First, then, issues of spend and demand will be considered. The amount 
spent on legal aid is an important part of the context for a comparative study 
of the administration of legal aid systems. Legal aid is one of the three key 
spending areas in judicial systems alongside courts and the prosecution 
service; it is not just the legal aid budget itself which is relevant but also how 
this relates to the wider justice spend in a jurisdiction. Further, the amount of 
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money devoted to justice and legal aid must also be seen in the context of the 
economic and social characteristics of the state which impact upon the need, 
and demand, for justice processes and legal aid.
8.2 Economic context: spend and demand
8.2.1 Spend (courts, prosecution and legal aid)
8.2.1.1 Data collection by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
All the jurisdictions under consideration fall under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe and a great deal of useful information on their justice systems is 
collected by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). 
A comparison of spend on justice is a useful starting point in the search for an 
appropriate comparison of context for legal aid.
CEPEJ carries out a biennial evaluation of European judicial systems, 
comparing aspects such as the budget devoted to justice systems, the status of 
judges, prosecutors and lawyers, court organisation and efficiency and quality 
of the activity of courts and public prosecutors. CEPEJ rightly cautions against 
too simplistic an interpretation of the comparative data, and points out that 
evident economic and size differences between states, as well as differences in 
data collection and reporting, can cause mis-comparison. Nonetheless, the data 
published by CEPEJ is a valuable tool in setting the context for the present 
comparison of legal aid, and the most recent report1327 can be used as a useful 
source of comparative quantitative data. The online database CEPEJ-STAT,1328 
which accompanies the report, contains additional detail.
The 2018 CEPEJ survey collected data from 2016. Amongst the jurisdictions 
under comparison here, only Northern Ireland was unable to provide any data 
for the report1329 and up-to-date comparative information on Northern Ireland 
is thus unfortunately unavailable from that source. Reference will, however, 
be made to the 2014 CEPEJ data for Northern Ireland at some points in this 
analysis, with suitable explanation and adaptation. 
CEPEJ collects statistics on the overall ‘justice system’, which represents the 
entire budget of the relevant Ministry of Justice and thus in many jurisdictions 
includes not only the costs of the court system but also other costs such as 
those of the prison system, the probation service, enforcement services, 
forensic services and in some cases also the police. More useful for present 
purposes is the information on the ‘judicial systems budget’ which is defined by 
CEPEJ as the combined budgets of the court service, legal aid and prosecution 
services. 
1327  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018.
1328  https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/dynamic-database-of-european-judicial-systems.
1329  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 7.
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8.2.1.2 Total spend on the judicial system
The various elements taken into consideration by CEPEJ when calculating 
the cost of judicial systems fall into three categories, as stated above. The 
included components are: court costs including staff salaries, computerisation, 
interpreters’ and experts’ costs, buildings and training; legal aid costs of civil 
and criminal cases brought to court and not brought to court; and prosecution 
service costs.
Following this scheme, the budget of the whole judicial system in 2016 per 
capita for the jurisdictions under consideration here is set out in the chart 
below. The European average judicial system budget amongst the European 
states who responded to the CEPEJ survey was 64 € and the median was 53 
€. All of the jurisdictions within this research thesis, except the Republic of 
Ireland, are above-mean and above-median spenders and five spend within a 
narrow range of 77 € to 84 € per capita per year. Iceland and Sweden spent 
considerably more than the others, with 2016 expenditure of 111 € and 119 € 
respectively. However, the nomenclature used by Sweden for the judicial system 
budget partially differs from the CEPEJ guidelines and caution is needed in 
interpreting the data.1330 Whilst figures were not available for Northern Ireland 
for 2016, that jurisdiction had the highest judicial system budget amongst these 
comparators in 2014; the second highest in Europe at 144 € per capita.
 
Fig. 5. Per capita allocated annual budget (€) for the judicial system in 2016 
8.2.1.3 Division of justice spend between 3 elements
A consideration of the amounts spent on judicial systems by states shows 
that there is also a significant variation in how resources are allocated to the 
different aspects of the justice system. Figure 6 below shows the breakdown of 
the judicial system budget into court, prosecution and legal aid costs. Figures on 
1330  Ibidem, p. 32.
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the breakdown of judicial system costs were not provided to CEPEJ by Iceland, 
Finland, compared to the other jurisdictions in this study, allocates the highest 
proportion (68%) of its judicial system budget to the courts, almost double that 
of Scotland (36%).1331 Within the context of Europe as a whole, the jurisdictions 
in this study allocate low proportions of judicial system spend to the courts; the 
European median is 67%. According to CEPEJ this is a characteristic of “Anglo-
Saxon countries/entities and Northern Europe”. The authors posit that:
The small share of the budget of the judicial system allocated to courts in 
common law systems is explained by a relatively low number of professional 
judges. For the Northern European states, part of the explanation also lies in 
the fact that the society is less litigious and also because ADR (Alternative 
Dispute Resolution) is better integrated into these systems than in the rest 
of Europe.1332
Caution is urged in interpreting the data, however: “differences may reflect 
differences in the organisation of judicial systems, as the tasks of the courts 
may vary from country to country”.1333 It should also be noted that the court 
budget figure does not include the costs of any administrative tribunals which 
are not formally courts. This data is reflected in the overall justice system 
budget if paid for by the Ministry of Justice; otherwise it may not feature in the 
CEPEJ statistics at all.
 
 
Fig. 6. Per capita annual implemented budget (€) for the judicial system 
broken down into the component parts of prosecution costs, court costs and 
legal aid. 
1331  Sweden spends 59%; Norway 55%; Denmark 50%; England & Wales 48%; Ireland 48% 
        and Iceland 45%. Figures are unavailable for Northern Ireland. The court expenditure 
        figure for Sweden is an implemented budget; for the other jurisdictions the allocated 
         budget is provided.
1332  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 41.
1333  Ibidem.
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The prosecution budget per capita also varies considerably as a share of the 
overall judicial budget. In Scotland, the public prosecution services budget is 
about one third of the judicial system budget, whilst the proportion in Norway 
is only 7%. 
For the purposes of this doctoral thesis, it is the level of legal aid spending 
which is most relevant, both in absolute terms and as a share of the judicial 
system budget. The variations in the latter measure are interesting because they 
may indicate that legal aid is playing a different role in the jurisdictions. Some 
examples will be explored later in this chapter when differences between civil 
and criminal law systems are examined. For the moment, however, it is worth 
noting that the group of jurisdictions being studied all spend a high proportion 
of their judicial budget on legal aid, compared to the rest of Europe. According 
to CEPEJ figures, this proportion in 2016 was as follows: England & Wales 39%; 
Norway 38%;1334 Ireland 36%; Scotland 35%; Sweden 28%, Denmark 27% and 
Finland 21% (figures for Iceland were not provided). Whilst figures were not 
available for 2016 for Northern Ireland, it is worth noting that in 2014 that 
jurisdiction had the highest proportionate spend on legal aid in Europe, at 
51.2%.1335 The Netherlands at 22% was in 2016 the only jurisdiction outside 
this study with as high a proportion as any of the jurisdictions within the study 
– all the other European jurisdictions spend lower proportions on legal aid. 
According to the authors of the CEPEJ report, the reasons for this can be found 
partly in the right to habeas corpus which explains why the judicial systems 
of the United Kingdom1336 “have always granted a special priority to legal 
aid”.1337 In addition, “Northern European states also have a strong tradition of 
generous legal aid systems, which tend to include more people by raising the 
threshold”.1338
However, within the group the differences are still considerable. It is usual 
for governments to compare legal aid spend when proposing policy change,1339 
but this figure may be misleading because it does not take into account 
differences in the amounts spent on other aspects of the judicial system, which 
may mitigate an apparently large difference in financial commitment to justice. 
This point can be most dramatically illustrated by an example from outside 
the North-Western European group; in 2016, France had a legal aid budget of 
only 5 € per capita, much lower than any of the study group. However, the per 
capita budget for the whole judicial system was 64 €; higher than the Republic 
of Ireland and relatively close to the 77 € to 84 € per capita per year group of 
jurisdictions identified above. Within the comparison group, in 2016 Finland 
spent almost exactly half as much per capita on legal aid as England & Wales,1340 
1334  The figure for Norway is based on approved, rather than implemented, legal aid budget.
1335  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2016.
1336  And presumably also Ireland, although CEPEJ do not explicitly suggest this.
1337  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 77.
1338  Ibidem, p. 76.
1339  See the literature review in Chapter 1.
1340  16 € in Finland; 31 € in England & Wales.
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yet the total judicial system budgets were almost the same.1341 Norway had an 
overall judicial spend lower than that of Denmark, but spent a third more on 
legal aid.1342
Thus, a simple comparison of legal aid spend between jurisdictions is likely 
to be too blunt an instrument for public policy development. As the various 
aspects of the judicial system function and interact in a unique configuration in 
each jurisdiction, the role of legal aid and consequently its cost are enmeshed 
within the wider judicial system. The goal of reducing legal aid expenditure 
so as to match lower spending in another jurisdiction is ill-conceived, as the 
interrelationship between the various parts of the judicial systems will not 
be the same. Worse, reduction of legal aid spend may be counterproductive 
as the consequences on the rest of the judicial system will be specific to that 
jurisdiction and may result in greater expense in other parts of the system, 
or a reduction in functioning of the judicial system overall. A clear example 
of this can be found in the experience in England & Wales, where significant 
reductions in legal aid took effect in 2013. The National Audit Office estimated 
a reduction in legal aid spending of £300 million in the financial year 2013-14 
but pointed out that:
The reforms have the potential to create additional costs, both to the 
Ministry and wider government. In the year following the reforms, there 
has been a 30% year-on-year increase in family court cases in which neither 
party had legal representation. What research there is suggests that such 
cases increase costs to HM Courts & Tribunals Service (an agency of the 
Ministry). Based on the increase in self-representation, we estimate the 
additional cost to HM Courts & Tribunals Service at £3 million per year, 
plus direct costs to the Ministry of approximately £400,000. The Ministry 
has committed to approximately £2 million for additional support for 
litigants in person over the next 2 years. There may also be costs to the 
wider public sector if people whose problems could have been resolved by 
legal aid-funded advice suffer adverse consequences to their health and 
wellbeing as a result of no longer having access to legal aid.1343
The direct financial consequences were modest in relation to the savings made 
on legal aid, but the costs to the wider public sector have not been quantified, 
and within the justice system there may be non-financial costs in terms of 
reduction in quality of service, increased waiting times etc. A recent study in 
Scotland has addressed the financial, economic and social impacts of spending 
on legal aid and supports a conclusion that money spent on legal aid provides 
wider advantages with a worth well beyond the direct outlay. For example, 
the study found that £1 spent on legal aid in a housing case can produce a 
return of approximately £11 for both the legal aid recipient and wider society; 
1341  77 € in Finland; 79 € in England & Wales.
1342  Norway has a judicial system spend of 81 € and legal aid budget of 31 €; Denmark’s  
        judicial system spend is 84 € and legal aid budget 23 €.
1343  National Audit Office 2014, p. 6.
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80% of the return benefits the individual due to fewer evictions and cases of 
homelessness and 20% benefits public services including the health service and 
local authorities with reduced demand for health and social services.1344
8.2.1.4 Legal aid spend
Having made the above caveats concerning the usefulness of legal aid budget 
figures in isolation, it is nevertheless important to be aware of the comparative 
legal aid spend when considering the organisation and administration of 
legal aid in a jurisdiction. As this is the central theme of this thesis, a closer 
examination of the cost of legal aid in the systems concerned is appropriate, 
and consideration of any recent or proposed significant changes will be made 
in section 8.2.2.2 below.
Within the CEPEJ study, the definition of legal aid costs includes amounts 
paid to litigants or their lawyers in criminal and non-criminal cases before 
courts and also amounts paid to individuals in measures “aimed at preventing or 
accompanying appeals before the courts” such as conciliation and mediation.1345 
In addition, CEPEJ includes “legal aid granted by the States or entities outside the 
courts, to prevent litigation or to offer access to legal advice or information”.1346 
Thus, the sums included in the CEPEJ studies include access to information 
and to legal advice and assistance as well as representation at court, including 
disbursements such as court fees. This definition is close to the one used for 
this thesis, but in including conciliation and mediation costs may be slightly 
broader, depending on the collection of statistics and organisation of services in 
each jurisdiction. In so far as resources for mediation and conciliation are spent 
on lawyer services (as, for example, in England & Wales), they will be included 
in both the CEPEJ figures and in this thesis, however, in some jurisdictions 
mediation services may be separate (as in Norway) and potentially included in 
the CEPEJ figures yet outside the remit of the rest of this thesis. Nonetheless, 
the definitions are close enough for the CEPEJ figures to be useful as part of the 
discussion of context. Due to the very large difference in population sizes in the 
jurisdictions being studied (see the section on national variables, below), the 
per capita legal aid spend, rather than the absolute spend, will be considered 
here. 
The figures used are those for implemented budget (i.e. actual spend) rather 
than allocated budget, except in the cases of Norway and Denmark, where 
the figure for implemented budget was not supplied to CEPEJ and thus the 
allocated budget is substituted in the table below. In the case of Denmark, 
significant overspend compared to budget had been an issue in previous years 
and the allocated budget was therefore considerably increased in 2014, which 
should mean that the implemented budget can be reasonably replaced by the 
allocated budget for present purposes. 
1344  Law Society of Scotland 2017.
1345  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 17.
1346  Ibidem, p. 71.
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The previous CEPEJ report,1347 on 2014 data, showed Northern Ireland as the 
highest spender on legal aid, by a considerable margin, at 74 € per capita. In 
order to allow some comparison here despite the lack of CEPEJ material for 
2016, the 2014 figure has been adjusted down by 20%, which is the drop in 
spend on legal aid reported by the Legal Services Agency Northern Ireland in 
its Annual Reports over the relevant period.1348 
Around 6.5 € per capita were allocated on average by the European states to 
legal aid in 2016, with a median value of 2.1 €.1349
Fig. 7. Implemented legal aid budget per capita 2016 (€). The figure for 
Northern Ireland is the adjusted 2014 budget. The figures for Denmark and 
Norway are the allocated budget.
The authors of the CEPEJ study point out that depreciations and appreciations 
of local currency can affect comparison and lead to misinterpretation of the 
statistics1350 and also warn that:
1347  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2016.
1348  Northern Ireland Legal Services Commission 2014, Northern Ireland Legal Services  
        Commission 2015, Legal Services Agency Northern Ireland 2016 and Legal Services  
       Agency Northern Ireland 2017. Northern Ireland, in common with the rest of the UK, 
       uses an accounting year running from 1st April to 31st March. The reported spends on 
        legal aid in 2013-14 and 2014-15 were apportioned accordingly to give an estimated  
        spend of £104.75 million for the calendar year 2014. A similar exercise resulted in an  
        estimated spend of £84.53 million in 2016; a drop of almost exactly 20%.
1349  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 78.
1350  Ibidem, p. 15.
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A note of caution is necessary, as the analysis of legal aid expenditures in 
the States cannot be complete without taking into consideration the level 
of demand (the number of individuals and cases requiring legal aid), the 
granting criteria (criteria of scope and eligibility used by the States), the 
case complexity and the level of professional and administrative expenses. It 
is, therefore, necessary to always interpret budgetary data with caution.1351
The amount spent on legal aid may not simply be dependent upon the political 
commitments of a government; socio-economic factors affect both the ability of 
a state to devote resources to access to justice, and the demand for legally-aided 
advice and representation. 
The measures available are relatively crude but can be used here for two 
purposes. Firstly, to ascertain whether there might be a simple explanation for 
differences in legal aid spending, external to the legal aid systems themselves. 
If this is the case, analysis of the systems must depend heavily on the budgetary 
context; an explanation for the expense of legal aid will not be found in the 
organisation of legal aid in a particular jurisdiction if it is socio-economic 
issues which drive spending. Secondly, a consideration of economic and social 
factors may throw into question some of the political arguments for reducing 
legal aid spend based on a bare comparison of legal aid spend per capita in 
different states.
In considering the factors which might affect legal aid spend, tables will 
be arranged with the jurisdictions in order of descending per capita legal aid 
spend, to assist easy consideration of any possible correlation between the two 
elements. The order will thus be: Northern Ireland, Sweden, England & Wales, 
Norway, Scotland, Denmark, Ireland, Finland.
8.2.2 Economic and social variables
8.2.2.1 Wealth of state
Simply comparing expenditure on elements of the justice systems between two 
jurisdictions does not give a full picture, as pointed out by the CEPEJ authors 
in the context of the entire judicial system:
Considering the budget allocated per inhabitant in absolute values is not 
sufficient for representing the effective budgetary effort for the judicial 
system performed by the States or entities, which can be very different from 
the perspective of their level of wealth. The same budget allocated to the 
judicial system may correspond to a considerably different budgetary effort, 
depending on the level of the available wealth. 
1351  Ibidem, p. 80.
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The figure [can be put into perspective] by comparing it to a measure of 
the wealth of the States and entities, the per capita GDP, thereby giving 
a more meaningful representation of the effective budget effort for the 
judicial system performed by each State and entity. It makes it possible to 
measure the budgetary effort devoted by a country to the access to justice 
and judicial activity.1352
The comparison of justice spend per inhabitant with GDP per capita carried 
out by CEPEJ across the whole of Europe unsurprisingly shows a correlation 
between the two. However, within the jurisdictions being examined here, 
Norway and the Republic of Ireland are outliers, spending relatively little on 
their judicial systems with respect to their GDP.1353 The 2014 figures showed 
Northern Ireland spending considerably more than would be expected given its 
relatively low GDP.1354 
A similar comparison is also appropriate when considering expenditure on 
legal aid. The wealth of a state might be expected to impact upon legal aid in 
two contrasting ways. Firstly, a rich country can quite simply afford to spend 
more on legal aid. This would logically particularly be the case if a wealthy state 
was also committed to a social welfare model of government; a combination 
which might be at least a partial explanation of the high spending on legal aid 
in Norway, which has a GDP per capita of 65,747 €,1355 almost three times that 
of Northern Ireland (at 23,600 €1356 the lowest within this study). Conversely, 
a low GDP as an indicator of poverty may signal a greater need within the 
population for access to justice (in securing social rights) and a greater 
proportion of the population which cannot afford to pay for their own legal 
advice and representation. Thus the low GDP of Northern Ireland may to some 
extent explain the very high expenditure on legal aid there.
At this point it may also be worth considering the very different population 
sizes within the study, ranging from England & Wales with over 57 million 
inhabitants to Northern Ireland with under 2 million. Iceland, which does not 
feature in the CEPEJ statistics which have been adopted here, has only about a 
third of a million. Again, population size may have both raising and lowering 
effects on legal aid spend; a larger legal aid system may benefit from economies 
of scale, but on the other hand a large scheme may be more complicated to 
administer.
1352  Ibidem, p. 27 and 28.
1353  Ibidem, p. 27. 
1354  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2016, p. 25
1355  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 12.
1356  Eurostat, 2018.
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Fig. 8. GDP per capita and population size.
The GDP per capita1357 and population sizes of the relevant jurisdictions are 
shown in the table above. There is no direct correlation between legal aid 
spend and either population size or GDP per capita; England & Wales with 
the largest population is the third highest spender on legal aid and Norway 
with the highest per capital GDP is the fourth highest legal aid spender. 
Northern Ireland has the lowest population (with the exception of Iceland) 
and the highest legal aid spend, which factors may be related as suggested 
above; however, population size alone is very unlikely to explain the amount 
spent on legal aid, particularly considering the lack of correlation across the 
jurisdictions. 
8.2.2.2 Legal aid spend in times of austerity
The perceived ability to dedicate public money to legal aid can of course change 
over time. Inevitably, in each of the jurisdictions there is a particular political 
and social context to the cost of legal aid, with some governments working 
towards reducing spend and others not proposing significant changes. Major 
reforms targeted at reducing legal aid expenditure have taken place since the 
1990s in several jurisdictions, and recent years have seen a concerted attempt 
by many European states to reduce public expenditure overall in response to 
economic pressures. Legal aid has been a target of cuts in many jurisdictions, 
including several of those under consideration in this thesis. The main changes 
are summarised below, in chronological order.
In Sweden, successful action was taken in the 1990s to bring legal aid costs 
under control1358 through the implementation of new legal aid legislation, the 
1357  As reported to CEPEJ, except for the Northern Ireland figure which is taken from Eurostat.
1358  The costs of the legal aid scheme almost halved from 348 million Swedish kronor in 
        1997 to 188 million Swedish kronor in 2010. This was achieved despite an increase in 
           hourly rates paid to lawyers.
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Legal Aid Act 1996.1359 An assessment of the effectiveness of the Act in 2003 
concluded that “the reforms have produced reduced legal aid costs for the 
country, state aid only when needed, increased consciousness of costs and more 
predictability of legal aid law”.1360 The main device by which the cost reduction 
was achieved was the implementation of strict rules concerning legal expenses 
insurance in non-criminal cases, which will be considered further below. 
Despite this success, problems continue with the criminal budget, which is 
consistently overspent by about a third each year. 
Changes to legal aid in Norway in 2005 were driven by the view that “in 
today’s circumstances it is not appropriate to cover citizens’ expenses for legal 
assistance in full”,1361 and were successful in reducing legal aid expenditure on 
advice to some extent.1362 However, the budget for representation continued 
to expand and the government undertook an exercise in 2008-2009 reviewing 
the operation of the legal aid scheme and adopting proposals for reform. This 
process was driven at least partly by a concern at the high expenditure on legal 
aid in comparison to in particular Finland.1363 Due to a change in government, 
the proposals were not in the event realised.
Radical reforms of legal aid in Denmark in 2007 and 2008 were ostensibly 
an attempt to modernise and simplify the rules, but resulted in a significant 
drop in legal aid expenditure through private lawyers. Whilst there was a 
corresponding increase in spending on legal aid institutions, the result in terms 
of court representation was stark. The number of civil court cases in which at 
least one party was legally aided fell from about 8000 in 2001 to about 3000 in 
2011.1364 There have been mixed views on the general success of the reforms, 
with the Bar Council in 2010 releasing a study which determined that the aims 
of the reforms had not been realised, whereas the Ministry of Justice in the 
same month stated that there was no reason to conclude that the intentions had 
not been met.1365
Legal aid in England & Wales has undergone major changes since 2011, 
and the situation has not yet stabilised. The government policy from 2010 
to 2015 was “to reduce unnecessary costs and make sure that legal aid helps 
those who need it”, to deal with the fact that the jurisdiction was said to have 
“one of the most comprehensive, and expensive, legal aid provisions in the 
world”.1366 In concrete terms, the aim and effect was a considerable reduction 
in spending, particularly on civil cases. The spend on civil legal aid fell from 
approximately £1.1 billion in 2012-13 to roughly £795 million in 2017-18.1367 
1359  Rättshjälpslagen, 1996.
1360  Utvärdering av rättshjälpslagen (1996:1619) – redovisning av ett regeringsuppdrag, 
         Domstolsverkets rapport 2001:6 as summarised in Ds 2003:55.
1361  Ot.prp. nr. 91 (2003–2004), para. 3.1.
1362  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008–2009), para. 1.31.
1363  Ibidem, para. 2.5.1.
1364  Danmarks Nationale Menneskerettighedsinstitution 2016, p. 19.
1365  Ibidem.
1366  Ministry of Justice 2010.
1367  Legal Aid Authority Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14 and 2015-16.
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Across the same period the number of civil cases funded dropped from 
724,275 to 251,230 cases.1368 Criminal legal aid, which (as seen above in 
Chapter 3) is the mechanism by which representation is provided for indigent 
criminal defendants, has also seen significant changes largely focused on the 
introduction of fixed fees and moves towards competitive tendering. The aim, 
again, is to reduce costs, with the Ministry of Justice announcing in 2013 an 
aim to reduce the annual expenditure on civil and criminal legal aid together 
by £220 million within 5 years.1369
Legal aid spend in Finland has traditionally been stable, but increased 
between 2014 and 2016 by 37% (from €65.3 million to €89.4 million), a rise 
which is believed to have resulted from an increase in demand for immigration 
assistance from asylum-seekers.1370 In an attempt to control this expenditure, 
the right to legal aid at the initial asylum interview was removed in 2016.1371
The process of attempting to reduce the amount spent on legal aid in 
Northern Ireland has been protracted. In August 2011 the report of the Access 
to Justice Review Northern Ireland1372 was published, with “three strategic 
objectives for reform: improving access to justice; bringing legal aid within 
budget; and improving governance”.1373 A further report was commissioned in 
2014 and published in 2015 in accordance with a government wish:
first, to identify and prioritise services where publicly funded advice and/
or representation should be provided to meet human rights obligations, 
safeguard the interests of vulnerable people and meet the wider public 
interest; secondly, to consider the delivery models that might be best suited 
to the provision of publicly funded legal services through mechanisms 
other than legal aid; and, thirdly, to consider whether there are aspects of 
the justice system where efficiencies might contribute towards reducing the 
cost of publicly funded legal services while sustaining the quality of service 
provision.1374
The report A Strategy For Access To Justice: The Report of Access to Justice (2)1375 
was published in September 2015 and contains 150 recommendations. The 
government has consulted on these but no changes to legal aid have yet been 
made following the review. Spending remains the biggest source of concern; 
the National Audit Office concluded in 2016 that the legal aid budget was 
out of control after expenditure spiralled from about £40 million to about 
£100 million over a decade and that the criminal legal aid reforms had not 
1368  Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Statistics quarterly, England and Wales, January to March 2018.
1369  Ministry of Justice 2013, para. 1.3.
1370  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 86.
1371  Utlänningslag 2004, 9 §, as amended by law 12.8.2016/646.
1372  Access to Justice Review Northern Ireland, 2011.
1373  David Ford, Ministerial Statement – in the Northern Ireland Assembly at 10:30 am on 3rd 
            November 2015 https://www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2015-11-03.2.1&s=david+ford#g2.23.
1374  Ibidem.
1375  Stutt 2015.
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achieved the aim of saving public expenditure.1376 Northern Ireland had in 
2014 the highest per capita spending on legal aid in Europe,1377 and there is 
ongoing tension between the government which wants to make savings and the 
profession and citizens’ interests groups which resist cuts. 
The situation in Scotland appears to have been less urgent, with the Scottish 
Government expressing a need to improve value for money, rather than taking 
significant action to reduce spend. In 2011 a number of Best Value Reviews 
were undertaken by the Scottish Legal Aid Board, covering various aspects 
of legal aid provision including civil legal assistance, mental health work, 
immigration and asylum. A government White Paper entitled A Sustainable 
Future for Legal Aid was published the same year with a focus on finding ways 
to make necessary savings on legal aid. In the event, no legislation was passed 
as a result of the White Paper although “a package of reforms and efficiency 
savings has resulted in significant savings”.1378 The government has an annual 
costs projection for legal aid, but the actual budget is open and spend continues 
to outstrip the budget. The Scottish Legal Aid Board in its Corporate Plan for 
2014-2017 stated that:
The size of the gap between the Scottish Government’s allocation for legal 
aid expenditure and our forecast expenditure is such that significant levels 
of further savings measures are required if that gap is to be closed. We are 
currently forecasting a total shortfall of £39m over the three years of this 
corporate plan.1379 
Another review of legal aid took place between February 2017 and February 
2018, with a view to the creation of a “sustainable and cost effective” legal aid 
system.1380 Despite the government’s position that legal aid expenditure must 
be controlled, the Law Society of Scotland called for more resources to be 
made available.1381 The review reported that legal aid expenditure in Scotland 
“has been falling since 2010-11”1382 as a result of lower demand, particularly in 
criminal cases, and the review conclusions urge increased efficiency and a focus 
on users, rather than financial savings.
The political ease with which several governments have attacked legal aid in 
financially difficult times may be related to the strange position access to justice 
and legal aid occupy within the classification of human rights. Access to justice, 
seen holistically, is a civil right and therefore, in Western democracies, fully 
protected in a way that social rights are not:
1376  Northern Ireland Audit Office 2016, p. 2.
1377  73.53€ per person per year. European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2016, 
        p. 72, Figure 2.39.
1378  O’Neill 2016, p. 290.
1379  Scottish Legal Aid Board Corporate Plan 2014-2017, p. 5.
1380  Scottish government legal aid review, Website of the Scottish Government.
1381  Law Society of Scotland 2014, p. 6.
1382  Evans 2018, p. 15.
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the status of access to justice as a civil right gives it, or should in principle 
give it, a more secure position in our culture than social rights. The 
importance of civil rights is accepted across the political spectrum. The 
position of social rights, however strong the arguments made on their 
behalf, is less certain. Whether there should be specific legal rights to 
say, health care or housing remains a matter of dispute but no one can 
consistently deny that each citizen should be equally able to protect 
whatever legal rights she does have1383
However, legal aid is often treated as a social right, possibly because it is means-
tested; a characteristic usually shared with social benefits such as social security 
benefits rather than civil rights such as the right to vote. This means that legal 
aid, whilst in fact an element of a civil right, is wrongly made vulnerable to cuts 
as a social right. Cornford persuasively argues against this approach:
The elision of access to justice with social rights and the idea that it is 
satisfied by providing a basic minimum tend to encourage the view that if there 
is a need for cuts in public spending, these can be achieved in part by reducing 
what is provided by way of legal aid to the poor. In a perfect system, there 
would be no difference in the degree of access to justice enjoyed by different 
sectors of society and a cut in spending would lead to an equal diminution on 
the extent to which each citizen’s rights were protected. In our system, access 
to legal services is grossly unequal, but the ideal of equal access demands 
nonetheless that the need to reduce public spending (if there is such a need) 
should not be allowed to increase the gulf between rich and poor in access to 
legal services.1384
Flynn and Hodgson argue that the broad societal consequences of failing 
to address civil law issues should result in higher priority for legal aid; a 
“simplistic view of civil law as an individualised want of only some sections of 
the community allows for cuts to civil legal aid to be more readily accepted”.1385 
Nonetheless, it is currently the case that many governments are prepared 
to make significant cuts to legal aid without serious consideration of their 
international obligation to realise the rights to access to court and fair trial.
8.2.2.3 Poverty levels
In addition to the overall wealth of a country, levels of relative poverty may 
affect the demand for legal aid. Poverty levels are not necessarily related 
to national wealth, as income distribution and levels of inequality play an 
important role. The simple figure of average gross annual salary is provided by 
CEPEJ, which gives an idea of the level of income enjoyed overall, but does not 
provide the more relevant information on how well the poorest in society are 
provided for:
1383  Cornford 2016, p. 34.
1384  Ibidem, p. 35.
1385  Flynn and Hodgson 2017, p. 9.
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Fig. 9. Average gross annual salary by jurisdiction
More detailed statistical information is available from other sources to illuminate 
the question of relative poverty in the jurisdictions under consideration, although 
this does not generally differentiate between the different parts of the UK. Studies 
of social cohesion within the EU have placed Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
respectively, in first, second and third place, the Republic of Ireland sixth and 
the UK twelfth.1386
According to other figures, in 2016 the following proportions of populations 
were at risk of poverty or social exclusion:1387
 
 
Fig. 10. Proportion of population at risk of poverty or social exclusion
1386  Dhéret 2015. Norway and Iceland were not included in the study.
1387  Eurostat, 2018.
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Again, the figures show a range which does not readily correlate to legal aid 
spend: the Republic of Ireland with the highest proportion of population 
vulnerable to poverty or social exclusion is the second lowest spender per 
capita on legal aid; the lowest spender, Finland, has the median position on 
social exclusion and Norway has legal aid expenditure in the middle range with 
low social exclusion ratings.
Here, it is also interesting to note that the proportions of the population 
financially eligible for legal aid, examined in Chapter 7 above, offer little 
correlation with spend. The high eligibility proportion jurisdictions of 
Finland and Scotland are respectively lowest and fourth lowest spenders; low 
proportion eligibility England & Wales and Norway are mid-spenders. Scotland 
with 75% eligibility spends 29€ per capita annually on legal aid and Norway 
with under 30% eligibility spends almost the same, at 31€ per capita.
8.2.2.4 Level of recourse to law
Another factor upon which the cost of providing legal aid depends is how 
many people wish to obtain legal advice on potential action or to be assisted 
in court actions, in other words on demand. Various factors will influence 
this, including the level of criminal prosecutions brought; whether the laws in 
force are seen by the public to be useful tools for achieving their goals; and the 
extent to which citizens are willing or even eager to go to law. In the recent 
review of Scottish legal aid, for example, falling crime rates and diversion of 
criminal cases away from the courts was found to be significant in the falling 
cost of legal aid in that jurisdiction.1388 The quality of ‘litigiousness’ is complex 
and its exploration is not within the remit of this thesis. However, as a broad 
contextual factor, it may be useful to briefly consider the numbers of lawyers 
in each of the relevant jurisdictions. A high concentration of lawyers suggests 
a society which uses law to a more significant extent than one with low lawyer 
density, although other factors such as the presence of a significant legal and 
financial services market may increase the figure without indicating a higher 
level of litigiousness in the general population. The CEPEJ report provides the 
information on number of lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016.1389 Once 
again, a correlation with legal aid expenditure is absent.
1388  Evans 2018, p. 15.
1389  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 2018, p. 172. The figure for Northern 
           Ireland is the 2014 figure.
289
 
 
Fig. 11. Lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016.
It would be logical for the level of trust in the justice system also to have an 
effect on the demand for legal aid; if a system is trusted, it is less likely that a 
person will feel a need for legal representation. Interesting research on social 
attitudes in Europe has been carried out by the European Social Survey (ESS). 
Not all the nine jurisdictions included within this dissertation were included in 
the ESS work, but Denmark, Norway, Sweden Finland and the UK (as a whole, 
rather than divided into legal jurisdictions) are covered. Respondents were 
asked about their views on the police and criminal courts and the conclusion 
was drawn that “clear patterns emerge: the Nordic countries are most trusting 
of their police and courts and believe that their institutions are legitimate 
holders of power and authority”.1390 In particular, the Nordic countries showed 
high levels of perceived common moral values with the police, and trust in 
courts’ procedural fairness and competence.1391
Blankenburg has pointed out that the relationship between legal aid and 
litigation levels is not straightforward; the two “vary independently of each 
other, presumably because legal aid helps to fund access to courts just as 
much as it leads the way to avoiding courts or even serves as an alternative to 
litigation”.1392
1390  Jackson et. al. 2011, p. 8.
1391  Ibidem.
1392  Blankenburg 1995, p. 178.
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8.3 Systemic context
8.3.1 Strategies for achieving access to justice without legal aid
The role of legal aid in different jurisdictions cannot meaningfully be compared 
without an understanding of the extent to which other mechanisms contribute 
to access to justice in each system. There may be less need for legal aid in a 
jurisdiction where many disputes are dealt with in ways consistent with access to 
justice but which do not require parties to have legal advice or representation. 
Approaches to access to justice which avoid the need for representation may 
take the form of dispute resolution mechanisms outside the formal justice 
system or adaptations and variations within it, including structural differences 
in the operation of courts. Furthermore, the provision of legal representation 
funded by third parties, particularly legal expenses insurance, reduces pressure 
on legal aid.
8.3.2 Achieving access to justice outside the formal justice system
8.3.2.1 Policy perspectives
One of the ways in which governments can potentially achieve access to justice 
despite restricting legal aid is to provide alternative methods to resolve disputes 
fairly. Diverting problems away from the formal justice system saves court 
time (and potentially enables savings in the court budget) as well as reducing 
individuals’ need for legal assistance in dispute resolution. Many alternative 
dispute resolution methods discourage legal representation and some even 
prohibit it, as a way of levelling the playing field without the public expense of 
legal aid.
The resolution of problems before they reach court can also be seen as 
desirable from a human perspective, particularly in family cases. As the Civil 
and Family Justice Review in Northern Ireland stated, “solutions found among 
families should be preferred, which leads to a consideration of mediation and 
other alternative dispute resolution prior to litigation”.1393 In other civil cases, 
the preliminary report suggested that “unnecessary escalation of disputes 
should be emphatically discouraged and kept out of court wherever possible 
with increased emphasis on mediation and early neutral evaluation”,1394 
although the final report on civil justice1395 did not propose any substantial 
structural changes in this regard.
In England & Wales, legal aid restrictions were said to have a role to play in 
encouraging the use of non-court based dispute resolution processes:
1393  Review of Civil and Family Justice in Northern Ireland: Review Group’s Report on Family 
         Justice, 2017, p. 14. 
1394  Review of Civil and Family Justice in Northern Ireland: Preliminary Civil Justice  
        Report, 2016, para. 27.11. 
1395  Review of Civil and Family Justice in Northern Ireland: Review Group’s Report on  
        Civil Justice, 2017.
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the Government’s proposed reforms to legal aid are intended to encourage 
people, rather than going to court too readily at the taxpayer’s expense, to 
seek alternative methods of dispute resolution, reserving the courts as a last 
resort for legal issues where there is a public interest in providing access to 
public funding.1396
Common systems for resolving problems outside court are administrative 
tribunals and mediation. In family matters it will be seen that the jurisdictions 
under consideration have developed a wide range of structures. Concern has at 
times been voiced, though, about the non-public nature of such alternatives: “if 
dispute resolution is relocated into private, confidential fora, how do we know 
whether justice is being delivered, particularly for the less powerful?”1397
8.3.2.2 Administrative tribunals and appeal boards
The use of the term ‘tribunal’ here requires some explanation. In the UK 
and, to a lesser extent, the Republic of Ireland, tribunals as referred to here 
are administrative dispute resolution fora tasked with hearing appeals in 
a particular sphere. The UK Courts and Tribunals Service website lists 24 
different tribunals within its remit, covering various types of dispute including 
social security, employment, care standards, immigration and asylum, and war 
pensions. Some, including the Employment Tribunals and the Social Security 
Tribunals, have first-tier tribunals and also an upper-tier Appeal Tribunal. 
Tribunals are quasi-judicial administrative settings, designed to be accessible to 
lay persons,1398 and representation is therefore rarer than in courts, as set out in 
the discussion of the scope of civil legal aid in Chapter 5. Legal aid is often not 
available for first-tier tribunals as “it has been assumed that lawyers and legal 
aid are not necessary to do justice in those alternative fora”.1399
Such tribunals aim to assist in the resolution of disputes without recourse to 
court and “were originally introduced to provide a proportionate and easy to 
use service, mainly for citizens appealing decisions of the state”. 1400 Some of this 
thinking is long-term and remains relevant:
One of the key drivers of the development of citizens’ remedies since the late 
nineteenth century has been a perception held by government policymakers 
that courts were not suitable for resolving the disputes that arose from 
modern schemes of public administration. They were thought to be slow, 
excessively formal, disproportionately costly, and the judges lacking in 
relevant expertise and unsympathetic to much regulatory and social welfare 
legislation and so likely to interpret it contrary to its intent.1401
1396  CP12/10, para. 1.8.
1397  Hunter, Barlow, Smithson and Ewing 2017, p. 240.
1398  Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ss2(3)(a) and 22(4)(b). See also Jacobs  
        2016, Chapter 1.
1399  Mullen 2016, p. 70.
1400  Cm 9321, 2016, para. 5.1.
1401  Mullen 2016, p. 76.
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However, it should be noted that tribunals are not restricted to appeals against 
administrative decisions; employment and care standards tribunals, for example, 
also cover disputes between individuals, albeit relating to statutory rights. The 
extent to which tribunals continue to provide access to justice without legal 
representation is under question, with the UK government accepting that “over 
time they have become complicated and slow to deal with, burdened with paper 
and unnecessary bureaucracy.”1402 There has even been a suggestion that it is 
inevitable that quasi-judicial institutions over time will become more court-like 
and formalistic:
A pilot study […] found that the process of taking a claim to an [Employment 
Tribunal] was experienced as overly legalistic, time-consuming and extremely 
stressful. […] The reason for this has been convincingly explained as arising 
out of a process of ‘institutional isomorphism’ by which an organisation 
becomes similar to another which operates in the same field where both 
experience coercive pressures by the body controlling their resources, in this 
case government.1403
In England & Wales, the accessibility of employment tribunals was significantly 
reduced by the imposition of significant fees in 2013.1404 However, the fees were 
subsequently found by the Supreme Court to be unlawful and were revoked, 
with repayments ordered of all fees already paid.1405
The UK and Irish tribunals system is comparable to administrative appeal 
boards seen in some of the Nordic countries. In Denmark, in particular, 
Administrative Boards of Appeal play a “prominent part”1406 in ensuring access 
to justice and “many conflicts are taken care of by tri-partite institutions of the 
welfare state”.1407 These Boards are informal in nature and it is not usual for 
parties to be represented before them. Many decisions are made without oral 
hearings, but the Boards have investigatory powers. Legal aid is not available 
for representation before these Boards and thus their existence has the effect 
of reducing the burden on legal aid. Some Boards have a higher tier Appeal 
Board but where this is not the case, appeals can be brought before the courts, 
on limited grounds. Because the Boards deal with specific subject areas (for 
example, immigration, environmental law and social security law) cases can 
be highly technical and some argue that representation would be desirable to 
ensure fair hearing of issues.1408
As will be seen below, separate administrative courts in Finland and Sweden 
decide administrative cases, often without oral hearings, and generally without 
representation for the parties. These, though, are formally courts and thus cannot 
1402  Ibidem.
1403  Busby and McDermot 2016, p. 180.
1404  The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013.
1405  R (on the application of UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor, 2017. 
1406  Conradsen and Gøtze 2014, p. 164.
1407  Blankenburg1995, p. 181.
1408  See e.g. Ellersgaard Nielsen et. al. 2012, p.31-32.
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be seen as mechanisms for diverting cases away from formal resolution.
8.3.2.3 Mediation
Some jurisdictions put the emphasis on early resolution by assisted agreement 
between the parties to a dispute. Diverting cases to mediation is a way to reduce 
pressure on courts (and legal aid) and reduce the need for access to formal justice.
In Norway, much emphasis is placed on attempting to resolve matters before 
court proceedings. To this end, an attempt at mediation is compulsory in many 
civil cases; matters must be dealt with by Conciliation Boards (forliksråd) 
before they can be brought before the court. The role of Conciliation Boards, 
as set out in the Civil Disputes Act,1409 is to “achieve a simple, swift and cheap 
resolution of the case through conciliation or judgement”.1410 Boards cannot 
hear, inter alia, family or administrative law matters,1411 but are available to the 
parties in most other types of civil case. In cases involving claims to assets of 
under 125,000 Norwegian kronor,1412 the Mediation Board procedure must be 
used.1413 The Board can pass judgment when the parties are in agreement and 
in some cases, notably assets cases under 125,000 kronor and money claims 
where there is no applicable defence, at the request of one party only.1414 There 
are limited grounds for appeal to the District Court against a ruling of the 
Mediation Board.1415 It is noteworthy that the boards provide a combination of 
mediation and imposed resolution.
In England & Wales, mediation services are available for solving disputes 
non-judicially, but these have not made significant inroads other than in 
commercial cases and to some extent in family cases (see below). Some 
mediation services can be funded through legal aid. 
8.3.2.4 Family law alternatives to court
Family law, in particular, is an area in which many jurisdictions try to reduce 
reliance on courts for resolving disputes. This is seen as being better for 
the ongoing relationship between parents and thus better for the children 
concerned. Furthermore, family disputes tend to make up a high proportion of 
non-criminal disputes, and therefore any success in keeping these out of court 
is likely to provide significant financial savings. All the Nordic jurisdictions 
have to a greater or lesser extent diverted private family law cases away from 
the ordinary courts.
In Sweden, financial issues arising on relationship breakdown are in the 
first instance dealt with completely outside the court system. In the case of a 
1409  Tvisteloven, 2005, Chapter 6.
1410  Ibidem, § 6-1(1).
1411  Ibidem, § 6-2(1).
1412  Approximately 13,000€ in April 2018.
1413  Tvisteloven, 2005, § 6-2(2).
1414  Ibidem, § 6-10.
1415  Ibidem, § 6-14.
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dispute concerning allocation of property following a relationship breakdown, 
one or both parties can apply to the court to appoint a “division of property 
official” (bodelningsförrättare), usually a practising lawyer, who will attempt 
a negotiated settlement. If agreement is impossible, the official will impose a 
division and an application to court will only occur if one of the parties appeals 
this decision. Legal aid is not available for the division of property process but, 
depending on the financial circumstances, up to 5 hours’ help from a division 
of property official can be reimbursed by the state.1416 Disputes concerning 
children are dealt with by the District Courts, but parents are encouraged to use 
local authority mediation services to try and agree child residence and contact 
issues before taking a case to court.
Local authorities also play a role in Denmark, where civil disputes in family 
matters do not go directly to court but are first considered by the regional State 
Administration (Statsforvaltningen)1417 whose nine offices administer various 
areas on a local level. They attempt to settle family cases through mediation 
and negotiation and, if unsuccessful, forward the matter to court for a decision 
to be made. Similarly, in Iceland, mediation is compulsory in custody disputes 
before a court application can be made.1418
In Finland, family cases concerning residence of children and contact with 
their parents can, but need not, be dealt with by the courts. An equally binding 
outcome can be achieved with the help of local child welfare services. A welfare 
officer is able to give the parents information and advice and assist in reaching 
an agreement. The agreement can then be confirmed by the social welfare 
board, making it legally enforceable.1419 Mediation is also available, if couples 
are willing to try and resolve their disputes through this means.
Access to the courts in many family matters (as well as civil cases, see 
above) in Norway is conditional upon an attempt at mediation having failed. 
In family cases, free mediation is available at local family welfare offices, 
and it is compulsory for couples with at least one child under 16 to undergo 
mediation before divorce or separation.1420 Agreements about child access and 
related matters made between the parties can be given legal force by the County 
Governor without the need for a court process, if both parents agree to the 
administrative processing of the matter.1421 
In the UK, conversely, the norm is still for family disputes to be dealt with 
by the courts, and the resulting burden on the legal aid fund is high. In the 
financial year 2017-2018, £546 million (or 91%) of the total £601 million 
expenditure on civil legal aid for representation in England & Wales, was spent 
 on family cases.1422 Strikingly, the legal aid system in England & Wales has been 
1416  Äktenskapsbalken, 1987, Ch. 17, para. 7a.
1417  Further information on their website at http://www.statsforvaltningen.dk/site.aspx?p=5466.
1418  Barnalög, 2003, Article 33a.
1419  More information is available from the Department of Justice website.
1420  Barnelova, 1981, § 51 and Ekteskapsloven, 1991, § 26.
1421  Barnelova, 1981, § 55.
1422  Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Statistics quarterly, England and Wales, January to March 2018. 
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explicitly used as a tool to encourage people not to use the courts in family cases, 
but to handle disputes through mediation instead. The government’s proposals 
which led to the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
stated:
The Government believes that, wherever possible, it would be in the best 
interest of those involved in private law family cases which do not involve 
domestic violence to take a more direct role in their resolution, using 
mediation and keeping court proceedings to the minimum necessary. For 
this, and the other reasons set out below, we consider that legal aid can no 
longer be justified routinely for such cases. This approach is consistent with 
our wider policy of diverting cases away from court, which often gives rise 
to higher costs, both for those directly involved and the taxpayer.1423
Unfortunately, this aim was not achieved and use of mediation in fact fell in the 
year after the reforms.1424
There is concern in Northern Ireland to improve the performance of the 
family justice system and to this end a major review of family justice was 
recently undertaken with the aim of “improving access to justice; achieving better 
outcomes for court users, particularly for children and young people; creating a 
more responsive and proportionate system; and making better use of available 
resources, including through the use of new technologies”.1425 A final report was 
published in September 2017 and, whilst it is clear that reliance on courts for 
many, if not most, family disputes will continue, the recommendations include 
a “fresh emphasis on solutions outside the court system, with more accessible 
mediation and educative parenting programmes in private law cases involving 
children, with a special focus on the future well-being of children and not on 
the conflict between the adults”.1426
The approach to family breakdown in a jurisdiction is clearly a very significant 
factor affecting legal aid:
The practical impacts of governments’ human rights obligation to provide 
legal aid […] depend on the structure of their judicial systems. If one state—
such as Ireland—practises complex and restrictive rules for divorce that 
demand that the irreversible breakdown of the marriage is established, and 
if divorces are available only through complex court proceedings, then the 
individual need for legal aid can be considerable among poor people who 
want to divorce. If other states—such as Finland and Norway—have no-
fault divorce based on the request of one of the parties, and process divorce 
administratively, then brief legal advice might suffice in most cases.1427 
1423  CP12/10, para. 4.69. 
1424  Law Society of England and Wales 2014, p. 24.
1425  Review of Civil and Family Justice in Northern Ireland: Review Group’s Report on  
        Family Justice, p. v.
1426  Ibidem, p. ix.
1427  Johnsen 2018, p. 242.
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Further characteristics of the jurisdiction are also important: “liberal states, 
however, might see far more divorces than do restrictive ones, and might have 
to establish schemes capable of handling such cases for large numbers of 
people.”1428 As family law is a significant area for legal aid spend, the extent to 
which family-related dispute resolution processes are in demand, formal and 
complex will have a significant effect on legal aid in a jurisdiction.
8.3.3 Achieving access to justice inside the formal justice system
8.3.3.1 Non-legal aid formal justice system solutions 
Even in cases which are dealt with through the formal court system, differing 
approaches can be seen in how to ensure individuals are able to meaningfully 
engage with the process. One major factor is the level of assistance the court 
itself gives to a litigant and how active the judge is in directing the progress of a 
hearing. In two of the Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden), administrative 
matters are heard separately and require an enhanced level of court involvement. 
More generally, the differences between civil and common law systems may 
affect engagement by the individual. In addition to structural variations, 
there is of course the possibility of levelling the playing field by paying for 
representation for parties who would otherwise be at a disadvantage due to lack 
of funds. Whilst legal aid is one way of doing this, legal expenses insurance also 
provides such access for a considerable number of people in the jurisdictions 
under consideration.
8.3.3.2 Structural solutions in the administrative court
Administrative law is subject to particular rules in many jurisdictions. The Nordic 
countries all have overarching Public Administration Acts, which specify that 
at the point of contact between a member of the public and the administrative 
body, the latter has a duty to advise and assist.1429 In Norway, the government 
has made it clear that legal aid is not intended to replace this “traditional 
information and guidance duty”.1430 
In Finland and Sweden, as seen in Chapter 2, there are separate court streams 
for administrative cases, which are often dealt with on papers only without an 
oral hearing. In both countries, administrative court judges have a responsibility 
to ensure that the matter has been properly investigated by the authorities1431 
and in Finland, the court (or other appeal body) has an additional duty to order 
further investigations and evidence collection as necessary.1432 As a consequence 
1428  Ibidem.
1429  Finland, Förvaltningslag, 2003, 8 §, para. 1; Denmark, Forvaltningsloven, 2014, § 7;  
        Norway, Forvaltningsloven, 1967, § 11; Sweden, Förvaltningslag, 1986, 4 § (the new 
        Förvaltningslag in force from July 2018 contains a similar provision at 6 §).
1430  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009), para. 1.6.
1431  Sweden, Förvaltningsprocesslagen, 1971, 8 §; Finland, Förvaltningsprocesslag, 1996, 33 §. 
1432  Förvaltningsprocesslag, 1996, 33 §.
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of this approach, legal representation of parties is rare in the administrative courts 
in these two jurisdictions.
Denmark and Norway have unified court systems where civil, criminal and 
administrative cases are all heard by the same courts. In Denmark, however, as 
seen above, administrative boards of appeal divert most administrative cases 
away from the courts at first instance. Additionally, legal aid is not available for 
advice concerning the actions of an administrative authority1433 because it is 
intended that the duty to advise, which applies to all administrative authorities, 
should suffice. However, there are some concerns that the conflict of interests 
between the authorities and their clients may make the provision of good, 
impartial advice unlikely.1434
In Norway, there is no general reliance on administrative boards of appeal 
and indeed Conciliation Boards cannot hear administrative law matters.1435 
Therefore, Norway is the only one of the Nordic jurisdictions in which 
administrative law matters are fully integrated into the normal courts although, 
as seen, the duty of administrative authorities to advise is important.
In the UK, much administrative legal business is diverted to tribunals, as 
seen above. However, matters which do reach the judicial system are dealt 
with in the ordinary courts. Access to the courts in administrative law matters 
is restricted, due to the nature of the judicial remedy available. Essentially, 
decisions can only be annulled or rectified by a court if unlawful, which 
requires more than that the wrong decision was reached. The remedy in 
question is judicial review, which has as its object of consideration the first 
instance decision, rather than the merits of the matter which was decided; 
it is not a re-hearing of the evidence presented at the initial stage. Decisions 
which were improperly made can be challenged on specific grounds which have 
been developed through caselaw and which are not codified. In summary, a 
decision can be overturned if it is unlawful (which includes decisions made 
in error of law or fact, decisions made which went beyond the powers of the 
decision-maker and decisions on the basis of irrelevant factors), irrational or 
if an improper procedure was followed (breach of statutory procedures or the 
rules of natural justice).1436 The court cannot replace its own decision for that 
made by the administrative authority, but can only check that the decision was 
not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have made it, bearing in 
mind that “not every reasonable exercise of judgment is right, and not every 
mistaken exercise of judgement is unreasonable”.1437 
A judicial review does not have the same strength as an appeal on the basis 
that the decision was unreasonable; “On an appeal the question is ‘right or 
1433  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 323(4)(4).
1434  Ellersgaard Nielsen et. al. 2012, p.35.
1435  Tvisteloven, 2005, 6-2 §, para. 1.
1436  Proportionality is only a ground of review in cases concerning EU law or human rights.
1437  Re W (an infant) [1971] AC 682, p.700, per Lord Hailsham LC.
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wrong?’ On review the question is ‘lawful or unlawful?’”.1438 It has been said that 
“neither the possibility of judicial review nor of complaining to an ombudsman 
could be considered a satisfactory substitute for appeal or review on the 
merits”.1439 The requirements for judicial review are already strict, but moves are 
underway to make it even harder to obtain a hearing for a court to consider 
the lawfulness of an administrative decision. Despite its shortcomings, judicial 
review is thus currently being defended in England & Wales:
We must … be concerned if judicial review becomes less available to citizens 
both because individuals directly affected by decisions may not have access 
to a remedy and because challenges to unlawful policies which govern many 
decisions may become less likely or be delayed.1440
With the exception of Norway, it can be seen that the jurisdictions endeavour 
to achieve access to justice in administrative matters either outside the formal 
court system (Denmark), through less formal court processes (Finland and 
Sweden) or by limiting access to formal court proceedings in combination with 
the availability of some extra-judicial routes (the UK and Republic of Ireland). 
Whilst the reasoning is often based in the political structure of a state, the 
outcomes include a reduced need for legal representation amongst those with 
administrative law grievances.
 
8.3.3.3 The civil/common law divide
Another element of a judicial system which may affect the need for litigants to 
be represented, and the extent and therefore expense of that representation, is 
the nature of the legal system: civil or common law. This may on the face of it 
be a useful explanation:
There seems to be an easy explanation for the national differences which 
lies in the role which lawyers play in common law courts as compared to the 
civil law tradition. Comparative lawyers like to emphasise that adversarial 
procedure lays the full responsibility on argumentation and investigation 
for each party in court on to the lawyers representing their case, while in 
an inquisitorial procedure the judge has to actively search out the facts and 
legal arguments for both sides.1441
However, some scholars reject this explanation for the different levels of legal 
aid spending, at least in Europe:
1438  Wade and Forsyth 2014, p. 26. 
1439  Mullen 2016, p. 81.
1440  Ibidem, p. 84.
1441  Blankenburg 1992, p. 106.
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I do not regard such arguments to provide sufficient explanation for the 
lack of legal aid in many European countries. Procedural representation 
is only a small fraction of what lawyers do for their clients; consultation, 
negotiation and advice how to avoid litigation being more important than 
representation in court. Furthermore: an explanation along the lines of the 
procedural role of lawyers in the civil law tradition would have to hold true 
for all countries on the European continent alike, because they do not differ 
much in their procedural law systems. What we observe with respect to legal 
aid, however, are great differences from one country to the next.1442
Blankenburg agrees that “representation in court is only a fraction of lawyers 
work, and it should also not exhaust what legal aid is subsidising. Most of the 
public’s needs concern advice and assistance before considering court action, 
and studies of lawyer work points in the direction of precourt activities avoiding 
litigation as much as enabling parties to engage in it”.1443
Even the basic assumption of a much greater role for the judge in civil law 
systems is challenged by Zuckerman:
The court in civilian systems may have a greater role in managing the hearings 
and in eliciting witness testimony, but the process remains strictly adversarial 
[…]. As in England, the parties define the issues. The continental civil court 
has no greater power than the English court to decide what matters to 
investigate. Since legal representation is compulsory, the litigation process 
is conducted by lawyers and not their clients. The advocates present their 
parties’ allegations and indicate to the court the evidence they wish to 
adduce and witnesses they wish to call. The court summons only witnesses 
indicated by the parties; it does not seek witnesses of its own motion. While 
it is true that witnesses in civilian systems are questioned by the court and 
not the parties’ advocates, the court tends to pursue the line of questioning 
suggested by the advocates. This is only to be expected since it is the 
advocates who define the issues and therefore determine the matters that 
require examination.1444
He is also dubious about the possibility of systems becoming more inquisitorial 
in order to avoid the need for expensive legal representation for the parties. 
Referring to the situation where a litigant in person may need to cross-examine a 
vulnerable witness, he considers a case where the Court of Appeal decided that if 
necessary the public purse would have to pay for representation via the court’s 
own budget, and concludes:
1442  Ibidem.
1443  Blankenburg 1995, p. 182.
1444  Zuckerman 2014, p. 361.
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Providing legal representation at the court’s own expense is a novel and 
radical solution, one which may well be challenged by the treasury. For our 
purpose, however, the important aspect to note is that the Court of Appeal 
has recognised that there are situations where it is impossible to do justice 
without an adversarial process in which all parties are legally represented. 
No increase in the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings can make up for 
the adversarial deficit in such situations.1445
Zuckerman does, however, accept that “while there is no alternative to the 
adversarial process, it is the case that there is room for improving the adversarial 
process so as to make it easier for unrepresented litigants to manage”.1446 This is 
particularly pertinent at present in England & Wales. Due to cuts in legal aid, 
self-representation in civil cases is increasing, according to the government1447 
and senior judges have expressed concern that this may be leading to 
miscarriages of justice.1448 The review of civil justice mentioned in Chapter 1 is 
considering the sorts of adaptations that Zuckerman may have had in mind, to 
make it easier for unrepresented litigants to navigate the judicial system.
It has also been suggested that “inquisitorial systems are especially 
conducive to alternative non-legal forms of dispute resolution […] in 
adversarial jurisdictions […] there might be entrenched, system-related 
obstacles to non-legal routes to justice”.1449 If this is so, there would very likely 
be a consequent effect on demand for legal aid.
8.3.3.4 Legal expenses insurance
Whatever the successes of the government in keeping cases out of the formal 
court process, or making these processes easier to negotiate by unrepresented 
parties, there are inevitably some cases which end up in court and in which one 
or more parties need representation. Particularly if one of the parties is able 
to obtain legal representation by paying privately, the need for at least relative 
equality of arms may require funding to be found to pay for representation also 
for the other party. There are two main ways in which this is achieved in the 
jurisdictions studied here: legal expenses insurance and legal aid. 
As a matter of government policy, legal expenses insurance is expected 
to significantly reduce the financial burden on the state of providing legal 
assistance in several jurisdictions, most notably Sweden. One of the major 
reforms implemented there in 1997 was that access to legal aid was ended for 
those with legal expenses insurance. The government actively negotiated with 
insurance companies so that legal expenses insurance was included in home 
insurance policies under conditions which dovetail with the restructured 
legal aid scheme. Unifying features included the harmonisation of fees paid 
1445  Ibidem, p. 367.
1446  Ibidem, p. 372.
1447  House of Commons Briefing Paper 07113.
1448  New Law Journal, 4 December 2014.
1449  Moore and Newbury 2017, p. 32.
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to lawyers under insurance and legal aid, although under insurance schemes 
lawyers can and often do charge an additional fee directly to the client, thus 
increasing the de facto fees, which is prohibited under the legal aid scheme.1450 
Legal expenses insurance tends not to cover employment cases, or family cases 
which arise within a year of divorce or separation. Furthermore, insurance 
tends not to cover low-value cases (generally those under half the ‘base sum’).1451
In addition to those who have applicable legal expenses insurance, in Sweden 
legal aid will also be refused to those who ought to have such insurance, unless 
there are special reasons to grant legal aid upon consideration of the type 
of case and its importance to the individual.1452 The Legal Aid Agency uses 
a rule of thumb that it should not be found that those on a very low income 
should have had insurance. The interpretation of the rule on “ought to 
have had insurance” has been the subject of a number of court cases which 
form part of the Collection of Interesting Precedent issued by the National 
Courts Administration. These include a decision of the Supreme Court that 
those entirely dependent on income maintenance benefits who do not have 
possessions worth insuring should not be expected to have legal expenses 
insurance.1453 However in another case it was made clear that a mixed income 
including social security benefits should not be assumed to mean that a person 
need not have legal expenses insurance, particularly as the Social Services Act 
provides that home insurance should form part of the minimum costs covered 
by social security.1454 
The Court of Appeal has held that a person on low income who had only 
recently found accommodation after a prison sentence should also be allowed 
legal aid despite not having insurance1455 and it has been confirmed that the 
overall economic and personal circumstances of the applicant should be 
considered as a whole.1456 However, where a case comprised a dispute about 
the purchase of a car, the fact that the legal aid applicant was in the position to 
purchase a car meant that he ought to have had insurance covering the situation 
for which he sought legal aid;1457 the same applied in the case of purchase of a 
horse.1458 An applicant who wrongly believed his insurance would cover the 
circumstance which arose was not entitled to legal aid, and ought to have 
had effective insurance cover.1459 The “ought to have had insurance” rule is not 
generally applied in family cases as these are considered to be of such importance 
1450  Rättshjälpslagen, 1996, 29§ and Rättegångsbalken, 1942, Chapter 21, 10 §.
1451  This ‘prisbasbelopp’ is set annually; in 2018 it is 45 500 kronor, and thus legal expenses 
        insurance will generally not cover cases worth under 22,750 kronor or about 2,300 €.
1452  Rättshjälpslagen, 1996, 9 §, para. 2.
1453  Ö647-99, 1999.
1454  Ö1327-99, 2001.
1455  RH 1998:26, 1998.
1456  RH 1998:64, 1998.
1457  Rättshjälpsnämnden 405-1998.
1458  Rättshjälpsnämnden 623-1998.
1459  Rättshjälpsnämnden 478-1998.
302
that the exemption applies, as illustrated by various decided cases.1460 
Under Danish legislation, legal aid is not available if the person has legal 
expenses insurance which would cover the case,1461 although it may be available 
if the costs exceed the maximum payable under the insurance.1462 Legal 
expenses insurance is a standard element of household insurance in Denmark 
and it is felt that legal aid and legal expenses insurance together successfully 
ensure that there is not a significant problem with unrepresented litigants. 
However, it should be noted that insurance does not generally cover family 
matters or employment or industrial injury cases which have traditionally been 
part of the operations area of trades unions. 
In Norway, if a potential litigant has legal expenses insurance which covers the 
case, he will not be eligible for legal aid under the subsidiarity rule.1463 Likewise, 
in Finland, individuals with legal expenses insurance will not be eligible for 
legal aid for cases covered by that insurance,1464 which is an automatic additional 
element in most household insurance policies. Legal aid may be available to 
cover additional legal work beyond the limit of the insurance policy and in 
some cases also for the insurance excess payable by the client.1465 The ‘ought to 
have had insurance’ rule does not apply in Denmark, Norway or Finland. 
In the UK and Republic of Ireland, legal expenses insurance is not an 
explicit barrier to obtaining legal aid. This may be because of a very different 
insurance market to that in the Nordic countries; the UK Financial Ombudsman 
has said that there is “generally no cover available for: bringing/defending 
defamation proceedings; or funding actions where state funding is more widely 
available”.1466
8.3.3.5 Legal advice provision outside formal legal aid
There exist many other types of arrangement which provide legal advice to 
the public, which are not the subject matter of the thesis despite the fact that 
they fulfil a very similar purpose to legal aid, and indeed are included in some 
studies of legal aid.1467 Such schemes include pro bono advice clinics run by 
the legal professions; charitable organisations providing advice which can be 
partly legal; student-staffed legal advice clinics and advice services provided 
by administrative bodies as part of their statutory duties. In addition, in some 
jurisdictions legal professionals agree to waive their fees in cases which have 
particular public importance or which are significant for the client, if the client 
cannot afford to pay and legal aid is not available.
1460  See e.g. Ö 38/00; Ö1327-99.
1461  Retsplejeloven, 2017, § 325(1).
1462  Ibidem, § 336(1).
1463  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 5.
1464  An applicant must produce any relevant policies when making an application for legal 
         aid. Statsrådets förordning om rättshjälp, 2002, 8 §, para. 2. 
1465  Rättshjälpslag, 2002, 3 §.
1466  http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/legal-expenses. html.
1467  Halvorsen Rønning and Hammerslev 2018.
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The Norwegian legal aid system is a good example of such an arrangement. 
The public legal aid scheme focuses on providing free legal advice and 
representation in areas of law which are felt to particularly impact upon 
individuals’ lives, as seen above in Chapter 5. One outcome of this approach 
is that many areas are not covered, including many money cases and others, 
such as social welfare cases, which might be thought of as high impact. In 
an attempt to deal with this unmet need, many not-for-profit organisations 
provide legal advice free of charge to members of the public; some of these are 
funded in whole or in part by the Department of Justice and Public Security,1468 
thus providing an alternative from the same arm of government that funds the 
formal legal aid scheme. 
Similarly, in Denmark, private legal aid institutions provide much of the 
level 2 and 3 advice. There is a considerable variety between institutions; they 
may be open part- or full-time and some specialise in particular subject areas. 
At these levels there are financial eligibility criteria which must be applied by 
lawyers, but not all private legal aid institutions apply a means test and legal 
aid institutions may provide advisory assistance in areas of practice which are 
excluded from coverage by lawyers under the Administration of Justice Act. 
Furthermore, legal aid institutions offer level 2 and 3 services free of charge to 
the recipient; the 50% or 25% charge is not applicable. Institutions also provide 
assistance in areas which traditionally have not been covered by lawyers in 
private practice, such as conditions of employment and debt restructuring.1469 
Such institutions make a significant contribution to the provision of legal 
advice, operating partly within the formal legal aid scheme but partly outside it, 
with more generous rules and additional funding.
Ad hoc, but well established, not-for-profit NGOs and volunteer schemes 
provide wide-ranging services in the UK and Republic of Ireland.
The narrow definition of legal aid used in this thesis may lead to an 
impression that Cousins’ 1994 finding1470 that the vast majority of legal aid 
schemes focus on traditional legal advice and representation still holds. 
Caution should however be exercised as many services which would counter 
this conclusion have not been studied in detail here.
8.4 Conclusions: the role of legal aid
It has been seen that the jurisdictions under comparison show significant 
disparity on a number of levels. The use of administrative tribunals and appeal 
boards, mediation and mechanisms to divert family cases away from court, 
as well as court structures themselves, all vary and affect the need for legal 
representation. Furthermore, there can be multiple sources of legal help for the 
1468  E.g. JussBuss http://foreninger.uio.no/jussbuss/. 
1469  Ellersgaard Nielsen et. al. 2012, p. 23.
1470  Cousins 1994, p. 114. 
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indigent in addition to legal aid. These variations may be historic or the result 
of recent governmental policy, but appear to have little direct relation to the 
amount spent on legal aid.
Some structural patterns are discernible: the jurisdictions of the UK and 
Republic of Ireland share similar approaches to administrative tribunals, 
to family law cases and to legal expenses insurance, and are all common law 
systems, except for Scotland, which is a mixed system. The Nordic countries 
are all civil law systems with, in the main, either separate administrative law 
courts (Sweden and Finland) or administrative appeal boards (Denmark) 
which remove most administrative law matters from the courts. They also have 
active legal expenses insurance markets which provide meaningful cover for 
a considerable proportion of the population, and mechanisms which remove 
a large part of family law dispute resolution from the courts. Despite these 
similarities within the two groups, and the differences between the groups, 
there is no pattern showing higher spend on legal aid per capita in one of the 
groups.
Furthermore, none of the economic or social factors examined in the first 
part of this chapter revealed a correlation with legal aid spend, suggesting 
that there are complex factors behind the cost of legal aid in a jurisdiction. 
It is possible that these may be a combination of the matters considered in 
this chapter, but the necessary statistical analysis in not within the remit of 
this thesis or the competence of the author. Alternatively, other factors not 
contemplated may be at play, including political considerations.
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9. Chapter 9: Conclusions
9.1 Introduction
The introductory chapter of this thesis posed five research questions:
(i) What are the organisational forms and procedures for legal aid decision-
making and for the oversight of such decisions in the relevant jurisdictions?
(ii) What are the material rules limiting decision-making discretion in legal 
aid?
(iii) What is the nature and extent of the connections between legal aid, 
international human rights law, and the rule of law, and to what extent do 
the jurisdictions comply with the relevant obligations?
(iv) How do the procedural and material aspects of legal aid vary between 
jurisdictions and what reasons might there be for this variation?
(v) Can transfer or learning between jurisdictions take place within the sphere 
of legal aid and, if so, how?
The first two questions have been addressed in detail in Chapters 3 to 6, which 
were largely concerned with the minutiae of legal aid decision-making structures 
and with the material content of decisions. Further detail is not needed for 
conclusions to be drawn, but a summary will be given of the findings of those 
chapters. The third research question was also addressed in the core chapters, 
as part of the incorporated analysis, as well as being considered in theoretical 
terms in Chapter 1. However, as a measurement against international human 
rights law standards is an important part of the comparative methodology of 
this thesis, it will be necessary in this final chapter to take an overall view of 
the measurement of the legal aid systems against that benchmark, and to make 
normative recommendations.
Throughout this thesis, an attempt has been made to draw comparisons 
between the nine jurisdictions, and to identify any patterns which might be 
present within each topic being considered. At the level of detail, thus, the 
fourth research question has been addressed, but further analysis is now 
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needed to identify similarities, differences and patterns in the overall systems, 
as well as to tentatively consider possible reasons for these. A great deal of 
variation has been revealed in the legal aid and public defender schemes of 
the Nordic countries, the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and in their context, 
indicating that these are complex systems which may have a delicate, symbiotic 
relationship with the societies in which they operate. In order to answer the 
fifth research question, which asks whether learning or transfer between 
systems is possible in practice, an understanding of these patterns must be 
developed, and an attempt to do this will be made in this conclusive chapter.
In addition to answering the research questions, this thesis has also 
highlighted the complexity of the administration of legal aid, and the challenges 
of comparing schemes in different jurisdictions. There is a clear need for further 
research encompassing more jurisdictions, if the comparative understanding of 
legal aid is to be of practical benefit in the establishment of new schemes and 
the transformation of existing systems. This comparison of nine jurisdictions 
has enabled insights into the connections between the various elements of a 
legal aid system, and the interrelationship between the material content of rules 
and the policy positions they signify. These observations inform a proposal for 
the development of a framework for the systematic analysis of legal aid systems, 
which will constitute the final part of this chapter.
9.2 Overview of substantive findings 
It was established in Chapter 2 that judicial systems and legal professions can 
be considered to be the operational background for a comparison of legal 
aid, and that these elements vary between the Nordic countries, the Republic 
of Ireland and the jurisdictions of the UK. The discernible patterns of these 
factors will be considered below. The distribution of legal aid work amongst 
various categories of lawyers, and sometimes non-lawyers, was also considered 
in the chapter, and the distribution of legal aid work was found not to correlate 
to the structure of the legal profession overall.
State-funded assistance for criminal suspects and defendants was considered 
in Chapter 3, with an examination of criminal legal aid systems and public 
defender schemes which considered both organisation and qualifying criteria. 
The two types of organisation were found to be relatively similar in practice, 
as public defender work in the Nordic countries is performed by private 
practitioners. However, there are differences in the financial implications for 
clients of the system, and in the detail of the criteria for eligibility. Overall, 
though, the criminal defence assistance available throughout the jurisdictions 
considered is relatively similar from the perspective of a client. This may be 
surprising given that the schemes are nominally of two different types, whilst 
civil legal aid is, on the face of it, of the same nature throughout the area yet 
shows greater variation.
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The greater complexity of the procedural and material requirements for civil 
legal aid necessitated, within this thesis, three separate considerations: of 
decision-making and appeals, scope, and merits criteria. The research identified 
private lawyers, government agencies and courts as the three groups of first-
instance decision-makers and found that these groups were used in different 
configurations in the jurisdictions, with consequent differences in the extent 
to which indirect public administration is used for legal aid. In particular, it was 
seen that the extent to which courts make legal aid decisions varies dramatically. 
There is also great diversity in legal aid appeal and oversight processes, with 
consequences in particular for the independence of the review. Independence is 
important to protect against arbitrariness by minimising possible inadvertent 
bias arising from vested interests affecting the outcome of legal aid applications.
Scope restrictions were found to be a significant mechanism for limiting 
civil legal aid and thus maintaining control over expenditure. However, the 
policy basis for such restrictions is often insufficiently explained, given the 
serious effects upon access to justice of these material rules. As with other 
aspects of the civil legal aid systems, there was great divergence between the 
schemes on subject scope with some interesting and unexpected patterns which 
will be considered below. 
Despite the evident wide diversity of merits tests, four main significant criteria 
were found to be in use: need for representation; reasonableness; prospects 
of success; and proportionality between cost and benefit. The manner of the 
application of these criteria, and their combination with each other and with 
other less-used factors, produce the variation described in Chapter 6. However, 
despite some unifying themes, such as the universal presence of some form 
of reasonableness test, it is difficult to find similarities between jurisdictions. 
Therefore patterns were not found in the application of the merits tests overall, 
with the exception of the reliance on prospects of success as a decisive factor, 
as seen below.
It should be noted that the division of the material criteria for civil legal 
aid into ‘scope’ and ‘merits’ proved to be, to some extent, artificial. There is an 
overlap between merits tests and other eligibility criteria, which is particularly 
evident in the Icelandic legislation which does not separate the two elements 
but includes case type as one of the elements to be considered alongside 
other matters such as prospects of success. Even where the legislative scheme 
separates the components, there can be different approaches to the same concept; 
for example, importance to the client can be a factor used in deciding whether 
a case is in scope, or part of the relevant merits criteria. Nonetheless, as both 
aspects are within the remit of this thesis, the relevant material elements of civil 
legal aid eligibility have been considered in one or other chapter.
Continuing the theme of wide variation, the reach and content of legal aid 
were found to diverge within the jurisdictions. The percentage of the population 
which is financially eligible for legal aid ranges from about 25% to about 75%, 
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circumscribed by a number of different requirements. Availability of lawyers 
willing to carry out legal aid work is also a significant factor for access to 
publicly-funded services. Almost universally, private practitioners are unhappy 
with the low rates of pay and high levels of administration which accompany 
legal aid work, but even where the state directly employs lawyers to provide 
legal aid services, sufficient access is not guaranteed, as illustrated by the 
waiting times for assistance from the Legal Aid Board offices in the Republic 
of Ireland. All the legal aid systems are reliant on there being lawyers willing to 
undertake work for lower rates of pay than would be possible in other areas of 
legal practice, although opinions differ as to whether such lawyers are cynically 
using legal aid as a convenient complementary income which it is possible to 
manipulate to financial advantage, or whether they are desperately trying to 
keep their practices afloat in the light of falling real incomes.
No easy explanations for the disparity of legal aid schemes were found in the 
wider social or economic context. The structures of the judicial systems, and 
in particular the extent to which cases are diverted away from formal justice 
solutions, do follow clear patterns, with a different approach being taken in 
the Nordic countries compared to the other jurisdictions. Whilst there is no 
direct correlation with the expense of the legal aid scheme, these findings are 
important when attempting meaningful comparison of legal aid systems. 
9.3 Compliance with international human rights requirements
9.3.1 Human rights as a benchmark
The relevant provisions of international human rights treaties, and their 
application by treaty bodies, have been referred to throughout this thesis as 
they apply to the topics under discussion. These international requirements can 
be used as a neutral benchmark against which the different legal aid schemes 
can be measured,1471 to make the comparison valid and as objective as possible. 
However, in using this method it must be borne in mind that:
In the human rights setting, legal aid is perceived as one of several vehicles 
for access to justice. It is part of a broader rule of law and access to justice 
obligation for governments. Others include accessible courts, simple 
procedures, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), conflict prevention 
measures, such as legal planning, educational measures to ensure that 
people themselves are legally competent, etc.1472
Thus, an absence of legal aid for a particular case will not amount to a breach of 
the international obligations of the state if legal assistance is not needed for the 
individual to achieve access to fair dispute resolution. However, the discussion 
in Chapter 6 established a caveat to the discussion of legal aid as an element of 
1471  Michaels 2006, p. 375.
1472  Johnsen 2018, p. 238.
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access to justice. The explicit provisions of the human rights treaties refer to 
fair trial (or hearing), rather than to access to court (or to justice); the latter 
concept has developed through the interpretation of the provisions by the 
treaty bodies but has gained, it is submitted, a pre-eminence over the explicit 
provisions. 
This tendency to ignore fair trial rights skews the discussion of human rights 
as applied to legal aid; in particular, it changes the question posed to determine 
whether the absence of legal aid is acceptable. When the focus is on access 
to justice, the question asked is whether there are mechanisms which would 
enable that individual to have meaningful access to justice without legal aid. 
However, if fair trial is allowed its proper place in the discussion, the question 
becomes whether the individual has a right to use court to resolve the dispute 
and, if so, whether a potential court hearing would be fair if this party was not 
represented, even if the other party does obtain representation. The fair trial 
aspect has sometimes been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights, 
but only as a second issue after consideration of access to court:
Secondly, the key principle governing the application of Article 6 is 
fairness. In cases where an applicant appears in court notwithstanding lack 
of assistance by a lawyer and manages to conduct his or her case in spite 
of all the difficulties, the question may nonetheless arise as to whether this 
procedure was fair.1473
The second question posed above is not only necessary to address the human 
right to fair trial but also must be asked in defence of the rule of law. The rule 
of law requires equal access to the law and equality before the law; an access 
to justice focus can work against equality by leading to the establishment of 
different justice processes for those who are of limited means, whilst the formal 
court-based justice system becomes the preserve of the well-to-do. Alternative 
methods of dispute resolution undoubtedly have their place, but only if they 
represent a real choice by the parties to the dispute to eschew the courts. If, 
however, a person of low means cannot exercise the option to go to court due 
to financial difficulties, there is not equal access to the courts and thus no 
equality before the law. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the dispute 
resolution venue may be imposed by the party who commences the action, and 
an individual defending a court case also has the right to a fair hearing, an issue 
ignored by many discussions on access to justice which focus on the person 
wishing to instigate the process.
As noted in Chapter 1, the rule of law will require legal aid in some cases in 
all jurisdictions unless: either the judicial system and laws are so simple that 
any individual could understand and use them without help or all disputes 
which might ever involve a person with limited financial means are capable of 
binding resolution through a non-judicial process which provides a fair hearing 
1473  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 54.
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without representation of the parties. If the latter, it must be impossible for one 
of the parties to choose to resolve proceedings through a judicial route unless 
the other party agrees and impossible for one party in judicial proceedings to 
be represented if the other is not. These conditions are not met in Europe and 
thus legal aid is a necessary part of the protection of the rule of law, in addition 
to, and with a wider reach than, the role it plays in access to justice. 
The legal aid jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which forms the bulk of the human rights praxis noted in this thesis, often 
lacks consideration of the explicit fair trial right in Article 6 and focuses on the 
implied right of access to court, with some limited application of an implied 
right to equality of arms, as discussed above in Chapter 6. Guidance as to 
the application of the right to fair trial or hearing is thus inadequate, and a 
discussion of the compliance of the legal aid systems of North-West Europe 
with this right must rely largely on theory. In addition to consideration of the 
Court’s jurisprudence, reference will also be made to the role of legal aid in 
upholding the rule of law, in the following argument.
9.3.2 Evaluation of criminal assistance in North-West Europe 
As has been seen, the relevant treaty provisions are different for criminal and 
civil cases and therefore, as in the main body of this thesis, it is appropriate 
to consider them separately here. In both types of case (and in administrative 
cases, as established by the jurisprudence of the Court),1474 Article 6(1) provides 
the right to a fair and public hearing; in non-criminal proceedings, this is the 
provision from which a right to legal aid can be implied. In criminal cases, 
however, Article 6(3)(c) explicitly states that every person charged with a 
criminal offence has the right to be given legal assistance with his defence free 
of charge, albeit that this right is limited to situations where the interests of 
justice so require and the defendant does not have sufficient means to pay for 
legal assistance. In cases brought under Article 6 concerning criminal legal aid, 
it is unsurprisingly the more specific provisions of subsection 3(c) which have 
been relied upon, with the consequence that the judgments deal largely with 
the application of the ‘interests of justice’ test. 
The explicit nature of the requirement to provide state-funded legal assistance 
with criminal defence to those with insufficient means to pay for their own 
defence may explain why the right is well-observed in the jurisdictions under 
consideration. 
The ‘interests of justice’ jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights takes the approach of considering all the circumstances of the case, 
and does permit the exclusion of very minor matters such as traffic offences 
from eligibility for legal aid or a public defender. It has been seen that the UK 
jurisdictions and the Republic of Ireland use the same test, the interests of 
justice, as the merits selection criterion for criminal legal aid eligibility, with 
1474  See e.g. Aerts v. Belgium, 1998.
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the effect of ensuring compliance with Article 6, as long as the test is applied 
appropriately and in accordance with the interpretation of the Court. Whilst 
there is not an explicit interests of justice test in the Nordic public defender 
schemes, the combination of relevant factors in deciding eligibility amount to a 
similar test to that evident from the Court’s praxis. The human rights obligation 
does not in this instance assist in differentiating between the jurisdictions, as 
they all comply; it is the method of compliance which is varied and of interest, 
and this will be considered below.
In criminal cases, Article 6 has also been interpreted by the Court as 
requiring the provision of legal assistance early in criminal proceedings, 
including during questioning at the police station. Again, this is now provided 
by all the jurisdictions although in Norway there is currently no general right to 
assistance pre-trial unless in custody. At the other end of the proceedings, after 
conviction, legal aid is also, according to the Court, to be made available for 
appeals. The criteria for deciding whether legal aid is required replicate those 
at the initial trial, i.e. whether the interests of justice mandate such assistance, 
and all the jurisdictions either provide automatic assistance at appeal or apply 
an interests of justice test also at that level, thus complying with the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 6. All the jurisdictions also provide sufficient choice of 
lawyer in publicly-funded criminal cases to satisfy the international standard 
within the margin allowed by the Court in decided cases.
Financial eligibility criteria apply to criminal legal aid, although not 
to public defender schemes; this is an important difference between the 
jurisdictions and it may be possible to make normative recommendations 
based on compliance with international standards, on this point. Assistance 
must be given free of charge to a defendant who does not have ‘sufficient means 
to pay’, according to the international treaties. Whilst it is unclear precisely how 
this element of the right would be applied in a case before the European Court 
of Human Rights, it is self-evident that the non-means tested public defender 
schemes of the Nordic countries would comply. The financial eligibility tests 
in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland also comply, as they explicitly 
award legal aid if the defendant’s means are insufficient to enable him to pay 
privately for a defence lawyer. However, in Scotland and England & Wales, 
detailed fixed tests apply. In Scotland the test is similar to the test for civil legal 
aid, and therefore it can be estimated that about the same proportion of the 
population, 70%, is eligible. Furthermore, even if the income or capital limit is 
exceeded, legal aid may be granted if paying her own legal costs would cause 
the defendant undue hardship.1475 This provision, properly applied, should 
ensure that the requirements of Article 6 are met. In England & Wales there 
is no such relief provision; in most criminal cases there are fixed income and 
capital limits above which legal aid will not be granted, whatever the likely 
costs of the defence or the difficulty which the defendant may have in meeting 
1475  Scottish Legal Aid Board Criminal Legal Assistance Handbook, Part III, paras. 12.2 and 14.
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these costs. This situation would almost certainly be found a violation of Article 
6 if a defendant successfully persuaded the Court that, despite being above the 
financial eligibility limits, she was unable to pay privately for her defence as the 
case was complex and lawyer’s fees prohibitive even for a person of her means. 
In these circumstances a defendant may well not have ‘sufficient means to pay’, 
even with a comfortable middle-class income. In order to ensure compliance 
with the right to legal aid in criminal cases, England & Wales should introduce 
a provision to exempt a defendant from the financial eligibility test if paying 
privately would be unrealistic. A similar provision to that in Scotland might 
well be suitable.
9.3.3 Evaluation of civil legal aid in North-West Europe
In civil and administrative cases, there is no equivalent to Article 6(3)(c) and 
thus reliance must be placed on the ‘fair hearing’ right in Article 6(1). In theory, 
this should be a very useful right; it is not limited by references to the interests 
of justice or the financial means of the individual, but is a free-standing, 
absolute right to a fair hearing. As discussed at some length in Chapter 6, the 
European Court of Human Rights has established an implied right of access 
to court which is now more commonly applied than the explicit right to a fair 
hearing. The implied right, as developed by the Court, is capable of limitation 
in the same way as rights under Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. The explicit 
right to a fair hearing, however, is not capable of limitation and there is a line 
of cases which emphasises that Article 6(1) is only met if an individual can 
satisfactorily present his or her case either without assistance or, if that is not 
possible, with assistance paid for by the state. This focus on the explicit right is 
in keeping with the rule of law requirement for legal aid proposed above, whilst 
the access to court focus more commonly adopted by the Court confirms with 
the access to justice approach which, it has been argued here, is too narrow.
Johnsen has compared Nordic legal aid provision against human rights 
norms, largely illustrated by the examples of Norway and Finland. In his analysis, 
Johnsen states that his focus is on legal aid as part of a human rights obligation 
to provide legal assistance to enable those without financial resources to access 
judicial remedies;1476 the narrower ‘access to justice’ viewpoint described above. 
However, his conclusions also address elements which attach to a ‘fair hearing’ 
approach:
1476  Johnsen 2018, p. 238.
313
none of the schemes cover costly civil trials for the more affluent part of the 
population—not even when costs become exorbitant. […] We might note 
some differences between welfare ideology and access to justice. Human 
rights protect every human being, whether rich or poor. Welfare benefits are 
mainly limited to the poorer part of the population, unless the scheme is 
universal, which legal aid is not in any Nordic country, except for a few case 
categories in Norway.1477
Whilst Johnsen’s analysis describes a dichotomy between welfare ideology and 
access to justice, the same example could be used here to illustrate a difference 
between fair hearing and access to justice. Assistance with high cost civil cases 
for those with moderate or good financial circumstances would be required 
under the fair hearing provision if the hearing would otherwise be unfair; 
under the right of access to court the state could argue reasonable limitation of 
legal aid. 
It may be useful here to examine the compliance with international human 
rights standards of the various elements of civil legal aid schemes which have 
been addressed in Chapters 4 to 6, in turn. The consideration of decision-making 
structures at first instance and at appeal, in Chapter 4, included a discussion of 
relevant findings of the international human rights treaty bodies. It was argued 
that, to comply with human rights obligations, applications for legal aid must 
be dealt with diligently,1478 the appearance of the fair administration of justice 
must be maintained,1479 decisions must not be arbitrary1480 and reasons must 
be given for rejection of an application for legal aid.1481 The requirement of 
diligence is relevant in particular to the long waits for access to lawyers at the 
Law Centres run by the Legal Aid Board in the Republic of Ireland, and in 
the high level of delays reported in processing of civil legal aid applications in 
Denmark. Delays occur in the practical implementation of the administrative 
procedures set out in law; whilst they are thus not central to an administrative 
law consideration of legal aid, they can be extremely important in practice. 
Indeed, a long delay may completely subvert the objective of providing legal aid 
as proceedings may have gone ahead, or a deadline for an application passed, 
before help is received. Courts are not always willing to postpone proceedings 
for long periods whilst a legal aid applicant waits for a reply.1482
The making of decisions in a non-arbitrary manner, and the maintenance 
of the public appearance of fair administration of justice, both depend on 
good decision-making processes. The European Court of Human Rights has 
commented favourably on systems which provide neutrality or balance in 
decision-making bodies.1483 It was argued in Chapter 4 that the interrelationship 
1477  Ibidem, p. 241.
1478  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 54.
1479  Ibidem.
1480  Gnahore v. France, 2000, para. 41; Del Sol v. France, 2002, para. 26.
1481  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 54.
1482  FLAC 2009.
1483  Del Sol v. France, 2002.
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between the legal aid decision-makers at first-instance and at appeal is key to 
ensuring that decisions are legitimate and perceived to be so. The jurisdictions 
of North-West Europe do not all achieve decision-making and appeal processes 
which are evidently protected against unconscious bias. Of special concern are 
the systems where legal aid decisions are made within government agencies 
and the appeals are handled by the same agency. In particular, the fact that 
only internal review of legal aid is possible in Iceland, in the majority of 
cases in Scotland, and in lower court cases in Northern Ireland, provides 
insufficient protection against arbitrariness. At the least, some independence 
should be inserted into the appeal process through the use of independent legal 
professionals as in Ireland, England & Wales and in Northern Ireland higher 
court cases; ideally, appeals should be heard completely outside the body 
taking the original decisions, as in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. To 
ensure the coherence of decision-making, feedback should occur from appeal 
decisions to first-instance decision-makers. The proposed mechanisms for this 
in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are to be welcomed and an 
official feedback process in England & Wales should also be developed. The lack 
of reasons provided for appeal decisions by the Appeals Permission Board in 
Denmark is not only a hindrance to consistency of decisions, but also in breach 
of the specific requirement for written reasons for legal aid decisions1484 and 
the general administrative duty to provide reasons. This problematic situation 
should urgently be addressed.
It is clear from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
that legal aid must be available if necessary to ensure a fair hearing in any 
type of case (other than tax or some aspects of immigration status). Thus, any 
civil legal aid scheme which completely excludes any category of case from its 
scope will be in violation of Article 6 unless there are saving provisions which 
function effectively so that even in excluded case types, legal aid can be granted 
if required in order for a hearing to be fair under the Convention. As Johnsen 
asserts, the case of Steel and Morris establishes that “legal aid schemes cannot 
exempt selected categories of problems from legal aid irrespective of their 
importance to the individual”.1485 Saving provisions allowing legal aid to be 
granted in excluded case types in exceptional circumstances are absent in the 
Republic of Ireland and in Scotland (apart from in defamation cases), which 
is problematic. Ideally, in keeping with the fact that the right to fair hearing 
in Article 6 is not explicitly restricted to any types of hearing or capable of 
limitation due to other societal demands, there should not be scope restrictions 
at all. A legal aid scheme with universal scope would fully comply with the 
demands of the rule of law as it would not limit equal access to court in any 
matter. 
Some of the jurisdictions under comparison are very generous as to scope, 
most notably Iceland (with no restrictions) and Denmark (where there are few 
1484  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 54.
1485  Johnsen 2018, p. 241.
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restrictions and even these are covered if there are special reasons). Finland 
and Sweden are also generous, with short lists of absolutely excluded case types. 
Norway is problematic in respect of scope; in addition to very restrictive scope 
in general, the saving provisions are interpreted in such a way that case type 
is also crucial in obtaining legal aid outside the usual scope. Only cases of a 
nature which are in general considered to be of grave importance to a client can 
be granted legal aid, and this is judged by similarity to the in-scope categories. 
It is highly likely that this system fails to grant legal aid in many cases where, 
according to the criteria laid down by the European Court of Human Rights, 
it should be granted. Northern Ireland and England & Wales provide specific 
saving provisions to allow legal aid to be granted if failure to do so would 
breach Article 6 fair trial rights, or any other rights under the Convention, but 
it may be that in practice they do not fully achieve this goal. 
It would be naïve to imagine that systems such as Norway and England & 
Wales, which have very limited scope, would move towards universal, or even 
considerably wider, scope. However, in order to comply with international 
human rights obligations they must at least provide a realistic possibility of 
legal aid being granted in out-of-scope cases where this is necessary for fair 
hearing to be achieved, bearing in mind at least ‘the importance of what is 
at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of the relevant 
law and procedure and the applicant’s capacity to represent him or herself 
effectively’.1486 One effective option would be to adopt the suggestion mooted in 
Northern Ireland, that scope might be reconsidered and aligned with groups of 
people identified according to need, rather than groups of cases. 
The variety of merits tests for civil legal aid were set out in Chapter 6, and 
these were judged against the requirements of Article 6, as interpreted by the 
Court, and also against the rule of law and the right to a fair hearing in practice. 
The Court has been generous to governments, it is argued, in allowing a wide 
range of merits criteria including prospects of success and proportionality 
between cost and benefit. These restrictions on the availability of legal aid 
have been held to comply with Article 6 as long as they are not arbitrary or 
disproportionate, and do not impinge on the essence of the right of access 
to a court.1487 As pointed out above, in concentrating on the implied right of 
access to court with the possibility of limitation which has been granted by the 
European Court of Human Rights, decisions have been made in legal aid cases 
which do not give full recognition to the role of legal aid in ensuring the rule 
of law. 
Many of the merits tests used by the jurisdictions under comparison have 
been approved by the Court: prospects of success, need for representation 
and the importance of the matter for the client have all been pleaded in cases 
before the Court and have been found not to be in breach of the right to 
access to court. Other tests are inherently unproblematic from a human rights 
1486  Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, 2005, para. 61.
1487  Laskowska v. Poland, 2007, para. 52.
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viewpoint: Probabilis causa litigandi, compliance with international human 
rights obligations and the need for a case to be properly prepared all fall within 
this group. There is no clear praxis from the Court on how proportionality 
between cost and benefit and the various reasonableness tests might be 
viewed. However, the general approach is that limitations to legal aid (which 
would include merits tests) will be acceptable if they “pursued a legitimate 
aim, and there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved”,1488 which suggests that in 
principle the tests would be tolerated. Even within this generous environment, 
individual merits criteria which deny legal aid without room for consideration 
of other relevant factors will be found wanting, as the Court’s final evaluation 
is always whether overall the right to a (fair) tribunal was impaired in the 
particular case.
Although, in all likelihood, none of the tests would be found by the Court to 
impermissibly impair the right of access to court, some of them endanger the 
right to a fair hearing, and the rule of law, and are on this ground unacceptable. 
The worst offender, as explained in Chapter 6, is the prospects of success 
test, relied upon in all the jurisdictions other than Finland and Norway. In 
particular the approaches in the UK jurisdictions and the Republic of Ireland 
are problematic, as these jurisdictions bar cases with below a certain chance 
of success from legal aid funding. In the Nordic countries, where the test is 
used, it is as one of the factors to be considered and is not decisive. As has been 
suggested earlier in this thesis, the use of prospects of success as a decisive 
test for civil legal aid eligibility should be discontinued, as it is counter to the 
right to fair trial and the rule of law. At the very least, the use of percentages 
in prediction of prospects of success should be abandoned urgently due to the 
serious practical and theoretical problems inherent in such an approach, as 
detailed in Chapter 6. 
Similarly, a strict test of proportionality between cost and benefit is only 
justifiable within the implied right of access to court, and not acceptable as 
a limitation on the right to fair trial. This test is particularly significant in 
Iceland, Northern Ireland and England & Wales, and changes should be made 
to ensure that cases whose value is low compared to the cost of representation 
can be covered by legal aid if the other circumstances make this necessary for a 
fair hearing to be achieved. Judging the legal aid systems according to how well 
merits tests comply with the rights of access to court, fair hearing and the rule 
of law, Finland and Norway fare particularly well whilst England & Wales falls 
far short of full compliance. 
Although they have not formed a central part of this comparison, financial 
eligibility rules for legal aid also have human rights implications. In particular 
the proportion of the population financially eligible for legal aid is important, 
as if this proportion is low there will be many people who are ineligible but 
whose means are nonetheless modest. This group will have particular difficulty 
1488  Ibidem.
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accessing court and obtaining a fair hearing, particularly in complex, high-cost 
cases.
The issue of ability to pay for complex trials was in issue in the factually 
extraordinary case of Steel & Morris,1489 discussed above in Chapter 5. In 
that case, the applicants would have been financially eligible for legal aid, 
but a scope restriction meant that legal aid was not available for defamation 
proceedings. The scope restriction was found to amount to a violation of 
Article 6, but Johnsen also draws a wider conclusion from the case. In his 
evaluation of the Finnish and Norwegian legal aid systems against Article 6, he 
is particularly critical as regards fixed financial eligibility criteria:
For people of some means, the human rights consequence is–as spelled 
out in Steel and Morris–that they can claim access to legal aid if trial costs 
exceed what they can reasonably be expected to pay. Human rights do not 
lay down a right to free trials, but costs must be adjusted to the economic 
capacity of the individual. A legal aid system that demands that middle-
income people pay affordable legal aid costs themselves will not conflict 
with human rights if this protects against exorbitant costs. For the better-off, 
contributions might therefore be significant. However, since both Norway 
and Finland have upper income limits for cover, their schemes do not fully 
conform to human rights requirements.1490
However, it should be noted that although legal aid is not universal, there is 
in Norway the possibility to award legal aid to persons who do not satisfy the 
financial eligibility criteria if the cost of the case will be substantial in relation 
to the applicant’s economic situation,1491 which provision may well save that 
scheme from violating Article 6 in this regard.
If it is reasonable to assume that there is comparability between the 
affordability of legal fees for those of average income across the jurisdictions, 
percentage eligibility for legal aid is an indicator that a system conforms to 
Article 6 in protecting the rights of middle income individuals as well as the 
poorest. In all the jurisdictions other than Scotland and Finland, some cases are 
exempted from means testing, but these do not impact on the risk of violation 
of Article 6 in means-tested cases. Finland and Scotland have good cover 
across the middle income group, with approximately 75% eligibility; Sweden 
and Denmark, with very roughly half the populations eligible, are at risk of 
financially excluding some people who need assistance with legal costs; and 
Norway and England & Wales, with only about 25% eligibility, are undoubtedly 
refusing legal aid in cases in cases where there is no possibility that the 
individual can pay privately. 
1489  Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2005.
1490  Johnsen 2018, p. 244.
1491  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 11(4) and § 16(4); for application of these rules see 
        SRF-1/2017, Section 4.4. 
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9.3.4 Comparison of jurisdictions
In drawing conclusions on the compliance of legal aid schemes with international 
human rights law, this section considers the extent to which each jurisdiction, 
through its legal aid and public defender scheme, shields individuals against 
violation of the rights to fair trial, access to court and the rule of law. This is 
not the same as an overall assessment of the generosity of the scheme against 
the same criteria; an example concerning financial eligibility illustrates this 
point. In comparing the Finnish and Norwegian legal aid systems against 
the benchmark of Article 6, Johnsen concludes that the Norwegian financial 
eligibility criteria are more generous.1492 This finding is based on the fact that 
many cases in Norway are not means-tested, whereas in Finland all cases 
are means-tested. However, in means-tested cases, the applicable tests mean 
that 75% of the population of Finland is eligible, whereas only about 25% 
of Norwegians qualify. From this perspective, the Finnish system is more 
generous and better protects against the risk of a group of individuals falling 
outside the protections offered by human rights law, in some kinds of case. The 
Norwegian system provides generous help for those covered, but leaves more 
people behind, and thus is less effective at protecting all individuals against 
violations of their rights. In this thesis, therefore, the Norwegian financial 
eligibility scheme fares worse in the comparison.
In criminal cases, it has been concluded that all the jurisdictions provide 
legal assistance with the defence when this is necessary in the interests of 
justice, including in the police station. During the investigation stage, all except 
Norway provide assistance. In respect of the requirement that assistance be free 
if the defendant has insufficient means to pay for their own defence, England 
& Wales has fixed means tests (set at an ungenerous level) and does not 
protect defendants above the limit even if the trial is particularly complex and 
expensive. In criminal cases, therefore, Norway and England & Wales compare 
unfavourably with the other jurisdictions considered. 
Delays in Denmark and the Republic of Ireland raise the risk of violations 
of Article 6 in civil legal aid decision-making, whilst Iceland, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland all have failings in the decision and appeals processes, which 
do not sufficiently protect against arbitrariness. In terms of scope, the civil legal 
aid provision in Norway is particularly problematic, and clearly in breach of 
Article 6 as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. England & 
Wales is also very restrictive in scope and only saved by the exceptional case 
funding possibility, if this can be made to function properly in practice. Civil 
merits tests appear to breach the right to fair hearing, and the rule of law, in 
the UK jurisdictions and the Republic of Ireland, through use of a decisive 
prospects of success criterion, and there is a risk that Iceland also may fail to 
protect against breaches if the test of proportionality between cost and benefit is 
strictly applied. Financial eligibility rates are a concern in particular in England 
& Wales and Norway.
1492  Johnsen 2018, p. 246.
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Within the nine jurisdictions under consideration, only the legal aid schemes 
of Finland and Sweden escape significant criticism of the protection afforded 
against violations of the rights to fair trial, access to court and the rule of law; 
Denmark just fails to join this group by virtue of administrative failings. It is 
noteworthy that Sweden and Finland are, respectively, at the upper and lower 
ends of the spending scale, and Denmark is in the middle; the good levels 
of human rights compliance have been achieved seemingly independent of 
financial investment in the legal aid scheme. However, even these jurisdictions 
cannot be held up as paragons: in Finland the lack of protection from other 
side costs has a chilling effect on access to court, and choice of lawyer is limited 
and in Sweden relatively low financial eligibility levels and the ‘ought to have 
had insurance’ rule are of concern.
9.4 Patterns and variation
One advantage of a comparative study covering a large number of jurisdictions 
is that it affords the opportunity to identify patterns in the structure of legal aid 
law. The previous section judged the different systems against the benchmark 
of human rights and the rule of law. However, the methods used by the various 
jurisdictions do not only vary as to whether they comply with these measures; 
they also vary significantly as to how they comply. Consideration will next 
be given to whether there is any discernible order in the solutions chosen by 
governments to the functional need to provide legal aid.
It has been seen throughout this thesis that there is an extraordinary 
level of variation in the procedural and material elements of legal aid 
systems and public defence schemes. This is the case despite the similarities 
between the jurisdictions; they are all high spenders on legal aid, and spend 
a high proportion of their judicial budget on legal aid. It was suggested in the 
introduction at Chapter 1 that there might be similarities between the schemes 
in each of the two geographical sub-groups: the Nordic countries; and the UK 
and Republic of Ireland. However, during the course of the thesis it has become 
apparent that the situation is far more complex than this. 
To facilitate the search for patterns, the following table (Figure 12) 
considers three background elements (the organisation of the legal profession, 
the distribution of legal aid work and the nature of the court system); six 
procedural and material elements of legal aid (the choice of criminal legal aid 
or a public defender scheme; the nature of the criminal merits test; the civil 
decision-making structure; the independence of civil appeals; the scope of civil 
legal aid; and whether the prospects of success test is decisive), percentage 
eligibility, the amount of help provided under legal aid and three contextual 
elements (the diversion of family cases, legal aid spend and GDP per capita). 
Within each category, the jurisdictions are grouped, according to similarity 
of approach, into a maximum of four classes, each represented by different 
shading. In this exercise there is no attempt to place value on any alternative, 
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only to indicate similarities in order to identify patterns. The groupings are 
necessarily somewhat crude; full details of the similarities and differences 
of the various schemes can be found in earlier chapters. Some aspects of the 
comparison are not included on the chart because the sheer scale of variation 
renders this method unsuitable. It is for this reason that the only element of 
civil merits testing included in the chart is the presence of a decisive prospects 
of success test, and that much of the economic and systematic context is absent. 
A lack of shading indicates that information is not available.
Fig. 12. Legal aid comparison chart.
The table is useful for identifying trends in individual aspects of the legal aid 
systems, and also for comparing two or more countries across all aspects.
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With respect to the practical background to legal aid, the three jurisdictions of 
the UK are very similar, with closely related legal professions and comparable 
court systems. In respect of the legal profession, the Republic of Ireland also 
joins this group. The Republic of Ireland has more in common with Norway, 
Denmark and Iceland as regards the structure of the courts system, as there 
is no division of courts by category of case, although Ireland’s court system is 
more complex than the other three. Norway, Denmark and Iceland share the 
characteristic of regulated, unified legal professions. Sweden and Finland have 
similar judicial structures and legal professions, which are distinctive within 
our group of nine jurisdictions.
The distribution of legal aid work to lawyers does not follow the same 
pattern of groupings of jurisdictions as the structure of the legal profession; 
there does not seem to be a connection between organisation of the legal 
profession and distribution of legal aid. England & Wales has a restrictive 
contracting system for allocation of legal aid work; Denmark and Scotland have 
registration systems which are much looser. There is free or almost free access 
for lawyers to legal aid work in Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland 
and in criminal matters in the Republic of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland and 
Finland share a system of state-employed legal aid lawyers acting as gatekeepers 
for civil legal aid work and performing most of the work themselves.
The most obvious variation in the provision of publicly-funded assistance 
with criminal defence is in whether the jurisdiction operates a public defender 
scheme or a criminal legal aid scheme, with the practical and theoretical 
consequences discussed in Chapter 3. There is a clear division here between the 
Nordic jurisdictions and the others, although Finland of course operates both 
systems. There is also an evident division by geographical group concerning 
the structure of the criminal merits test; the Nordic public defender schemes 
provide lists of circumstances in which public defenders must be appointed, 
whilst in the UK jurisdictions and the Republic of Ireland, an overarching 
interests of justice test is applied. In the provision of criminal defence assistance, 
then, there is a clear pattern of different provision between the two geographical 
groups, with the exception being Finland, which in addition to the Nordic-style 
arrangements also provides criminal legal aid.
In civil legal aid, whilst it has been seen that indirect public administration 
through practising lawyers is the norm for advice level work, at the level of 
further assistance and representation there is considerable variation. The 
pattern here is much more complex than in criminal legal aid decision-making 
and similarities exist independent of the geographical sub-grouping. Thus, for 
example, there are similarities in decision-making structure between Finland 
and the Republic of Ireland, and between Iceland and the jurisdictions of the 
UK; within the Nordic countries, only Denmark and Norway have similar 
decision-making processes. Independence of appeal processes is similarly good 
in Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and similarly poor in Iceland and Scotland. 
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There is little geographical pattern to be found in civil scope restrictions, either; 
scope is heavily restricted in Norway and England & Wales, and moderately 
restricted in Sweden, Northern Ireland, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland. 
However, all the most generous scope provisions are to be found in the Nordic 
bloc: Denmark, Iceland and Finland. In contrast to the general mosaic in 
the chart within civil legal aid, there is a clear division between the Nordic 
jurisdictions and the others as regards the prospects of success merits test; 
this is decisive in the UK and the Republic of Ireland but not in the Nordic 
countries.
As can be clearly seen from the chart, percentage eligibility patterns do not 
follow geography, nor do they match the pattern of any of the other aspects. 
The groupings are England & Wales and Norway; Denmark and Sweden; and 
Scotland and Finland. The amount of help provided also appears relatively 
scattered across the jurisdictions, although the most generous systems, Finland 
and Sweden, are both in the Nordic countries whilst the least generous, 
England & Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland, are not. The important 
structural contextual element of diversion of family cases away from formal 
court processes is, however, clearly different in the two geographical groups. 
The Nordic countries all have significant structures in place to resolve family 
disputes without the use of court; the UK and Republic of Ireland do not. The 
economic structural elements of legal aid spend and GDP per capita do not 
follow any similar pattern.
In summary, a clear difference between Nordic and non-Nordic jurisdictions 
can be seen in the following areas: the organisation of criminal defence work; 
the structure of the criminal merits test; the decisiveness of the prospects of 
success test in civil merits assessment; and the diversion of family cases away 
from courts.
As has been discussed in Chapter 8, and as evident in the chart, there is no 
clear direct correlation between the amount spent on legal aid and any of the 
other factors considered, whether procedural, material or contextual. However, 
some interesting observations can be made. Both systems which are very 
restrictive on scope (Norway and England & Wales) are in the higher-spending 
group. Both systems which use employed solicitors to provide the bulk of legal 
aid (Finland and the Republic of Ireland) are in the lower spending group, and 
the systems which keep civil legal aid decision-making within government 
departments or agencies (the UK jurisdictions) are in the most expensive 
group.
In addition to the geographical grouping into Nordic and non-Nordic 
jurisdictions, other combinations of jurisdictions are interesting to compare. 
The three jurisdictions of the UK might be expected to have significant 
similarities and indeed they share more elements of their legal aid schemes than 
do the Nordic jurisdictions. Their legal professions and court systems are similar, 
and they all operate a criminal legal aid system with an overarching interests 
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of justice merits test. Within the sphere of civil legal aid, the jurisdictions have 
similar decision-making structures and a decisive prospects of success test. 
However, they do not have similarly independent appeals or equivalent scope 
restrictions. Percentage eligibility levels and amount of help provided vary 
within the group, but none carry out significant diversion of family cases and 
all are in the lower GDP group and the higher legal aid spend group, compared 
to the other jurisdictions. 
The similarity of Finland and Sweden might also be of interest, as these two 
jurisdictions share many similarities in other areas and have been classed as 
‘East Nordic’, with different characteristics from the remaining ‘West Nordic’ 
nations. In addition to the elements shared between all the Nordic countries, 
Finland and Sweden have similar court structures and legal professions. They 
have similar levels of independence in civil legal aid appeals and provide 
generous amounts of assistance to each legally-aided individual, although 
Sweden, in the higher-spending group of jurisdictions, spends more than twice 
as much as Finland per capita on legal aid. Despite their similarities in legal 
structure, they have very different methods of distribution of legal aid work 
within the legal profession and of legal aid decision-making. Unlike Sweden, 
Finland has, in addition to a public defender scheme, criminal legal aid which 
is more commonly used than public defenders. The scope of civil legal aid 
and the percentage of the population which is financially eligible are also very 
different between the two.
There is a surprising amount of correlation between legal aid in Finland 
and in the Republic of Ireland. The distribution of legal aid work and decision-
making structures for civil legal aid are strikingly similar, and very different 
from all the other jurisdictions under consideration. There is nothing to suggest 
that the resemblance occurred intentionally; no comparative exercise appears 
to have been undertaken resulting in a transfer of laws. Both jurisdictions are 
low spenders on legal aid, within the overall group, and it may tentatively be 
suggested that the decision-making and service delivery system they share 
enables greater government control over expenditure and therefore allows costs 
to be kept low. The characteristics which may be relevant here are the heavy 
reliance on government-employed lawyers who, in addition to carrying out the 
majority of the work, also act as gatekeepers of legal aid to private practitioners 
(although to a lesser extent in Ireland than in Finland).
This breadth and irregularity of variation in legal aid systems does not 
lend itself to simple explanation. It was seen above that the nature of the legal 
professions has been proposed as the main determining factor in legal aid, but 
this would not explain the variety disclosed in this study. It appears that legal 
aid schemes in general develop piecemeal, and that each jurisdiction is on 
its own path. The extent to which legal aid interacts with other aspects of the 
justice system, the legal profession and society as a whole makes explanations 
highly context-specific; thus, the considerable complexity of the legal aid 
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provisions in England & Wales, whilst unfortunate, is in keeping with the 
generally lengthy nature of legislation in that jurisdiction and may have little 
or nothing to do with the fact that legal aid is the subject. The rationale for 
a particular aspect of a legal aid scheme can also sometimes be found in a 
specific, small-scale policy decision. For example, the requirement in Sweden 
that everybody must pay something towards their legal aid is a policy decision 
based on ensuring that legal aid recipients understand the value of the benefit 
they are receiving, but may have a considerable impact on access for the 
poorest members of society. In Finland, as discussed above, it is an element 
external to legal aid, the imposition of inter-partes costs against the losing side 
in a court case, which appears to have a great impact upon the legal aid scheme 
and allows a very generous system to be affordable. 
This study has not revealed universally applicable explanations for the 
procedural and material solutions implemented in respect of legal aid, 
which is not to suggest that such explanations could not be found. However, 
significant further research would be needed to ascertain how the elements 
of a legal aid scheme relate to each other and how they influence outcomes, 
including cost, given the complexity involved. Furthermore, as pointed out in 
the methodology section of Chapter 1, cultural differences must be borne in 
mind when undertaking an exercise in functional comparison. Cultural issues 
were touched upon in Chapter 8 in sufficient detail to raise questions, but not 
provide answers, about their influence on legal aid. 
9.5 The possibility of inter-jurisdictional learning and transfer
9.5.1 Transplant theory 
This study set out to consider the possibility of inter-jurisdictional learning 
and transfer in legal aid, as one of its research questions. From the above 
summary, whilst bearing in mind the limitations of this research, it is at least 
clear that caution is needed when seeking inspiration from other jurisdictions, 
supporting the assessment of Moore and Newbury referred to in Chapter 1.1493 
Some attention was given to the theory of comparative law in Chapter 1; it may 
here be useful to return to theory and consider the particular issue of legal aid 
transplants, with some practical historical examples.
Whole-scale transplants of legal aid systems are rare within North-West 
Europe, as schemes already exist and the intention is generally to improve, 
rather than completely replace, these. Occasionally the potential for importation 
of a complete system does arises as, for example, in the possible forthcoming 
establishment of a legal aid scheme for Wales, although it is of course far 
from clear that a full-scale transfer would be proposed by the Commission 
on Justice in Wales. Small-scale transfers, on the other hand, are from time to 
1493  Moore and Newbury 2017.
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 time proposed and attempted, and these are relevant to a discussion of legal 
transplant theory.
There are two opposing schools of thought as to whether legal transplants 
are possible. The main proponent of the argument against is Legrand, who rejects 
a formalistic interpretation of law as rules and therefore condemns proponents 
of legal transplants for having “a particularly crude apprehension of what law is 
and of what a rule is”.1494 He asserts that the words of a rule can never represent 
the whole rule, which is dependent on the culturally specific meaning put upon 
the words by the interpreter and that “because of what they effectively are, rules 
cannot travel. Accordingly, legal transplants are impossible.”1495 To Legrand, 
context is not only the legal system but the whole ‘cultural ambiance’ absorbed 
by a member of the society in question from childhood. To effect a meaningful 
legal transplant it would be necessary to transplant both elements of the rule; 
the words and the cultural context. This is clearly impossible as no two different 
jurisdictions can have identical cultural environments.
Critics of Legrand’s approach argue that it is possible to gain a good 
understanding of another legal system and suggest that the problem is his 
insistence on a complete understanding. It can be argued that it might not be 
possible to see even one’s own system clearly, for lack of perspective1496 and that 
legal cultures are not fully evident to their members or to outsiders.1497 To this 
might also be added the observation that there can be several legal cultures 
within the same jurisdiction; a family lawyer within a particular country might 
well not be able to fully understand the nuances and specific cultural context 
of commercial law in that same place. Academic lawyers and practicing lawyers 
also have very different cultures and thus a strict application of Legrand’s 
argument would lead to very limited possibilities for research. 
Nelken counters Legrand by questioning the need to see another legal 
system as a native does. Transplants, he suggests, can still take place and it is 
possible to usefully predict how a native lawyer will act upon the implant of a 
foreign law. An investigation of the relationship between law and society can 
help to predict and understand potential problems in transplanting laws but 
it is important to remember that law does not always need to perfectly fit with 
society; it can be out of step for a while and may even be an expression of 
desired change.1498 
In addition to those who refute Legrand’s stance on the possibility of 
understanding another legal system, many scholars disagree with Legrand on an 
experiential level, pointing out that legal transplants take place frequently and 
thus their existence cannot be denied. Watson, for example, takes a view based 
largely on his study of Roman law and its historical spread that “borrowing, 
1494  Legrand 1997, p. 113.
1495  Ibidem, p. 114.
1496  Lasser 2003, p. 197.
1497  Rosen 2003, p. 493.
1498  Nelken 2003, p. 437.
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even mindless, is the name of the legal game”.1499 As Smits puts it, “the use of 
comparative law while drafting new legislation is as old as the phenomenon of 
statutory law itself ”.1500
Many scholars, when discussing legal transplants of smaller bodies of law 
within a system, take it for granted that these can and maybe even will involve 
changes to the law being moved. For example, Graziadei states that “even when 
those vested with authority have decided what law to import, the process 
of adaptation to the local environment will often add new and unexpected 
elements to the import. This is inevitable”.1501 He is of the view that “it is idle to 
ask if there can be perfect imitation because such perfection is simply not the 
point”1502 and denies Legrand’s argument its force by proposing that “although 
the meaning of law, like any other cultural element, may be manipulated 
rearranged, transformed and distorted as it is passed on, the transmission of 
law from one culture to another can still take place”.1503 Örücü also takes a 
practical approach which starts from the understanding that borrowing and 
imitation are an important part of legal change. What is essential, according 
to him, is to ensure that the appropriate adjustments are made to the law to 
suit its new context. He likens the process to that of transposing music for a 
different instrument and adopts the term ‘legal transposition’ as preferable to 
‘legal transplant’. The incoming elements of a transposition are legal culture, 
legal structure and legal substance. All of these must be made to harmonise 
with the host system if a successful move of law is to be achieved.1504 
The question of whether transplants should be directed towards legal 
rules or towards policies is raised by Siems,1505 who points out that the two 
often overlap. He accepts that there are valid criticisms of legal transplants 
which have a disruptive effect on the recipient legal system, but proposes that 
these should not be taken to mean there cannot be “reflective learning from 
abroad”.1506 Interestingly, one of Smits’ main examples is the spread of laws 
permitting same-sex marriage, but he in fact traces the spread of the policy 
rather than of any specific legal formulation. Whether this is an instance of 
legal transplants is arguable.
It is apparent from this brief look at some of the theories of transplants that 
a wide range of learning and borrowing activities are included in what various 
scholars debate within the theme of ‘transplants’, ‘transpositions’ or ‘transfers’. 
Different conclusions as to the possibility of transplants can be drawn 
depending on whether a small-scale or large-scale transplant is proposed, 
and also on the degree of similarity between the two jurisdictions involved. 
1499  Watson 2007, p. 5.
1500  Smits 2006, p. 515.
1501  Graziadei 2068, p. 465. 
1502  Ibidem, 469.
1503  Ibidem, 470.
1504  Örücü 2003, p. 467.
1505  Siems 2014, p. 192.
1506  Ibidem, p. 197.
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Smits has suggested that in both civil and common law countries, inspiration is 
sought in the drafting of major new statutes from other jurisdictions, through 
various mechanisms.1507 He suggests that one way to categorise different types 
of foreign influence on legislation is to “distinguish between the wholesale 
importation of large pieces of law (like a complete civil code) and the adoption 
of specific rules”.1508
Large-scale transplants may pose a particular challenge due to the difficulties 
of achieving a good enough match. As Örücü states, large-scale transpositions 
need a compatible receiving culture and if this is not in place changes will 
need to be made to ensure a good match. This may involve, inter alia, training 
lawyers and judges.1509 Small-scale transplants, on the other hand, may be 
easier to achieve. Indeed, as many authors have been able to discuss numerous 
examples, such transplants are clearly possible, and have been attempted within 
the sphere of legal aid. 
9.5.2 Small-scale transfers within legal aid
9.5.2.1 Past examples
Two recent examples of proposed or attempted small-scale transfers of legal 
aid law are Northern Ireland learning from the other UK jurisdictions, and 
Norway considering lessons from Finland. In 2010, the Northern Ireland 
Justice Minister appointed a team to review legal aid in the jurisdiction and 
develop proposals to ensure access to justice. In the introduction to its report, 
delivered in 2011, the review team stated:
While we are clear that this review should produce outcomes suited to the 
particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, it makes sense to take account 
of the experiences of the other jurisdictions in these islands which have legal 
systems bearing many similarities with our own. During the consultation 
period, we undertook visits and had discussions with government 
departments, legal aid authorities and other organisations in the Republic of 
Ireland, Scotland and England and Wales.1510
However, when drawing conclusions the team was conscientious in considering 
the fit between the approaches in other jurisdictions and the operational 
circumstances in Northern Ireland. The outcome was that some of the 
most significant potential transplants were rejected. A prime example of this 
concerned the scope of legal aid in family cases. At the time of the Northern 
Irish review, major changes were being proposed in England & Wales which led 
to the adoption of the contentious Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012, significantly reducing legal aid for family cases, as has been 
seen in Chapter 5, amongst other reforms. The Northern Irish review team were 
1507  Smits 2006, p. 516.
1508  Ibidem, p. 517.
1509  Örücü 2003, p. 467.
1510  Access to Justice Review Northern Ireland: The Report, 2011, p. 14.
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aware of the recommendations being pursued in the neighbouring jurisdiction 
and considered whether they should follow the same course:
Cases concerning family and children accounted for around 70% of the 
spend on civil legal aid in 2010/11. We gave serious thought to whether, 
following proposals in England and Wales, we should recommend removing 
from scope private family law cases (primarily matrimonial and associated 
matters) other than those where domestic violence or child abuse was a 
factor. […] However, largely as a result of our observation of proceedings in 
court, we came to the view that an increase in unrepresented parties would 
impede the effective management of a court system already under pressure 
and render more difficult the resolution of differences between the parties, 
especially where children were involved. We therefore recommend that 
private family law remains in scope.1511
Not all the laws of neighbouring jurisdictions which were considered were 
rejected, however. Further research was sought on some topics to further 
explore the potential benefits of developing certain aspects of access to 
justice, for example criminal legal aid fee arrangements, in line with the other 
jurisdictions:
We note the possibility of introducing one standard fee to apply whether 
there is a plea or the case goes to trial (as is the case in Scotland) and suggest 
that the way this works in other jurisdictions and its possible application in 
Northern Ireland should be further researched.1512
Most impact was achieved by comparative legal studies in areas where it was 
recommended that provisions which were working well elsewhere should 
immediately be adopted in Northern Ireland:
We recommend that high priority is given to developing guidance for the 
use of fixed penalty notices and the Code of Practice on conditional cautions 
as required by the legislation. And we suggest that urgent consideration 
is given to legislating to enable the introduction of prosecutorial fines in 
Northern Ireland and to assessing whether other direct measures of the type 
deployed in Scotland might be applicable in this jurisdiction.1513
The very close relationship between Northern Ireland and the other UK 
jurisdictions makes it unsurprising that attention is given to developments in 
the neighbouring areas. The comparative law approach involved consideration 
of solutions used in nearby jurisdictions and assessment of whether they would 
be suitable in Northern Ireland. Some of the ideas examined were adopted and 
some were rejected, as a result of the analysis of the research team.
A further example can be found in Norway, which undertook an exercise 
in 2008-2009 reviewing the operation of its legal aid scheme and adopting 
1511  Ibidem, p. 8.
1512  Ibidem, p. 7.
1513  Ibidem, p. 45.
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proposals for reform. Part of the review was an academic comparative law 
project undertaken by Professor Jon Johnsen of Oslo University at the request 
of the Ministry of Justice. In particular, he was asked to compare the Norwegian 
and Finnish legal aid systems and report on any lessons which might be learnt 
from Finland in developing the strategy for reform.1514 The original request for 
the comparison came from parliament, which asked the government to “assess 
the current legal aid scheme, among other things in light of the Finnish legal 
aid scheme”.1515 As well as the report of Professor Johnsen, the Finnish National 
Research Institute of Legal Policy was engaged by the Norwegian government 
to produce a document mapping the Finnish legal aid system and visits were 
made by government officials to the Finnish Ministry of Justice and to a Legal 
Aid Office in Helsinki.1516 Visits were also made to Sweden and Denmark and 
written information was sought from the UK and the Netherlands. The focus of 
the comparative legal work seems to have been on Finland; although a separate 
report was also commissioned from Professor Johnsen on England & Wales, the 
scale of the investigation into the Finnish scheme was greater. Interestingly, one 
of the reasons for taking Finland as the comparator was that “Finland is more 
different from Norway than the other Nordic countries when it comes to legal 
service and legal aid” and it was felt that “such contrasts might produce more 
incentives for reforms than comparing jurisdictions that have almost identical 
systems”.1517
The comparative law element of the exercises referred to led to a variety 
of legislative outcomes. The Norwegian recommendations have not resulted in 
any legislation because the reforms were shelved upon change of government. 
NGOs continue to call for the recommended changes to be made.1518 Some of 
the Northern Irish recommendations were implemented, with the introduction 
of standard legal aid fees for guilty pleas1519 and of police-issued fixed penalties 
for low level offences and prosecutorial fines.1520 The recommendation not to 
follow England & Wales in restricting the scope of family legal aid has been 
respected, in that no changes have been made. 
Whilst no practical outcome can be measured from the Norwegian 
comparative work, the Northern Irish experience suggests that legal transplants 
are possible. The legal cultures of the origin and receiving jurisdictions 
were very similar and the absorption of the new rule appears to have been 
straightforward. Little adjustment was needed to the nature of the rule, but 
the form which the legislation took was not the same as in the jurisdiction 
of origin. The copying of ‘prosecutorial fines’ from Scotland is a case in 
1514  Johnsen 2009a, p. 2.
1515  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008–2009), para. 1.1.
1516  Ibidem.
1517  Johnsen 2009a, p. 2. This comment on the similarity of the other Nordic schemes is  
        not supported by the current thesis.
1518  Rettshjelpsordningen må styrkes, 2015. 
1519  Implemented for magistrates’ courts on 26th June 2014 and for Crown Court on 5th May 2015.
1520  Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2015.
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point, and relevant to legal aid as it diverts a group of criminal cases away from 
the courts, thus removing the need for criminal legal aid for those cases. In 
Scotland, legislation sets out the option for a ‘fixed penalty conditional offer by 
procurator fiscal’:
Where a procurator fiscal receives a report that a relevant offence has 
been committed he may send to the alleged offender a notice under this 
section (referred to in this section as a conditional offer); and where he 
issues a conditional offer the procurator fiscal shall notify the clerk of court 
specified in it of the issue of the conditional offer and of its terms.1521
The conditional offer is to give “such particulars of the circumstances alleged to 
constitute the offence to which it relates as are necessary for giving reasonable 
information about the alleged offence”1522 as well as the amount of the 
penalty, the length of time for which the offer will be valid (28 days), and the 
consequences of accepting or rejecting the offer. 
In Northern Ireland, legislation provides for the equivalent system under 
the name of ‘prosecutorial fines’ and provides that:
Where a Public Prosecutor receives a report that a summary offence has 
been committed and that the alleged offender was at the time of the offence 
aged over 18, the Public Prosecutor may issue a notice to that person 
offering that person the opportunity of receiving a prosecutorial fine notice 
in respect of that offence.1523
The requirements for the contents of the notice are in effect the same as in 
Scotland but expressed in different words and arranged differently in the 
statute. It can be seen that the danger perceived by Legrand, that the words 
would not mean the same in a new jurisdiction, was avoided by changing the 
words so that they blend properly into the receiving system. The process closely 
resembles Örücü’s ‘transposition’, with adjustments being made to ensure that 
the same tune is played albeit by a different instrument.
9.5.2.2 Future possibilities
Thus, despite the theoretical difficulties, transplants have been proposed and 
carried out, albeit very small-scale, in the jurisdictions under consideration. A 
research question of this thesis is whether transfer or learning can take place 
between jurisdictions within the sphere of legal aid (and if so, how) and the 
future potential for further transplants must therefore also be considered. It 
has been discussed above that Legrand believes transfer is impossible because 
the meaning of a law cannot survive the journey; law cannot move and still be 
applicable as it is jurisdiction-specific. “As it crosses boundaries, the original 
1521  Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 302.
1522  Ibidem.
1523  Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2015, Part 3, s. 17.
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rule necessarily undergoes a change that affects it qua rule”.1524 However, it can 
be seen from the examples in the preceding section that policy-makers and 
legislators when considering borrowing laws for other jurisdictions do not 
in fact talk about the precise wording of the laws, they talk about the ideas 
inherent in the laws.
It is submitted that it is not necessary for the transplant country to fully 
understand the functioning of the law in the country of origin because, 
precisely as Legrand warns, the same functioning will never be achieved in 
the destination country. Policy-makers and legislators inherently understand 
that Legrand is right in this regard, and do not simply copy laws with an 
expectation that it will lead to outcomes identical to those in the origin state. 
However, it is common to investigate how things are done in other countries, 
particularly those which are geographically close or share similarities such as 
a historical link. One reason for doing this is a conscious desire to seek an 
efficient solution1525 by using a model which is already proven to work well in 
another jurisdiction, or by reducing the direct costs of legislative preparation. 
In addition, there may be a simple motivation to seek a number of different 
ideas which can be considered as options for the desired transformation. 
Comparative law, as a knowledge project,1526 can help in displaying a number of 
possible alternatives.
This thesis has, in highlighting the complexity of legal aid systems, provided 
a warning of the challenges of effective micro-comparison within legal aid. 
Whilst it might be tempting, for example, for a government, inspired by the 
low cost of legal aid in Finland, to borrow some aspects of Finnish legal aid in 
the hope of reducing their own expenditure, care is needed. Referring back to 
the table at Figure 12, characteristic elements of the Finnish scheme include 
wide scope, minimal prospects of success assessment, a dual criminal legal aid/
public defender arrangement, and the concentration of legal aid in state legal 
aid offices. Firstly, it is apparent that many of these elements are generous, and 
to simply transfer, for example, wide scope rules across to a higher-spending 
jurisdiction such as Northern Ireland would be more likely to increase than 
to reduce costs. The main apparent cost-limiting element, the use of state 
employed-lawyers for the bulk of the work, would seem like a better option. 
However, outcomes of state legal aid offices in other jurisdictions would be 
very different if, for example, financial eligibility rates and scope limitations 
were much more restrictive in the destination jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
experiments with state legal aid offices in other jurisdictions have not provided 
costs savings. Overall, in fact, the Finnish legal aid system is very generous, 
yet cheap compared to the other, less generous schemes in this study. This 
paradox is likely to be explained by cultural factors, such as low inclination to 
use the judicial system as a means for resolving disputes, or by combinations 
1524  Legrand 1997, p. 120.
1525  Siems 2014, p. 192.
1526  Kennedy 2003, p. 345.
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of factors, such as the lack of protection against inter-partes costs in a relatively 
risk-averse population. These aspects are not readily changed, certainly not in 
the short term.
In addition to the complexity of the configurations of various elements 
in the different jurisdictions, the weight of each factor may vary, which also 
makes transplants challenging. For example, the changes to the insurance rules 
in Sweden in 1997 led to significant costs savings and appear to be a major 
element in the overall picture of access to justice. However, similar rules in the 
other Nordic countries do not appear to occupy such a central role. 
When considering a legal transplant in legal aid, the focus must be on how 
well that particular idea would work in the receiving jurisdictions. Indeed, the 
success of the policy in the origin country is not necessarily highly relevant, 
depending on the degree of difference in the other interrelated aspects of the 
legal aid scheme and its context, although an unsuccessful idea is unlikely to be 
thought of as attractive in the first place. Likewise, the reasons for the policy in 
the origin country are not particularly pertinent. What is important is how the 
idea could be used in the recipient country. A similar concept is expressed by 
Smits:
It is not so much foreign law that is taken over by a national lawmaker or 
court, but the argument expressed in foreign legislation, or in a foreign 
court decision. That argument itself, however, is not specifically ‘foreign’; 
it has persuasive authority because of its inherent quality, not because it is 
used in another country.1527
The experience of other countries can act as a source of ideas but such inspiration 
will only give results if it chimes with the needs of the recipient country. This 
analysis also raises the possibility of ‘overfitting transplants’,1528 i.e. those which 
work better in the transplant country than in the origin country. If it is ideas 
that are borrowed, rather than laws per se, it is clearly possible that there may 
be a wide range of factors which enable the idea to work better when put 
into law in the new country than it did in its place of origin. This should also 
encourage policy-makers to actively investigate the detail of a variety of other 
schemes, as good ideas may be found in situations where they are not being 
well-used, or as a well-functioning part of an overall poorly-functioning legal 
system. 
Learning and borrowing from other jurisdictions, in the field of legal aid, 
is thus possible and desirable, but must be undertaken with extreme caution. 
The complexity of legal aid schemes renders any presumption as to cause 
and effect in another jurisdiction unsafe, unless a very detailed study of all 
aspects of that legal aid scheme and its context are undertaken. An appropriate 
alternative approach, given the paucity of detailed country studies of legal 
aid, is a thorough and careful consideration of how a rule would operate in 
1527  Smits 2006, p. 536.
1528  Siems 2015, p. 133.
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the circumstances of the destination jurisdiction. As long as this exercise is 
undertaken with a recognition that the functioning in the origin jurisdiction is 
not necessarily understood and that replication of outcomes cannot be assumed 
in the destination jurisdiction, a reasonable prediction of performance after 
transfer should be possible. 
9.6 A new analytical framework for legal aid
9.6.1 Construction of the framework
This thesis, which concentrates only on the administrative procedural and 
material aspects of legal aid, has disclosed diversity on a scale which is almost 
overwhelming. This leads to a dilemma; comparative law is useful and to be 
encouraged, yet daunting in its complexity. Meaningful comparison of legal aid 
requires broad consideration of the various elements of each scheme and how 
they interact, in a systematic way which enables consistent assessment. Within 
access to justice research, a methodology has been proposed for consistent 
measurement of the “cost and quality of access to justice from the perspective 
of the user of justice”1529 and work has begun on its development. This thesis 
suggests that a similar project would be beneficial for legal aid research.
Full development of an analytical framework for the structural analysis 
and comparison of legal aid systems requires more data than is available 
here, particularly if robust connections are to be found between structures 
and outcomes. Nonetheless, the detailed comparison in this thesis between 
a large number of legal aid systems, albeit similar schemes from a global or 
even European perspective, has already enabled consideration of many varied 
component elements of a scheme and a wide range of possible solutions to the 
need for a legal aid scheme. Some links between policy and practice have been 
identified and thus the tentative starting point for an analytical framework can 
be proposed. If developed, the framework would enable the methodical analysis 
of one system or a structured comparison of legal aid schemes. 
The elaboration of such a framework would also enable a coordinated 
collation of the varied research relevant to legal aid. As was seen in Chapter 
1, existing literature relevant to legal aid covers a variety of themes, including 
access to justice and human rights as well as lobbying and awareness-raising. 
There is also, inter alia, research on unmet legal needs and on outcomes of 
legal interventions which was not summarised in that chapter. At present, 
the various research threads remain largely separate but an interdisciplinary 
development of an analytical framework would enable them to be woven 
together into a more comprehensive and cohesive understanding of legal aid.
1529  Gramatikov, Barendrecht and Verdonschot 2011, p. 353.
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Within the variables identified in the comparison of the Nordic countries, the 
Republic of Ireland and the jurisdictions of the UK, four categories can be 
proposed, as illustrated below. 
Fig. 13. Diagram showing categorisation of legal aid variables.
Three of these groups are internal to legal aid and represent the choices which 
can be made in creating a scheme, at three different levels. The highest level is 
the establishment of underlying principles; these may be expressly determined 
by parliament or government or may only be discernible by implication 
from the next category, policy choices. Policies are, ideally, consistent with 
the underlying principles, and largely derive from them. However, it may be 
that there is conflict between the stated ideals of a legal aid system and the 
policies which determine the reach of the scheme in practice. This has been 
illustrated in the current study in the area of scope and merits tests which have 
been found to work against the principles of fair trial and access to justice, thus 
negating, in practice, government policy declarations.
The following level of elements of variation is the practical delivery methods. 
These have little connection to the theoretical basis of the scheme but may 
be dictated to a greater or lesser extent by the policy choices. Again, ideally 
there should be a logical harmony between the policy choices and practical 
delivery methods. The fourth and final category of variable is the elements 
making up the structural, societal and economic context of the legal aid 
scheme. Whilst this is not chosen by legal aid policy-makers, it has been seen 
to be highly relevant. In addition to identifying the constituent elements in 
these four categories, an understanding of the theoretical and practical links 
between them should be included as part of the framework. Choices at any 
level may have consequences for other elements in the same or other categories, 
either mandating a change elsewhere in the system or resulting in logical 
inconsistency.
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Such a framework, if developed, could have various applications in the analysis 
of existing legal aid systems, either individually or by comparison with each 
other, and also in the planning of change to schemes or indeed of altogether 
new schemes. In analysis of existing legal aid systems, the structure could be 
used to consider delivery and policy choices to indicate which principles are 
demonstrated, which could then be compared with the values which the system 
purports to support in order to determine whether the legal aid scheme is fit for 
its stated purpose. This will not always be the case, as the system may not have 
been set up in a coherent manner; often economics and a history of piecemeal 
reform lead to internal contradictions. Development through comparison with 
other jurisdictions may also have led to a system not being fully rational if the 
context and interrelationship of factors were not fully explored or understood 
when changes were made.
Comparison of legal aid schemes in different jurisdictions also may 
be facilitated by the application of such a framework. Breaking down the 
administrative law elements of legal aid systems according to the same schematic 
provides a structure which enables comparison of the equivalent element of 
each system; a more in-depth approach than comparing whole systems. By 
indicating the links between principles, policy and organisation the schematic 
can aid comparative analysis. For example, if two systems profess to follow 
similar guiding principles, significant difference in policy choices would 
be particularly interesting and invite further investigation. Conversely, 
discrepancy in policy may be of little note if it clearly relates to different values 
expressed in the guiding principles; in that situation it is the difference in 
principle which is of interest. Sometimes, also, as discussed above, difference 
in performance (particularly expense) may be found to relate very largely 
to context if principles and policy are aligned between two jurisdictions but 
outcomes are at variance. 
When used in planning, the framework would provide a series of issues to 
be addressed, identify the range of options available and alert policy-makers 
to the implications of their choice for the values demonstrated by the legal 
aid system. It could also highlight practical consequences of a given choice, 
the interrelationship between that and other elements of the system and draw 
attention to areas where there is a risk of falling foul of international human 
rights obligations. Very many of the choices to be made involve compromises, 
often with a tension between budget and principles, and these need to be 
carefully considered in a structured manner. A framework for doing this would 
improve the chances of a rational outcome and help to avoid unintended and 
unwanted consequences arising from the interactions between policy and 
practice in the interwoven elements of a necessarily complex legal aid system. 
The aim would be to enable the development of a coherent legal aid scheme, 
consistent with the underlying principles on which the system is founded.
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Depending on the purpose for which the framework is being used, some 
change may be desired or envisaged but the four identified sets of variables 
are not equally open to change. The least flexible category is context, which 
includes some elements which can only be altered long-term, if at all, through 
social and attitudinal change. Both guiding principles and, more frequently, 
policy choices may be revisited when large-scale reviews of legal aid are 
conducted. Organisational choices are sometimes also included in such 
reviews, or implicitly determined by them, but may also be made as part of the 
ongoing management of the legal aid scheme, hopefully consistently with the 
policy and principles already established. 
As stated, it cannot be within the scope of this thesis to fully develop the 
suggested framework. More research is needed, encompassing more jurisdictions 
and, importantly, other disciplines beyond administrative and public law. 
Nonetheless, a provisional attempt can be made to list some of the constituent 
elements of each category and make some initial observations on the links 
between them. The following section aims only to describe the outline of each 
category and populate it with the findings from this thesis; a small start to the 
considerable work which is needed in the field.
9.6.2 Sets of variables
9.6.2.1 Context
The context of legal aid varies between jurisdictions but is not always variable 
over time. Some significant elements are outside the justice system and therefore 
unlikely to be within the scope of access to justice reviews and similar. Those 
within the justice sphere may be included in such reviews but several are 
long-term attitudinal issues resistant to change. Any framework for analysis, 
comparison or planning of legal aid systems must include at least the following 
contextual factors: 
o External to the justice system
• Availability of other sources of funding for advice or litigation  
 (e.g. insurance)
• Poverty levels
• Public litigiousness 
• Public attitude to risk
• Population size and density                
337
o Broadly within justice sphere
• Access to justice budget
• Diversion of cases to non-court resolution mechanisms
• Level of assistance for litigants from court during hearings
• Complexity of laws
• Affordability of private lawyers
• Permissibility of non-lawyer advice and representation
• Nature of hearings, in particular the extent to which evidence and 
argument are oral
These factors vary considerably in nature and, importantly in planning, in 
the extent to which they are susceptible to strategic change, and the speed at 
which such change may be possible. For practical purposes, some contextual 
factors must simply be accepted, and a legal aid system built in a way consistent 
with them. For instance, public attitude to risk is not something which policy-
makers are likely to be able to influence or change. However, it may be possible 
to redesign parts of the justice system so that certain cases are diverted away 
from formal court proceedings, in conjunction with an overhaul of legal aid. 
9.6.2.2 Guiding principles
The guiding principles of a legal aid scheme are drawn from the political 
commitment to access to justice and legal aid, and the centrality of legal aid 
as a delivery method for these. The principles are politically and culturally 
sensitive; “the worth, functions and limits of the legal aid scheme are 
intimately connected to the structures and values of the society within which 
it operates.”1530 It is clear that the theoretical basis for legal aid is different in 
different jurisdictions, with in particular a distinction between legal aid as 
social benefit or as part of access to justice. As Kiraly and Squires suggest, “in 
some [EU] member states, legal aid is still seen as a kind of privilege, a part of 
welfare law, while in others, legal services and access to justice is a commonly 
accepted social factor”.1531 
Whilst legal aid schemes are not always consistent with the alleged guiding 
principles, it is not uncommon for governments to make statements which link 
their legal aid policy to high ideals. The need to ensure access to justice and 
uphold the rule of law is politically unassailable and in debates and publications 
concerning legal aid, governments often make reference to these factors. A 
typical example is that of England & Wales, where in a consultation on the 
future of legal aid, concerned primarily with the need to dramatically reduce 
expenditure, the government prefaced its proposals with the statement that it 
“strongly believes that access to justice is a hallmark of a civil society”.1532 
1530  Young and Wall 1996, p. 10.
1531  Kiraly and Squires 2011, p. 40.
1532  CP12/10, para. 1.2. 
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As well as its contribution to ensuring access to justice, however, legal aid also 
at times forms part of state policy in other areas such as equality and poverty 
reduction. One example is the approach of the Scottish government. In that 
jurisdiction, access to justice is considered as being of primary importance but 
legal aid is in addition seen as contributing to the Scottish Government’s aim of 
reducing inequality.1533 Prevention of and early intervention in legal problems 
is seen as key.1534 In Finland it is specifically the need to “guarantee the equal 
rights of citizens to competent legal help” which is seen as “the central task and 
aim of the public legal aid system”,1535 and thus equality is a guiding principle 
for legal aid in that jurisdiction also. 
Within the Norwegian legislation, legal aid is stated to be a social benefit 
scheme, consistent with the suggestion that “legal aid in the Nordic countries has 
been framed as a welfare right, rather than being viewed from the perspective 
of access to justice”.1536 Legal aid in Norway is “a social benefit” intended “to 
guarantee necessary legal assistance for persons who do not have the financial 
means themselves to enable them to meet a need for legal aid that is of great 
importance to their persons and their welfare”.1537 This ideological basis was 
established as early as 1954 during a process of legal aid reform1538 and legal 
aid is officially acknowledged as an important measure in the fight against 
poverty,1539 with an explicit statement of this function of legal aid being added 
to the legislation in 2005.1540 
In England & Wales, Moore and Newbury suggest that the theoretical basis 
for a societal understanding of legal aid has changed: “Once seen as a form 
of social welfare, since the mid-1980s legal aid has come to be framed as a 
benefit operating extrinsically to the legal system and understood in primarily 
economic terms”.1541 Others have argued a different approach, echoing that in 
Finland and Scotland, arguing that “legal aid is not a welfare benefit; it is an 
equalising measure”.1542 Meanwhile, as Peers points out, the Court of Justice of 
the EU has indicated that in EU law, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union does not conceive of the right to legal aid 
primarily as social assistance.1543 The absence of legal aid from the ‘social rights’ 
provisions of Title IV of the EU Charter of fundamental rights tends to this 
conclusion.1544
1533  Scottish Legal Aid Board Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16, p. 2.
1534  O’Neill 2016, p. 294.
1535  RP 26/2016.
1536  Hammerslev and Rønning 2018, p. 323.
1537  Rettshjelploven, 1980, § 1.
1538  St.meld. nr. 26 (2008-2009), para. 1.2.1.
1539  Ibidem, paras. 1.3.2.1 and 8.2.3.
1540  Innst. O. nr. 43 (2004-2005), para. 3.
1541  Moore and Newbury 2017, p. 69.
1542  Halford and Schwarz 2013.
1543  Peers 2016, p. 59.
1544  DEB Deutsche Energiehandels/ und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublic Deutschland, 2010.
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The content of the category of guiding principles is clearly open to considerable 
debate. Hynes and Robins, for example, suggested six ‘foundation principles’ 
for legal aid in England & Wales in 2009. These were that: access to justice 
is the constitutional right of each citizen; the right to access to justice applies 
equally to civil and criminal law; the interests of the citizen should determine 
policy on access to justice issues, not those of the providers of services; the 
constitutional right to be regarded as innocent until proved guilty should be 
respected as a cardinal principle of criminal law; promoting access to justice 
requires policies across a range of areas including law reform, education and 
legal services; and proposals for reform must take account of the realistic levels 
of resources but these should not be seen as defining policy. Whatever they may 
be, it is desirable that the principles governing legal aid are overtly stated so 
that compliance with them on the policy and practical levels can be assessed.
The provisional list which follows is not derived from the various theories 
mentioned, but is drawn from the arguments in the earlier chapters of this 
thesis. The guiding principles are expressed as a set of scales, with a choice to 
be made as to where on each scale the jurisdiction wishes to position itself. 
It is suggested that the legal aid policy decisions made will also indicate a 
position on each scale, in the absence of or even in conflict with any express 
commitment to principle by government.
Commitment to the rule of law 
and the principle of fair trial
Commitment to fulfilling 
only constitutional and 
international obligations 
concerning legal aid
Legal aid is a justice issue Legal aid is a social issue
Legal aid is part of the justice 
system
Legal aid is about access to 
the justice system, but is itself 
ancillary to it
Costs control is paramount Independent decision-making is paramount
Selection for assistance can best 
be achieved efficiently by 
categorising cases
Selection for assistance must 
be individualised so that those 
who need help are identified
Commitment to the principle of 
‘innocent until proven guilty’ and 
the right to a defence
Willingness to make those 
with means pay to realise these 
rights
Budget generous and flexible Budget low and fixed
Fig. 14: Guiding principles 
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9.6.2.3 Policy decisions
The policy decisions level of the framework includes those elements which 
are less tied to ideals and move towards the practicalities, yet are not the 
operational detail. Policy decisions are also characterised by greater ease and 
frequency of change than context or guiding principles; changes at this level are 
common when legal aid schemes are redesigned, whereas alteration to guiding 
principles requires a sea change of political and public opinion, which happens 
less often. 
An illustration of repeated politically-driven change to policy, in the form of 
financial eligibility levels, can be found in Iceland:
In recent times, discussions on legal aid in Iceland can be characterised 
along the lines of right-wing vs left-wing politics and in narrow legalistic 
terms. Those to the right of the political spectrum have generally advocated 
for a more restricted access to legal aid, to be solely granted on the basis 
of low economic status, while those to the left of the political spectrum 
advocate for a broader access to legal aid for cases that are deemed to be of 
great significance for individuals or larger groups.1545
In Norway, “gaining political support for selective schemes that prioritise 
support to the poor is significantly more difficult than getting support for 
universal schemes, even when they become more costly”.1546
Again, the factors below have been drawn from the findings of the 
comparison of legal aid schemes in North-West Europe and represent the crude 
beginnings of a list which should be developed. Many of these are decisions as 
to where on a scale the system will be fixed; others are choices between options.
1545  Antonsdóttir 2018, p. 141.
1546  Johnsen 2018, p. 237.
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Fig. 15: Policy choices
9.6.2.4 Organisation
Organisational choices fill in the detail of the schemes once the policy direction 
has been decided and are open to change by the administrators of the scheme. 
Political considerations are rarely involved in this category, which ideally 
should simply realise the ideological and policy goals set at the higher levels. 
However, where there is inconsistency with those goals, organisational factors 
have the decisive impact in practice and may thwart the political intentions 
which should be steering the system. Organisational factors have little bearing 
on the values demonstrated by the legal aid system, although they are vital in 
ensuring an effective scheme. Indeed, Rissanen claims that “an efficient and 
integrated legal aid model is the main reason that the Finnish legal aid system 
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has been able to maintain its comprehensive coverage and internationally 
recognised reputation”.1547 
Organisational choices are closely related to the context of the legal aid 
scheme, and choices must be made which are appropriate in the light of the 
other elements of the justice system and societal challenges in the jurisdiction. 
As before, some are decisions as to where on a spectrum the system will sit.
Access arrangements (particularly important if the policy focus is on advice 
assistance)
Provision through private 
practitioners
Provision through state-
employed lawyers
Payment arrangements
Scope by subject Scope by forum
Scope defined by exclusion Scope defined by inclusion
Civil merits test details
Criminal merits test global 
‘interests of justice’ test
Criminal merits test lists 
criteria but special case 
dispensation
Financial eligibility test details
Fig. 16: Organisational choices
9.6.3 Links between categories
The outline presented above is open to debate; some issues may be better placed 
in other categories and many issues are missing. This is simply a tentative 
beginning from the perspective of this author, although it may even in this 
form be useful to law-drafters. 
Returning to the diagram of the levels, connections may and, indeed, must 
be noted between the categories and elements within them, if the framework 
is to be useful. Some examples of links between categories are as follows. 
Organisation and context are linked by access arrangements (which need to 
take account of geography, language, attitude to law and lawyers); the use 
of private practitioners or state-employed lawyers (not only the structure of 
the legal profession is relevant but also public confidence in lawyers and how 
high the threshold is for seeking legal advice from private firms); payment 
arrangements for legal aid (which need an awareness of payment rates and 
mechanisms for payment from private clients); and the details of the financial 
eligibility test (which need to harmonise with the social security system, level 
of financial information available to government etc.). A link is also present 
1547  Rissanen 2018, p. 94.
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between these two categories in the choice of civil scope determination by 
subject or forum (which will be affected by the structure of the justice system 
and the level of diversion of cases away from formal judicial resolution).
Fig. 17 . Diagram showing connections between categories of legal aid 
variables
Connections can also be noted between organisational details and policy 
choices: the details of the civil merits test, as seen in Chapter 6, indicate policy 
priorities; access arrangements should vary depending whether there is a policy 
focus on early advice or not; financial eligibility tests must tie in with policy on 
the proportion of the population which should be covered; defining scope by 
inclusion rather than exclusion may be easier if scope is very restricted.
Between policy and principle there should be consistency, which can be 
seen, for example, by considering the percentage financial eligibility for legal 
aid, which may vary according to whether legal aid is seen as a social benefit or 
as a justice issue. The principles adhered to concerning the right to a criminal 
defence should balance with the choice of criminal legal aid or a public 
defender scheme, and a concentration on ensuring fair trial will influence the 
merits criteria used in civil legal aid.
These links are those immediately arising from this thesis, and thus are 
of a legal, theoretical nature. Other links should be explored, including 
those apparent from other disciplines; socio-legal scholars, experts in public 
administration, economists and others all have important perspectives to 
contribute. 
The exploration in this thesis of legal aid in the Nordic countries, the 
Republic of Ireland and the jurisdictions of the UK has been enlightening. 
The research questions have been answered, with some surprising results. In 
addition, and maybe most importantly, the study has revealed a real need for 
more, and more coordinated, research in the field if legal aid systems are to 
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be fully understood. Without such research, learning between jurisdictions is 
difficult and assumptions about other schemes are often flawed. The proposed 
analytical framework for legal aid might provide a suitable vehicle for a more 
comprehensive understanding of legal aid. 
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